9A PAR

1
9A PAR 8/28/02 Jerry Holsomback/Darrell
Warner NASA/Boeing Safety and Mission Assurance
2
Increment 5 Summary
3
Mission Summary

• Mission Duration 1112
• Crew Size 6 on Orbiter
• 3 on ISS
• EVAs 38.5 man-hours (Orbiter crew EVAs)
• EVA 1 615
• EVA 2 630
• EVA 3 630
• Crew
• CDR Jeff Ashby
• PLT Pam Melroy
• MS1 David Wolf (EV1)
• MS2 Sandra Magnus
• MS3 Pier Sellers (EV2)
• MS4 Fyodor Yurchikhin

Rendezvous Altitude 210 nmi.   Station
Attitude Initial Flight XPOP Inertial XVV, Z
Nadir Rendezvous XVV, Z Nadir Mated XPOP
Inertial XVV, Z Nadir TEA (limited to XVV
until S1 activation) Departure
XVV, Z Nadir
DTOs

• 264 Validation of SSRMS Dynamic Attitude
  Control System
• 13005-U ISS Structural Life Validation and
  Extension (SSRMS Operations, S1 Installation,
  Reboost, Undock)
• 15003-U Microgravity Environment Definition
  (TRRJ rotation)

4

Primary Mission Objectives

• Install S1 truss and activate
• Deploy and activate S Band
• TVIS RR
• Install Spool Positioning Devices on 1.0 / 1.5
  inch QDs
• Deploy S1 central radiator and configure EATCS
  for future use
• IUA RR
• Release CETA Cart

5
9A Mated Configuration
6
Payload Bay Layout
7
S1 Cargo Element
8
S1 Radiator Fully Deployed Configuration
Radiator Beam
Low High Gain S-band (S1 only)
Nitrogen Tank
CETA Cart
Pump Module Assembly
EATCS Radiators Deployed
DDCU
Thermal Radiator Rotary Joint (TRRJ)
Video Camera
Rotary Joint Motor Controller
MDM-10, MDM-4
UMA
9
9A / STS-112 Flight Plan

• FD5
• Transfer operations
• PAO event
• FD6
• Reboost
• EVA 2
• Install Spool Positioning Devices
• Install Lab ETVCG
• Complete removal of CETA Cart Launch Locks
• Connect S1 fluid umbilicals
• FD7
• Transfer operations
• TRRJ Checkout
• EATCS Radiator Deploy (Center Panel)
• TVIS RR
• FD8
• Reboost
• EVA 3

• FD1
• Launch
• FD2
• SRMS and OSVS Checkout
• EMU SAFER Checkout
• FD3
• Rendezvous with ISS
• Dock Orbiter to PMA2
• Transfer operations
• FD4
• Unberth S1 from PLB using SSRMS
• Maneuver S1 to preinstall position near S0 and
  perform DTO 264
• Complete berthing to S0 and activate SSAS
• EVA 1
• Connect zenith tray umbilicals and begin
  activation
• SASA deploy and activate heaters

S1 in SAFE mode (90)
SASA in SAFE mode
S1 in SAFE mode (100)
10
Mission Priorities Overview

• IDRD, MIP and Flight Rules are in agreement
• Priorities
• Rendezvous and dock
• Berth S1 and connect umbilicals to achieve Safe
  configuration
• Deploy SASA and activate heaters to achieve
  Safe configuration
• Transfer critical equipment
• TVIS RR
• Perform mandatory daily maintenance for powered
  Middeck and Lab payloads
• Perform remaining transfers
• Install critical Spool Positioning Devices
• Complete remaining S1 umbilical connections
• Perform TRRJ checkout
• Deploy S1 central radiator
• Disconnect Squib Firing Units to redundant
  radiator beam line heaters
• IUA RR

Primary Mission Objectives achieved
Secondary Mission Objectives achieved, STS can
depart with no or minimal impact to future
assembly missions
11
Mission Priorities Overview

• Priorities (cont.)
• Configure inboard section of MT translation path
  
• Release CETA Cart
• Install 2 ETVCGs
• Complete additional ISS consumables transfer
• Configure outboard section of MT translation path
• Release S1 / S3 line clamps
• Remove Fluid Hose Rotary Coupler launch restraint
  bolts
• Open Radiator Beam Valve Module MLI flaps
• Perform ZCG activation
• Complete S1 activation and checkout
• Reboost
• Imagery survey during flyaround
• Install third group of Spool Positioning Devices
• EVARM
• DSOs, DTOs, SDTOs

