Observations On Perceptions in Platos Later Dialogues

1
Observations On Perceptions in Platos Later
Dialogues

• By Michael Frede

2

• Ast (from Lexicon Platonicum) aisthanesthai -
  to sense, to perceive, by a sense, and hence
  generally to perceive by the senses.
• Frede This statement is wrong, and also
  misleading if one is trying to understand Platos
  views of perception

3

• It is only Plato who introduces a clear notion of
  sense-perception, because he needs it for certain
  philosophical purposes.
• In order to do this, his narrowed down definition
  to perceive by the senses has to be understood
  against the common definition, which can be any
  case where someone comes to understand something,
  however this may come about.

4

• I.e. becomes aware of something, notices
  something, realizes, or comes to understand
  something.
• This general definition also includes becoming
  aware of something by grasp of the mind

5

• Using the common definition, then, it seems that
  there is no difference between the way the mind
  grasps something and the way the eyes see it.
• In the Phaedo and the Republic, however, Plato
  uses the term to describe only cases of awareness
  that involve the body, and an awareness of
  something corporeal.

6

• Unfortunately, in both these cases,
  aisthanesthai is used interchangeably with the
  verbs dokein, to seem, and doxazein to
  believe.
• So we cannot yet say that aisthanesthai is used
  to strictly describe sense-perception.

7
Theaetetus 184-7

• According to Frede, this is where we find the
  main evidence for the definition of
  aisthanesthai meaning strictly
  sense-perception

8

• Theaetetus through which
• Theaetetus they belong to the body
• Theaetetus It does seem to me to be so

9

• Socrates Then knowledge is to be found not in
  the experiences but in the process of reasoning
  about them it is here, seemingly, not in the
  experiences, that it is possible to grasp being
  and truth.
• Theaetetus So it appears
• Socrates Then in the face of such differences,
  would you call both by the same name?

10

• Theaetetus One would certainly have no right
  to
• Socrates So what name do you give the former-
  Seeing, hearing, smelling, feeling cold or warm
• Theaetetus I call that perceiving, what else
  could I call it?

11

• Although Socrates says that knowledge and
  perception cannot be the same thing, argues
  Frede, Plato is careful never to say some
  questions are settled by perception or a sense.
  All questions are ultimately settled by the mind,
  but for some, perception is used to decide.

12

• So while we may see , the question of whether or
  not A is red is not settled by perception alone.
  We are passively affected by the color red, but
  in order to form the belief that A is red, there
  is activity of the mind as well.
• We may perceive the color red, but we do not
  perceive that A is red without this activity.
• Knowledge, since it always involves belief, is
  never just a matter of perception.

13
(No Transcript)