Secure Autoconfiguration and Routing in an IPv6-Based Ad Hoc Network

1
Secure Autoconfiguration and Routing in
anIPv6-Based Ad Hoc Network

• Jehn-Ruey Jiang
• National Central University

2
Outline

• IPv6 Overview
• Ad Hoc Networks
• IP Autoconfiguration
• CGA
• S-DSR
• Conclusion

3
Outline

• IPv6 Overview
• Ad Hoc Networks
• IP Autoconfiguration
• CGA
• S-DSR
• Conclusion

4
Internet History

• 1969 ARPANET (using Network Control Protocol,
  NCP)
• 1974 TCP/IP (by Vinton Cerf and Bob Kahn)
• 1981 IPv4 (RFC 791)
• 1984 NSFNet (using Transmission Control
  Protocol/Internet Protocol, TCP/IP)
• 1990 ARPANET retired
• 1991 WWW (World Wide Web) (by Tim Berners-Lee)
• 1993 NCSA Mosaic (by Mark Andreesen) ? Netscape
  Navigator
• 1990s Internet
• 2000s internet

5
IPv6 History

• 1992 IPng (Next Generation IP) began in IETF
  (Internet Engineering Task Force) working groups
• 1994 IPv6, announced by IESG(Internet
  Engineering Steering Group) (RFC 1752) (IPv5 is
  for a stream protocol)
• 1998 IP Version 6 Addressing Architecture
  July (RFC2373)
• 1998 Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6)
  Specification December (RFC2460)

6
IPv6 Features

• Expanded address space128 bits ( 3.41038 IP
  Addresses)
• Auto-configurationStateless (Prefix EUI-64),
  Stateful (DHCPv6), Addressing Lifetime (Age for
  renumbering)
• Quality of Service 20-bit Flow Label enables
  identification of traffic flows for real-time
  Voice and Video stream
• Integrated Security SupportIPSec(AH HeaderESP
  Header)
• MobilityNo Foreign Agent, Free of Triangle
  routing, PlugPlay (Care-of Address)

7
IPv6 Vision
IPv6 ? Anything, Anytime, Anywhere Connection to
Internet
Source NDHU
8
Outline

• IPv6 Overview
• Ad Hoc Networks
• IP Autoconfiguration
• CGA
• S-DSR
• Conclusion

9
Ad hoc Networks

• Ad hoc formed, arranged, or done (often
  temporarily) for a particular purpose only
• Ad Hoc Network (MANET)A collection of wireless
  mobile hosts forming a temporary network without
  the aid of established infrastructure or
  centralized administration

10
Infrastructure vs Ad-hoc Modes
infrastructure network
AP
AP
wired network
AP
Multi-hop ad hoc network
ad-hoc network
ad-hoc network
11
Applications of MANETs

• Battlefields
• Disaster rescue
• Spontaneous meetings
• Outdoor activities

12
MANET Routing Protocols

• Table Driven (Proactive) DSDV, FSR
• On Demand (Reactive)AODV, TORA, ABR, SSA
• HybridZRP

13
Secure Routing Protocols

• SAODV
• SRP
• SAR
• CSER
• SEAD
• Ariadene
• BSAR

14
Outline

• IPv6 Overview
• Ad Hoc Networks
• IP Autoconfiguration
• CGA
• S-DSR
• Conclusion

15
Stateful vs. Stateless

• Stateful DHCPv6
• StatelessDAD (Duplicate Address Detection)

16
DAD (1/3)

• A function of NDP (Neighbor Discovery Protocol)
• Two types of messages
• NS (Neighbor Solicitation)
• NA (Neighbor Advertisement)

17
DAD (2/3)
Ethernet Header Dest. MAC is
33-33-FF-22-22-22 IPv6Header Source Address is
Destination address is FF021 NS Header
Target Address is FE802AAFFFE222222
Tentative IP FE802AAFFFE222222
Host A
(multicast)
Neighbor Solicitation
IP FE802AAFFFE222222
Host B
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DAD (3/3)
Ethernet Header Dest. MAC is
33-33-00-00-00-01 IPv6Header Source Address
is FE802AAFFFE222222 Destination address
is FF021 NA Header Target Address is
FE802AAFFFE222222
Tentative IP FE802AAFFFE222222
Host A
Neighbor Advertisement
(multicast)
Host B
IP FE802AAFFFE222222
19
Outline

• IPv6 Overview
• Ad Hoc Networks
• IP Autoconfiguration
• CGA
• S-DSR
• Conclusion

20
What is a CGA

• Cryptographically Generated Address
• Also known as SUCV(Statistically Unique and
  Cryptographically Verifiable) address
• It associates a host's address with its public
  key in order for other hosts to verify the
  ownership of the address

21
Public Key and a CGA
22
Outline

• IPv6 Overview
• Ad Hoc Networks
• IP Autoconfiguration
• CGA
• S-DSR
• Conclusion

23
S-DSR Overview (1/2)

• Secure Dynamic Source Routing Protocol
• It incorporates
• DSR protocol
• CGA
• Address autoconfiguration
• DNS autoregistration and discovery

