S' Felix Wu

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Davis Social Links
S. Felix Wu Computer Science Department University
of California, Davis wu_at_cs.ucdavis.edu http//ww
w.cs.ucdavis.edu/wu/
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Urgent! Please contact me!
FROMMR.CHEUNG PUI Hang Seng Bank Ltd Sai Wan Ho
Branch 171 Shaukiwan Road Hong Kong. Please
contact me on my personal box puicheungcheungpui_at_
yahoo.com Let me start by introducing myself. I
am Mr. Cheung Pui, director of operations of the
Hang Seng Bank Ltd,Sai Wan Ho Branch. I have a
obscured business suggestion for you. Before the
U.S and Iraqi war our client Major Fadi Basem who
was with the Iraqi forces and also business man
made a numbered fixed deposit for 18
calendar months, with a value of Twenty Four
millions Five Hundred Thousand United State
Dollars only in my branch. Upon maturity several
notice was sent to him,
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http//www.ebolamonkeyman.com/cheung.htm
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Pick your favor Spam Filter(s)
5
This was considered a spam!
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This was considered a spam!
Sometimes, the cost of False Positive may be very
high
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You have about 1 second to decide
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Motivations

• What is the fundamental issue of spams?
• Is it something to do with the design of our
  basic communication mechanism?
• Why cant we explicitly utilize the social
  context in our communication?

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Davis Social Links

• What is the fundamental issue of spams?
• Is it something to do with the design of our
  basic communication mechanism?
• Why can we explicitly utilize the social
  context?
• Routable identity versus receiver control
• Trust Reputation system in L3

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Communicate A, D
B
D
A
C
As long as A knows Ds routable identity
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Hijackable Routable Identify
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A,D social context
B
D
A
C
A has to explicitly declare if there is any
social context under this communication activity
with D!
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The same message content

• M from Cheung Pui
• M from Cheung Pui via IETF mailing list
• M from Cheung Pui via Karl Levitt

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Social Context

• M from Cheung Pui
• ? Probably a spam
• M from Cheung Pui via IETF mailing list
• ? Probably not interesting
• M from Cheung Pui via Karl Levitt
• ? Better be more serious

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Social Context

• M from Cheung Pui
• ? Probably a spam
• M from Cheung Pui via IETF mailing list
• ? Probably not interesting
• M from Cheung Pui via Karl Levitt
• ? Better be more serious

Either M is important, or Karls machine has
been subverted!
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A,D social context
??
B
D
A
C
A has to explicitly declare if there is any
social context under this communication activity
with D! But, D only cares if it is from C
or not!
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Online Social Network

• What is an online social network?
• Realize and represent the human social networks
  explicitly (from somewhat vague, fuzzy and
  implicit)
• Promote OSN Applications
• Utilizing the online perspective to further
  develop the human social network
• Representation, Application, Development

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Who is Salma?
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Who is Salma?
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Who is Salma?
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My message to Salma
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The Social Path(s)
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More Examples
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Just a couple issues

• How to establish the social route?
• How would A know about D (or Ds identity)
  ?
• How to maintain this reputation network?
• MessageReaper A Feed-back Trust Control System
  (Spear/Lang/Lu)

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Social network analytical models

• Network Mathematics
• Random graph model (low diameter)
• Newman/Watts/Strogatz, 2002
• Small world model (high cluster coefficient)
• Watts/Strogatz, 1998
• Scale-free network (node degree distribution)
• Barabasi/Albert, 1999
• What is the right model for the network?

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Search on OSN

• How to get to from ?
• The Small world model
• 6 degree separation (Milgram, 1967)
• existence of a short path
• How to find the short path? (Kleinberg, 2000)

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Routing in a Small World

• Common question do short paths exist?
• Algorithmic question assuming short paths exist.
  How do people find them?

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Kleinbergs Model

• Kleinbergs model
• People ?? points on a two dimensional grid.
• P Grid edges (short range).
• Q long range contacts chosen with the inverse
  rth-power distribution.
• How to search?
• S, T
• Find the neighbor closest to T
• Work well only when r2, pq1

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Kleinbergs Model

• Use only Local information, except the distance
  to the target.
• However, what is the global distance in cyber
  space? Yet, the assumption behind is that the
  edges depend on the relative distance.

