NSLS-II Shielding Workshop

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NSLS-II Shielding Workshop
S. Buda Personnel Protective Systems March 27,
2007
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Design Goals Personnel Protection System

• Protects personnel from high radiation areas by
  preventing access and controlling radiation
  producing devices 
•  
• Linac (LPPS)
• Booster Ring (BPPS)
• Storage Ring (APPS)
•  
• Experimental Beam Lines (PSS)
•  
• RF test cell area
•  

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NSLSII Facility Hazards

• Linac Hazards
• Accelerated electrons
• Dark Current
• Main Ring /Booster Hazards
• Radiation produced from secondary emissions in RF
  cavities
• (Both main ring and booster RF cavities)
• Accelerated electrons
• Synchrotron and Bremsstrahlung radiation
• Oxygen Deficiency Alarm (ODH) (RF Cavity and cryo
  plant)
•  
• Experimental Beam Lines hazards
• Synchrotron and Bremsstrahlung radiation
•  

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Linac Area
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NSLSII Storage Ring
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Design Goals Personnel Protection System

• Modular
• Simple as possible to carry out task
• Designed with testing as a key feature
• Meet DOE and BNL requirements for Interlocks
• Quality assurance system
• Flexibility for expansion and modification
• Diverse Component Selection
• Ability to be upgraded with technology
• Diagnostic capability

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Technical Description Personnel Protection Systems

• Dual chain PLC architecture (one safety rated)
• Modular
• Designed with testing as key consideration
• Reliability and availability emphasized
• Reduce wiring where possible
• Use fiber optic busses for interference and
  security
• Compatible I/O for all systems
• Separate safety and command functions in beam
  line systems

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Technical Highlights of Personnel Protection
Systems

• Integration of Radiation monitors with the main
  ring system (APPS) 40 locations
• Main ring divided into 6 separate sections for
  modular concept.
• Main ring uses a distributed I/O system
• Interface to APICS for archiving of system data
• Use of safety rated PLCs to increase reliability
  and diagnostic capability

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Other Design Features

• Interlock system must allow
• Linac operable with personnel in booster
• Booster operable with personnel in storage ring
• All interlock logic trees will have redundant and
  independent chains
• The system will be fail safe for foreseeable
  failure modes (e.g., loss of power/pressure, open
  circuit, short to ground, and single component
  failure
• Redundant circuits will not share cables and
  should be separated physically on circuit boards
  and terminal strips. Redundant systems should be
  configured differently.

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Other Design Features (Cont.)

• A rigorous configuration management program will
  be established to control unauthorized
  modifications to interlock system components
• All interlock lines and components will be
  labeled and readily identifiable.
• Testing certification of interlock systems will
  be performed by independent personnel
• Design for enclosure search systems will include
  sequenced and timed inspection stations, warning
  lights, audible alarms, and emergency off-
  switches.

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NSLS X-RAY INTERLOCK LOGIC
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NSLS VUV INTERLOCK LOGIC
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NSLS INJECTOR INTERLOCK LOGIC
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NSLS STANDARD SHUTTER LOGIC
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SYSTEM CONFIGURATION CONTROL
PHYSICAL ACCESS CONTROL
CABLE IDENTIFICATION
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STANDARD LASER INTERLOCK
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INJECTOR INTERLOCK PLC