Maritime Domain Protection CC4913 Study

1
Maritime Domain Protection CC4913 Study

• Naval Postgraduate School
• June 2004

2
The Class

• Thirteen Junior Officers.
• Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force.
• Surface Warfare, Intelligence, Air Defense and
  Communications.
• From 1 to 18 years in the service.

3
Task

• Employ observe, orient, decide and act (OODA)
  framework to develop a Maritime Domain Protection
  (MDP) Architecture.

4
Dr. Bogers Direction

• Examine command relationships.
• Why does one actor need to talk to another?
• Examine all elements of OODA loop.
• Focus on Processes and Organizational structures.
  
• Assume existing and future technical
  interoperability issues will be overcome.

5
Class Considerations

• Organizations and Commanders
• Speed of Decision / Response time / Latencies
• Sensor Requirements
• Communications Requirements
• Decision Processes and Processors (doctrine)
• Information trade-offs

• AOR Scope
• Threat and Mission
• Resources for Commanders
• Other command relationships (organic vs.
  in-organic)
• Rules Of Engagement
• Legal Requirements and Constraints

6
Overview

• Scope
• Threat
• Technology
• Operational Architecture

7
Scope

• Capt Gilbert Garcia, USMC
• LT Mark Haney, USN
• ENS Aaron Woolsey, USN

8
Scope of the Problem

• Develop a Maritime Domain Protection (MDP)
  Architecture capable of discovering
• and quickly disseminating information pertaining
  to future or impending
• Acts of Violence,
• Weapon Engagement, or other
• Hostile Act at any Phase by any adversary.
• Originating from a planned Sea base . launched
  from the Sea, or utilizing the Sea as a
  conduit..  The primary focus is outside of CONUS,
  12 nm out, not inland waters. Designed to defend
  CONUS, Alaska, Hawaii.
• APPROACH
• Identify the key players.
• Define the information flow among the key
  players.
• Apply the information flow to a MDP Organization.
• Fine tune the scope of the MDP problem.

9
Litmus Test

• Scenario
• Undercover Drug Enforcement Agency Agent in
  Thailand gets a tipper that an Anthrax shipment
  will be made on known merchant vessel.
• Considerations
• Keep him undercover.
• Locate the vessel.
• Get the info to the boarding team.

10
USA PATRIOT ACT Uniting and Strengthening of
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism

• Primary Benefits
• Warrants for physical searches and electronic
  collections easier when involving foreign
  suspects.
• the purpose changed to significant purpose
• Breached the wall between criminal law
  enforcement and intelligence or
  counterintelligence gathering.
• Sunset December 30th, 2005
• Lose the collection benefits.
• Do not lose information flow, wall remains down.

11
Maritime Law

• United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea
  (UNCLOS)
• Addresses Slave Trading, Piracy Drugs.
• Does not address WMD.
• International Law
• On the high seas, unlawful activities of a
  merchant vessel remain the prerogative and
  responsibility of the flag State.

12
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)

• Effort to reach agreements among nations to allow
  searches of ships and aircraft carrying suspected
  weapons-related cargo.
• The US, recognizing that cooperation may not
  always be forthcoming, has intimated that it will
  act unilaterally, if necessary.

13
Legal Issues

• Title III (Duties, Human Rights and Guarantees)
• Specific procedures to collect for criminal
  activity.
• Probable cause of a criminal act required.
• Does not cover threats to National Security.
• FISA (Foreign Intel Surveillance Act of 1978)
• Established requirement for judicial approval.
• Probable cause that it is a foreign actor.
• FISA/DOJ set up a wall intel and criminal.

14
PATRIOT ACT

• Must be a significant foreign intelligence
  information gathering purpose versus primary.
• Obtain evidence primarily for a criminal
  prosecution if it is an offense related to a
  foreign intelligence threat (under FISA).
• Breached the wall between criminal law
  enforcement and intelligence or
  counterintelligence gathering.
• FISA investigations can be used against US
  citizens but requirements are stricter.

