Asset prices in the representativeagent economy with background risk

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Asset prices in the representativeagent economy with background risk

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Title: Asset prices in the representativeagent economy with background risk


1
Asset prices in the representative-agent economy
with background risk
  • Andrei Semenov (York University)

2
Introduction
  • The standard consumption CAPM
  • Problems
  • a) The equity premium puzzle
  • b) The risk-free rate puzzle

3
  • Generalizations
  • a) Preference modifications
  • b) State-dependent parameters
  • c) Psychological models of preferences
  • d) Incomplete consumption insurance
  • Brav et al. (2002), Balduzzi and Yao (2007), and
    Kocherlakota and Pistaferri (2009)

4
Outline
  • Consumption-Based Model with Background Risk
  • The stochastic discount factor (SDF)
  • Risk vulnerability and the asset pricing puzzles
  • Risk aversion and the EIS under background risk
  • Empirical Investigation
  • The data
  • The estimation procedure (conditional HJ
    volatility bounds)
  • Estimation results
  • Concluding Remarks

5
1. A Consumption-based asset pricing model with
background risk
  • 1.1 The Stochastic Discount Factor (SDF)
  • The representative agent faces (Franke et al.
    (1998) and Poon and Stapleton (2005))
  • The financial risk
  • An independent, non-hedgeable, adverse
    background risk (the losses from domestic
    political turmoil, the inflation risk, an
    uncertain income tax rate, the risk from natural
    disasters, etc.)

6
  • In the presence of background risk, the
    representative agent maximizes
  • is the representative-agents hedgeable
    consumption in period . The
    non-hedgeable consumption is
    independent of both optimal consumption and the
    risky payoff and has a non-positive expected
    value.

7
  • One of the first-order conditions
  • or
  • This is the consumption CAPM with background
    risk. The SDF
  • In the absence of background risk,

8
  • 1.2 The precautionary premium
  • Following Kimball (1990)
  • where is an
    equivalent precautionary premium.
  • Assume , then

9
  • We can write the SDF as
  • Assume that the utility function is CRRA
  • The precautionary premium for the agent with
    CRRA utility is hence

10
  • This implies that, with CRRA utility, for any t
  • Where is the normalized variance of
  • We need for marginal
    utility to be well-defined.
  • The SDF is then

11
  • 1.3 Risk vulnerability and the asset pricing
    puzzles
  • As introduced by Kihlstrom et al. (1981) and
    Nachman (1982), define the following indirect
    utility function
  • Gollier (2001) argues that, in the case of the
    background risk with a non-positive mean
    preferences exhibit risk vulnerability if and
    only if the indirect utility function is more
    concave than the original utility function, i.e.,

12
  • As shown by Gollier (2001), this inequality holds
    if at least one of the following two conditions
    is satisfied
  • (i) ARA is decreasing and convex and
  • (ii) both ARA and AP are positive and decreasing
    in wealth (standard risk aversion (Kimball
    (1993)).

13
  • Risk vulnerability and the equity premium puzzle
  • The consumption CAPM with background risk in
    terms of
  • Assume
  • Then
  • If , then is less concave
    than utility
  • and hence .

14
  • Risk vulnerability and the risk-free rate puzzle
  • In the presence of background risk,
  • Since and , then
  • Because the agent is risk averse (i.e., utility
    is concave), from this it immediately follows
    that in each state the ratio of marginal
    utilities at t1 and t under background risk
    exceeds that in the no background risk case. As
    this is true in each state, this is true in
    expectation as well.

15
  • 1.4 Risk aversion and the EIS under background
    risk
  • Suppose that at time t the agent faces the
    background risk and a lottery with an uncertain
    payoff .
  • For any distribution functions and
  • Since and are independent, then

16
  • A Taylor series expansion of
    around
  • and hence
  • It then follows that
  • implying

17
  • The RRA coefficient of the agent with utility
    is then
  • Since is independent of ,
  • and hence

18
  • Denote as the risk premium we would observe
    if the utility curvature parameter were .
  • The proportion of the risk premium due to the
    background risk in the total risk premium the
    representative agent is ready to pay to avoid the
    financial risk is then

19
  • Kimball (1992) defines the temperance premium
    by the following condition
  • By analogy with the risk premium,
  • The conditions and
    (the necessary conditions for risk
    vulnerability) imply that .