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X, Y, and Z

• How will we tell whether the relative distance
  between XY is closer than XZ?
• X, Y, Z (assuming they are all direct friends to
  each other)
• One simple idea Keyword intersection
• KW(X), KW(Y), KW(Z)
• 1/(KW(a) KW(b) 1)
• Will this work? How about global distance?

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Similarity
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Similarity
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Kleinbergs model

• Inherently assume routable identity
• You have to know the Target identity, and you
  also need to know the distance metric.
• And, then the search algorithm will get to it
  probabilistically.
• The sender/receiver interface is very simple.

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Social Route Discovery for A2D
??
B
D
A
C
Lets assume A doesnt have Ds routable
identity Or, D doesnt have a global unique
identity! Then, how can we do A2D?
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Finding
??
B
D
A
C
A2D, while D is McDonalds! D would like
customers to find the right route. idea
keyword propagation e.g., McDonalds
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Announcing
B
D
K McDonalds
A
C
Hop-by-hop keyword propagation
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Announcing
B
D
K McDonalds
K McDonalds
A
C
Hop-by-hop keyword propagation
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Announcing
B
D
K McDonalds
K McDonalds
K McDonalds
A
C
Hop-by-hop keyword propagation
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Announcing
B
D
K McDonalds
K McDonalds
K McDonalds
A
C
Hop-by-hop keyword propagation And, I know I am
doing FLOODING!!
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Now Finding
Q McDonalds
B
D
K McDonalds
K McDonalds
K McDonalds
A
C

• Search Keyword McDonalds
• A might know Ds keyword via two channels
• (1) Somebody else (2) From its friends
• Questions does D need an identity? Scalable?

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Phishing/Hijacking is the default
Application Test
Q McDonalds
B
D
K McDonalds
K McDonalds
K McDonalds
A
C
Search Keyword McDonalds Questions is this
the right Felix Wus?
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Application Tests

• Example 1 credential-oriented
• PKI certificate as the keyword
• If you can sign or decrypt the message, you are
  the ONE!
• Example 2 service-oriented
• Service/protocol/bandwidth support
• Example 3 offer-oriented
• Please send me your coupons/promotions!

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Routable Identity

• Application identity Mgt Network identity
• Network identity Rgt Network identity
• Network identity Mgt Application identity

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App/Route Identity

• Application identity Mgt Network identity
• Network identity Rgt Network identity
• Network identity Mgt Application identity
• Keywords (MF-R)gt Multiple Paths
• Application identity selection
• Network route selection

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Hijackable Routable Identify
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Application Test Layer 3
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Finding
Application Test
Q McDonalds
B
D
K McDonalds
K McDonalds
K McDonalds
A
C
Search Keyword McDonalds Questions is this
the right Felix Wus? How to avoid/control
flooding??
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Scalability - Avoid the Flooding

• As it is, every keyword will need to be
  propagated to all the nodes/links (but the same
  keyword will be propagated through the same link
  once possibly with different policies).
• The issue who should receive my keywords?

57
Community-Keyword Model

• A Social Peer, P, has 3 keyword sets
• Attributes (ATTR)
• Original Keywords (OK)
• Propagating Keywords (PK)

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Community-Keyword Model

• Attributes (ATTR)
• Keywords describing P (the social node)
• Decided/configured by the owner of P
• Original Keywords (OK)
• Keywords announced by P (the social node)
• Decide/configured by the owner of P
• Each keyword is associated with a propagation
  policy (decided by the owner of P)
• Propagating Keywords (PK)
• From its own OK and other direct neighbors
• Each keyword is associated with a propagation
  policy

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Community-Keyword Model

• Attributes (ATTR)
• Keywords describing P (the social node)
• Decided/configured by the owner of P
• Original Keywords (OK)
• Keywords announced by P (the social node)
• Decide/configured by the owner of P
• Each keyword is associated with a propagation
  policy (decided by the owner of P)
• Propagating Keywords (PK)
• From its own OK and other direct neighbors
• Each keyword is associated with a propagation
  policy

