THE U'S' ELECTORAL COLLEGE: ORIGINS AND TRANSFORMATION, VARIANTS AND PROBLEMS

1
THE U.S. ELECTORAL COLLEGE ORIGINS AND
TRANSFORMATION, VARIANTS AND PROBLEMS

• Nicholas R. Miller
• UMBC
• LSE/VPP Talk
• May 6, 2008
• Revised for POLI 323
• September 10, 2008
• http//userpages.umbc.edu/nmiller/ELECTCOL.html

2
Overview of Talk

• Outline the original design of, and expectations
  for, the Electoral College
• Describe the rapid transformation of the
  Electoral College into the popular vote-counting
  mechanism that exists today
• Identify criticisms of the Electoral College
• Identify Variants of, and Alternatives to, the
  Electoral College
• Analyze the EC and variants with respect to (i)
  voting power and (ii) election reversals.
• The last is based on ongoing and incomplete
  research.

3
How the Electoral College Works in Practice

• Instead of electing a President (and Vice
  President) in a single national election,
• there are 51 separate state ( DC) elections,
• the winner in each state wins a number of
  electoral votes equal in number to the states
  total representation in Congress (total EV
  538), and
• electoral votes are added to determine the winner
  of the election (270 required for election).
• The result of adding up electoral votes across
  the states may be different from adding up
  popular votes across the states (election
  reversal, wrong winner, reversal of winners).

4
Electoral College Details

• ME and NE do not award electoral votes on a
  winner-take-all basis (but rather on the basis of
  a Modified District Plan) so their electoral
  votes might be split (but in fact never have
  been).
• Lurking beneath these electoral votes are real
  people (elected officials) called Presidential
  electors.
• Candidates may be deprived of electoral votes by
  faithless electors.
• Other methods of selecting Presidential electoral
  have been used in the past, sometimes resulting
  in split electoral votes.
• If no candidate wins 270 electoral votes, because
  either
• a third candidate wins some electoral voter or
• there is a 269-269 tie),
• the election is thrown into the House of
  Representatives (which last happened in 1824).
• Unpledged electors are sometimes elected (AL and
  MS in 1960).

5
Evaluations of the Electoral College

• The mode of appointment of the Chief Magistrate
  of the United States is almost the only part of
  the system, of any consequence, which has escaped
  without severe censure, or which has received the
  slightest mark of approbation from its opponents.
  . . . I venture somewhat further, and hesitate
  not to affirm that if the manner of it be not
  perfect, it is at least excellent. (Publius
  Alexander Hamilton, Federalist 68)
• Many subsequent evaluations (and the many
  proposed constitutional amendments) suggest a
  less favorable assessment of the mode of
  appointment of the Chief Magistrate, which has
  been variously viewed as
• part of a generally elitist and anti-democratic
  constitution or
• a last-minute jerry-built compromise or
• a well designed compromise among diverse
  considerations, or possibly
• the embodiment of well-thought selection criteria.

6
Evaluations of the EC (cont.)

• My own take on the Electoral College
• The original EC was a compromise among diverse
  considerations that was cleverly designed but had
  a fatal flaw that had to be (and was) corrected
  by constitutional amendment.
• The EC was rapidly transformed into an
  institution quite different from its designers
  had intended.
• So, even if you like the existing EC, you cant
  really give credit to the wisdom of the framers
  of the Constitution.
• Likewise, even if you dislike the existing EC,
  you cant really blame the framers.
• The transformed EC has proved to be a serviceable
  institution but is problematic in a number of
  ways.

7
Origins of the Electoral College

• The original Electoral College the term is not
  used in the Constitution was a compromise
  between two modes of election of the President
• legislative election, which (it was feared) would
  make the President subservient to Congress, and
• national popular election, which presented
  formidable practical difficulties at the time and
  reopened the conflict between large vs. small
  states.
• The perceived advantages of the Electoral
  College
• unlike Congress, the EC would perform a single
  task i.e., cast votes for President -- and
  would then disband and
• unlike popular election, the relative power of
  large vs. small states could be compromised in
  the fine details of the EC (and public opinion
  could be refined through represention).
• Legislative election was the default choice, so
  it is more accurate to say the Framers settled on
  the EC
• as an alternative to legislative election, rather
  than
• as an alternative to popular election.

8
The Original Electoral College Rules

• Each state selects a number of electors equal
  in number to its total (House Senate)
  representation in Congress (H 2).
• The legislature of each state determines the mode
  of selection of the electors from its state, the
  most likely alternatives being
• election by the legislature itself,
• popular election from districts, and
• popular election on a state-wide general ticket
  the almost universal practice for the last 175
  years.
• Congress has the power to determine
• when electors are selected (but Congress may only
  states a range of choices), and
• when electors cast their votes (which must be the
  same day for all states).
• Originally, Congress gave the states a window of
  about 30 days within which to select electors
• Electors were originally required to
• cast two votes for two different candidates,
• at least one of whom had to be a resident of
  another state.

9
The Original Electoral College (cont.)

• To be elected by the Electoral College, a
  candidate was originally required to receive
• votes from a majority of electors and
• more votes than any other candidate.
• Given the double vote system, these requirements
  were logically distinct.
• In particular, more that one candidate could
  receive the required majority
• If no candidate met both requirements, the
  election was thrown into the House of
  Representatives.
• The House would choose
• between the two (or more) tied candidates, in the
  event both (or all) received votes from a
  majority of electors, or
• among the top five candidates, in the event no
  candidate received votes from a majority of
  electors.
• Voting in the House is by state delegation, with
  each delegation casting one vote.
• Balloting continues until some candidate is
  supported by a majority of state delegations.
• In any event, the runner-up Presidential
  candidate would become Vice President.

