Sago Mine Disaster

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Sago Mine Disaster January 2-4 2006
What Happened Then Where is Mine Safety
Today? UC Education and Research Center
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Source WVOMHST, Sago Report, 2006.
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Sago Mine Background

• Opened August 1999. Operator BJM Coal
• Coal production (2000) 735,000 tons
• Closed 2002 2003
• Reopened 2004
• Sold to Anker Acquired by ICG in 2005
• Coal production (2005) 507,000 tons
• Injury Incidence Rate (2005)
• 5.68 US rate (nationally Ug Coal)
• 15.90 per 100 workers (Sago)

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MSHA Presence at Sago in 2005

• 4 quarterly inspections
• 12 other inspections or investigations
• 2 technical investigations roof and ventilation
• 7 non-injury roof fall investigations, including
• Nov 7, 2005 Continuous miner operator seriously
  injured in roof fall

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Immediate Aftermath

• Jan 4 MSHA announces investigation team
• Jan 9 WV Gov. Manchin asks McAteer to lead
  investigation
• State MSHA announce public hearing
• Jan 12 WV Gov. Manchin appoints 6 legislators to
  investigation panel
• Jan 17 MSHA State begin interviews
• Jan 19 Aracoma/Alma belt fire kills 2 miners

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January 23

• US Senate Hearing
• WV Legislature Passes Mine Safety Bill
• Supplies of SCSRs
• Wireless, person-worn communication and tracking
• 15-minute notification to State call center
  100K penalty for failing to comply

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Aftermath

• Jan 25 MSHA Fed Reg request for information on
  tracking, communication and refuges
• Jan 31 Nomination hearing R.Stickler
• Feb 1 MINER Act bills introduced in Congress
• Feb 10 WV asks NIOSH to test Omega block for
  explosion resistance

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Technically, the label on this illustration is
not correct neither MSHA nor Bureau of
Mines/NIOSH ever said this is an explosion
proof seal they called it explosion resistant
Depiction of a Mitchell-Barrett seal
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May 2006 Sago public hearing Dan Merideth,
Davitt McAteer, and Russell Bennett display an
Omega block.
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All 10 seals completely destroyed
In-Mine Investigation
Photo No 1 Seal

• Inadequate seal between Omega block and BlocBond.
• No BlocBond was observed in the vertical joints.

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SEALS
Seals were not constructed according to required
specifications. Two of 10 exceeded dimension
maximums (20 X 8) No. 1
Seal was 21.7 X 8.9 and No. 2 Seal was 20.4 X
8.7 One seal was not set back at least 10 feet
from the corner of the pillar. Physical and
witness evidence that BlocBond was spread on the
mine floor dry as a base.
Vertical joints were not coated with at least ¼
inch thick BlocBond. Wedges were driven parallel
to the wood planks rather than perpendicular.
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Explosion Testing of Omega Block Seals

• Properly constructed 40 inch Omega block seal
  withstood 51-psi explosion
• Sago-simulated built seal withstood 21-psi.
• A 93-psi explosion to the Sago-simulated built
  seal caused substantial damage, but not as severe
  as the damage observed at the actual Sago mine
  seals

NIOSH, Lake Lynn Experimental Mine, Report date
Feb 2007
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Aftermath

• Jan 25 MSHA files for a temporary restraining
  order in federal court against ICG subsidiary for
  failing to allow UMWA to participate in
  investigation as miners rep. (Granted on Jan.
  26)
• Jan 25 MSHA Federal Register
• request for information on tracking,
• communication systems and safety refuges

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Aftermath (Feb-March 06)

• Jan 25 MSHA RFI tracking/comm and refuges
• Jan 31 Nomination hearing R.Stickler
• Feb 1 MINER Act bills introduced in Congress
• Feb 10 WV asks NIOSH to test Omega blocks
• Feb 13 US House hearing on mine safety
• Feb 15 MSHA proposes increase in penalties
• Feb 28 WV Gov appoints Taskforce to assess
  communication, other safety equipment