12
Interdependencies
Future Flights
Previous Flights

• 8A
• Install S0 Truss (complete)
• S0/S1 SSAS Checkout (complete)
• R2 software upload (complete)
• SSRMS power/video reconfiguration (complete)
• UF2
• Install MBS onto MT
• Assemble 2 ETVCGs
• SSRMS Joint Replacement

• 11A
• Outfit CETA Cart
• ULF1
• Return 2 ETVCG stanchion dummy boxes for relaunch
• 12A.1
• EATCS configuration
• TRRJ checkout
• Release CETA Cart from launch position
• 13A
• Install S1 Truss
• Release S1/S3 line clamps
• S1/S3 SSAS Checkout
• MT translation path configuration
• 10A
• Install ETVCG to support Node 2 berthing

13
9A Interfaces
14
ISS StatusOn-Orbit Issues
15
What is Out of Configuration

• Since last flight TVIS temporarily operational
  restrictions imposed
• Four RPCMs that cannot be refreshed - no impact
• Node 1 Smoke Detector 2 Off no impact
• Awaiting troubleshooting to determine failure
  cause
• EEATCS starboard radiator - one loop plumbed
  incorrectly - no impact
• 1 of 4 Beta Gimbal Assembly (BGA) latching
  mechanisms not locked on starboard 4 bar
  assembly - no impact
• Vozdukh operating on 2 of 3 CO2 beds - no impact
  to CO2 removal

16
Current On-Orbit Status

• CDH
• All Station MDMs operational
• Node - N1-2 primary, N1-1 secondary
• Lab
• CC 1 standby, CC 2 backup, CC 3 primary
• INT systems 1 off, INT systems 2 operating
• Lab Aft 1 on Lab Aft 2, 3 - operating
• Power Management Controller Unit (PMCU) 1
  operating, PMCU 2 off
• GNC 1 primary, GNC 2 backup
• Payload 1 primary, PL 2 off
• Airlock MDM - operating
• Photovoltaic Control Unit (PVCU) - 2B backup, 4B
  primary
• S0
• EXT 1 operating, EXT 2 off
• S0-1- operating S0-2 - operating
• FGB - 1 operating, FGB - 2 off
• SM - Loaded with version 5.0 software
• SMTCs - all in redundant set
• SMCCs all in redundant set SMCC-1 primary

17
Current On-Orbit Status(continued)

• CT
• S-band high/low data rate operating nominally
• Ku band operating nominally
• MCOR operational
• SM Regul System - 2 of 3 strings operational
• Audio system
• Internal Audio Controller (IAC) 1 active, IAC-2
  off
• Have occasional P-bits on audio equipment
• SM Kurs set 2 has intermittent failures - no
  impact

18
Current On-Orbit Status(continued)

• ECLS
• Lab ECLS systems operating as required
• CDRA has single bed capacity
• MCA is under investigation
• Node smoke detector 2 not operational - still
  awaiting on-orbit troubleshooting
• SM Vozdukh operating on 2 of 3 CO2 removal beds
• CO2 removal capability nominal
• SM Air conditioners (SKV) 1 and 2 operational.
• SVK 2 in use
• SM rapid depress response now enabled all the
  time
• The Russians had been enabling the algorithm
  during the crew day
• They have installed filters, both physical and
  software, to remedy the problem
• The sensors appear to be operating nominally now

19
Current On-Orbit Status(continued)

• EPS
• FGB EPS working nominally
• 5 of 6 batteries on-line
• SM EPS working nominally
• 7 of 8 batteries on-line
• P6 power channels 2B and 4B operating nominally
• 2B and 4B rotated as required for power
• Dual angle mode and XPOP flown when possible
• RPCMs
• RPCMs LAD22B-A, LAFWD-1B-A, LAFWD-1B-C, and
  LAD62B-A have bit flips on SRAM and cannot be
  refreshed
• No short term impact
• Spares available, if required
• Overall RR plan being implemented to return
  suspect RPCMs to the ground
• P6 Battery 4B21 vs 4B22 Average Pressure Delta
  8645 mmHg ( 167 PSI)