10
Expectations Concerning the Original EC

• This original Electoral College system was
  designed to operate in a non-partisan
  environment.
• It therefore was hoped and expected that
• typically there would be many potential
  Presidential candidates,
• who would not declare themselves as such, let
  alone actively campaign for the office, and
• electors would choose among these candidates on
  the basis of their character and connections, not
  party affiliation or policy promises.
• Therefore, it was also expected that electoral
  votes would be widely scattered and the House
  contingent procedure would be needed 19 times
  out of 20, so
• big states would have the dominant role in
  screening/nominating candidates (in the EC),
  while
• small states would have equal role in most final
  elections (in the House).

11
Expectations Concerning the EC (cont.)

• It was generally hoped and expected that electors
  would typically be
• popularly elected
• from single-member districts (like most state
  legislators, delegates to the state ratifying
  conventions, members of the British House of
  Commons, and as was expected also for members of
  the new U.S. House) and
• that they would be well-informed local notables
  who would act as representative trustees of their
  states and districts.

12
Duvergers Law and Crackup of the Original
Electoral College

• These expectations did not anticipate the
  development of a national two-party system.
• Duvergers Law Given politically ambitious
  candidates, single-winner elections produce (in
  equilibrium) two-candidate contests by virtue of
  the wasted vote argument, etc. and sustain a
  two-party system.
• Given the development of a two-party Federalist
  vs. Republican system, the combination of the
  double-vote and runner-up-is-VP provisions of the
  original Electoral College turned out to be a
  fatal flaw.

13

• The Election of 1789
• Not literally unanimous
• Double-vote system
• NC and RI had not yet ratified
• NY failed to cast electoral votes
• Scattering of second votes
• Fears that northerners wanted to make Adams
  President

14
The Election of 1792

• We see beginnings of the Federalist-Republican
  two-party system in the second (Vice
  Presi-dential) votes

15
The Election of 1796

• The first contested Presidential election
• Federalists John Adams (MA) Thomas Pickney
  (SC)
• Republicans Thomas Jefferson (VA) Aaron Burr
  (NY)
• Nominated by their respective Congressional
  Caucuses
• Note the regionally balanced tickets.
• Intra-Federalist maneuvering
• Hamilton (who had feuded with Adams)
  unsuccess-fully urged some Southern electors to
  vote for Pick-ney anybody but Adams
• However, some Northern electors learned this and
  withheld votes from Pickney (gt Ellsworth and
  others)

16
The Election of 1796 (cont.)Electors 138
Electoral votes 276, Required majority 70
17
The Election of 1796 (cont.)

• The electoral vote outcome was very close
• Federalists won 71electors, all of whom voted for
  Adams, giving Adams the required majority of 70
  for election as President.
• Republicans won 68 electors, all of whom voted
  for Jefferson.
• But the withholding of second votes from Pick-ney
  lowered his vote total to 59, dropping him to
  third place behind Jefferson,
• So the defeated Republican Presidential candidate
  became Vice President.
• Republican electors were even less resolute in
  following the party line in casting their
  second votes.
• Burr had only 30 votes

18
The Election of 1796 (cont.)

• Sectionalism is evident, despite the sectionally
  balanced tickets.
• Many states did not select electors by popular
  vote.

19
Lessons from the Hazardous Game

• Electors are expected to be party men.
• pledged electors
• However, Samuel Miles (Fed. PA) violated his
  pledge.
• An angry Federalist supporter complained What,
  do I chuse Samuel Miles to determine for me
  whether John Adams or Thomas shall be President?
  No! I chuse him to act, not to think.
• State legislative elections (perhaps coming a
  year or more in advance of Presidential
  elections), become very important for politicians
  with national ambitions, because
• legislatures chose how to select electors and may
  change the method for election to election and
• legislatures may choose to appoint the electors
  themselves
• The party that controls a state legislature may
  not want to risk a popular for electors.
• States using legislative election increased to 10
  in 1800.

20
Lessons from the Hazardous Game (cont.)

• And if a controlling party was confident it could
  win popular election, the mode of popular
  election (using at-large election rather than
  districts) could be manipulated to short-term
  party advantage.
• Madison to Monroe (1800)
• All agree that an election by districts would be
  best if it could be general, but while ten states
  choose either by their legislatures or by a
  general ticket, it is folly or worse for the
  other six not to follow.

21
Election of 1800

• Largely a repeat of 1796
• same candidates
• same battle lines.
• However, the strategic implications of EC rules
  were better understood
• manipulation of elector selection
• danger of withholding votes.
• Equally close as 1796 but tipping the other way.
• Republicans win with 73 electors vs. 65 for
  Federalists.

22
(No Transcript)
23
Election of 1800 (cont.)

• The Republicans (unlike the Federalists) failed
  to withhold one Vice Presidential electoral
  vote.
• Counting of Electoral Votes before joint session
  of Congress
• Jefferson 78
• Burr 78
• Adams 65
• Pickney 64
• Jay 1
• So the election was thrown into House, under
  the contingent procedure,
• choosing between Jefferson and Burr only.
• Burr did not chose to withdraw.
• But if the four electoral votes from GA for
  Jefferson and Burr had been disqualified as
  invalid, no candidate would have received the
  required 70 electoral votes, so
• the House could have chosen any of the five
  candidates as President.
• Note that the single Federalist elector who voted
  for Adams and Jay could have voted for Adams and
  Burr,
• in which case Burr would have been elected
  President and Jefferson would have remained Vice
  President.