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Community-Keyword Model

• Attributes (ATTR)
• Keywords describing P (the social node)
• Decided/configured by the owner of P
• Original Keywords (OK)
• Keywords announced by P (the social node)
• Decide/configured by the owner of P
• Each keyword is associated with a propagation
  policy (decided by the owner of P)
• Propagating Keywords (PK)
• From its own OK and other direct neighbors
• Each keyword is associated with a propagation
  policy

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in Community of Davis
??
B
D
A
C
Who should receive the keyword announcement for
McDonalds?
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as the Social Peer

• Attributes
• McDonalds Express, 640 W Covell Blvd, D,
  Davis, [phone], Davis Senior High School,
  Community Park, North Davis

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as the Social Peer

• Attributes
• McDonalds Express, 640 W Covell Blvd, D,
  Davis, [phone], Davis Senior High School,
  Community Park, North Davis
• Original Keywords
• McDonald, Davis, California, DHS, North Davis,
  Happy Meal, 50 off Tuesday, Lobster
• Propagating Keywords
• McDonald, Davis, California, DHS, North Davis,
  Happy Meal, 50 off Tuesday, Lobster, Anderson
  Plaza, Save-Mart, Taqueria Guadalajara

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Per-Keyword Policy

• For each keyword, we will associate it with a
  propagation policy T, N, A
• T Trust Value Threshold
• N Hop counts left to propagate (-1 each step)
• A Community Attributes
• Examples
• gt0.66, 4, Davis K via L1
• gt0, , K via L2

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in Community of Davis
??
B
D
A
C
Who should receive the keyword announcement for
McDonalds?
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Scalability Controllability

• McDonalds doesnt want to flood the whole
  network
• It only wants to multicast to the Target set of
  customers
• And, it only wants this target set of users being
  able to use that particular keyword to contact.
• Receiver/owner controllability

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Autonomous Community

• Each social entity configures a set of
  attributes for itself.
• Some or all of the attributes will be exchange
  with certain neighbors.

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Social/Community Attributes
??
B
D
A
C
Who should receive the keyword announcement for
McDonalds? Answer
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Relevant Attribute/OK/PK

• ATTR Davis
• OK McDonalds
• PK McDonalds
• The owner uses the policy to control the
  flooding
• K McDonalds
• T gt 0.66, N 6, ATTR Davis

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IP versus DSL

• IP address prefixes announced by BGP to ALL the
  Autonomous Systems in the whole Internet
• Every IP node can send packets to McDonalds at
  Davis (if we have a unique IP address)
• DSL will only announce McDonalds (under the
  control of McDonalds express) within the Davis
  social community
• Only the receivers of the announcement can use
  the keyword to contact McDonalds express!

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Community-Keyword Model

• A Social Peer, P, has three keyword sets
• Attributes (ATTR)
• Original Keywords (OK)
• Propagating Keywords (PK)
• Flooding Avoidance Receiver/Owner Control

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T gt 0, N , ATTR K

• What is the consequence?
• Spam
• Denial of Service
• How to deal with it?

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T gt 0, N , ATTR K

• Limited Resources on PK
• P can only remember up to M keywords in its own
  PK
• Ordering Preference between Ki and Kj
• T(Ki) gt T(Kj)
• N(Ki) lt N(Kj)
• ATTR(Ki) ATTR(Kj)
• Incentive Model
• P is willing to pay a price

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Potential Problems

• Mostly only local contacts
• Local interests dominate
• Possible resource allocation for different ATTRs
  within the same community

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Community

• A connected graph of social nodes sharing a set
  of community attributes

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Community
??
B
D
A
C
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Community Control
D
C
E
Who should receive the keyword announcement for
wu_at_cs.ucdavis.edu? Answer Who should receive
the keyword announcement fot South Lake Tahoe
Tournament? Answer
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Community

• A connected graph of social nodes sharing a set
  of community attributes

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Community
??
B
D
A
C
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Social/Community Attributes
??
B
D
A
C
Who should receive the keyword announcement for
McDonalds? Answer but not ALL
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Community

• A connected graph of social nodes sharing a set
  of community attributes
• The community members can decide the
  administrative policy within the community
• Membership maintenance
• Attribute setting
• Keyword propagation policy (e.g., allocation)
• Application-dependent policy
• Incentive model

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Potential Problems

• Mostly only local contacts
• Local interests dominate
• Possible resource allocation for different ATTRs
  within the same community
• Reachability
• How likely will my keywords be able to go through
  to the community I want?
• I must be a direct friend of the community
• How can we set up remote long range contact?

