OPCW Contribution to the Counter - Terrorism Efforts

1
Safety and Security at Chemical Plants
CBRNe CONVERGENCE 28-30 October 2009 World
Forum Centre The Hague Krzysztof
Paturej Director, Office of Special Projects
2
Overview of Presentation

• Status of the CWC implementation
• OPCW contribution to anti-terrorism efforts
• Cooperation with the international bodies
• OPCWs role in chemical safety and security

3

• CWC - Four Pillars
• Verifiable elimination of chemical weapons
  
• stockpiles and associated production
  facilities
• Non-proliferation
• Assistance and Protection
• International co-operation in peaceful
• application of chemical science and
  technology

4

• Verifiable elimination of chemical weapons
  
• stockpiles
• Total and complete chemical disarmament is a core
  and urgent objective of the OPCW
• The Technical Secretariat verifies the declared
  stockpiles and then monitors their destruction
  until the process is completed
• About 85 of our inspection effort is dedicated
  to this segment of the Convention
• Status
• 4 Possessor States ( 3 former possessors
  Albania, India and A State Party already
  destroyed its stockpiles) - in total 71,000
  tonnes of chemical-warfare agents have been
  declared.
• Current Possessor States are Russia, USA, Libya
  and Iraq
• Currently more than 50 of the declared
  stockpiles has been verifiably destroyed.
• Deadline for destruction is 2012.

5
CWC - Universality

• 188 States Parties
• 2 Signatory States
• 5 Non-Signatory

• Non-Signatory States
• Angola
• Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea
• Egypt
• Somalia
• Syrian Arab Republic

• Signatory States
• Israel
• Myanmar

6

• Chemical Weapons Non-proliferation
• CW non-proliferation means that when existing
  chemical arsenals are destroyed, no new chemical
  weapons should appear in the current or former
  possessor states or anywhere else
• Second OPCW core objective Non-proliferation of
  chemical weapons, through application of the
  verification and implementation measures provided
  for in the CWC also serve to build confidence
  between States Parties
• CWC non-proliferation require establishing and
  maintaining national controls of toxic chemicals
  (including dual-use materials), without in any
  way impeding developments in the chemical
  activities that are not prohibited under the CWC.
  
• Over 98 of chemical industry under CWC
• Over 1500 inspections conducted

7
Non-proliferation
Activities Developing channels of communication
with the Member States and CWC stakeholders to
support promotion of non-proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction. Supporting and conducting
events with CWC stakeholders to promote active
OPCW non-proliferation policies, and developing
cooperation with Member States and CWC
stakeholders with a view to comprehensive
implementation of the CWC within national
non-proliferation policies. Continuing to
inform the Director-General about the
developments and challenges in the sphere of
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
Developing contacts and cooperative policies to
be maintained with international partners on
non-proliferation, including the 1540 Committee.


8
Threat of Terrorism with use of chemicals
significant chemical weapons threat since CWC
entry into force

• chemicals and relevant production equipment are
  readily available
• multiple chlorine attacks in Iraq, attempts to
  acquire toxic chemicals for terrorist purposes
  use of improvised chemical devices
• use of chemical weapons by terrorists could have
  devastating consequences, resulting in thousands
  of casualties, economic and social disruption
• Chemical plants world-wide are at risk for
  receiving a terrorist attack

9
OEWG Platform for practical co-operation

• Implementing Art. X core activity
• Engaging CWC stakeholders, including chemical
  industry, and promoting safety and security of
  chemical plants
• OPCW as a forum for exchanges and sharing best
  practices
• Strengthening the interaction with the relevant
  international organisations

10

• Cooperation with the International Bodies
• The Secretariat has established and maintained
  channels of communication with a number of
  regional, sub-regional, and international
  organisations and agencies in the field of
  counter-terrorism.
• The aim of these contacts are to identify ways in
  which these organisations can assist one another,
  pursuant to relevant mandates, by exchanging
  information, knowledge, and expertise as needed,
  and by coordinating programme activities that
  relate to action against terrorism.

11

• The UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy
• The UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/60/288,
  dated 8 September 2006
• Encourages the IAEA and the OPCW to continue
  their efforts, within their respective mandates,
  to help States to build capacity to prevent
  terrorists from accessing nuclear, chemical, or
  radiological materials, to ensure security at
  related facilities, and to respond effectively in
  the event of an attack using such materials.