24
Election of 1800 (cont.)

• Until 20th Amendment (1933), the new Congress did
  not convene until late in the year following
  Congressional elections.
• So the Presidential election was thrown into the
  lame duck House elected in 1798, which was
  controlled by the Federalists (though Federalists
  had lost control of the House elected in 1800).
• Federalists generally supported Burr in order to
  deny Jefferson the presidency.
• Several state delegations were internally
  deadlocked.
• House deadlocked for 35 ballots.
• Ultimately, a few Federalists abstained to end
  the deadlock on 36th ballot.

25
(No Transcript)
26
The 12th Amendment

• After the 1800 fiasco, Congress proposed, and the
  states quickly ratified (in time for 1804
  election), the 12th Amendment to the
  Constitution.
• Electors now cast separate (single) votes for
  President and Vice President.
• The required electoral vote majority for
  President (and for Vice President) is a simple
  majority of votes cast ( number of electors),
  which at most one candidate can achieve.
• If no candidate receives the required simple
  majority for President, the House (still voting
  by state delegations) chooses from among the top
  three vs. top five candidates.
• If no candidate receives the required majority
  for Vice President, the Senate (voting
  individually) chooses from among the top two
  candidates.
• Early drafts of the amendment included a
  requirement that electors be popularly elected
  from districts, but this provision was later
  dropped.
• The 12th Amendment remains the constitutional
  language governing Presidential elections.

27
The Transformation of the Electoral College

• By the 1830s, the Electoral College, already
  formally modified by the 12th Amendment, had been
  further transformed into the kind of
  (essentially) automatic popular vote counting
  system that exists today.
• This transformation
• was also driven largely by the development of a
  two-party system, and
• was brought about without any further
  constitutional amendments or (with one minor
  exception) change in federal law,
• but rather by changes in state laws and party
  practice.

28
Elements of the Transformation

• The way the rival parties first contested a
  Presidential election was to secure the selection
  of electors expected to cast electoral votes for
  their Presidential and Vice Presidential
  candidate.
• Beginning even with the first contested
  Presidential election in 1796, elector candidates
  were therefore almost invariably party men,
  pledged (and faithful) to the (Presidential and
  Vice Presidential) nominees of their party.
• Put otherwise, electors became party delegates
  rather that trustees of their states or districts
  cf. regular delegates vs. superdelegates
• Once pledged and faithful electors have been
  selected, the prospective electoral vote for
  Presidential candidates is also known.

29
Elements of the Transformation (cont.)

• In early elections, the mode of selecting
  Presidential electors was regularly manipulated
  by party politicians in each state, on the basis
  of partisan calculations.
• By 1832, Presidential electors were almost
  universally selected by popular (vs. legislative)
  vote (and by much expanded electorates).
• By 1836, the mode of popular election in every
  state was (following Madisons strategic advice)
  the general ticket (or party slate), rather than
  election from districts (or by some kind of
  proportional representation).
• This induced the almost universal
  winner-take-all rule for the casting electoral
  votes at the state level.
• However, at the present time two small states (ME
  and NE) use the Modified District Plan.

30
Mode of Elector Selection
31
Mode of Elector Selection (cont.)

• Why were state legislatures willing to give up
  the power to select Presidential electors?
• The intensity of party competition declined after
  1800.
• Legislative appointment of electors was
  disrupting state legislative elections.
• cf. willingness of state legislatures to ratify
  the 17th Amendment (popular election of U.S.
  Senators)
• The lone holdout was South Carolina.

32
Mode of Elector Selection (cont.)

• Why did election of electors by districts give
  way to election of electors at-large (usually on
  a slate or general ticket)?
• Partisan strategic considerations
• as expressed by Madison to Monroe in 1800
• More important state strategic considerations
• No matter what other states may do, each state
  could enhance its influence in Presidential
  politics by casting electoral votes on a
  winner-take-all basis.
• cf. Floridas consideration of district elections
  in the mid-1990s
• There is no equilibrium until all states use
  the winner-take-all method.
• However, this equilibrium results in new balance
  of voting power that is much more favorable to
  the larger states, much more than
  counterbalancing the small state bonus in EV
  apportionment.

33
Elements of the Transformation (cont.)

• Moreover, the two-party system bypasses the House
  contingent procedure at least 19 times out of
  20.
• On this point, the election of 1824 (the second
  and last time an election was thrown into the
  House) was the exception that proved the rule.
• The Federalist Party had collapsed and the
  Democratic-Republican Party was unchallenged.
• Consequently there was no longer pressure for
  D-Rs to unite behind a single Presidential-Vice
  Presidential ticket.
• Four candidates, all nominally belonging to the
  same D-R party, sought the Presidency.
• Unsurprisingly, no candidate received a majority
  of the electoral votes and the election was
  thrown into the House (for the second and last
  time).
• However, whenever there is a serious
  third-party ticket (especially one with a
  geographical base of support such that it may win
  electoral votes), the possibility than the
  election may be thrown into the House arises.
• Moreover, since the 23rd Amendment (giving the
  District of Columbia three electoral votes) was
  ratified in 1961, the total number of electoral
  votes has been an even number (538),
• so an electoral vote tie (269-269) is possible,
  and
• an election might be thrown into the House even
  in the absence of a third-party candidate winning
  election votes.