20
Current On-Orbit Status(continued)

• SM
• 2B and 4B BGA showing high currents sporadically
• 2B and 4B rotated as required for power
• Dual angle mode and XPOP flown when possible
• Low b X-POP being pursued to limit BGA rotations
• Work two month agreements with the Russians
• Impact mark on SM window 7
• 3 of 4 Beta Gimbal Assembly (BGA) latching
  mechanisms locked on starboard 4 Bar assembly
• Latched port 4 Bar assembly on 5A.1
• Strength analysis shows 3 of 4 acceptable for
  time being

21
Current On-Orbit Status(continued)

• TCS
• Early external active thermal control system
  operating within specs
• Starboard radiator has one loop plumbed
  incorrectly
• Heat rejection capability impacted - still meets
  current heat rejection needs
• ITCS operating nominally
• ITCS fluid forward plan still in work
• EVR
• CanadArm2 operating nominally
• WR Joint RRd on UF2
• RWS had one monitor failed
• Replacement flown on UF2
• RR completed

22
Current On-Orbit Status(continued)

• GNC
• CMG 1 failed
• All remaining CMGs have experienced occasional
  loss of comm
• GPS system active
• Propulsion systems nominal and ready for 9A
  operations

23
Current On-Orbit Status(continued)

• EVCS/GFE hardware
• VOA (air sample analyzer) - sporadically
  operational
• 3-4 month system validation process in work
• TOCA (water sample analyzer) - operational
• TEPC (radiation monitor) - returned to ground
• Defibrillator - working
• IRED, CEVIS - working
• TVIS - operating restrictions in place
• Replacement hardware being flown on 9A
• IV-CPDS - experiences occasional downlink of data
  problems
• EV-CPDS - working
• Water Maintenance Kit (WMK) - kits useable

24
On-Orbit Summary

• None of the identified items for investigation
  regarding the on-orbit configuration represent a
  constraint to the flight of 9A
• The MER personnel and facilities will be ready to
  support

25
Certification Results

• CoFR Exceptions (Items not meeting the intent of
  the CoFR Endorsement)
• Constraints to Launch
• None

26
9A Special Topics

• SMA Assessment
• CMG 1 Failure
• No Constraints Identified
• Expired PBA Certification
• No Constraints Identified
• BGA Shoulder Bolt
• No Constraints Identified
• TVIS Anomaly
• No Constraints Identified
• IRED Cable Life
• No Constraints Identified

27
Certification ResultsSMA Significant Open Work
Summary

• Safety
• Completion of ISS Safety Review Process
• 6 open CFE hazard report
• ISS-COL-1002-9A ISS Collision (Approved w/mods
  ECD 8/28/02)
• ISS-EVA-0302-9A EVA Crewmember exposure to sharp
  edges/corners, pinch points and
  entanglement/entrapment (Approved w/mods, SRP OSB
  8/21/02)
• ISS-EVA-0307-9A EVA Crewmember Loss of Restraint
  (Approved w/mods, SRP OSB 8/21/02)
• ISS-MCH-0109-9A Inability to gain/maintain
  structural integrity using attachment mechanisms.
  (ECD 8/28/02)
• ISS-STO-0801-9A Stowage of Loose Hardware.
  (Approved w/mods, ECD 8/28/02)
• ISS-TCS-1204-9A Loss Of ISS Element or Critical
  and Non-Critical Hardware Due To Thermal
  Extremes. (Approved w/mods, SRP OSB 8/21/02)

28
Certification ResultsSMA Significant Open Work
Summary

• Safety (Cont.)
• Completion of Payload Safety Review Process
• Three of 5 ISS payloads completed review ECD
  9/XX/02
• IEHA to be performed ECD 9/14/02
• Completion of cargo and non-experiment safety
  review process
• Four open GFE Safety Data Package
• Standard card carrier (MDM CCA) ECD 08/23/2002
• TVIS Dummy SLD's ECD 08/30/2002
• HMS Ancillary Support Pack (HASP) ECD 08/23/2002
• CO2 Removal Kit (CRK) Assembly ECD 08/23/2002
• Two potential GFE NCR
• TVIS Dummy SLD's ECD 08/30/2002
• CO2 Removal Kit (CRK) Assembly ECD 08/23/2002
• Russian Concurrence of US Hardware
• Crew Care Package (date to be sent) ECD
  09/15/2002
• Russian Safety Certificates or Re-flight Letters
• 70 mm Film, (Safety Data Pack needed) ECD
  09/15/2002
• Video cassettes, 35mm film in a case, Compact
  flash digital memory card
• (Re-flight Letter needed) ECD 09/15/2002

