Financial Intermediation

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Financial Intermediation

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Arbitrage will lead to: (1 i20)2 = (1 i10)(1 i11) Spot rates and Forward rates ... Theory violates no-arbitrage condition in perfect capital markets ' ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Financial Intermediation


1
Financial Intermediation
  • Lecture 6
  • Major Risks Faced by Banks

2
The nature of risk
  • Risk is due to uncertainty so it is not the
    same!
  • Ex post uncertainty and variability are the same,
    but ex ante the two differ one can have a large
    but certain variability
  • Risk can be diversified (to some extent), but
    some of it will be around anyhow

3
Major risks faced by banks
  • Default of credit risk (A) Physical hazard
    cash flow variations beyond the control of the
    bank (screening) (B) Moral hazard monitoring
  • Interest rate risk by variations in market
    prices (and prepayment risk think of mortgages)
  • Liquidity (withdrawal) risk

4
Term structure of interest rates
  • Yield curve yield to maturity (YTM) is defined
    as the internal rate of return that equates the
    PV of future cash flows from a bondholder to the
    current market price
  • The yield curve is defined as the relationship
    between YTM and the length of the time to
    maturity for debt instruments of identical
    default risk characteristics

5
Yield curve under certainty
  • Pmt price of a bond of maturity m at t
  • imt YTM of .
  • Face value 1, zero coupon
  • So P10F/(1YTM) 1/(1i10)
  • And P20 1/(1i10)2
  • One can also invest at time t1 in a bond that
    has the yield i11
  • Arbitrage will lead to (1i20)2 (1i10)(1i11)

6
Spot rates and Forward rates
  • Spot rate Present price for future delivery
  • Forward rate Future price for future delivery
  • General formula for the YTM on a bond of
    maturity n to be issued t period from now
  • Shape is determined expectations that short-term
    interest rates will keep rising ? upward slope
  • interest rates will keep falling ? downward
    slope

7
Yield curve under uncertainty (1)
  • Complication under uncertainty investors face
    risk. A risk averse lender would require
    compensation for bearing this risk
  • Modern arbitrage theory ruling out riskless
    arbitrage in equilibrium, analyze as if
    investors were risk neutral ? risk aversion
    becomes irrelevant and the valuation is
    preference free

8
Yield curve under uncertainty (2)
  • First think of the yield curve under certainty
  • Inverting both sides to express in terms of
    bond prices
  • Forward rates uncertain ? calculate expected
    value by using probabilities (? as upstate
    probability (1- ?) as downstate probability in
    case of risk aversion we can calculate the risk
    neutral probability ?)

9
Term structure theory
  • Theory no-arbitrage development of the term
    structure
  • - The Expectations Theory
  • - The Liquidity Preference Theory
  • - Preferred Habitat Theory

10
The Expectations Theory
  • Unbiased Expectations Hypothesis states that
    implied (one-period) forward rate for any
    period in the future must equal the expected
    spot rate on a one-period bond to be issued in
    that future period.
  • This is inconsistent with the absence of
    riskless arbitrage opportunities in
    equilibrium ? under uncertainty the forward
    rate can not be equal to the expected value of
    the future spot rate

11
The liquidity preference theory
  • Investors demand a risk premium for holding
    long-term bonds
  • Variability of bond prices increase with
    maturity, liquidity premium does as well
  • Hypothesis does not assert that long term
    yields must be higher than short term yield
  • Long-term bonds are not necessarily less liquid
    than short term bonds ? liquidity premium is
    more a term premium

12
The Preferred Habitat Theory
  • The bond with maturity closest to the
    investors investment horizon will be viewed as
    safest
  • Investors require a higher expected return form
    bonds with different times to maturity
  • Theory violates no-arbitrage condition in
    perfect capital markets
  • Preferred Habitat misses importance of risk
    aversion

13
Duration (1)
  • Interest risk can be measured by duration and
    duration-gap
  • Duration is the weighted-average time to
    maturity using the relative PVs of the cash
    flows as weights
  • Duration gap is the weighted duration of
    equity (weighted duration of assets - weighted
    duration of liabilities)