34
Almost Winner-Take-All

• By the 1830s, almost all states had moved to
  popular election of electors on an at-large or
  state-wide basis.
• Most states used a general ticket system in which
  votes chose among party slates of elector
  candidates.
• Vote for one slate of electors
• Democratic electors
• Republican electors
• This effectively guaranteed that a states
  electoral votes would be cast on a
  winner-take-all.
• However, in some states electors ran as
  individuals on a generalize plurality basis.
• Vote for no more than four elector candidates
• D1 R1
• D2 R2
• D3 R3
• D4 R4
• Friends and neighbors politics might result in
  a divided electoral vote from the state.

35
Duvergers Law

• Single-winner elections, especially conducted on
  the basis of Simple Plurality Voting, tend to
  produce and sustain two-candidate (and two-party)
  elections in equilibrium.
• Conversely, parliamentary systems using
  proportional representation in large districts
  tend to produce and sustain multi-party systems.
• In part, Duvergers Law is driven by strategic
  voting by ordinary voters who are reluctant to
  waste their votes by voting for third
  candidates/parties that have no real chance of
  winning.

36
Duvergers Law (cont.)

• In much greater part, Durvergers Law is driven
  by the strategic calculations of ambitious
  candidates and parties.
• If a party splits and runs two (more or less
  clone) candidates, they will be spoilers against
  each other and throw the election to the other
  party.
• This prospect of electoral disaster creates a
  huge incentive for even a highly factional party
  to unite behind a single candidate.
• Conversely, if there three significant candidates
  or parties are contesting an election, there is a
  huge incentive for two of them to make deal
  under which one makes a strategic withdrawal in
  favor of the other (in return for something).
• In general, each party in a competitive two-party
  system has a huge incentive to remain united and
  not split into rival factions that run candidates
  in general elections.

37
Duvergers Law (cont.)

• With respect to the Electoral College system,
  Duvergers Law implies that (contrary to the
  Framers expectations) the House contingent
  procedure will be bypassed at least 19 times out
  of 20.
• Thus the Electoral College system is trans-formed
  into something still more favorable to large
  states than the Framers expected, i.e.,
• not only do large states gain more power in the
  first (electoral vote) stage (due winner-take-all
  electoral votes), but also
• the second (House contingent election stage)
  stage (where small states have equal power) is
  almost always bypassed.

38
Duvergers Law (cont.)

• The inverse of Duvergers Law implies that if
  one of the parties in a two-party system is
  greatly weakened, or is unable or unwilling to
  compete for votes effectively, the dominant party
  is very likely to break apart, because the
  external threat that otherwise keeps it together
  is removed.
• Consistent with this inverse principle, the
  totally dominant Democratic-Republican Party
  split into factions in the 1824 election, with
  the result that four (serious) candidates for
  President sought and won electoral votes.
• So the 1824 election was thrown into the House.

39
The Election of 1824

• Initially, there were five prospective
  Presidential candidates (all Democratic-Republican
  s), nominated by their state legislatures and
  supported by their regions
• John Quincy Adams (Secretary of State)
• John C. Calhoun (Secretary of War)
• Henry Clay (U.S. Representative and former
  Speaker)
• William Crawford (Secretary of the Treasury)
• Andrew Jackson (Army General, hero of the Battle
  of New Orleans)
• Thus 1824 was an essentially a non-partisan
  election, more or less of the nature that the
  Framers expected.
• In due course Calhoun withdrew his Presidential
  candidacy and became the (more or less) consensus
  candidate for Vice President.

40
The Election of 1824 (cont.)

• Adams represented the Northeast and was favored
  by residual Federalists.
• Jackson represented the West and the common
  man.
• Crawford was in poor health and was supported
  primarily by his home state of Georgia.
• Clay was the obvious compromise candidate
  between Adams and Jackson, with much second
  preference support
• He probably could have beaten either Adams or
  Jackson (and certainly Crawford) in a straight
  fight.

41
The Election of 1824 (cont.)

• Presidential election results (first round)
• Electoral Vote Popular
  Votes Jackson 99 41
• Adams 84 31
• Crawford 41 11
• Clay 37 13
• Others 0
  4
• Bear in mind that six states still appointed
  electors and that states that used popular
  election varied considerably with respect to the
  franchise.

42
The Election of 1824 (cont.)
43
The Election of 1824 (cont.)

• The compromise candidate Clay was squeezed out of
  third place in the electoral vote ranking by
  Crawford.
• Under the 12th Amendment, the House could chose
  only from among top three candidates.
• Clay probably would have been elected president
  if
• the House could still chose among the top five
  candidates or
• Crawford had not been a candidate (Crawford was a
  spoiler to Clay).
• Even if Adams or Jackson had won the electoral
  votes cast for Crawford, Clay would have been
  among top three candidates.
• However, if Jackson had won at least 32 of
  Crawfords electoral votes, the election would
  not have gone into the House.

44
The Election of 1824 (cont.)

• Clay had great influence in the House.
• He detested Jackson and endorsed Adams.
• Adams (just) won on the first ballot (24 state
  delegations)
• Adams 13
• Jackson 7
• Crawford 4
• Adams subsequently appointed Clay Secretary of
  State.
• Jackson and his supporters denounced the corrupt
  bargain between Adams and Clay.