29
Certification ResultsSMA Significant Open Work
Summary

• RM
• Open PMA for GFE LLI is on schedule for closure
  and does not represent a constraint to launch.
• QA
• CFE
• SCANs (g.2) SCAN 42 Positronic Plating ECD
  9/16/02 (released 8/21)
• Software
• Payload Executive Processor (PEP) Verification
  Closure Notices (VCNs)
• Operations
• All open work will be accomplished prior to
  flight. There are no constraints to neither
  launch or Stage operations.

30
Readiness Statement

• Pending completion of the identified planned open
  work and closure/acceptance of exceptions, Safety
  and Mission Assurance is ready to proceed with
  the launch and on-orbit stage operations for
  Launch Package 9A.

Jerry Holsomback NASA SMA Manager
Darrell Warner Boeing SMA Manager
31
Backup Charts
32
USOS Battery Delta Pressure

• One of our battery sets (4B2) are mismatched in
  age. The result is a growing delta P between the
  two battery internal pressures
• The delta P affects overall battery capacity.
  One battery is short changed on charging. The
  other battery has less capacity due to a higher
  internal pressure
• If the delta P is not corrected, the reduced
  capacity could result in inability to support
  required loads
• Have tried to correct the delta P with two
  different methods
• Shallow discharge (battery re-initialization) of
  the higher pressure battery with marginal
  affects.
• Connecting the battery drain resistor on the
  higher pressure battery
• Most recent attempt resulted in more
  significantly delta P reductions
• PPL to modify battery heater management
  implemented
• Forward plans depends on PPL effectiveness. Data
  gathering and analysis underway. Options include
• More drain resistor cycling
• Changing of the battery efficiency via heater
  management
• Periodic discharges

33
Mobile Transporter (MT) Trailing Umbilical
System (TUS) IUA Safing Bolt

• During flight 8A, the EVA crew was not able to
  remove the safing bolt from the TUS-2 IUA TUS
  Disconnect Assembly (TDA)
• Possible causes are that the TDA had accidentally
  fired and was pushing on the safing bolt or that
  the safing bolt had galled
• On UF2 the safing bolt on IUA-1 was engaged in
  order to protect the TDA from an inadvertent
  firing while the anomaly was being investigated
• A spare TUS IUA was flown on flight UF2 and is
  currently in on-orbit stowage
• 9A IUA plan is as follows
• Extract IUA 1 safing bolts with precaution of
  installing one of two launch restraint bolts.
• Remove TUS cable from the IUA 2 and insert one
  of the launch restraint bolt on the IUA shoe,
  then attempt to extract the IUA 2 safing bolt
• If IUA 2 TDA has not fired, then do not perform
  the IUA 2 RR
• If IUA 2 TDA has fired, then RR IUA 2
• Note the MT will not be translated until the
  safing bolts are retracted
• After the failed IUA is returned on 9A, ground
  investigation will determine the cause of the
  failure and the appropriate course of action

34
ITCS Coolant Issues

• High total organic carbon
• Above specification levels.
• Caused by leeching Isopropyl Alcohol.
• Current condition on-orbit is acceptable
• pH level
• pH is below specification levels (8.5 vs. 9-10),
  but it has stabilized.
• Suspected causes are CO2 absorbed from ISS
  atmosphere and/or generated by microbial
  activity.
• Current pH level is acceptable at this time.
  Lower pH levels can accelerate corrosion
• Presence of ammonia
• NH3 present in LTL and MTL.
• Most likely due to microbial activity (high NH3
  concentration in stagnant coolant).
• Potential to mask interface heat exchanger NH3
  leak