15
Benefits of PATRIOT

• Any Foreign Intel Information collected in a
  criminal investigation will be turned over to the
  CIA and visa versa.
• Roving wire taps.
• Delayed notification of physical searches.
• Sneak and Peek Searches - Can be extended.
• Also warrant to required to be issued in district
  performed.
• Pen Registers, Traps, and Traces.
• Before relevant to investigation and used by
  foreign actor.
• Now just relevant.

16
PATRIOT ACTFISA Section 1806(k)

• 1) Federal officers who conduct electronic
  surveillance to acquire foreign intelligence
  information under this title may consult with
  federal law enforcement officers to coordinate
  efforts to investigate or protect against

17
PATRIOT ACTFISA Section 1806(k)

• a) actual or potential attack or other grave
  hostile acts of a foreign power or an agent of a
  foreign power
• b) sabotage or international terrorism by a
  foreign power or an agent of a foreign power
• c) clandestine intelligence activities by an
  intelligence service or network of a foreign
  power or by an agent of a foreign power.

18
Sunset Dec 30th 2005

• Significant Purpose
• Roving wiretaps
• Pen Register, Trap, and Trace
• Do not lose
• disclosure of grand jury information containing
  foreign intelligence information to any federal
  law enforcement, intelligence, protective,
  immigration, national defense, or national
  security official in order to assist the official
  receiving that information in the performance of
  his official duties.

19
Threat

• LT Chris Savage, USN
• LT Nelson Heintz, USN
• ENS Jada Johnson, USN

20
MDP Threat Cell

• LNG Tanker
• Everett, MA (near Boston densely populated
  area)
• Cove Point, MD (in Chesapeake Bay)
• Elba Island, GA (inland near Savannah, GA up
  Tybee River)
• Lake Charles, LA ( inland near LA/TX border)
• Oil Tanker
• Galveston, TX
• Port of South Louisiana
• Long Beach, CA
• Trans-Oceanic (WMD)
• New York, NY
• Port of South Los Angeles, CA
• Houston, TX
• Port of South Louisiana, LA

21
Vulnerability Assessment
Scale of Attack
Vectors of Attack
Blue Assets
Red Capabilities
22
Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) Tanker

• Origin
• Malaysia
• Indonesia
• Qatar
• Brunei
• Oman
• Algeria
• Nigeria
• Libya
• Trinidad Tobago
• Australia

• Destination
• Everett, MA
• Cove Point, MD
• Elba Island, GA
• Lake Charles, LA

23
Oil Tanker

• Origin (rank)
• Saudi Arabia(1)
• Iraq(6)
• Kuwait(11)
• Oman(25)
• UAE(27)
• Venezuela(4)
• Colombia(10)
• Ecuador(13)
• Argentina(15)
• Nigeria(5)
• Angola(9)
• Algeria(20)

• Destination
• Galveston, TX
• Port of South Louisiana, LA
• Long Beach, CA

24
Trans-Oceanic Carrier (WMD)

• Origin
• Singapore
• Shanghai, China
• Hong Kong, China
• Ulsan, South Korea
• Kwangyang, South Korea
• Middle East
• Indonesia
• Malaysia

• Destination
• New York, NY
• Long Beach, CA
• Los Angeles, CA
• Port of South Louisiana, LA
• Galveston, TX

25
Vulnerability AssessmentWMD Scenario
Scale of Attack
4
4
Vectors of Attack
Blue Assets
4
3
Threat Area 28 units2 Max Area 50 units2
Red Capabilities
26
Technology

• LT Dave Ng, USN
• 1LT Amanda Kelly, USAF
• ENS Derek Jaskowiak, USN

27
Technology Topics

• Ship Detection Tracking Technology
• Space Based Radar
• Airships
• Weapon Detection Technology
• Buoys
• Knowledge Management Systems