45
The Election of 1824 (cont.)
46
Consequences of the1824 Election

• Consistent with Duvergers Law, the
  faction-alized Democratic-Republicans split into
  two rival political parties.
• Adams and Clay formed the new National Republican
  (subsequently Whig) Party.
• Jackson formed the new Democratic Party.
• Two party competition has been sustained ever
  since (though with temporary splits in one or
  other party in individual elections).
• No subsequent election has been thrown into the
  House.
• Prior to the 1825 contingent election, the House
  adopted special rules for its conduct.
• These rules remain in effect and would
  (presumably) by used in any future House election.

47
The EC as a Vote-Counting Mechanism

• In 1845 Congress established a uniform nationwide
  Presidential election day (i.e., day for
  selecting Presidential electors).
• On November 4, 2008, voters in each state will go
  to the polls and vote for either the Democratic
  or Republican (or possibly other) slate of
  elector candidates, who are pledged to their
  partys (Pres. VP) nominees.
• With popular election of pledged electors,
  American voters may be forgiven for thinking they
  are actually voting directly for Presidential
  candidates (often there is little on the ballot
  to suggest otherwise).
• In each state, the elector slate receiving the
  most votes is elected (with the exceptions noted
  for ME and NE).
• The electors will meet in their state capitals in
  mid-December and cast their electoral votes as
  pledged.

48
Vote-Counting Mechanism (cont.)

• Electoral vote tallies will be transmitted from
  each state capital to Congress and are counted
  before a joint session on January 5, 2009.
• The President of the Senate Vice President
  Cheney will announces the vote and proclaim that
  ?? and ?? are the President-elect and Vice
  President-elect.
• So in (almost invariable) practice, everything
  will be determined on election night in November,
  and the remaining steps are merely ceremonial
  that is, TV prognosticators can
• report the popular vote winner in each state,
• add up the corresponding electoral votes, and
• declare a President-elect.

49
(Alleged) Problems with the EC

• The Voting Power Problem. Does the EC or EU
  give voters in different states member nations
  unequal voting power?
• If so, the EC EU violates the criterion of One
  Person, One Vote (OPOV).
• Which voters are favored and which disfavored and
  by how much?
• The Election Reversal Problem. The candidate who
  wins the most popular votes nationwide may fail
  to be elected.
• The election 2000 provides an example (provided
  we take the official popular vote in FL at face
  value).
• The Partisan Bias Problem. Does the EC as a vote
  counting system favor one party over the other
  (at the present time or in times past)?
• This is closely connected with the Election
  Reversal Problem.
• The Battleground States Problem. The Electoral
  College focuses the Presidential election contest
  on a few battleground states, which get very
  disproportionate attention from the candidates
  and parties.
• This is loosely connected with the Voting Power
  Problem.
• Other Problems -- mere vote-counting may fail.
• What if electors violate their pledges?
• What about the House contingent procedure?
• Americans have no constitutional right to vote
  for President.

50
EC Variants The Apportionment of Electoral Votes

• Keep the winner-take all practice in 2000, Bush
  271, Gore 267 in 2004, Bush 286, Kerry, 252 but
  use a different formula to apportioning electoral
  votes among states (All require a constitutional
  amendment.)
• Apportion electoral votes in whole numbers on
  basis of House seats only Bush 211, Gore 225
  Bush 224, Kerry 212
• Apportion electoral votes fractionally
  precisely proportional to population Bush
  268.96092, Gore 269.03908 Bush 275.67188, Kerry
  262.32812
• Translated outcomes take account of Duvergers
  mechanical effects only (vs. psychological/stra
  tegic effects)

51
EC Variants The Apportionment of Electoral Votes
(cont.)

• Apportion electoral votes fractionally to be
  precisely proportional to population but then add
  back the constant two Bush 277.968, Gore
  260.032 Bush 285.407, Kerry 252.593
• Apportion electoral votes equally among the
  states in the manner of the House contingent
  procedure Bush 30, Gore 21 Bush 31, Kerry 20
• National Bonus Plan 538 electoral votes are
  apportioned and cast as at present but an
  additional bloc of electoral votes e.g., 100
  are awarded on a winner-take-all basis to the
  national popular vote winner. Bush 271, Gore
  367 Bush 386, Kerry 252

52
EC Variants The Casting of Electoral Votes

• Apportion electoral votes as at present but use
  something other than winner-take-all for casting
  state electoral votes.
• Some such proposals can be adopted on a
  state-by-state basis (because the position of
  elector can be maintained.
• All are likely to produce splits in state
  electoral votes.
• Pure District Plan select electors from
  single-member districts (as originally expected),
  so each electoral vote is cast for the district
  winner.
• Modified District Plan select the two Senate
  electors statewide and the House electors by
  district probably CDs -- present NE and ME
  practice. Bush 289, Gore 249 I dont have
  good data for 2004

53
EC Variants The Casting of Electoral Votes
(cont.)

• Pure Proportional Plan electoral votes are cast
  fractionally in precise proportion to state
  popular vote. Bush 259.2868, Gore 258.3364,
  Nader 14.8100, Buchanan 2.4563, Other 3.1105
  Bush 277.857, Kerry 260.143 (excluding minor
  candidates) (implies doing away with electors
  as individuals)
• Whole Number Proportional Plan e.g., Colorado
  Prop. 36 electoral votes are cast in whole
  numbers on the basis of some (PR-style)
  apportionment formula applied to each states
  popular vote. Bush 263, Gore 269, Nader 6, or
  Bush 269, Gore 269 Bush 280, Kerry 258

54
The Popular Vote Alternative to the EC

• Elect the President and Vice President on the
  basis the popular vote of the nation as a whole.
• Requires national election administration, voter
  qualifications and registration, ballot access
  rules, etc.?
• Runoff requirement? With what threshold?
• Supplementary vote like London mayor, IRV etc.?
• To bypass the constitutional amendment process,
  adopt the National Popular Vote Plan,
• to be effected by interstate compact (which
  requires the consent of Congress but is not a
  constitutional amendment) among states that
  collectively control at least 270 electoral
  votes.
• The states in the compact pledge to cast their
  electoral votes for the national popular vote
  winner.
• Problems
• There is no official national popular vote
  winner.
• The Plan largely ignores general popular vote
  problems noted above.
• Would the compact hold in an election like 2000
  (i.e., in which NPV plan would actually make
  difference)?