35
ITCS Coolant Issues(continued)

• High microbial count
• Most recent microbial counts acceptable (silver
  biocide was effective).
• Biofilm could eventually impact system
  performance and accelerate corrosion
• High concentration of Nickel Ions
• Levels have increased indicating corrosion of
  ITCS components (cold plates, heat exchanger)
• Must be removed prior to raising pH to avoid
  precipitate formation
• Biocide
• Use of silver biocide is suspended due to
  corrosion concerns

36
ITCS Coolant Issues(continued)

• Coolant Working Group has formed specialized
  teams to address these issues
• Ground test underway to quantify corrosion impact
  and provide coupons for microbial contribution to
  corrosion
• Assessing the risk associated with continued use
  of the current on-orbit interface heat
  exchangers
• Development of Nickel Ion removal device is in
  work
• Development of an acceptable biocide is in work
• Suggested improvements in on-orbit sampling
  capabilities are in work
• Ground test capabilities are being reviewed and
  optimized
• ITCS spare hardware availability
• Complete dry PPA currently on board
• Fine particulate filter is being flown on 9A

37
CDRA/MCA Repairs

• Both the CDRA and the MCA had hardware replaced
  during the UF2 Stage
• CDRA Sorbent Bed ORU 1 removed and replaced
• Startup was unsuccessful
• Still operable for single bed operations
• No impact to 9A Shuttles 31 LiOH sufficient
  for 9A docked phase
• Overall plan for 11A includes troubleshooting
  prior to 9A and/or 9A stage in work.
• MCA Mass Spectrometer and Verification Bed ORU
  removed and replaced
• Startup was unsuccessful
• Isolated to a valve position sensor problem
• Investigating whether or not work around to this
  is feasible
• Data analysis underway
• Not required for 9A EVAs during 10.2 psia ops in
  airlock
• Utilized exiting procedure for 10.2 psia
  management without MCA as used during UF-2
• Utilizes CSA-CP hardware.

38
Airlock CCAA Anomaly

• Airlock CCAA is spitting water during certain
  conditions
• Fault is isolated to the water separator ORU
• Suspect that filter within the water separator
  ORU is clogged
• Need to changeout ORU at next opportunity
• Replacement ORU has been manifested on STS-112/9A
• RR will be during 9A stage, possibly 9A docked
  phase
• 9A Operations Impacts (EVA operations)
• Engineering analysis revealed that if nominal 4
  crew present in the airlock at 10.2 psia the
  system should accommodate humidity removal
• MOD and Crew Office wants to preserve to have 5
  people in crewlock during 10.2 psia ops.
• Increase risk to spitting water, but not safety
  hazard.
• No constraints to Oxygen Recharge Compressor Assy
  (ORCA) operations
• Developing and documenting ops constraints for
  MOD
• Agreement For EVA 1, nominal 4 crew will be in
  crewlock. ISS MER will perform realtime analysis
  of 4 crew case to determine if the 5 crew is
  acceptable.

39
Flight 9A Special Topic BGA Shoulder Bolt

• Observation
• Hole size for P6 BGA shoulder bolt bushing is too
  large
• Discussion
• Background
• The shoulder bolt diameter was reduced to
  facilitate assembly
• This reduction puts the bolt in bending rather
  than shear and was not analyzed for this
  condition originally
• Analysis using the latest loads and cycles has
  been completed and yielded adequate margins and
  life up to 12A.1
• Impact
• Analysis needs to be completed to show adequate
  life on the bolt for the life of ISS
• Need evaluation of risk of bolt backing out of
  insert due to cycle loading
• Resolution
• Perform life and locking feature analysis per
  bubble plan

40
Flight 9A Special Topic BGA Shoulder Bolt
Phase 1 Evaluation
Assess P6 Shoulder Bolt Life - Using Initial NDE
Defect Sizes, Include Bending and other Applied
Stresses
Utilize Post Flight Loads to Reduce Conservatism
Utilize Post Flight Cycles to Reduce Conservatism
Evaluate Current Life Used
Completed 7/9/02
Completed 7/17/02
Complete
Complete
Phase 2 Evaluation
Re-evaluate the conservatism in the pre-flight
loads and cycles - Including impact of
incomplete 4 bar linkage on P6 2B BGA unit
No Further Action Required/Use As Is
Perform Strength, Fatigue and Fracture
Assessment - Including impact of incomplete 4 bar
linkage on P6 2B BGA unit
³4
Life

