Incomplete Tours: Causes, Trends, and Differences

1
Incomplete Tours Causes, Trends, and Differences

• Martha Koopman
• David Gregory

13 November 2009
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Introduction

• Purpose
• Determine the extent to which enlisted tours of
  duty are completed
• Address the concern that completion rates are
  strikingly low
• Focus how much does tour completion affect
  amount of sea duty?
• Followup to 2002 CNA paper
• What we do in this paper
• Look deeper into what causes incomplete tours and
  variations over type of tour
• Update data from FY98 to FY06, adding 8 years
• Make specific policy recommendations

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Findings of previous CNA study

• Overall, 67 of tours were incomplete this
  percentage increases with tour length
• Most of the incomplete tours were terminated by a
  Navy loss
• Response to sea pay a 50 increase in monthly
  sea pay decreased incomplete tours by
• 4 -points for 36-month PSTs
• 6 -points for 48-month
• 2 -points for 60-month
• Given these estimates, the 50 sea pay increase
  induces enough more completions to be a
  cost-effective means of obtaining additional
  sea-duty work years

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Complete vs. incomplete is an imperfect metric

• A better metric is the average amount of sea duty
  per tour
• Completion rate is one element
• Timing of losses and the number/length of tours
  that exceed the completion point are also
  important
• Whether tours are incomplete due to Navy losses
  or rolls to another type duty is also important
• We focus on tours that arent completed due to
  rolling early
• Tours that arent completed due to Navy losses
  shouldnt be ignored
• Different loss types require different policies

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Methodology

• A tour begins when a Sailor changes type of duty
  (shore to sea or sea to shore)
• We present results for sea tours in this briefing
• At that point, we assign Prescribed Sea Tour
  (PST) lengths by occupation and paygrade from a
  Navy instruction
• This determines the Projected Rotation Date (PRD)
• We then track the Sailor until he/she leaves the
  tour
• The tour ends because the Sailor either leaves
  the Navy or moves back to shore duty
• If the Sailor leaves the tour within a window
  around the PRD, the tour is complete

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Data and definitions

• Data set
• 445,783 tours ending from FY 1994 to 2006
• Detail by type of loss, Prescribed Sea Tour (PST)
  length, and first term vs. career
• Two data sources
• CNAs longitudinal manpower files allow us to
  identify and track actual tours
• Navy instructions give PSTs by occupation and
  paygrade
• In this briefing, we present results for 48- and
  60-month first-term tours and 36- and 48-month
  career tours (larger sample sizes)

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Adjusting completion rates by status after
leaving tour
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How do sea tours end?

• There are two broad reasons why sea tours end
  (either before or after the PRD)
• Navy losses, either end of contract or attrition
• Rolling to shore duty
• Here are the percentages of sea tours that end
  with Navy losses

FY 2000-06 data
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How sea tours end by term and tour length
This is all tours, not just incomplete tours!
Many Sailors who end their tour by rolling to
shore have already completed their tour.
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Completion rates depend on how tours end

• Without adjusting for why a tour is terminated, a
  high percentage of tours are incomplete
• But, as weve seen, many tours end because
  Sailors leave the Navy
• If Navy losses are excluded, the percent of
  incomplete tours falls

Percentage of tours that arent completed
Percentage of tours ending with a move to shore
duty that arent completed
FY 2000-06 data
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Completion rates for all tours
For both first term and career, incompletes
increase with tour length
With equal tour lengths, career and first-term
have the same incompletes
12
Completion rates improve after Navy losses are
removed
Incompletes increase with tour length
With equal tour lengths, career now has more
incompletes
13
Where does excluding Navy losses make the
greatest difference?
Larger deltas mean you can attribute more of the
unadjusted percentage of incomplete tours to Navy
losses
FY 2000-06 data
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Timing of losses affects average sea duty per tour

• The timing of losses adds information to
  completion rates
• For example, two tour types may have the same
  percentage of incomplete tours, but more losses
  occur early for the first
• Here is the percentage of tours still ongoing
  3/4ths of the way through the tour

There are pronounced differences in timing
between 48- and 60-month first-term tours
Comparing 48-month tours, more losses occur
early for careerists than for first termers
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Timing of losses first-term and career 48-month
tours
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Tours that pass completion window affect average
sea duty
Tours that exceeded the completion point were
one-third of all 48-month tours and almost 40 of
successful tours
Percent of tours still ongoing after the
completion point Out of
Successful completed extended tours
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Ultimate outcome average sea duty per tour

• Average sea duty per tour depends on completion
  rates, when Sailors leave tours, and time
  contributed after the completion window
• Here are average months per tour

FY 2000-06 data
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Policy considerations

• Goal is to generate more years of sea duty
• Options
• Increasing mandatory sea duty is not an effective
  strategy
• Combinations of sea pays and reenlistment bonuses
  are cost-effective
• Focus on increasing average sea duty per tour
  rather than just completion rates
• New incentive pays, Sea Duty Incentive Pay (SDIP)
  in particular, are promising

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Increasing mandatory sea duty may not be
effective strategy

• A 12 month longer PST (60 vs. 48) was associated
  with only 2 more average months of sea duty per
  tour
• Shorter PSTs combined with incentives allow
  Sailors with higher preferences for sea duty to
  supply the extra man-years
• Sailor choice helps morale
• Less costly because Sailors who like sea duty
  require lower incentives

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Combinations of incentive pays are cost-effective

• Sea Pays provide direct incentives for increasing
  sea duty
• Effective when sea manning problem is pervasive
  (cant be targeted by occupation)
• The pays are relatively inflexible, though, and
  current structure may not be optimal as goals
  change
• Selective Reenlistment Bonuses (SRBs) increase
  sea duty indirectly by providing retention
  incentive
• May be important tool when problems are limited
  to a subset of ratings and many tours end with
  Navy losses
• Previous analyses have found that combinations of
  sea pay and SRBs provide cost-effective policies
  for generating extra sea time

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New incentive pays hold promise

• SDIP
• Paid to Sailors who extend sea tours or roll from
  shore early
• Can be finely targeted by occupation and paygrade
• With one year of history, its been successful in
  increasing sea manning, but hasnt had full
  program evaluation
• Differential SRB (D-SRB) is targeted to Sailors
  who reenlist to sea duty
• Assignment Incentive Pay (AIP) could potentially
  be used to make hard-to-fill sea billets more
  attractive

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Recommendations

• Know why tours arent being completed. Policies
  should be set based on whether incomplete tours
  are caused by leaving the Navy or rolling early
• Avoid prescribing longer mandatory tours to
  increase sea time this does not seem to be
  effective
• Use appropriate combinations of sea pays and SRBs
  as incentives to increase sea time voluntarily
• Continue to use and evaluate SDIP