Who pays for necessary harms Outline, Sept. 2 and 7, 2004 - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Who pays for necessary harms Outline, Sept. 2 and 7, 2004

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Game theory mechanics: filling in the grid; picking a dominant square ... is liable for harm to the boat, if dock owner doesn't allow the boat to moor. ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Who pays for necessary harms Outline, Sept. 2 and 7, 2004


1
Who pays for necessary harms?(Outline, Sept. 2
and 7, 2004)
  • Necessity as a defense to trespass.
  • Ploof v. Putnam and Vincent v. Lake Erie
    alternative rules.
  • Vincent and Anti-Vincent.
  • Game theory mechanics filling in the grid
    picking a dominant square
  • What we learn from the game.

2
Ploof v. Putnam (necessity as defense to trespass)
  • Alternative rules Boat should be able to dock
    when
  • a) Any danger to boat or passengers
  • b) Serious danger to passengers
  • c) Serious danger to the boat
  • d) Danger to boat outweighs harm to dock owner
  • e) Danger to the boat/passengers, and no danger
    to dock owner
  • f) Boat pays the customary/reasonable fee
  • g) Permission by the dock owner

3
Ploof v. Putnam (necessity as defense to trespass)
  • Alternative rules Boat should be able to dock
    when
  • a) Any danger to boat or passengers
  • b) Serious danger to passengers
  • c) Serious danger to the boat
  • d) Danger to boat outweighs harm to dock owner
  • e) Danger to the boat/passengers, and no danger
    to dock owner
  • f) Boat pays the customary/reasonable fee
  • g) Permission by the dock owner

4
The Reynolds
5
Vincent and anti-Vincent Game
  • Constants
  • Ploof The dock owner is liable for harm to the
    boat, if dock owner doesnt allow the boat to
    moor.
  • State of nature If the boat owner doesnt try
    to dock, and ends up experiencing harm, the boat
    owner absorbs it.
  • Varying rules
  • Vincent Boat owner is liable for any harm done
    the dock
  • Anti-Vincent No such liability.

6
Vincent and Anti-Vincent Game(a) H(boat) gt
H(dock) H(boat) 10, H(dock) 5
7
Vincent and Anti-Vincent Game(a) H(boat) gt
H(dock) H(boat) 10, H(dock) 5
8
Vincent and Anti-Vincent Game(a) H(boat) gt
H(dock) H(boat) 10, H(dock) 5
9
Vincent and Anti-Vincent Game(a) H(boat) gt
H(dock) H(boat) 10, H(dock) 5
10
Vincent and Anti-Vincent Game(a) H(boat) gt
H(dock) H(boat) 10, H(dock) 5
11
Vincent and Anti-Vincent Game(a) H(boat) gt
H(dock) H(boat) 10, H(dock) 5
12
Vincent and Anti-Vincent Game(b) H(boat) lt
H(dock) H(boat) 5, H(dock) 10
13
Vincent and Anti-Vincent Game(b) H(boat) lt
H(dock) H(boat) 5, H(dock) 10
14
Vincent and Anti-Vincent Game(b) H(boat) lt
H(dock) H(boat) 5, H(dock) 10
15
Vocabulary
  • Expected value probability(cost or benefit)
  • Cost-benefit analysis comparing the expected
    value of the loss/benefit under one decision with
    the expected value of the loss/benefit under a
    different decision.
  • Efficiency (technically, Kaldor-Hicks
    efficiency) the lowest available cost or maximum
    available benefit to all the relevant parties
    that is, summed across parties
  • Conduct rules (which tell people what they may
    and may not do) vs. liability or compensation
    rules (which tell people when they must pay).

16
Intentional Torts Black Letter Rules (review)
  • Battery, generally Level of intent required
  • Intent, generally Purpose or knowledge
  • Mental illness and intentional torts.
  • Self-defense and mistaken self-defense
  • Necessity and trespass
  • a) Necessity as a defense to trespass
  • b) Necessity as an imperfect privilege

17
The Fault Continuum

Non-fault
Fault
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