55
Voting Power

• A measure of individual voting power allows us to
  resolve the following questions
• How much (if any) does individual voting power
  under the existing EC vary from state to state?
• In so far as it does vary, are voters in large or
  small states favored?
• How would voting power change under various
  proposed (and other) alternatives to the existing
  Electoral College?
• It is essential to define and distinguish between
• voting weight and
• voting power.
• With respect to the Electoral College, we need to
  bear in mind the distinctions already made
  between
• how electoral votes are apportioned among the
  states (which determines voting weight), and
• how electoral votes are cast within states
  (which, in conjunction with voting weight,
  determines voting power).

56
Weighted Voting Example

• Suppose that four parties receive these vote
  shares Party A, 27 Party B, 25 Party C, 24
  Party 24.
• Seats are apportioned in a 100-seat parliament
  according some apportionment formula. In this
  case, the apportionment of seats is
  straight-forward
• Party A 27 seats Party C 24 seats
• Party B 25 seats Party D 24 seats
• Seats (voting weights) have been apportioned in a
  way that is precisely proportional to vote
  support, but voting power has not been so
  apportioned (and cannot be so apportioned).

57
Weighted Voting Example (cont.)

• Since no party controls a majority of 51 seats, a
  governing coalition of two or more parties must
  be formed.
• A partys voting power is based on its
  oppor-tunities to help create (or destroy)
  winning (governing) coalitions.
• But, with a small number of parties, coalition
  possibilities -- and therefore differences in
  voting power -- are highly limited.

58
Weighted Voting Example (cont.)

• A 27 seats B 25 seats C 24 seats D 24
  seats
• Once the parties start negotiating, they will
  find that Party A has voting power that greatly
  exceeds its slight advantage in seats. This is
  because
• Party A can form a winning coalition with any one
  of the other parties and
• the only way to exclude Party A from a winning
  coalition is for Parties B, C, and D to form a
  three-party coalition.
• The seat allocation (totaling 100 seats) is
  strategically equivalent to this much simpler
  allocation (totaling 5 seats)
• Party A 2 seats
• Parties B, C, and D 1 seat each
• Total of 5 seats, so a winning coalition requires
  3 seats.
• So the original seat allocation is strategically
  equivalent to one in which Party A has twice the
  weight of each of the other parties (which is not
  at all proportional to their vote shares).

59
Voting Power (cont.)

• With respect to the second question, directly
  contra-dictory claims are commonly made.
• The Electoral College . . . gives greater voting
  power to voters in states with less than average
  population and less to those with greater than
  average population. (Gary Parish, The Electoral
  College Source of Inequality and Social
  Injustice in America)
• According to a frequently published argument . .
  . , there is an intrinsic large-state advantage
  in Presidential elections. (Howard Margolis,
  The Banzhaf Fallacy, AJPS, 1983)
• Partly because the Electoral College is viewed by
  some as favoring small states and by others as
  favoring large states, it is commonly asserted
  that a constitutional amending modifying or
  abolishing the Electoral College can never by
  ratified by the required 38 states.
• Hence the National Popular Vote Plan (to use an
  interstate compact to bypass the constitutional
  amendment process).

60
Weighted Voting Example (cont.)

• Suppose at the next election the vote and seat
  shares change a bit
• Before Now
• Party A 27 Party A 30
• Party B 25 Party B 29
• Party C 24 Party C 22
• Party D 24 Party D 19
• While the seats shares have only slightly
  changed, the strategic situation has changed
  fundamentally.
• Party A can no longer form a winning coalition
  with Party D.
• Parties B and C can now form a winning coalition
  by themselves.
• The seat allocation is equivalent to this much
  simpler allocation
• Parties A, B, and D 1 seat each
• Party D 0 seats
• Total of 3 seats, so a winning coalition requires
  2 seats.
• Party A has lost voting power, despite gaining
  seats.
• Party C has gained voting power, despite losing
  seats.
• Party D has become powerless (a so-called dummy),
  despite retaining a substantial number of seats.

61
Weighted Voting Example (cont.)

• Suppose at the next election the vote and seat
  shares change a bit
• Before Now
• Party A 27 Party A 30
• Party B 25 Party B 29
• Party C 24 Party C 22
• Party D 24 Party D 19
• While the seats shares have only slightly
  changed, the strategic situation has changed
  fundamentally.
• Party A can no longer form a winning coalition
  with Party D.
• Parties B and C can now form a winning coalition
  by themselves.
• The seat allocation is equivalent to this much
  simpler allocation
• Parties A, B, and D 1 seat each
• Party D 0 seats
• Total of 3 seats, so a winning coalition requires
  2 seats.
• Party A has lost voting power, despite gaining
  seats.
• Party C has gained voting power, despite losing
  seats.
• Party D has become powerless (a so-called dummy),
  despite retaining a substantial number of seats.