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Community Development

• How will each one of us set up our Attributes and
  Original Keywords plus policy such that together
  we can communicate with each other optimally?
• A game theoretical setting problem for network
  formation

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Community
??
B
D
A
C
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Network Formation
??
B
D
A
C
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Network Formation
??
B
D
A
C
What is Bs incentive in adding the new ATTR
keyword?
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Network Formation
??
B
D
A
C
If B adds , then A will add
!
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Network Formation
??
B
D
A
C
Both A C why would A C be willing to
establish a direct friendship?
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Open Issues

• What is the value of this social network?
• How would this value be distributed and
  allocated to each individual peers?

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What is the value difference?
B
D
A
C
B
D
A
C
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C can join !
B
D
A
C
B
D
A
C
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A alone can help C to join more communities!
B
D
A
C
B
D
A
C
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Value Allocation for B ?
B
D
A
C
B
D
A
C
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Nash Equilibrium with CS
B
D
03030
A
C
Propagating or not?
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Three Person Coalition Game
Player 2 get 44! Again, players 1 and 3 can
collaborate and break their links with 2 to get
30 each from merely 14!
1
2
3
1
1
2
3
2
3
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Today is Sunday
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Open Issues

• What is the value of this social network?
• How would this value be distributed and
  allocated to each individual peers?
• DSL, Facebook, LinkedIn didnt define the game
  for network formation and value allocation.
• But, it is important to design the game such that
  the OSN will eventually converge to a state to
  best support the communities.

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Social Network Games
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Lets come back to SPAM!

• How will the proposed DSL model handle spam?
• Social Network games can be another major social
  spams to reduce the value of our online social
  network.

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Lets come back to SPAM!

• How will the proposed DSL model handle spam?

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wu_at_cs.ucdavis.edu
??
B
D
K wu_at_ Policy
A
C
Who should receive the keyword announcement for
wu_at_cs.ucdavis.edu? Answer
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Even if A claims
??
B
D
K wu_at_
A
C
Who should receive the keyword announcement for
wu_at_cs.ucdavis.edu? Answer
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B can help
??
B
D
K wu_at_
A
C
What is Bs incentive? What is Bs risk?
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Message Value Prioritization
Link Ranks Reputation Incentives Other Trust
Metrics
Application IDS
good, bad messages
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MessageReaper vs. Spams
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MessageReaper vs. Freeloaders
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MessageReaper

• A Feedback Control Trust/Reputation system
• P2P and decentralized
• Collusive Attacks
• Still needs more works
• But, under our social network, it might not be
  easy for the attackers to obtain the right social
  spots to attack us. (can we formally argue that?)

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Collusive Attacks
B
D
A
C
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Robustness as OSN Value
B
D
A
C
B
D
A
C
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Community-Oriented Networking

• DSL offers a way to dynamically identify and
  establish social communities
• But, we still have a lot of open issues
• Facebook
• Networks email address dependent
• Groups you have to use your existing social
  network to invite.

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Davis Social Links over Facebook
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Smart Proxy

• Overlay Social Graph
• User-defined keywords and attributes
• DSL server
• Trust Routing Protocol

DSL
Facebook
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Sub-communities

• Social Graph
• User-defined keywords and attributes
• DSL server
• Trust Routing Protocol

DSL
Facebook
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Social Network Development

• Social Graph
• User-defined keywords and attributes
• DSL server
• Trust Routing Protocol

DSL
Facebook
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Component Interactions
Attributes Keywords Policies
DSL
Profiles
Social Graph, Keywords
Facebook
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Route Discovery Messaging
Sender
Recipient
Keywords, Message
Keywords, Message
DSL
Optimal routes
Previous Interaction Outcomes, Shortest Paths
Basic Algorithm

• Identify destination nodes
• Determine Optimal paths
• Remove paths that violate keyword policies
• If there is a path, store message for recipient

MessageReaper
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Antispam email/IM
UCD Network
Keyword Policy All UCD Members get keyword
wuDavis_at_cs.ucdavsis.edu
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Bypassing Facebook

• When you send a message
• Via Facebook
• Via DSL
• Activity and Intensity hiding via
  Decentralization!