28
Ship Detection Technologies

• HUMINT
• Reporting Systems
• OSINT
• IMINT
• EO/IR, laser-enhanced TV
• ELINT/COMINT
• RADAR, Moving Target Indicator (MTI)
• Synthetic Aperture RADAR (SAR) / Inverse SAR
• Over the Horizon RADAR (OTHR) / Re-locatable OTHR
• HF Surface Wave RADAR (220 nm)
• Passive Millimeter Wave Imaging
• Imaging Coherent Optical Ranging in development
• MASINT
• Acoustic
• Magnetic Anomaly Detection (500 m)
• Wake Detection Bioluminescence
• Stack Effluents

29
Space Based Radar (SBR)

• New program in 2001.
• The main objective is a space-borne capability
  for theater commanders to track moving targets.
• 2001 Mission Needs Statement (MNS) establishes
  the requirement for
• continuous multi-theater surveillance
• identification
• tracking
• targeting of moving ground targets

30
SBR (continued)

• The focus in 2002 2003 included
• requirements development
• technology risk reduction
• concept exploration
• cost feasibility
• FY2004 budget request for Space Based Radar was
  274 million.
• Initial launch is currently projected for 2012.
• Limitations
• Can not identify specific item unilaterally.
• Relies on another ISR source to provide
  identification on target
• Small gaps in coverage early in deployment.

31
SBR Background

• New major defense acquisition program in 2001.
• Delegated by the Secretary of Defense to the Air
  Force.
• The main objective is
• to field, beginning in 2008.
• a space borne capability for theater commanders
  to track moving targets.

32
SBR Mission Needs Statement

• 2001 Multi-Theater Target Tracking Capability
  (MT3C) Mission Needs Statement (MNS) establishes
  the requirement for
• continuous multi-theater surveillance
• identification
• tracking
• targeting of ground-moving targets

33
SBR 2002-2003

• The focus in 2002 and 2003 includes
• requirements development
• technology risk reduction
• concept exploration
• cost feasibility

34
SBR Requirements

• Requirements
• offer day/night,
• all-weather,
• near-continuous,
• global GMTI search/track,
• and high resolution imagery,
• near real-time, direct downlink to theater of
  overhead GMTI and imagery collection.

35
SBR Future

• Initial launch currently is projected for 2012.
• Provide worldwide, on-demand, near continuous,
  surveillance, and reconnaissance for battlespace
  characterization.
• FY2004 budget request the Space Based Radar was
  274 million.
• FY2004 DOD appropriations act (P.L. 108-87),
  Congress cut SBR by 100 million.

36
Limitations

• Can not identify specific item unilaterally.
• Relies on other source of ISR to provide
  identification on target.
• Small gaps in coverage early in deployment.

37
AirshipsCurrent Commercial Technology

• Speeds 40-80 kts
• Altitude 500-9,000 ft
• Range/Endurance 100-600 nm, hours to days
• Payload 12352500 lb
• Sensor packages video, EO/IR, RADAR, SAR, EW/ESM
• Power conventional, solar-fuel cell combo
• Comms SATCOM
• Control manned, remotely piloted, automated
  flight control
• Uses
• cargo, comms relay, surveillance and patrol,
  environmental survey
• pipeline and boundary inspections, coastal patrol
• Maritime Patrol, Border Patrol, VIP Security, Key
  Installation Security, Counter Narcotics,
  Anti-Smuggling, COMINT/SIGINT

38
Sensor Platforms - Airships

• History
• Civil War surveillance, comms
• WWII convoy protection, search and rescue,
  photographic, and mine clearing missions
• Operation Plumbbob
• Operation Moby Dick
• Drug Wars
• Kosovo, Iraq

39
Airships

• Today
• Uses cargo, comms relay, surveillance and
  patrol, environmental survey
• pipeline and boundary inspections, coastal patrol
• Maritime Patrol, Border Patrol, VIP Security, Key
  Installation Security, Counter Narcotics,
  Anti-Smuggling, COMINT/SIGINT
• SASS LITE