62
The Apportionment of Electoral Votes

• The apportionment of electoral votes (voting
  weights) produces a systematic and substantial
  small-state advantage in the apportionment of
  electoral votes relative to the apportionment
  population.
• This is the basis of the argument that the
  Electoral College advantages voters in smaller
  (rural, more conservative, etc.) states.
• The magnitude of this small-state apportionment
  advantage is not fixed in the Constitution.
• It varies (inversely) with the size of the House
  (relative to the Senate), which is determined by
  Congress.
• If the House had been sufficiently larger than
  435, Gore would have won the 2000 election (even
  while losing Florida).

63
The Small-State Apportionment Advantage
64
Another View of the Small-State Advantage
65
The Casting of Electoral Votes

• Remember that state choice of the general ticket
  for electing electors produces the
  winner-take-all practice that produces the
  weighted voting game noted at the outset.
• Many have believed that this practice produces a
  large-state advantage in voting power that
  counteracts (in some degree) the small-state
  advantage in apportion-ment.
• This is the basis for the argument that the
  Electoral College gives disproportionate voting
  power to voters in larger (urban, ethnically
  diverse, etc.) states.

66
A Priori Voting Power

• An appropriate voting power measure can evaluate
  the voting power of each state in the Electoral
  College weighted voting game with 51 voters.
• In addition, there is a large-number unweighted
  majority voting game within each state that
  determines how that state will vote in the
  Electoral College.
• So the overall Presidential election is a
  two-tier voting game.
• The measurement and interpretation of a priori
  voting power has been a major focus of the LSE
  program on Voting Power and Procedures.
• VPP research has focused primarily on voting
  power with respect to the EU Council of Ministers
  (and other EU institutions).
• Measures of a priori voting power applied to the
  Electoral College (or the EU) take account only
  of the its formal rules plus the population of
  each state and the mathe-matical formula used to
  apportion House seats among the states,
• but not demographics, historic voting patterns,
  ideology, polling results, election forecasts,
  etc.

67
Felsenthal and Machover, The Measurement of
Voting Power

• In their book, Dan Felsenthal and Moshé Machover
  (both members of the VPP Board of Directors)
  present the most conclusive study of voting power
  measures.
• They conclude that the so-called Absolute Banzhaf
  Measure is the appropriate measure for evaluating
  power in typical voting situations, including the
  Electoral College.
• They further show that this measure has the
  following a probabilistic interpretation
• A voters absolute Banzhaf voting power is the
  voters a priori probability of casting a
  decisive vote, i.e., one that determines the
  outcome of an election (e.g., by breaking what
  otherwise would be a tie).
• In this context, a priori probability means, in
  effect, probability given that all other voters
  vote randomly (i.e., vote for either candidate as
  if they independently flip fair coins), so that
  every point in the Bernoulli space (every
  combination of voters) is equally likely to
  occur.
• Such hypothetical two-candidate elections may be
  called Bernoulli elections.

68
Calculating Power Index Values

• There are mathematical formulas and algorithms
  that can calculate or estimate voting power
  values.
• Various website make these algorithms readily
  available.
• One of the best of these is the website created
  by Dennis Leech (University of Warwick and
  another VPP Board member) Computer Algorithms
  for Voting Power Analysis,
• http//www.warwick.ac.uk/ecaae/
• which was used in making most of the
  calculations that follow.

69
Share of Voting Power by Share of Electoral Votes
70
Share of Voting Power by Share of Population
71
State Voting Power in the Existing EC (cont.)

• It is evident from these charts that
• only Californias share of voting power
  substantially deviates from (and exceeds) its
  share of electoral votes
• the very modest large-state advantage in voting
  power (relative to voting weight) is not
  sufficient to balance out the small-state
  advantage in apportionment indeed,
• even Californias distinctive advantage in terms
  of voting power (relative to voting weight) is
  not sufficient to give it voting power
  proportional to its population.
• Californias absolute Banzhaf power is .475 .
• Remember what this means if all other states
  cast their electoral votes by independently
  flipping coins, almost half of the time they
  would split their 483 votes sufficiently equally
  that Californias bloc of 55 votes would be
  decisive and determine the winner.

72
The 125 Million Two-Tier Voting Game

• But as previously noted, a U.S. Presidential
  election really is a two-tier voting system, in
  which the casting of electoral votes is
  determined by a simple majority voting games
  within each state.
• In such a two-tier system, individual a priori
  voting power is the probability of double
  decisiveness, i.e.,
• that a voter casts a decisive vote within his or
  her state (i.e., that there is tie among the
  other voters in the state),
• and
• that his or her state casts a decisive bloc of
  electoral votes (i.e., that neither candidate
  wins 270 electoral votes from the other states).
• Put otherwise, individual voting power in the
  two-tier system is equal to
• individual voting power in the unweighted (but
  large number) majority voting game within the
  state
• times
• the states voting power in the 51-state weighted
  voting game.

73
The Two-Tier Voting Game (cont.)

• Probability theory and the properties of Banzhaf
  measure tell us that the individual voting power
  in the first tier (within state) voting game is
  inversely proportional to the square root of the
  number of voters in the state (to excellent
  approximation once n gt 25).
• We previously saw that a states voting power in
  the second tier voting game is approximately
  proportional to its electoral vote (and
  therefore, apart from the small- state
  apportionment advantage, roughly proportional to
  its population).
• Putting these two considerations together, it
  follows that individual a priori voting power in
  the two-tier system
• increases with the population of the voters
  state, and
• is approximately proportional to the square root
  of the number of voters in the voters state.

