Title: Ranking systems: the PageRank axioms
1Ranking systems the PageRank axioms
- This paper
- initiates research on the foundations of ranking
systems - deals with PageRank, the most famous page ranking
algorithm - presents a set of simple (graph-theoretic,
ordinal) axioms that are satisfied by PageRank
and - any page ranking algorithm that does satisfy them
must coincide with PageRank - bridges the gap between page ranking algorithms
and the mathematical theory of social choice.
2Representing and Reasoning with Preferences
- This paper considers
- How to represent and reason with users
preferences - Representing preferences binary preference
relation, CP-nets and its extensions - Preference aggregation voting rules
- Manipulation of voting rules
- Uncertainty incomplete preferences are given
- How we can elicit preferences efficiently and
effectively - Preference elicit focus on resolving the
relationship between possible winners - Single-peaked preferences easy to elicit and to
aggregate
3Qualitative Decision Theory
- This paper
- Describes a framework for specifying conditional
desires desire ? if ? and - Example If I have the umbrella, then I will be
dry - Evaluating preference queries would you prefer
?1 over ?2 given ? - Would an agent decides whether she should carry
an umbrella given that she sees that the sky is
cloudy? - Equips an intelligent agent with decision making
capabilities based on two inputs belief and
preference
4Reasoning With Conditional Ceteris Paribus
Preference Statements
- In many domains it is desirable to assess the
preferences of users in a qualitative rather than
quantitative way. - Such representations of qualitative preference
orderings form an important component of
automated decision tools - CP-network (Conditional Preference-network) is a
graphical model for representing qualitative
preference orderings
5Preferences over Sets
- Research on preference elicitation and reasoning
typically focuses on preferences over single
objects of interest. - However, in a number of applications the
outcomes of interest are sets of such atomic
objects. - This paper gives
- An intuitive approach for specifying preferences
over sets of objects. - A set-preference specification language is given
- Set-preference statements are represented by a
TCP-net (tradeoffs-enhanced CP-nets)
6Propositional belief base merging and some links
with social choice theory
- Belief merging defines the goals (beliefs) of a
group of - agents from their individual beliefs (resp.
goals) - This paper
- Studies the relationships between two important
sub-families of merging operators - Shows some relationships between logical belief
merging operators and social choice rules
7Social choice theory, belief merging, and
strategy-proofness
- This paper investigates the link between the
belief merging and some results in social choice
theory by - Providing a consistent set of properties for
merging - Showing that there is no Arrow-like impossibility
result for merging - Investigating notions of strategy-proofness in
the context of merging
8Belief revision, belief merging and voting
- This paper investigates the relationship between
revision, merging and voting - Voting There are several conflicting
demands/preferences and we are looking for a
collective compromise - Belief revision There is a theory T and we get
new information ?, we want to accommodate ? into
T consistently - Belief merging We are trying to aggregate
knowledge bases which together are possibly
inconsistent. - Common feature fairness principles are concerned
when resolve conflicts
9Representing and Aggregating Conflicting Beliefs
- This paper considers the two-fold problem of
representing collective beliefs and aggregating
these beliefs - proposes modular transitive relations for
collective beliefs - describes a way to construct the belief state of
an agent informed by a set of sources of varying
degree of reliability - gives a simple set theory-based operator for
combining the information of multiple agents - shows that this operator satisfies desirable
properties
10Common Voting Rules as Maximum Likelihood
Estimators
- This paper
- Gives a view on voting rule
- There exists a correct outcome (winner/ranking)
- Each voter's vote corresponds to a noisy
perception of this correct outcome - Studies
- Voting rules that can be interpreted as MLEs
(Maximum Likelihood Estimator) - Voting rules that cannot be interpreted as MLEs
11Arrow's theorem in judgment aggregation
- Judgment aggregation How can the judgments of
several individuals on logically connected
propositions be aggregated into corresponding
collective judgments? - It is related to earlier results in social choice
theory - This paper
- proves two impossibility theorems on judgment
aggregation - discusses relationship between preference
aggregation in social choice theory and judgment
aggregation
12Judgment aggregation under constraints
- This paper
- make constraints explicit in judgment aggregation
with - constraints as propositions that the decisions
should be consistent with - discusses some properties of the judgement
aggregation under constraints - reviews several general results on judgment
aggregation in light of such constraints.