21st CENTURY

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21st CENTURYS STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT SYMPOSIUM

• 14 January 2003
• -- Re-thinking Intervention --
• Professor David Carment,
• Norman Paterson School of
• International Affairs,
• Carleton University
•  

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Three Positive Trends

• The number and magnitude of armed conflicts
  within and among states has significantly
  decreased since the early 1990s and the world is
  a less riskier place to live than it was five or
  even ten years ago. Three positive trends have
  been identified
• 1) ethnic groups are gaining even greater
  autonomy and power sharing and
• 2) democratic governments now outnumber
  autocratic governments two to one
• 3) and continue to be more successful in
  resolving violent societal conflicts
•  

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Current Environment

• Fundamental system-wide problem of state failure
  as a structural and global problem that is
  unlikely to go away in the short run
• Many states in the developing world have failed,
  are failing or will fail in the next 20-30 years
• Most are in sub-Sahara Africa

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Track Record

• The failure to prevent the slow collapse of
  states in Central and West Africa despite clear
  understanding of when and where such events would
  occur and the availability of forecasts for
  predicting and explaining their causes and
  manifestations (Congo, Guinea, Sierra Leone)
• The failure to anticipate the moral hazards that
  are generated by efforts to address refugee
  flows, ethnic cleansing and clan warfare (Rwanda,
  Somalia)
• The failure to understand how biased
  interventions can accelerate conflict between
  combatants (Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Liberia)
•  
• The failure to produce credible responses to
  warring factions thereby generating even greater
  violence (Rwanda, Bosnia)

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State of Peacekeeping

• Post-Cold War peace operations differ from their
  predecessor missions in a number of important
  ways
• the central characteristics of traditional
  peacekeeping missions - the use of force for self
  defense only, the interposition of troops after a
  ceasefire and the maintenance of tactical and
  strategic impartiality - no longer provide the
  boundaries for presumed mission success.
• intrastate conflicts are more complex and more
  deadly for both peacekeepers and ordinary
  citizens caught in the fray.
• In order to perform functions such as
  guaranteeing the safe passage of humanitarian aid
  and assisting and protecting displaced persons,
  peacekeepers have had to resort to more forceful
  actions.

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Policy Insights

• Several initiatives have been undertaken to
  advance the debate on collective security and
  peacekeeping. These include the Report of the
  Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (the
  Brahimi Report) which builds on the Secretary
  Generals Millennium Report and the recently
  launched International Commission on Intervention
  and State Sovereignty (ICISS).

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Key Recommendations

• UN as a secondary actor
• Importance of regional context
• Identification of thresholds
• Prior Risk Assessment
• Emphasis on Preventive action

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Strategic Insights

• The assumption that interveners must be perceived
  and act as impartial is now seriously questioned.
  
• Faced with extreme instances of political
  violence, a coalition of states or an
  organization should not be discredited in seeing
  a conflict reach a specific outcome.
• The use of force must be tightly linked to the
  mediation process.
• Force and the threat to use force are the
  coercive side of negotiating a peace plan in
  which the fear of even greater costs, motivates
  combatants to make concessions at the bargaining
  table.

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Strategic Insights

• Credibility and resolve relate directly to
  developing effective and dynamic strategies as
  well as to generating an effective reputation for
  credible response over time.
• Security institutions and organizations are not
  just things that evolve structurally. Their
  reputations and credibility also change over
  time.
• Any strategy that is weak in capability will not
  be taken seriously as a credible deterrent and
  is more likely to fail under extreme and hostile
  conditions.
• Peacekeeping forces must be prepared to implement
  robust mandates when necessary acquiesce and
  possibly withdraw in the face of stronger
  counter-forces in other instances and if
  incapable of mustering the necessary resolve, be
  prepared to not get involved in the first place.
  

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Implications for UN Peacekeeping

• Lost credibility over the last 10 years
• Secondary actor in support of regional missions
• Circumvention of the UN
• Avoid situations in which it is unlikely to
  succeed

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Implications for Intervention

• Large-scale robust missions not an automatic
  guarantee of success.
• A variety of operations - both large and small
  that match the extensive array of belligerent
  strategies are more appropriate.
• We should not eliminate less intense forms of
  involvement such as fact finding, observer
  missions and information gathering through early
  warning networks.
• Information gathering is particularly crucial
  in determining belligerent intentions and
  strategies.
• Astute leaders aware that overt tensions may lead
  to escalation will prefer a low intensity war,
  effective enough to accomplish specific
  objectives, without attracting outside
  involvement.

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Strategic Issues

• Moral hazard actions taken to forestall violence
  may encourage it
• Security provided by peacekeepers and
  humanitarian agencies can be understood as a
  public good available to belligerents and
  civilians alike.
• The impact of bias forceful interventions may
  encourage more violence by favouring the
  ascendant side

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Summary

• Preference should be given to preventive action
• Local analysis (risk assessment and early
  warning) are crucial
• Costs of early intervention are less than late
  intervention