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Spatial Theory in 2-space

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Guns. Butter. Etc. McKelvey Chaos Theorem. With multiple ... Guns. Butter. Committees (and subcommittees) reduce policy dimensionality. A (Butter Committee) ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Spatial Theory in 2-space


1
Spatial Theory in 2-space
  • 17.251
  • Fall 2004

2
Throat-clearing
  • Fundamental finding of unidimensional spatial
    model
  • Pure majority rule the median prevails
  • More generally the pivot prevails
  • Fundamental finding of multidimensional spatial
    model
  • The center doesnt hold
  • Preferences cant induce equilibria
  • ? institutions (or something else) must enter

3
Basic set-up Ideal points
Jesse Ventura
Walter Mondale
Libertinism
Norm Coleman
Jerry Falwell
Govt intervention in economy
4
Basic set-up Utility curves
?
Utility
Libertinism
Govt intervention
Mondale
5
Basic set-up Indifference curves
Walter Mondale
Libertinism
Govt intervention in economy
6
Basic set-up Indifference curves
Walter Mondale
Libertinism
Govt intervention in economy
7
Basic set-up Indifference curves
Walter Mondale
Libertinism
Govt intervention in economy
8
Why it matters Jerry Falwell vs. George Bush
Libertinism
Fallwell indifference curve
Bush indifference curve
Govt intervention in economy
9
The Simple Euclidean System The Equation
10
The Simple Euclidean System The Picture
Ideal points
A
Status quo
B
Indifference curves
?
C
11
The Simple Euclidean System Preference relations
P2
A
B
?
Butter
P1
P3
C
Guns
12
The Simple Euclidean System
A
B
?
Butter
C
As preferred-to set
Bs preferred to set
Guns
13
The Win Set, W(?)
A
B
?
Butter
C
Guns
14
The Contract Curve
A
B
?
Butter
C
Guns
15
The Pareto Set
A
B
?
Butter
C
Guns
16
You are always off a contract curve
A
B
Etc.
Butter
C
Guns
17
McKelvey Chaos Theorem
  • With multiple attributes and multiple
    decisionmakers
  • There is no equilibrium of tastes
  • Anything can happen
  • I.e., the median voter result doesnt hold
  • This is really important

18
What Might Induce Stability?
  • Tastes
  • Undertainty
  • Impatience
  • Rules

19
Tastes may induce stability
  • Ideology
  • Median in all directions

Appeasing Iraq
Abortion Availability
20
Tastes may induce stability
(Make s.q. the medians ideal point, then
draw the indifference curves)
Appeasing Iraq
Abortion Availability
21
(Rotate this graph)
22
The result is knife-edged
Appeasing Iraq
Abortion Availability
23
Uncertainty may induce stability
Policy w/ uncertainty
Appeasing Iraq
Abortion Availability
24
Impatience may induce stability
  • Rubenstein bargaining

25
Rules may induce stability
  • Floor rules, e.g.
  • vote on status quo last
  • Not stability so much as guarding against
    anything can happen
  • Germaneness rules
  • Committees

26
Status quo last
C is Speaker
A
B
Butter
C
Guns
27
Germaneness
A
B
Butter
C
Guns
28
Germaneness
A
B
Butter
C
Guns
29
Germaneness
A
B
Butter
C
Guns
30
Committees (and subcommittees) reduce policy
dimensionality
A (Butter Committee)
B
Butter
C (Guns committee)
Guns
31
Stability-inducing powers of leaders and
committees
  • Committees reduce dimensionality
  • Committees and leaders have agenda-setting powers

32
Examples of Multidimensionality in Action
  • Informal decisionmaking
  • Rikers heresthetics
  • Heresthetics the strategic introduction of
    extraneous issues

33
Unresolved Issues
  • Salience
  • Sophistication

34
Salience can distort the win set
35
Sophisticated Voting
  • The strategy of preferring one alternative at
    time t even through the immediate alternative is
    better, in order to prevent an even worse outcome
    in the future

36
Sophisticated Voting Example
Democrats Hawkish R Dovish R
Treaty No treaty Treaty
Treaty Treaty No treaty
No treaty Treaty Treaty
Note that a majority prefers ratification of an
unadorned treaty to rejection
37
Agenda
  • Add proviso to treaty
  • If the proviso passes, pair the treaty with the
    proviso against the status quo (rejection)
  • If the proviso fails, pair the treaty against
    rejection

Treaty
Treaty
Treaty
Q
Treaty
Q
38
Outcome
  • The proviso passes
  • The amended treaty fails, even though a majority
    would have favored the original treaty over the
    status quo
  • How to save ourselves? Sophistication
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