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Aftermath (Feb-March 06)

• March 1 US House hearing on mine safety
• March 2 US Senate hearing on mine safety
• March 9 MSHA issues ETS on mine evacuation
• March 14 Intl Coal Group announces findings
• explosion ignited by lightning
• March 15 Sago mine resumes operation
• March 27 NIOSH examines recovered SCSRs

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Randal McCloy, Jr. Lone Survivor of the 2nd
Left Crew

• March 30 Randal McCloy leaves hospital
• Shown here with daughter Isabel. Randal
  McCloy and his wife Anna welcomed their third
  child, Isaac Martin McCloy, in April 2007.

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Aftermath (April 06)

• March 30 Randal McCloy leaves from hospital
• April 11 Families receive copies of interview
  transcripts
• April 20 WJU hosts symposium
• April 24 MSHAs public hearings on ETS on mine
  evacuation
• April 26 Randal McCloy gives letter to Sago
  families

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April 26 Confidential Letter from Randal McCloy
to

• Families and Loved Ones of my Co-Workers,
  Victims of the Sago Mine Disaster
• I do not recall whether I had started work, nor
  do I have any memory of the blast.
• I do remember that the mine filled quickly with
  fumes and thick smoke and that breathing
  conditions were nearly unbearable.

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Randal McCloys Letter (April 26, 2006)

• The first thing we did was activate our rescuers
  as we had been trained. At least four of the
  rescuers did not function.
• Shortly thereafter We attempted to signal our
  location to the surface by beating on the mine
  bolts and plates. We found a sledgehammer, and
  for a long time we took turns pounding away.

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Randal McCloys Letter (April 26, 2006)

• We had to take off our rescuers in order to
  hammer as hard as we could. This effort caused
  us to breathe much harder.
• We never heard a responsive blast or shot from
  the surface.
• We were worried and afraid, but we began to
  accept our fate.

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Randal McCloys Letter (April 26, 2006)

• We prayed a little longer, then someone
  suggested that we each write letters to our loved
  ones.
• I wrote a letter to Anna and my children. When
  I finished writing, I put the letter in Jackie
  Weavers lunch box, where I hoped it would be
  found.

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Self-Contained Self-Rescuers (SCSRs)

• Operators records show NO required 90-day test
  for units, including six Sago miners.
• One unit expired (10 years).
• NIOSHs post-hoc lab examination all
  produced O2
• Remember Maximum capacity is 1 hour

Anderson, Bennett, Bennett, Groves, Hamner,
Toler Jones NIOSH Report Sept 2006
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May 2-4 Five Month Anniversary Three-day
Public Hearing, Wesleyan College
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May 2-4 Five Month Anniversary Three-day
Public Hearing, Wesleyan College
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May 2-4 Five Month Anniversary Three-day
Public Hearing, Wesleyan College
Bill Tucker, Debbie Groves Shelly Rose
Ron Hixson
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Aftermath (May 2006)

• May 12 WV imposes moratorium on Omega block-seal
  installations begins review of all seals
• May 22 MSHA announces moratorium on alternative
  seal installations requires testing atmosphere
  behind seals
• May 29 WV Taskforce issues report
• Recommends written plans for communication
  tracking by Aug 2007
• Suggests 30-min maximum for current SCSRs caches
  underground by Aug. 2006.