DSL
Facebook
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ADSL (Avatar-based DSL)
??
B
D
K wu_at_ Policy
A
C
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ADSL (Avatar-based DSL)
B
D
K fli_at_ Policy
A
C
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SecondLifes problems

• Its a virtual society but the trust model is
  unclear.
• It is much easier to hide and fake (and, BTW,
  that is not necessarily always a bad thing).
• What would be the impact to our first-life
  society?

127
SecondLife

• No communication infrastructure
• No/minimum pre-exist social trust
• How do we recover such information? (And, should
  we?)

128
DSL vs. Google
129
Google

• Its about the content
• Data-centric networking.
• Input to the Engine
• A set of key words characterizing the target
  document.
• Output
• A set of documents/links matching the keywords

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DSL

• Its also about the content
• Application will decide the mechanism to further
  the communication.
• Input to the Decentralized Engine
• A set of key words characterizing the target
  document (plus the aggregation keywords).
• Output
• A set of DSL entities with the DSP (Davis Social
  Path pointer) matching the keywords

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DSL Search Engine
Receiver or Content
Sender or Reader
DSL Social World
We are not just connecting the IP addresses! We
are connecting all the contents that can be
interpreted!
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Google vs. DSL

• Google is essentially a routing framework
  between the contents and their potential
  consumers.
• Google decides how to extract the key words
  from your (the owner) web page or document.

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Google vs. DSL

• Google is essentially a routing framework
  between the contents and their potential
  consumers.
• Google decides how to extract the key words
  from your (the owner) web page or document.
• A DSL owner/receiver to be has the complete
  control over that. A balance between
• How I would like others to know about me?
• And, I might want different folks to know me in
  different ways!
• How I can differentiate myself from other Felix
  Wu?

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DSL is an old idea!
A
B

• We, as human, have been using similar
  communication principles. Maybe it is a good
  opportunity to re-think about our cyber
  communication system.
• Identity is a per-application, context-oriented,
  and sometime relative issue.
• Forming cyber communities of interests for
  application.

F
A
B
F
F
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LinkedIn Get Introduced
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Another one
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DSL, Facebook, AL-BGP and GENI
http//www.geni.net/DSLport
AL-BGP over GENI/PlanetLab
Each DSL/FB user should select a closer GENI
entrance as www.geni.net. In other words, we
might need to set up DNS records correctly.
Facebook
138
DSL Architecture
Applications with Tests
DSL
AL-BGP
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Link
Applications with Tests
2
3
1
4
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AS-oriented Social Mapping
Applications with Tests
141
Control versus Data Path
Applications with Tests
control path
2
1
data path
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Social-Control Routing
Applications with Tests
3
2
1
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DSL is still an old idea!
A
B

• Many applications already have social network
  like structure to enable P2P sharing across
  Internet.
• e.g., media sharing, on-line game, restaurant
  recommendation,
• Should we push these into a generic Social
  Network layer-3 to support all the applications?

F
A
B
F
F
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A Different Internet?!

• Current Internet every IP address will be able
  to communicate with every other IP address!
• Allow by Default
• DSL-based Internet we have a large number of
  pairs (two entities and their corresponding
  direct social link)
• Deny by Default

145
The Physical Pipe

• Facebook, Overlay no problem
• Can we do better?

146
Shared-Secret DSL

• Can we do better than crossed random walk?
• A B -- S(A,B), conceptually
• From the joined node, one single sequence of bits
  -- A uses the prefix and B uses the suffix but in
  a reversed order
• Problem what is the bit sequence? Can we derive
  it from the shared sequence, probabilistically?
• Idea?