40
Airships

• Future
• Stratospheric airships
• HAA
• Battle Blimps
• Broadband Blimps

41
Weapon Detection Technologies

• Chemical, Biological, Radiological Nuclear or
  High-Yield Explosives

42
Detection Technologies(Close Proximity)

• High Energy Photons
• Detects Nuclear, Radiological
• Range Must Surround Target
• X-ray and Backscatter
• Detects Explosives, Nuclear, Radiological
• Range up to 15 feet
• Gravitational Anomaly
• Detects Nuclear Radiological
• Range Minimal
• Fast Neutron and Gamma Ray
• Detects Chemical, Biological, Explosives
• Range up to 6 feet
• Longer range increases detection time

43
Detection Technologies(Close Proximity)

• High Energy Photons
• Detect hidden, shielded nuclear material
• Testing various configurations of shielding
  materials - including lead - that could be used
  to hide nuclear material inside a container and
  so far, nothing has been able to block the
  detector's signals
• X-ray and Backscatter
• Non-intrusive means of rapidly detecting organic
  threats, such as plastic weapons and explosives
• Can also detect nuclear materials
• Explosives naturally send more backscatter
• Gravitational Anomaly
• Responds to minute gravitational gradient
  anomalies
• Unlike radiation, the force of gravity cannot be
  shielded
• Fast Neutron and Gamma Ray
• Unique and remote deciphering of chemical
  formulas through steel using advanced technology
• Tested by the U.S. Navy on January 9, 2003. The
  system had a 100 effective rate in the detection
  of explosives.

44
High Energy Photons

• Detect hidden, shielded nuclear material
• Testing various configurations of shielding
  materials that could be used to hide nuclear
  material inside a container - including lead -
  and so far, nothing has been able to block the
  detector's signals
• Three-microsecond pulse of high-energy photons
• When those photons hit some materials, they cause
  some neutrons to detach
• Three-foot-long metal tubes with sensors
  surrounding the shipping containers pick up those
  signatures
• Goal is to inspect a whole container in 20
  seconds

45
X-ray and Backscatter

• The ZBV is an X-ray inspection tool built into a
  commercially available delivery van. With
  one-sided Z Backscatter imaging, the system
  provides a safe, non-intrusive means of rapidly
  detecting organic threats, such as plastic
  weapons and explosives.
• capable of identifying low levels of
  radioactivity from both gamma rays and neutrons
• Explosives naturally send more backscatter
• Range Varies 5-15 feet
• Van produces low dosage of X-ray
• Lower radiation then ansi standard
• Ships harder then cars
• much bigger
• Can not read through water

46
Gravitational Anomaly

• Portable Nuclear Weapons Detection Technology
• Responds to minute gravitational gradient
  anomalies
• Disturbances are produced by high density nuclear
  materials such as Uranium and Plutonium
• Unlike radiation, the force of gravity cannot be
  shielded
• www.nuclearsolutions.com

47
Fast Neutron and Gamma Ray

• Stoichiometric explosive detector
• Unique and remote deciphering of chemical
  formulas through steel using advanced technology
  with fast neutrons and gamma rays
• Tested by the U.S. Navy on January 9, 2003. The
  system had a 100 effective rate in the detection
  of explosives.
• Longer distance, longer detection time, up to one
  minute
• Six feet detection Range
• Water has no effect on detection
• With no protection, operators stand 30 ft
• Carol Long at NPS is in contact with company
• Coming to NPS in the coming Months
• http//www.hienergyinc.com

48
Buoys

• Uses
• Navigational
• Environmental monitoring
• Oceanographic data collection
• Signal repeaters
• Acoustic array support
• Radiological detection

49
Buoys
50
Buoys
51
Decision Support Knowledge Management Systems
52
Maritime Tracking Systems

• Automated Identification System
• Transponder operating in VHF handles 4,500
  reports per minute and updates every 2 sec
• Vessel Management System
• GPS based vessel tracking and management system,
  any mobile unit can be a vessel
• Vessel Traffic Management Systems
• A multi-sensor C2 system for naval, coastal and
  maritime applications