14
Duration (2)
  • General formula for duration
  • CF Cash Flow at end op period t
  • DF Discount Factor

15
Duration (3)
  • Economic interpretation D is the interest
    elasticity of the securitys price to small
    interest rate changes
  • Convexity measure of how much a bonds
    price-yield curve deviates from a straight
    line. Greater convexity, price of a bond will
    fall more slowly as yields rise and rise faster
    as yields fall

16
Duration (4)
  • Convexity factors that increase convexity
  • Decreasing coupon
  • Decreasing yield
  • Increasing maturity
  • Thus zero-coupon bonds with long maturities will
    have high convexity.

17
Duration (5)
  • Duration gap
  • - Positive gap FIs net worth will decline if
    the entire yield curve moves up and will
    increase if the entire curve moves down
  • - Negative gap Opposite
  • Maturity gap
  • Although maturities may be perfectly matched,
    timings of cash flows may not be matched ?
    Better to use duration

18
Liquidity risk
  • The risk of being unable to satisfy claims with
    impairment to its financial or reputational
    capital
  • Informational asymmetry about asset quality
    plays an important role in creating liquidity
    risk
  • Duration mismatching is an important, but not a
    necessary ingredient for interest risk

19
Credit risk analysis factors
  • Capacity borrower has legal and economic
    capacity to borrow
  • Character borrowers reputation
  • Capital resolves private information and moral
    hazard problems
  • Collateral additional reduction of risk, it can
    signal quality, and reduce moral hazard
  • Economic conditions that determine the borrowers
    capacity to repay

20
Credit analysis sources of information
  • Internal interview with applicant and banks own
    records
  • External Borrowers financial statements, credit
    information brokers, other banks!
  • One can use loan covenants special clauses
    designed to protect the bank and prohibit the
    borrower from taking actions that could adversely
    influence the likelihood of repayment

21
Complete contingent contract
  • Amount of repayment/or additional loan
  • Interest rate on the remaining debt
  • Possible adjustment in the collateral required by
    the lender
  • Actions (e.g. investment decisions) to be
    undertaken by the borrower
  • All in all states of nature at each possible
    date!

22
Loan design
  • Loans are typically incomplete contracts
  • What should be taken care of in a contract and
    what kind of actions can be undertaken by
    governing the loan?
  • A typical loan contract includes the repayment
    and collateral requirements only what is the
    theoretical foundation?

23
Theory of symmetric risk sharing
  • Suppose we have a lender with utility function uL
    and a borrower with utility function uB. At date
    0 the borrower invests L and gets a return ye at
    date 1. The borrower has no wealth and the lender
    provides a loan L
  • What is the optimal repayment function R(y)?

24
Symmetric risk sharing (2)
  • We assume that there is limited liability
    0 ? R(y) ? y. The borrower gets y - R(y).
  • The problem is max EuB (ye - R(ye) given EuL
    (R(ye)) ? UL0 and 0 ? R(y) ? y
  • We could also maximize EuL (R(ye)) given EuB
    (ye - R(ye)) ? UB0 and 0 ? R(y) ? y
  • The utility functions are Von Neumann-Morgenstern,
    monotonically increasing

25
Symmetric Risk Sharing (3)
  • It is easy to see that the FOC reads
    uB (y - R(y)) - ? uL (R(y)) 0,
    taking logs gives
  • log(uB (y-R(y))) - log(uL (R(y))) - log ? 0
  • Differentiate with respect to y gives
  • uB/uB (Y - R(y)) (1 - R(y))
    uL/uL (R(y)) R(y) 0
  • Define IB -uB (x) / uB (x) and
    IL -uL (x) / uL (x)

26
Symmetric Risk Sharing (4)
  • R(y) IB (y-R(y)) / IB (y-R(y)) IL (y)
  • So R(y)1/1IL/IB. So if IL 0, a risk
    neutral lender, R(y) 1. If IB/IL is large the
    cash-flow sensitivity of the repayment is large
  • This is not a realistic banking case R(y)R
    would be more common, or R(y) min (y,R) with
    limited liability
  • So we need to know more about managing risk
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