147
Bit Sequence Prediction

• When two parties try to connect, we may be able
  to tolerate for a short period of time (I.e.,
  we can retry a few possible sequence, but the
  problem is how many before we can get them
  connected!)
• What is the difference between BSP and Cross
  Random Walk?
• How about the idea of common meeting area?
  then we converge to the optimal route.

148
Smart Router

• If we give S, d, to a router
• Shared Secret, Direction, Index of bits
• The router will determine which should be the
  next hop such that A and B will meet in a finite
  number of steps with very high probability.
  (first assume that the network topology is static
  and each router is aware of the whole topology
  but it doesnt know where the other direction!)

149
One Simple Idea

• The network router computes the whole bit
  sequence and translates that result into a unique
  identity of a particular router (the common one),
  and then meet there!
• Cons
• Not optimal (but we can improve later)
• Insecure? (still DDoS-able?)

150
IP address-less BGP

• AS only BGP
• No issues such as MOAS, Address Hijack, and
  Multiple Homing
• Discover another AS (much more scalable)
• The implementation of a Social Link
• Both Ases will use the same secret to find a
  middle point to meet (as one possibility)
• Route Optimization will be accomplished AFTER we
  first meet (ISPs resp.)

151
AL-BGP

• Address-less BGP
• Any AS will have one or more route to reach any
  other AS in the Internet
• SRC/DST -- AS
• Some improvements and provable properties over BGP

152
AL-BGP Forwarding

• Destination AS, Next Hop

153
AL-BGP versus BGP

• BGP
• The BGP tables determine how to route a
  particular prefix
• AL-BGP
• We have to discover the destination AS first
• Both source and destination ASes need to know how
  to route the packets to the local identifier
• Multi-homing is accomplished via social-layer or
  network-layer multi-path routing in the AS level

154
AL-BGP Evaluation

• Take the Observation Point data
• Abstract the replay-able explanation
• Replay the explanation but WITHOUT the prefixes
• Collapsing the BGP updates into AL-BGP (How much
  will we save?) even with the explanation
• Modify Zebra or other implementations!
• What do we want to evaluate?
• How about Self-Stablization?
• GENI/PlanetLab (mixed virtual and real)

155
DSL Link Process

• Both peers shared a secret X
• Both peers obtain a local identifier from its
  current ISP
• Peers can change their local identifier due to
  mobility
• Local identifiers are only meaningful to the
  local ISP, I.e., no global uniqueness and
  assignment
• Each peer will give its local ISP all the DSL
  link shared secret (one secret per friend link)
• For each friend link, the ISP will run the DSL
  rendezvous process (to find the ISP on the other
  side of the link)

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the DSL rendezvous process

• Each ISP/AS uses the shared secret to find the
  rendezvous AS
• For robustness, we might want to use N rendezvous
  ASes.
• Both AS send a request to the target rendezvous
  AS (AL-BGP will provide the route).
• The first one arrives will store a record for
  delta T time waiting for the other one
• The result of a successful rendezvous is for
  these two ASes to know each other so they can
  support the link.
• These two ASes, then, negotiate the best option
  to support the link. (e.g., link QoS)

157
One Issue

• The Link quality for a pair of friends might not
  be that important as these links are only used to
  deliver/relay social control messages.
• The real data packets are delivered in a
  completely different path/way.

158
DSL Data Path

• Assuming the social path has been
  established/selected.
• This step can be piggy-backed for the last round
  of messages in path discovery (confirmation, for
  example)
• The DPEM (Data Path Establishment Message) is
  delivered from S to D via each social hop.
• While the DPEM message is being delivered, the
  underlying ISPs along the path will tap along and
  discover eventually the ISPs for both S and D.
• Now, the ISP of S and D can negotiate the best
  data path (quality is now critical) to support
  the communication

159
Privacy Consideration

• To prevent the intermediate ASes to know the
  source and destination ASes, in DSL route
  discovery, both S and D will exchange a secret
  such that the ASs can be encrypted in DPEMs.
• To prevent both Ases of S and D to discover the
  true identity of S and D, S and D should use
  per-session local identifiers from their ISP so
  identifier correlation is impossible.