53
Military KMS

• Current
• USCG Ports and Waterways Safety System Vessel
  Traffic Service
• USCG Maritime Awareness Global Network
  Intelligence Data Management
• Web-enabled Timeline Analysis System (WebTAS)
  with OSINT
• Air Force Research Lab, Naval Surface Warfare
  Center, JIATF-W, JIATF-S, USSOUTHCOM, Joint
  Battle Lab, DIA, NAIC, USSTRATCOM, National
  Institute of Justice
• Future
• Canada Maritime Information and Knowledge
  Management group
• US Joint Knowledge Development Distribution
  Capability

54
Where the military is going

• Canada Maritime Information and Knowledge
  Management group to investigate Maritime ISR,
  multi-sensor integration within a common
  operating environment.
• US Joint Knowledge Development Distribution
  Capability creating, storing, imparting and
  applying knowledge to enhance individual's
  ability to think intuitively joint.

55
Keys for scenarios

• Maintain metadata and definitions to help prevent
  dirty data.
• Design a rule base for passing information.
• Use artificial intelligence to develop
  connections between data points.
• Trusted pull system.

56
Data Mining Tools for Non-obvious Relationships

• Reflexion rule-based engine that detects and
  reacts to patterns in live data streams.
• Colexion Taxonomy Navigation intelligence
  engine that aggregates, classifies, extracts and
  builds knowledge from live data streams.
• NORA seeks out and integrates non-obvious
  relationships between customers, employees,
  vendors, and other sources, 30 of separation.
• ANNA perform entity resolution using only
  anonymized data.

57
Pattern Analysis
Northrup Grumman Information Technology
http//www.webtas.com/patterns.shtml
58
Operational Architecture

• Capt Dave Joseforsky, USMC
• LT Anthony Toriello, USN
• LT Jim Christensen, USN
• ENS Dave Germakian, USN

59
Organization
POTUS
NSC
DoD
DoS
DoHS
CIA
SOUTHCOM
NORTHCOM
PACOM
CENTCOM
EUCOM
USCG
Global Affairs
Arms Control
TTIC
SOCOM
JIATF-W
JIATF-E
JIATF-S
JIATF-N
60
Reasons to use JIATF

• It is a tested and proven JC4I structure that
  works.
• It already leverages interagency relationships.
• It already combines observe/orient (intel) with
  decide/act (operators law enforcement).
• Have USCG and USN units that chop to them
• They have an existing knowledge of their maritime
  region.
• Need to plus up with CT and CP missions and
  personnel.

61
JIATF Missions

• Maritime Domain Protection
• Maritime Domain Awareness
• Counter-Drug (JIATF-S and JIATF-W only)

62
Responsibilities
JIATF X
Discover
Eliminate
MIFC
USN
USAF
Interrupt
JIC
DIA
SOF
CT
CIA
NMIC
CP
INTRL
USCS
USCG
INS
FBI
DEA
PT AUTH
Discover heavy because MDA part is so big.
New to JIATF
63
Why a Maritime Intelligence Fusion Center (MIFC)?

• Already Coordinate with
• Law Enforcement Agencies
• Intelligence Agencies
• Operations Agencies
• Numbered Fleets Coast Guard Districts
• They leverage existing JC4I systems
• Must subordinate MIFC to JIATF