20
  • We have
  • With power utility
  • and therefore

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22
  • The EIS in the model with an independent
    non-hedgeable background risk
  • Since the representative agent with utility
    facing background risk has the same optimal
    consumption plan as the representative agent with
    utility in the no background risk
    environment, we can suppose that
  • where and
  • The model with background risk enables us to
    disentangle the coefficient of pure RRA and
    the EIS in the expected utility framework.

23
2. Empirical investigation
  • 2.1 The data
  • The consumption data
  • Quarterly consumption data (consumption of
    nondurables and services (NDS)) from the CEX (the
    US Bureau of Labor Statistics) from 1980Q1 to
    2003Q4.
  • We drop households
  • a) that do not report or report a zero value of
    consumption of food, consumption of nondurables
    and services, or total consumption,

24
  • b) nonurban households, households residing in
    student housing, households with incomplete
    income responses, households that do not have a
    fifth interview, and households whose head is
    under 19 or over 75 years of age.
  • We consider four sets of households based on the
    reported amount of asset holdings at the
    beginning of a 12-month recall period in constant
    2005 dollars
  • a) all households,
  • b) households with total asset holdings gt 0,
  • c) households with total asset holdings
    1000,
  • d) households with total asset holdings 5000.

25
  • The returns data
  • a) The nominal quarterly value-weighted market
    capitalization-based decile index returns
    (capital gain plus all dividends) on all stocks
    listed on the NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq are from the
    CRSP.
  • b) The nominal quarterly value-weighted returns
    on the five and ten NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq
    industry portfolios are from Kenneth R. French's
    web page.
  • c) The nominal quarterly risk-free rate is the
    3-month US Treasury Bill secondary market rate
    from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
  • d) The real quarterly returns are calculated as
    the quarterly nominal returns divided by the
    3-month inflation rate based on the deflator
    defined for NDS.

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  • 2.2 The estimation procedure
  • We use HJ (1991) volatility bounds to assess the
    empirical performance of three SDFs
  • 1. Standard SDF
  • 2. The SDF in Brav et al. (2002)
  • where is the household i's consumption
    growth rate and

30
  • 3. The SDF in the consumption CAPM with
    background risk
  • When estimating and
    for all t

31
  • For each of the above SDFs, we test the
    conditional Euler equations for the excess
    returns on risky assets
  • and the risk-free rate
  • Denote the error terms in the Euler equations as
  • Thus, at the true parameter vector,
  • where is a variable in the agent's time t
    information set.

32
  • A lower volatility bound for admissible SDFs
    , which have unconditional mean m and
    satisfy
  • where is the unconditional variance-covariance
    matrix of .
  • We look for the values of the SDF parameters, at
    which a considered SDF satisfies the volatility
    bound, i.e.,
  • where

33
  • Denote as the utility curvature parameter
    in .
  • The optimal value of the estimate of the
    curvature parameter is
  • Denote as the instrument , for which
  • Since
  • or equivalently
  • we estimate the subjective time discount factor
    as

34
  • In the model with background risk, the effective
    RRA coefficient differs from the utility
    curvature parameter (the coefficient of pure
    RRA) and is
  • We follow Kimball (1993) and Franke et al. (1998)
    and assume that the background risk is
    actuarially neutral, i.e.,
  • Under this assumption, the estimate of the
    effective RRA is

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36
Concluding remarks
  • Empirical evidence that, in contrast to the
    previously proposed incomplete consumption
    insurance models, the asset-pricing model with
    the SDF calculated as the discounted ratio of
    expectations of marginal utilities over the
    non-hedgeable consumption states at two
    consecutive dates jointly explains the
    cross-section of risky asset excess returns and
    the risk-free rate with economically plausible
    values of the pure RRA coefficient and the
    subjective time discount factor.
  • The results are robust across different sets of
    stock-returns and threshold values in the
    definition of asset holders.

37
  • Since the important components of the pricing
    kernel are the first two unconditional moments of
    the distribution of the non-hedgeable
    consumption, this supports the hypothesis that
    the independent non-hedgeable adverse background
    risk can account for the market premium and the
    return on the risk-free asset.
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