NASA Approval of Flaw Size
ECD 11/1/02 Incremental info release
Yes
12/1/02 Incremental info release
NASA Accepts Perform Hi-Fidelity NDI to Reduce Flaw Size on
current Bolt Stock
NASA Review of Analysis
CR/ SSCM
12/20/02 Incremental Review
1. Develop Operational Constraints 2. Develop
On-Orbit Mod.
No
ECD Qty 8/2/02
95 8/23/02
25 120 Prepping of bolts is taking longer
than planned, 101 bolts are currently in Clean
Masking Process expected to complete tomorrow,
Die Pen inspection expected to be 15-30 minutes
per bolt
TBD
No Further Action Required/Use As Is
Bolt has Adequate Locking Feature
Evaluate risk of bolt backing out of insert due
to cycle loading NASA/Boeing TIM
Cycle test And/Or- On-Orbit Modification 1.
Re-torque 2. Cap for Anti-rotation 3. Other
Yes
Week of 9/1/02
TBD
No
41
Flight 9A Special Topic BGA Shoulder Bolt

• Risk assessment (low/medium/high)
• Low
• Acceptable for flight (yes/no)
• Yes
• Status (open/closed)
• Open

42
Safety Significant Open Work Summary

• CFE/IP
• 6 Open Hazard Report (h.1) ECD 8/28/02
• 8 OCAD Submittals (h.3) ECD 8/28/02
• 46 Open VTLs (h.4) ECD 9/4/02
• Transfer and stowage safety constraints submittal
  (h.8) ECD 8/28/02
• 0 NCRs (CFE) (h.10)
• Integrated Experiment Hazard Assessment approval
  (h.11/h.12 ) ECD L-3wks (9/14/02)
• CFE 1230s (h.13)
• GFE/SMART
• 4 Open SDP ECD 8/30/02
• 0 SMART open VTLs
• 2 GFE NCRs ECD 8/30/02
• 0 SMART/GCHAP open action
• 2 Safety Certificate requires Russian concurrence
  with US H/W ECD 9/15/02
• 2 Open Russian Safety Certificates of Preflight
  Letters ECD 9/15/02
• RDMA risks (i.1) - None
• GSRP Process(h) Complete
• PSRP Process (h)
• All safety assessments have been received

43
9A ISS NCRs
44
9A ISS Payload Safety Review Status
45
9A ISS Cargo Status
46
QA Significant Open Work Summary

• CFE
• 10 FCA/PCA/AR/ARB Open action items (b.1)
• 3 SMA Actions (3 QA) ECD 9/13/02 (2 delinquent)
  All paperwork issues, NO CONSTRAINT
• 7 Actions assigned to Eng CM ECD 9/13/02 (2
  delinquent)
• 11 Open non-conformances (b.3)
• All in closure process ECD 8/22/02
• ADPs/DD250/Deliveries Open Items (b.5)
• 5 Items requiring ADP and DD250 ECD 9/2/02, NO
  CONSTRAINT
• (1 filter assy, 4 Bolt Assy)
• 1 Item requires delivery to KSC ECD 9/2/02, NO
  CONSTRAINT
• (1 filter assy)
• Open PRACA
• 12 PRACA Open
• 12 Evaluated by SPRT NO CONSTRAINT
• 1 SCANs (g.2) SCAN 42 Positronic Plating
  Released 8/21- ECD 9/16/02
• GFE
• FIARS
• 1 Open, Urine collection kit, NO CONSTRAINT
• ALERTs

PRACA Summary CFE 12 Open, 12 No Constraint
GFE 0 Open IP 9 Open, 9 No
Constraint Total 21 Open, 21 No
Constraint Flight 9A 21 Open, 489 Closed
47
Software QA Significant Open Work Summary (as of
8/19/02)

• CFE
• SPDR (FCA/PCA) open action items (b.1)
• 4 open action items all documentation related -
  low risk
• Open S/W non-conformances (PCS included in total
  count)
• 192 PRs of which 39 need analysis. 9A SPNs 71
• On-orbit SPNs 55
• CNs 17
• ADPs/AR/DD250 open
• None
• GFE
• Open S/W non-conformances
• PCS included in CFE Total
• ADPs/AR/DD250 open
• None
• IRMA Risks - None