64
JIATF X Organization
JIATF (CG)
DEP DoHS (SES)
JAG/Counsel
COS (Any)
LNO NORTHCOM
C4 Support JI-C (Any)
OPS JI-O (Any)
LAW ENF JI-L DoJ (GS)
ADMIN JI-A (GS)
INTEL JI-I (Any)
Plans Policy JI-P DoHS (GS)
LOG JI-G (GS)
MIFC
FBI
Force Coord.
DoS
DoD
DoD
INTRL
LNOUSAF
DoHS
DoHS
DoHS
JIC
CIA
USCS
LNOUSN/MC
DoJ
INTRL
NMIC
DIA
LNO USCG
INS
DoE
CT
CP
DEA
LNO SOF
PT AUTH
65
JIATF X Organization HD
JIATF (Any)
DEP DoHS (SES)
JAG/Counsel
COS (Any)
LNO NORTHCOM
OPS JI-O (Any)
LAW ENF JI-L DoJ (GS)
ADMIN JI-A (GS)
INTEL JI-I (Any)
Plans Policy JI-P DoHS (GS)
LOG JI-G (GS)
C4 Support JI-C (Any)
CIVIL RESPONSE JI-R (Army)
MIFC
FBI
Force Coord.
DoD
DoD
FEMA
Governor Rep.
INTRL
LNOUSAF
DoS
DoHS
DoHS
Police
JIC
CIA
USCS
LNOUSN/MC
DoHS
INTRL
Fire
NMIC
DIA
LNO USCG
INS
DoJ
Medical
CT
CP
DEA
LNO SOF
DoE
PT AUTH
LNO N Guard
66
JIATF X Centers
MIFC Watch
OPS Watch
INS
JIC
Force Coord.
DoS
CT
FBI
LNOUSAF
DoHS
DEA
NMIC
LNOUSN/MC
DoJ
LNO USCG
CP
CIA
DoE
USCS
DIA
INTRL
PT AUTH
LNO SOF
JAG/Counsel
67
Proposed Locations of JIATF X
68
Other Characteristics

• Manning to new JIATFs
• Add representative from DoHS, and DoS
  (Counter-Terrorism, Counter-Proliferations)
• Surface Action Groups and/or Expeditionary Strike
  Groups (no full CSG)
• Reshuffle existing agency liaison officers
• Military Operations and International LNOs
• Dual hat RegCoCom Representatives to support
  JIATF, as needed.

69
Litmus Test

• Scenario
• Undercover Drug Enforcement Agency Agent in
  Thailand gets a tipper that an Anthrax shipment
  will be made on known merchant vessel.
• Considerations
• Keep him undercover.
• Locate the vessel.
• Get the info to the boarding team.

70
Thailand Scenario Info Flow
71
Thailand Scenario Information Needed by
Boarding Team

• Ship picture
• Flag
• ELINT
• Location
• Home port
• Departure city, date, time

• Arrival city, date, time
• Blueprints
• Crew
• Manifest
• Target (CBRNE)

72
Issues and Considerations

• Coordinating handoffs.
• Processes within the organizations.
• Existing legal and cultural walls.
• USCG Deepwater implications for Naval Force
  requirements.

73
UCP Change Recommendations
74
Issues and Considerations

• Coordinating handoffs.
• Processes within the organizations.
• Existing legal and cultural walls.
• USCG Deepwater implications for Naval Force
  requirements.

75
OODA Loop
76
Bottom Line

• Continue streamlining bureaucratic and legal
  channels.
• HUMINT is a key to detecting and understanding
  emerging threats.
• Invest in critical technologies.
• Further integration of civilian and military
  organizations.

77
Questions?
78
Alternate Names

• NPTUNNautical Protection Task-force Unified
• NADIANautical Awareness and Defense Inter-Agency
• POSIA(TF)Protection Of the Sea Inter-Agency (TF)
• UNITYUnified National Inter-agency activity
• UNIPSUnified National Inter-agency for
  Protection of the Sea
• UNITFUnified National Inter-agency TF
• IGMAPInter-agency Group for Maritime Protection
• TIGAPSTeam of Inter-Government Agencies for
  Protection of the Seas
• TIPPSTeam of Inter-agency Personnel for
  Protection of the Sea
• GMAPCGlobal Maritime Protection Center
• SPITSea Protection Interagency Task-force
• MPITMaritime
• _____-West, North, South, East

79
Government Inter-agency Group (GIG) Matrix
Organization
80
GIG Organization
POTUS
NSC
DoD
DoS
DoHS
DoJ
AMB GIG-CENT
NSC CENT
AMB GIG-EUR
DoJ CENT
DoD CENTCOM
DoHS CENT
DoS CENT
NSC EUR
DoJ EUR
DoD EUCOM
DoHS EUR
DoS EUR