74
Individual Voting Power Under the Existing EC

• The following chart shows how individual voting
  power under the existing Electoral College varies
  by state population.
• It also shows
• mean individual voting power nationwide, and
• individual voting power under direct popular vote
  (calculated in the same manner as individual
  voting power within a state).
• This is necessarily uniform over the nation.
• Note that it is substantially greater than mean
  individual voting power under the Electoral
  College.
• Indeed, it is greater than individual voting
  power in every state except California.
• By the criterion of a priori voting power, only
  voters in California would be hurt if the
  existing Electoral College were replaced by a
  direct popular vote.
• Methodological note in most of the following
  charts, individual voting power is scaled so that
  the voters in the least favored state have a
  value of 1.000, so
• numerical values are not comparable from chart to
  chart, and
• the scaled value of individual voting power under
  direct popular vote changes from chart to chart.

75
Individual Voting Power Under the Existing EC
76
House Electoral Votes Only
77
Electoral Votes Precisely Proportional to
Population
78
EVs Precisely Proportional to Population, plus Two
79
Electoral Votes Apportioned Equally Among
States(or House Contingent Procedure)
80
Individual Voting Power under Alternative Rules
for Casting Electoral Votes

• Calculations for the Pure District Plan, Pure
  Proportional Plan, and the Whole-Number
  Proportional Plan are straightforward.
• Under the Modified District Plan (or National
  Bonus Plan), each voter casts a single vote that
  counts two ways
• within the district (or state) and
• at-large (i.e., within the state or nation).
• Calculating individual voting power in such
  systems is far from straightforward.
• I am in the process of working out approximations
  based on very large samples of Bernoulli
  elections.

81
Pure District System
82
Modified District System (Approximate)
83
A Unilateral Move From Winner-Take-All to the
(Pure) District System

• In the mid-1990s, the Florida state legislature
  seriously considered switching to the Modified
  District Plan.
• The effect of such a switch on the individual
  voting power is shown in the following chart.
• However, I assume a switch to the Pure District
  Plan, because this can be directly calculated.
• Madisons earlier strategic advice is powerfully
  confirmed,
• though the voting-power consideration is
  logically distinct from the party-advantage
  consideration Madison had in mind.
• But the latter is also illustrated considering
  mechanical effects only, if Florida had made
  the switch, Gore would have been elected
  President (regardless of the statewide vote in
  Florida).
• Even if a district system is universally agreed
  to be socially superior (as Madison considered
  it), states will not voluntary choose to move
  that direction.
• States are faced with a Prisoners Dilemma.

84
(No Transcript)
85
(Pure) Pure Proportional System
86
The Whole-Number Proportional Plan

• This plan divides a states electoral votes
  between (or among) the candidates in a way that
  is as close to proportional to the candidates
  state popular vote shares as possible, given that
  the apportionment must be in whole numbers.
• Unlike the (Pure) Proportional Plan, whole-number
  proportionality allows for the retention of
  electors.
• Accordingly, it is the only proportional plan
  that can be implemented at the state level (as
  Colorado Prop. 36 proposed).
• Colorado Proposition 36 used a distinctly ad hoc
  apportionment formula.
• But, in the event there are just two candidates
  (as in Bernoulli elections), all apportionment
  formulas work in the same straightforward way
• multiply each candidates share of the popular
  vote by the states number of electoral votes and
  then round off in the normal manner.
• The following chart shows that this plan produces
  a truly bizarre distribution of voting power.

87
Whole-Number Proportional Plan

• Similar calculations and chart were
  produced, independently and earlier, by Claus
  Beisbart and Luc Bovens, A Power Analysis of the
  Amend-ment 36 in Colorado, University of
  Konstanz, May 2005, and Public Choice, March 2008.

88
National Bonus Plan(s)
89
Individual Voting Power Summary Chart
90
Election Reversals

• Any districted electoral system can produce an
  election reversal.
• That is, the candidate or party that wins the
  most popular votes nationwide may fail to win the
  most parliamentary seats or electoral votes (and
  therefore loses the election).
• Such outcomes are actually more common in some
  parliamentary systems than in U.S. Presidential
  elections.
• The U.S. Electoral College has produced three
  manifest election reversals (though all were very
  close). outcomes).
• But the mother of all EC election reversals is
  not usually recognized as such.

91
EC Election Reversals

• Election Winner Runner-up
  Winners 2-P PV
• 2000 271 Bush (R) 267 Gore (D)
  49.73
• 1888 233 Harrison (R) 168 Cleveland
  (D) 49.59
• 1876 185 Hayes (R) 184 Tilden (D)
  48.47
• The 1876 election was decided (on inauguration
  eve) by a Electoral Commission that, by a bare
  majority and on a straight party line vote,
  awarded all of 20 disputed electoral votes to
  Hayes.
• Unlike Gore and Cleveland, Tilden won an absolute
  majority (51) of the total popular vote.
• Note that, of the two undoubted wrong winner
  elections, 1888 was worse than 2000 in that,
  while the (relative) popular vote margins were
  about the same, Bush won with the smallest
  electoral vote margin since 1876, while Harrison
  won quite decisively in the Electoral College.

92
The 1860 Election

• Candidate Party Pop. Vote EV
• Lincoln Republican 39.82 180
• Douglas Northern Democrat 29.46 12
• Breckinridge Southern Democrat 18.09 72
• Bell Constitutional