48
9A CIL Summary

• Segment-to-Segment Attach System (SSAS)
• Segment-to-Segment Attach System (SSAS)
  components Capture Latch Assembly (CLA),
  Ready-to-Latch (RTL) Sensor Assembly, Motorized
  Bolt Assembly (MBA), Flexure Nut Assembly.
• The failure mode of Fails to Close for the
  CLA. Unable to mate Segment S1 to S0. ISS
  assembly cannot continue if Segments S1 and S0
  cannot be mated. (Crit 2)
• The failure mode of Fails Mid-Travel for the
  CLA (during mating) results in structurally
  unsound configuration, with potential loss of ISS
  due to collision of attaching End Item with the
  remainder of the ISS if CLA interface releases.
  Unable to mate Segment S1 to S0. ISS assembly
  cannot continue if Segments S1 and S0 cannot be
  mated. (Crit 1)
• The failure mode of Fails To Detect for the RTL
  Sensor Assembly. The sensor does not provide
  signal to indicate ready-to-latch. Unable to mate
  Segment S1 to S0. ISS assembly cannot continue
  if Segments S1 and S0 cannot be mated. (Crit 2)
• The failure mode of Erroneous Indication for
  the RTL Sensor Assembly. The sensor assembly
  gives a false indication that the segments are
  located correctly and the capture bar is within
  the capture envelope. Unable to mate Segment S1
  to S0. ISS assembly cannot continue if Segments
  S1 and S0 cannot be mated. (Crit 2)
• The failure mode of Fails to Mate for the MBA.
  Unable to mate Segment S1 to S0. ISS assembly
  cannot continue if Segments S1 and S0 cannot be
  mated. (Crit 2)
• The failure mode of Fails to Mate for the
  Flexure Nut Assembly. Unable to mate Segment S1
  to S0. ISS assembly cannot continue if Segments
  S1 and S0 cannot be mated. (Crit 2)

49
9A CIL Summary

• Segment-to-Segment Attach System (Continued)
• Retention Rationale
• All SSAS components are designed to preclude
  failure from environmental factors all
  components have full qualification and acceptance
  testing.
• If the CLA fails to close or fails mid-travel, a
  manual EVA drive is available as a backup. If
  failure precludes the use of EVA backup (i.e.,
  CLA binds/jams), the Payload Retention Devices
  (PRDs) can be used to temporarily attach Segment
  S1 to S0 until the EVA Contingency Bolts can be
  used for permanent attachment.
• If the RTL Sensor Assembly fails to detect RTL
  condition, or erroneous indicates RTL condition,
  the EVA crew can use visual observation to
  confirm RTL status.
• If a MBA fails to mate, a manual EVA drive is
  available as a backup. If failure precludes the
  use of EVA Backup (i.e., MBA binds/jams), the EVA
  contingency bolt kit can be used to mate Segment
  S1 to S0.
• If the Flexure Nut Assembly fails to mate, the
  EVA contingency bolt kit can be used to mate
  Segment S1 to S0.

50
9A CIL Summary

• Remote Power Control Module (RPCM) Types II and V
• These RPCM CILs were previously approved for
  earlier flights.
• The failure mode of Fails to Overcurrent Trip
  has the potential for arcing which can cause an
  IVA fire condition or damage to EVA EMU.
  Potential for IVA shock hazard if wire is
  exposed. (Crit 1S)
• Failure of the RPCM combined with a short to
  produce an un-detectable sustained short is of
  low probability, likelihood of a fire is low due
  to use of nonflammable materials, and internal
  wire harnesses are protected from crew contact by
  non-conductive close-out covers.

