Market for Martyrs

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Market for Martyrs
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Key Points

• Prospective martyrs react rationally to changes
  in expected costs and benefits
• Terrorist groups benefit from a religious
  orientation
• The supply of individuals willing to participate
  in terrorist actions is readily available
• It is very difficult if not impossible to deter
  suicide terrorism from the supply-side
• Changes designed to undermine demand for violence
  should be the most effective deterrents

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The Groups

• Militant religious groups religious firms that
  produce acts of violence in exchange for benefits
  both material and social
• Group leaders act as managers and employers who
  recruit, train and supervise
• Outside investors/customers who value acts of
  violence are the primary source of funds

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The Recruits

• The religious economies model of conversion
  accounts for converts to militant religious
  groups
• Typical converts are normal
• Conversion is rare
• Converts are recruited through social networks
• The conversion process involves repeated social
  interactions
• Recruits participate extensively and
  intentionally in their own conversions

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Difficulty of Supply-side Deterrence

• Terrorist firms can function effectively even
  with a low supply of suicide-bombers
• Standard criminal penalties have little impact on
  expected costs and benefits of a suicide bomber
• Potential recruits are interested in diverse
  types of benefits which allows for different
  methods of recruitment

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Conclusions

• Religious extremism almost never leads to
  violence
• Attempts to deter supply, often increase the
  perceived benefits of militant action and thus
  increase demand
• Religious freedom and equal treatment undermine
  demand for religious militancy

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Discussion Questions

• What do you find convincing about Iannaccones
  argument?
• What are the weaknesses of his argument?
• If he is right that religious terrorist firms
  need a market for violent acts to survive, what
  exactly can be done to decrease demand for them?