Critical Infrastructure: the chemical industry

1
Critical Infrastructure the chemical industry

• Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the
  Environment
• Directorate of External Safety

2
Introduction

• Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the
  Environment VROM (3500 p)
• Directorate External Safety (30 p)
• linked to
• Directorate General Environment (400p)
• Directorate General Spatial Planning (300p)

3
Global characteristics the chemical industry

• Global characteristics of the industry in the NL
• 16.3 million inhabitants
• 40.000 square km
• 500.000 companies
• 300 Seveso II sites
• 160 Seveso reporting sites
• 1000 storages of chemicals and pesticides
• 2200 LPG filling stations

4
Authorities and parties involved

• Authorities and parties involved with the risks
  of the chemical industry
• Central Government Policy and Legislation
• Implementation EU directives
• Provinces (12) and Municipalities (450)
• Environmental Management Act Land-use Act
• Regional Fire brigades
• Disaster and Major accidents Act prevention,
  emergency
• planning, rescue operations
• Inspectorates of the ministries

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Project Vitaal Critical Infrastructure, the
chemical industry

• April 2002 Start project Critical (Vital)
  Infrastructure
• Main objectives
• Development of a coherent set of measures to
  protect the critical infrastructure (incl. ICT)
• Establishment of these measures within the
  normal operations of the companies and the
  authorities
• At first the chemical industry was not selected
  as a critical sector, but it was added to the
  project in 2004
• Reason potentially vulnerable sector in terms of
  victims and societal disruption

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VROM Coördination the chemical industry

• Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the
  Environment
• (VROM) responsible for
• Drinking water sector
• Nuclear sector
• (Chemical) industry (dangerous substances)
• 3 different directorates involved
  coordination by the
• VROM-Inspectorate

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Objectives

• September 2004 start project
• Dangerous substances and deliberate violation
• Objectives
• Inventory of possible effects of terrorist
  attacks
• (chemical sites and storages dangerous
  substances)
• Inventory of the vulnerability of the Dutch
  industry for such
• attacks
• (stationary installations and transport of
  dangerous goods)
• Ranking of vulnerabilities and if necessary
  development of
• extra measures for companies and on policy
  level

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Project outline

• The project is executed by VROM in cooperation
  with
• Other ministries
• security/intelligence experts,
• the provinces
• The Association of Dutch Enterprises (VNO/NCW)
• A (limited) international benchmark is also
  part of the project
• In September 2005 a report shall be sent to
  Parliament

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Results so far

• Results of the project so far are (mid-February
  2005)
• A ranking of the most important establishments
  based on
• potential casualties has been drawn up
• The maximum possible effects of potential
  deliberate violations
• during the transport of dangerous goods by
  rail, road and
• ship have been calculated
• Vulnerability analysis chemical sector and
  transport dangerous
• goods has been performed with assistance of
  security experts

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Intended disturbance what to analyse?

• Vulnerability analysis
• terrorist, employee, criminal, hooligan,
  anti-globalists and
• other activists, hacker
• type of weapon
• type of industry or other vulnerable objects
• (many people in the neighbourhood of
  dangerous substances)
• possibilities for protection (resistance)

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A possible approach

• Quick scan should give information on
• Amount of casualties (deaths and wounded)
• Infrastructural damage
• Evacuations/displaced persons
• Contamination
• Economic impact
• Potential for multiple events
• Recovery time

• From geographical considerations and event
  dynamics one should focus on
• Prevention/deterrence/protection
• Emergency Assesment/Diagnosis
• Emergency Management/Response
• Incident/Hazard Mitigation
• Public protection
• Victim care
• Investigation/Apprehension
• Recovery/Remediation

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Old USA examples of Quick wins
2002 Clorine factory after 1 mln USD security
investment still easy access to clorine gas pens
due to gates left open.
2002 an unsecured gate gives access to 200.000
ponds of chlorine gas.
2002 fencing supposed to keep intruders away
from a warehouse and its lethal anhydrous
ammonia.
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Activities in the next three months

• Quick-scan inventory and evaluation of existing
  security measures for (most of) the selected
  establishments
• Quick scan of situations of hazardous substances
  with large public events
• International benchmark of security measures in
  the chemical industry
• Discussion with companies and transport
  organisations about estimated effect levels and
  existing/necessary security levels
• Report to the Parliament

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Benchmark

• The Netherlands has little to no experience
  with terrorisme in relation to the chemical
  industry. Therefore we need to learn from other
  countries and their experiences
• UK
• USA
• France
• Germany

15
Questions

• responsability for the protection of critical
  infrastructure state, district, (province),
  municipalities
• the balance between private companies
  authorities
• security measures in chemical sites
• quality control
• role of authorities, inspectorates

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Dilemma need to know or need to share?

• What about the confidential information versus
  the community right to know

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Information on risks

• Information to the public about risks in the
  Netherlands
• Seveso directive (Major Accidents Hazards
  Decree, 1999)
• Two initiatives after fireworks explosion in
  Enschedé
• Ministry of Interior
  risk mapping
• Ministry of HSP the Environment risk
  register

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Discussion

• Safety reports do not give all the information
  we need
• ( information from emergency planning is
  also necessary)
• Experience from USA (ACC/SOCMA-methodology and
  of
• Port Authorities (IMO) can be used for
  assessment of security
• UK experience and approach can be useful for
  NL
• EC has taken initiatives (CCA and CIP
  committees)

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More Information

• For further information
• directie.externeveiligheid_at_minvrom.nl