51
9A CIL Summary

• Nitrogen Tank Assembly
• The failure mode of Structural Failure in the
  Orbiter payload bay may cause overpressurization
  of the Orbiter payload bay, and/or cause release
  of shrapnel that may damage the the Orbiter
  payload bay and /or adjacent hardware. (Crit 1)
• The failure mode of Structural Failure on-orbit
  may cause release of shrapnel that could result
  in loss of a nearby EVA crewmember and/or cause
  damage to adjacent hardware. (Crit 1)
• Retention Rationale
• Nitrogen tank has a 6061-T6 aluminum liner and
  carbon/epoxy laminate overwrap (T-1000GB carbon
  fiber, LRF0092 resin) to provide a
  Leak-Before-Burst design.
• Nitrogen tank end tube/stubs are fabricated from
  6061-T6 aluminum and 304L CRES and are welded
  using inertia-welding process.
• Nitrogen tank halves are welded using an
  electron-beam welding process.
• Nonconductive BR127 primer and FM73 adhesive are
  applied between electrically conductive aluminum
  liner and carbon/epoxy overwrap to prevent
  galvanic corrosion.
• Qualification Proof Pressure test cycled nitrogen
  tank pressure 20 times from 0 to 4510 psig (1.5 x
  MDP at 140 deg F) with no evidence of damage
  (tank passed subsequent leak tests with leakage
  measured at 1.1x10-8 scc/sec helium).
• Qualification leak tests demonstrated leakage
  does not exceed 1.0 x 10-6 scc/sec of helium at
  tank MDP of 3000 psig. Leak test results a)
  post-pressurized volume test leakage 3.4x10-9
  scc/sec, b) post random vibration test leakage
  3.2x10-9 scc/sec, and c) post-pressure cycling
  test leakage 1.1x10-8 scc/sec.
• Qualification burst pressure test demonstrated
  the nitrogen tank will survive burst pressure of
  6000 psia (2.00 x MDP) without rupture. Tank
  pressure was increased until tank rupture
  occurred at 7550 psig (2.52 x MDP).

52
Operations Significant Open Work Summary

• LL hardware has been identified and LM planning
  accomplished (e)
• LL Hardware identification Crit. 1 11 , Crit
  2 10 Hardware
• IDRD Manifest Incomplete ECD 8/19/02
• Integrated Truss Segment (ITS) S1 Installation,
  IUA Removal/Replace, Deploy and safe the S1
  S-Band (1550 to 5200 Megahertz) Antenna
  Structural Assembly (SASA). TVIS SLD RR, CEVIS
  RR
• IFAs assessed
• 55 open IFIs (h) No constraints to flight or
  stage operations identified.
• 19 open Chits (g) No constraints to flight or
  stage operations identified.
• MER support tools readiness (l)
• ECD 09/06/02 Update of Folios (FMEA/CILs and HR)
• Mission support personnel readiness (l)
• Complete All console operators will have
  necessary certification prior to launch
• Final verification of Flight Rules (m)
• ECD 9/23/02 ISS Increment 5A (9A), Vol. B, C and
  D (if required) final publications
• Final verification of Operational Procedures (m)
• ECD 9/23/02 ISS 9A, SODF, RODF and PODF final
  publications
• SMA Operations RDMA risks
• MMOD strike on SM window 7
• MT TUS IUA

53
Operations Significant Open Work Summary

• OCADs
• 74 OCADs listed in total. 62 are EVA related.
• OCADs can be obtained at http//mod.jsc.nasa.gov/
  do5/projects/ocad/
• ECD - 9/2302
• SPNs
• 55 Severity 1N, 32 2N SPNs identified. Not ready
  for verification
• Listing of SPNs can be obtained at
  http//iss-www.jsc.nasa.gov/ss/issapt/spn/
• ECD 9/23/02
• CILs
• 21 CILs have been identified. CILs will be
  available for verification TBD
• CILs will be available at http//mod.jsc.nasa.gov
  /df/cils/index.cfm
• ECD - 9/23/02
• ONSs
• Starting verification of ONSs completion TBD
• ONSs are listed in the IDRD, Planning Period 4
  8/15/02
• ECD 9/23/02

54
Open Flight Software Paper Against Flight 9A
(includes On-Orbit)
55
Open Flight Software Paper Against Flight 9A
Analysis Required
56
Open Flight Software Paper Against Flight 9A
Analysis Supplied
57
Open Flight Software Paper Against Flight 9A
Created
58
Open Flight Software Paper Against Flight 9A
Update Required
None Open
59
Open Flight Software Paper Against Flight 9A
Station Program Note Status
60
Open Flight Software Paper Against Flight 9A
Open Station Program Notes
61
Open Flight Software Paper Against Flight 9A
Severity 1
None Open
62
Open Flight Software Paper Against Flight 9A
Severity 1N