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S-DSR Overview (2/2)

• It allows the network to be bootstrapped without
  manual administration
• It can resist a variety of attacks, including
• black hole attack
• replay attack
• message forging attack
• message tampering attack
• DNS impersonation attack

25
S-DSR Assumption

• There is a publicly known one-way,
  collision-resistant hashing function H, and there
  exists an IPv6 DNS server in the MANET. The DNS
  server has a public-private key pair, which is
  known by all mobile nodes prior to entering the
  MANET.
• For a mobile which intends to own a permanent
  domain name, an entry (domain name, IP address)
  should have been placed at the DNS server before
  the network is formed. In this case, impersonate
  such hosts would be impossible.
• For a mobile node which dose not intend to own a
  permanent domain name, its (domain name, IP
  address) entry can be registered with the DNS
  server on-line after the network is formed. We
  adopt the first-come-first-serve policy for
  registration of new domain names.

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S-DSR Messages (1/2)
8 types of messages
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S-DSR Messages (2/2)
Definitions of symbols
28
S-DSR DAD (1/4)

• On receiving AREQ(SIP,seq,DN,ch,RR), each
  intermediate node appends its address into the
  route record RR and rebroadcasts the message.
• When a node R receives an AREQ with SIP equal to
  its own IP address, it unicasts an address reply
  message AREP(SIP,seq,RR, SIP,seq,chRSK,
  RPK,Rrn) to S along the reverse route derived
  from RR.

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S-DSR DAD (2/4)

• The AREP message should also be delivered to the
  DNS server through unicast
• When a DNS server N receives the AREQ message and
  finds that the domain name in the DN field has
  already been registered by another host of
  address different from SIP, it will also unicast
  a DREP message (SIP, seq,RR, SIP,seq,chNSK) to
  S.

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S-DSR DAD (3/4)

• When the node S with a pending address request
  receives the AREP message, it authenticates the
  integrity of the message as follows
• It verifies if SIP matches with H(RPK,Rrn).
• It decrypts SIP,seq,chRSK by RPK and verifies
  if the decrypted result matches with
  SIP,seq,ch.
• If both checks pass, the AREP message is
  considered valid.

31
S-DSR DAD (4/4)
32
S-DSR Routing (1/5)

• On receiving (SIP,DIP,seq,SRR,SIP,DIP,seq
  SSK,SPK,Snd), each intermediate node I appends
  SIP,seqISK,IIP,IPK,Irn into the secure route
  record SRR and rebroadcasts the message.

33
S-DSR Routing (2/5)

• On receiving RREQ (SIP,DIP,seq,SRR,SIP,DIP,seq
  SSK,SPK,Snd), it authenticates the message as
  follows
• It verifies if SIP matches with H(SPk, Srn).
• It decrypts SIP,DIP,seqSSK by SPK and verifies
  if the decrypted result matches with
  SIP,DIP,seq indicated in the message.

34
S-DSR Routing (3/5)

• It verifies every IP address appearing in SRR.
  For an IP address IIP, whose corresponding
  information is SIP,seqISK, IIP, IPK,Irn, the
  verification is done by checking if IIP matches
  with H(IPK,Irn), and if SIP,seqISK can be
  decrypted by IPk to be SIP,seq.
• It verifies if seq is greater than the sequence
  number of any RREQ message sent by S.

35
S-DSR Routing (4/5)

• If all the verifications are passed, the RREQ
  message is considered valid.
• The destination node D then unicasts a RREP
  Message (SIP,DIP,seq,RR,SR(D-S),
  SIP,seq,SR(D-S)DSK,DPK,Drn) to S along source
  route SR(D-S), which is derived form SRR.

36
S-DSR Routing (5/5)
37
Outline

• IPv6 Overview
• Ad Hoc Networks
• IP Autoconfiguration
• CGA
• S-DSR
• Conclusion

38
Conclusion (1/2)

• S-DSR can resist
• Black hole attack
• Route request (RREQ) message reply attack
• Forged route request (RREQ) message attack
• Forged address reply (AREP) message attack
• Forged route error (RERR) message attack
• Tampered control message attacks
• DNS server impersonation attack

39
Conclusion (2/2)

• Future workTo extend S-DSR to be a credit-based
  protocol with the help of CGAs, in which each
  node keeps a record for each IP address to
  differentiate between favorable nodes and
  unfavorable nodes.

40
Publication

• Yu-Chee Tseng, Jehn-Ruey Jiang, and Jih-Hsin Lee,
  Secure Bootstrapping and Routing in an
  IPv6-Based Ad Hoc Network, ICPP Workshop on
  Wireless Security and Privacy 2003, 2003.
• Yu-Chee Tseng, Jehn-Ruey Jiang, and Jih-Hsin
  Lee, Secure Bootstrapping and Routing in an
  IPv6-Based Ad Hoc Network, Journal of Internet
  Technology, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp.123-130, Feb. 2004.

41

• QA