160
AL-BGP Insider Attacks

• Black Holes, Hijacks
• It seems to me that these attacks are impossible,
  as for the DSL link process, we will try multiple
  paths and we will use the shared secret to verify
  the correctness.
• Maybe, we can add reputation in AL-BGP to
  eliminate some misbehaving Ases
• Traffic Attraction Attacks (Wormhole)
• What can the attack get out of these?
• Will the multiple path design reduce the damage?

161
Wormhole

• With or without SBGP?
• One idea using Reputation
• If you claim there is a peer relationship between
  X and Y (both are ASes), then I would ask the
  reputation about that relationship.
• EigenTrust versus Beholder

162
Reputation in AL-BGP

• For each successful DSL session, we give one
  credit to all the AS Links involved.
• The credit might decayed (exponentially?!)
• So, these credits were kept by only the ASes of S
  and D.
• Well, new links might be picked and tried out for
  its performance and correctness.
• The ISP can use multiple paths for one session
  to balance the reputation risk and QoS.

163
DSL, Facebook, AL-BGP and GENI
http//www.geni.net/DSLport
AL-BGP over GENI/PlanetLab
Each DSL/FB user should select a closer GENI
entrance as www.geni.net. In other words, we
might need to set up DNS records correctly.
Facebook
164
DSL Architecture
Applications with Tests
DSL
AL-BGP
165
Link
Applications with Tests
2
3
1
4
166
AS-oriented Social Mapping
Applications with Tests
167
Control versus Data Path
Applications with Tests
control path
2
1
data path
168
Social-Control Routing
Applications with Tests
3
2
1
169
DSL over IPv6

• Utilizing the IPv6 addressing (locator and
  identity) to implement the DSLnet

170
DSL Wifi

• I think this two-tiers architecture is suitable
  for MANET as DDoS is not really an issue there
  (they can DDoS already)

171
Intra-Community Management

• Community is a dynamic concept!
• Anybody can try to contact all the community
  members (e.g., ucdavis cs soccer), and then
  establish the basis for community
• Administration is then possible.

172
Botnet under DSL

• I can use my existing relationships to spread
  (however, possibly much slower as I will be
  restricted by how many social friends reached).
• Maybe a research by itself to study

173
Traceability under DSL
174
Comparison

• IP/email
• Convergence to an absolute consistent state
• IP/email addresses are all you need, but the
  controllability is biased toward the sender
• DSL
• Convergence to a relative consistent state
• No global network identity. Every DSL entity
  defines its own relative identity based on origin
  keywords.
• Controllability is more balanced with other
  application challenges.

175
Easy to Send Receive

• Easy for both the good users and the spammers.
  (fair simplicity)
• The spammers abuse the sending right, while the
  good users have very limited options to counter
  back.
• how easy can we change our email address?
• how often do we need to do that?
• A receiver or the owner of the identity
  should have some control.
• But, that means also burden to the users.

176
Easy to Send Receive

• Easy for both the good users and the spammers.
  (fair simplicity)
• The spammers abuse the sending right, while the
  good users have very limited options to counter
  back.
• how easy can we change our email address?
• how often do we need to do that?
• A receiver or the owner of the identity
  should have some control.
• But, that means also burden to the users.

177
Davis Social Links

• Peer-to-Peer System (P2P)
• How human socially communicate?
• Online Social Network (OSN)
• How to utilize OSN to enhance communication?
• How to have a securer OSN?
• Autonomous Community (AC)
• How to build/develop more effective
  community-based social networks?

178
Acknowledgement
A
B

• Lerone Banks
• George Chen
• Dimitri DeFigueiredo
• Felix Huang
• Juan Lang
• Xiaoming Lu
• Matt Spear
• Shih-Ming Tsang
• Shawn Ye

more info wu_at_cs.cudavis.edu
F
A
B
F
F
179
Possible Collaboration??
A
B
DSL WiFi
F
A
B
F
F
180
The DSL Talk has been given at
181
BTW
182
students

• Spears, Banks, Lang, Chen, Ye, Tseng
• Justin, Casey, David, Tran, Garg
• Daniela, Wenfu, Coit, Gary