The Nature of the Firm - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

1 / 22
About This Presentation
Title:

The Nature of the Firm

Description:

... 20 to a shoe-shinning boy who brushes your shoes, is this a product market ... Do you pay for the product' of a pair of brushed shinning shoes? ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

Number of Views:1405
Avg rating:3.0/5.0
Slides: 23
Provided by: ktgs8
Category:
Tags: brushed | firm | nature

less

Transcript and Presenter's Notes

Title: The Nature of the Firm


1
The Nature of the Firm
2
In Classical economics
MARKET
Market is an efficient mechanism in allocation
resources from low-valued uses to high-valued
uses. At equilibrium, MUV MC.
3
In reality
Consumer A Consumer B Consumer C
Firm employs various factors of production for
turning out goods to be sold to final consumers.
4
The nature of the firmB. Why does firm
exist?C. The contractual nature of the firm
5
A. What is the nature of the firm?
  • As a mechanism of allocating resources for
    production
  • Within a firm, factor owners respond to the
    authority and direction of entrepreneur instead
    of the market signals
  • Visible hand replaces invisible hand in directing
    the use of resources

6
A. What is the nature of the firm?
  • Factor market transactions supersede product
    market transactions
  • The no. of factor market transaction increases
    while that of product market transaction
    decreases
  • It is a marginal substitution, not an all-or-none
    substitution

7
A. What is the nature of the firm?
  • Factor owners voluntarily surrender the autonomy
    of their factors to the entrepreneur in exchange
    for an income
  • Such income, measured by time, does not
    accurately measure the contribution of an
    individual factor to the total revenue
  • It is called as a proxy payment

8
B. Why does firm exist?
  • Firm emerges as an alternate device for
    coordinating factor allocation because there are
    huge costs of using market, like
  • The cost of discovering relevant prices
  • The cost of knowing the product
  • The cost of negotiating and enforcing separate
    contracts
  • The cost of measuring marginal contribution of
    each factor owner

9
B. Why does firm exist?
  • The existence of firm saves greatly the
    transaction costs of using product market
  • Why dont we have only a big firm on earth so
    that we can keep the transaction costs of using
    product market at minimum?
  • It is because there are also transaction costs of
    using firm / factor market

10
B. Why does firm exist?
  • The transaction costs of using firm, like
  • The cost in setting up a legal framework
  • The cost of hiring monitors and supervisors to
    reduce shirking among factor owners
  • The cost of assigning tasks among factor owners
    to meet changed circumstances

11
B. Why does firm exist?
  • The optimum firm size could be found when the
    savings in market transaction costs equate the
    monitoring costs of using firm at the margin, and
    the monitoring costs of each firm are the same

12
C. The contractual nature of the firm
  • To Professor Coase, in a firm, the entrepreneur
    holds a set of use rights of the factors and
    coordinate production activities without
    immediate reference to the price in market
  • To Professor Cheung, there is no such thing as a
    firm in reality

13
C. The contractual nature of the firm
  • When you pay 20 to a shoe-shinning boy who
    brushes your shoes, is this a product market
    transaction or a factor market transaction?
  • Do you pay for the product of a pair of brushed
    shinning shoes?
  • Do you pay for the factors, like labour and
    shoe-cream, which make your shoes shine?

14
C. The contractual nature of the firm
  • Prof. Cheung argues that the payment is either
    for the product or for the factor
  • It is redundant to speak of a product market and
    a factor market
  • In the absence of a firm, product market and
    factor market are not separate market
  • There is no supersession between factor market
    and product market
  • There is only one market and no firm

15
C. The contractual nature of the firm
  • Prof. Cheung emphasizes the contractual nature of
    the supersession
  • Why would a factor owner sign a contract with an
    enterpreneur but not with a final consumer?
  • The natures of these two types of contract are
    exactly the same, but they have the same nature

16
C. The contractual nature of the firm
  • In a contract, the rights and responsibilities of
    both buyer and seller would be confined
  • The buyer could be a consumer or an entrepreneur
  • The seller could be a producer or factor owner

17
C. The contractual nature of the firm
  • When a developing company contracts out a project
    to a construction company, are there two firms or
    one firm?

18
C. The contractual nature of the firm
  • If Firm A directs the production activities of
    Firm B, could we say that the entrepreneur of
    Firm A manages the factor owners work in Firm B?
  • If this is so, in economics point of view, there
    could be one firm
  • Then there is only one big FIRM in the world, as
    all firms have such contractual relationship

19
C. The contractual nature of the firm
  • In China, many boats were pulled upstream with a
    rope by team of men (or boat hands ??) walking on
    shore

20
C. The contractual nature of the firm
  • These boat hands were supervised by a leader who
    would beat those who are lazy
  • Who is employer? Who is employee?
  • The workers employ the leader to supervise them
  • There is cooperation among enterpreneur and
    factor owners

21
C. The contractual nature of the firm
  • In reality, there are many types of contractual
    arrangements, like
  • Fixed wage rate contract (e.g. office clerk)
  • Piece rate contract (e.g. garment worker)
  • Commission (e.g. salesman)
  • Fixed rental contracts (e.g. taxi drivers)
  • Self-employed (e.g. insurance agents)

22
C. The contractual nature of the firm
  • The choice of different types of contracts
    depends on the nature of each transaction and
    product. Prof. Cheung singled out the
    significance of the cost of discovering relevant
    prices (one type of the transaction costs) and
    the concept of risk aversion to explain the
    choice of a particular contract.
  • In short, the choice of contractual arrangement
    is made on the basis of the minimization of
    transaction costs and the sharing of risk.
  • Recently, he considers that the explanation in
    terms of transaction costs is more useful, as it
    is difficult to measure risk.
Write a Comment
User Comments (0)
About PowerShow.com