12
Safety and Security at Chemical Plants - A new
issue arising from the Second Review Conference

• The Second Review Conference reaffirmed concerns
  expressed at the First Review Conference that
  chemical facilities may become subject to attacks
  or other incidents that could lead to the release
  or theft of toxic chemicals.
• The Second Review Conference welcomed the fact
  that some States Parties had taken measures to
  minimise such risks and encouraged States Parties
  to exchange experiences and discuss related
  issues.
• It noted the value of Article X in this respect
  and the role of the OPCW as a forum for
  consultation and cooperation among the States
  Parties.
• The Second Review Conference recognised the need
  for close cooperation with other relevant
  international organisations and agencies active
  in this field.

13
Building the OPCW role in the chemical safety and
security

• With the rapid development of chemical industry
  production and its spread to new areas of the
  world the question of security in the area of
  legitimate production, transportation and use of
  chemicals is assuming much higher importance.
• The risk of terrorist attacks using the toxic
  properties of industrial chemicals adds
  additional urgency to the problem
• Enhancing chemical security culture will provide
  greater assurance that the national chemical
  security systems will accomplish their functions
  of preventing, detecting and responding to,
  theft, sabotage, unauthorized access, illegal
  transfer of chemical material and the associated
  facilities and transport.

14
OPCW as a platform of support for global
cooperation in chemical safety and security

• The Technical Secretariat develops an analysis on
  the OPCW role in development of chemical safety
  and security. The analysis shall be considered
  as a process of gathering relevant knowledge,
  expertise and practical experience to be offered
  the States Parties and the chemical industry
• Main dimension - to develop the role of the OPCW
  as a platform (venue) of support for global
  cooperation in reducing the chemical threat by
  promoting awareness of chemical safety and
  security best practices by fostering cooperation
  between chemical professionals (ref. CWC Art.
  VIII OPCW as a forum for consultation and
  cooperation)

15
OPCW role in promoting Safety and Security at
chemical facilities

• The OPCW will NOT
• - have an independent role
• - develop expertise within the Technical
  Secretariat on Chemical safety and Security
  issues
• - include chemical safety and security issues
  in inspection and verification activities
• - develop regulatory measures
• - develop guidance or advise on chemical
  safety and security issues
• ICCA, CEFIC, Member States, national chemical
  associations, scientific community, and the
  relevant international organisations will be
  invited to work, on voluntary basis, to join
  these efforts
• Since there are no relevant resources at the
  Secretariat, the OPCW contribution to enhancing
  the security of chemical facilities should rely
  mainly on resources and assistance from and
  through States Parties.
• First financial contribution was made by Saudi
  Arabia to support OPCW as a useful platform of
  exchanging experiences and support for global
  cooperation in lessening chemical threat by
  promoting awareness of chemical security best
  practices, as an important development in the Art
  XI implementation

16
OPCW role in promoting Safety and Security at
chemical facilities continued

• Working together with the chemical industry
  associations and relevant government agencies,
  OPCW as a platform (venue) will support
  decreasing the chemical threat by
• raising awareness and improving chemical safety
  and security best practices
• exchanging of information and building networks
  on relevant issues related to chemical safety and
  security
• Keeping States Parties fully abreast of
  developments in the sphere of chemical safety and
  security best practices, by seeking and
  disseminating information and views from the
  National Authorities and relevant national
  agencies, chemical industry (for example, via
  chemical industry associations Responsible
  Care), in the academic community (for example,
  via the International Union of Pure and Applied
  Chemistry (IUPAC))

17
OPCW role in promoting Safety and Security at
chemical facilities continued

• Increase the OPCW role and capacity in the field
  of emergency response.
• Increase the importance of Art. X as a forum for
  cooperation between Member States and chemical
  industries stakeholders in the field of response
  to chemical emergencies
• Use of expertise available in the chemical
  industry for provision of technical advice to
  Member States in the framework of implementation
  of Art. X and XI
• Assist developing countries to participate in the
  industry programmes related to safety and
  security of chemical plants

18
Conclusions

• When chemical disarmament is completed, CW
  non-proliferation will remain a permanent
  concern OPCW has built a consensus that national
  implementation measures are critical to prevent
  production or transfer of CW or misuse of
  chemicals - OSP supports practical implementation
  of this commitment.
• OPCW develops programs and activities to support
  Members in their policies and practices against
  proliferation of chemical weapons and terrorism
  with use of toxic chemicals
• There is a growing support from Member States
  and CWC stakeholders for the OPCW as a platform
  to advance chemical safety and security with
  regional dimension and multi-stakeholder
  participation

19

• Thank you !

QUESTIONS ?