SECURE FLIGHT

1
SECURE FLIGHT

• Presentation and Proposal to ASAC September 30,
  2004
• Justin Oberman, Director of the Office of
  National Risk Assessment (ONRA), TSA
• Lisa Dean, TSA Privacy Officer

2
BACKGROUND

• TSA/DHS is moving forward with the Testing Phase
  of new Passenger Prescreening Program Secure
  Flight
• Consistent with the Aviation and Transportation
  Security Act (ATSA) and recommendations of the
  National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the
  United States ( The 9/11 Commission)

3
9/11 COMMISSION REPORT

• Recommended that (i)mproved use of no fly and
  automatic selectee lists should not be delayed
  while the argument about the successor to CAPPS
  continues.
• Screening function should be performed by TSA
  and it should utilize the larger set of watch
  lists maintained by the federal government.
• Air carriers should be required to supply the
  information needed to test and implement this new
  system.
• As the President determines the guidelines for
  information sharing among government agencies and
  by those agencies with the private sector, he
  should safeguard the privacy of individuals about
  whom information is shared.

4
SECURE FLIGHT GOALS

• Identifying, in advance of flight, passengers
  known or suspected to be engaged in terrorist
  activity
• Moving passengers through airport screening more
  quickly and efficiently
• Reducing the number of individuals unnecessarily
  selected for secondary screening and better
  targeting of known terrorists by excluding
  non-risk passengers, and
• Fully protecting passengers privacy and civil
  liberties.

5
SECURE FLIGHT

• TSA is currently seeking public comments to a
  draft Order, issued Tuesday, September 21, 2004,
  requesting historical Passenger Name Record (PNR)
  data for domestic flights from the airlines.
• Apply a streamlined version of the existing CAPPS
  rule set.
• On a very limited basis, use commercial data to
  determine if it is effective in determining
  whether passenger information is incorrect or
  inaccurate.
• The Secure Flight program will include robust
  redress mechanisms that will permit passengers to
  work with TSA to resolve instances in which they
  think they are being inappropriately selected for
  secondary screening or are having a difficult
  time obtaining a boarding pass.
• TSA is establishing a Passenger Advocate to aid
  passengers with the redress process, and will
  refine system privacy-related design as
  appropriate based on the testing results.

6
SECURE FLIGHT TESTING - PRIVACY ISSUES

• In addition to the publication of the draft
  Order, TSA has also published and is seeking
  public comment on a Privacy Impact Assessment, a
  Privacy Act System of Records Notice and an
  Information Collection Request, applicable to the
  test phase of Secure Flight only. TSA will
  publish revised versions of those notices before
  implementation of the program.
• For the Secure Flight Test period, TSA will not
  require air carriers to collect any additional
  information from their passengers than is already
  collected by carriers and maintained in PNR data.
  
• TSA will dispose of the PNR data it collects as
  soon as possible after testing. Currently TSA is
  working with National Archives and Records
  Administration to establish a short records
  retention schedule for the data.

7
SECURE FLIGHT TESTING - PRIVACY ISSUES

• TSA will not own or store historic passenger name
  record data used for testing for any significant
  length of time after the test period.
• Test results will not be used for ongoing
  operations or be provided to other agencies,
  except in limited instances where actual matches
  to terrorist watch lists are identified.

8
SECURE FLIGHT TESTING PRIVACY ISSUES

• TSA does not assume that the result of comparison
  of passenger information to commercial data is
  determinative the intent of the person who
  provided the passenger information.
• TSA will institute the following privacy
  protections
• Commercial data providers will be restricted from
  retaining, accessing, or using the PNR data for
  any other purpose than testing of effectiveness
  for determining PNR information accuracy.
• Strict firewalls between the government and
  commercial data providers
• Real-time auditing procedures to determine when
  data has been accessed and by whom
• Strict rules governing the accessing or use of
  commercially-held data by TSA.
• TSA will refine system privacy-related design as
  appropriate should the agency decide to use
  commercial data for any screening purposes.

9
TSA PROPOSAL TO ASAC

• Establishment of ASAC Secure Flight Privacy/IT
  Working Group meets
• Congressional statutory requirement for Privacy
  IT Oversight
• TSA internal planning, and
• GAO report standards as defined in, Aviation
  Security Computer-Assisted Passenger
  Prescreening System Faces Significant
  Implementation Challenges (GAO-04-385, February
  2004).

10
OBJECTIVES OF WORKING GROUP

• Provide secure forum for the exchange of ideas
  and discussion within the framework of existing
  rules and policies
• Provide TSA/DHS officials access to persons with
  key knowledge and expertise on a continuing basis
• Provide an objective and independent assessment
  of the technical and privacy oriented parameters
  that are the basis for Secure Flight design and
  present findings
• Build public understanding, trust, and confidence
  in the new system and its implementation.