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McAteer, July 2006
WVOMHST, Dec 2006
MSHA, May 2007
UMWA, March 2007
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McAteer Report, July 06 (6 months)

• Distinguishes cause of Explosion and Disaster.
  What might have happened if
• Explosion contained in sealed area
  (explosion-proof seals)
• SCSRs worked for the miners
• Rescuers and miners could have communicated with
  each other
• Gas chromatograph arrived sooner than 8 hours
  after explosion
• Mine rescue operations had allowed expedited
  procedures
• Miners had known MSHAs seismic equipment was
  obsolete
• It had not been a federal holiday

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McAteers 12 Recommendations

• Research adopt lightning protection measures
• Ban use of Omega blocks
• Strengthen existing seals
• Evaluate seal standard
• Require refuge chambers
• Conduct review of SCSRs
• Develop comprehensive emergency response plans

• Give miners 2-way communication
• Require tracking systems
• Review WVs mine rescue system
• Require installation of lifelines
• Expand RD and manufacturing opportunities in WV
  for HS technology

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MSHAs WVs Investigations

• Included
• 80 transcribed interviews
• Collecting physical evidence and photographing
  mine interior
• Mine mapping (see next slide)

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MSHAs WVs Investigations

• Included
• 80 transcribed interviews
• Collecting physical evidence and photographing
  mine interior
• Mine mapping
• Team did not go underground until Jan. 26 (needed
  boreholes, dewatering, and ventilation restored)

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MSHAs States Investigations Probable Causes
of Explosion

• Open flame
• Spontaneous combustion
• Roof fall-triggered explosion
• Mine electrical systems
• Lightning

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WVMHST Report, December 2006

• "This represents the final report of the Agency
  on this matter. You may note as you read the
  report that all questions may not be answered.
  The Investigation Team recognizes this and
  continues to seek those answers. We recognize,
  however, answers to all questions associated with
  this tragedy may never be answered. Because of
  this uncertainty, it is important to move forward
  with our report.

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WVMHST Report, December 2006

• As the Team continues its work, should
  additional answers be found, the report will be
  supplemented. Additionally, it is important that
  we focus our efforts on doing what we can to
  assure that nothing similar occurs in the future.
  This will be the primary goal of our
  investigators as they move forward."

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WVMHST Report, December 2006

• Conclusions
• The "seals sustained high explosive forces from
  the mine explosion... Why the pressures were so
  high is becoming clear, but not yet proven."
• "The cause of the explosion is clearly related to
  lightning. This conclusion is presented by
  strong corroborated circumstantial evidence...
  How the electricity from lightning entered the
  sealed area is still under investigation, and in
  that regard, this report is not complete."

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MSHA Report, May 2007

• 273 citations issued during investigation
• Proposed penalties totaling 273,774
• ICG/Wolfe Run has paid 49,167
• 71 citations being contested
• No Contributory violations issued

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MSHA Report, May 2007

• Details process of elimination of probable
  causes
• Methane
• Roof fall
• Electrical power, equipment and grounding
• Circuit breakers to switches to cap lamps
• Lightning

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Methane Explosions

• Explosive range 5-15 concentration
• Lighter than air typically found near roof
• Fire bosses/spotters check for methane
• Mixture of methane and air ignited by
• Electric arcs, sparks from equipment
• Open flames
• Heat of friction (cutting bits rock)

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Sagos Recently Sealed Area 2nd Left Mains

• Roof control plan called for supplemental roof
  support truss bolts, tunnel arches, wire
  screens, cable bolts.
• Second mining (see next)

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Bottom Mining
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Sagos Recently Sealed Area 2nd Left Mains

• Roof control plan called for supplemental roof
  support truss bolts, tunnel arches, wire
  screens, cable bolts.
• Second mining completed early Oct 05.
• Nov 05 serious roof fall injury
• Sago managers decided to seal-off this area.

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Sagos Recently Sealed Area 2nd Left Mains

• Ten seals were constructed
• Contract-miners
• Completed on December 12, 2005.
• Explosive range (5-15) on/about December 26,
  2005.
• Estimate (subsequent) to non-explosive range
  January 22, 2006.

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• Two methane studies were conducted in the area
  previously sealed inby the 2 North Mains seals
  (Feb 7-9, Mar 2-3, 2006.)
• The results of the studies show that at the time
  of the explosion, 347,300 cubic feet of methane
  had accumulated in the sealed area.

Fuel
Fuel
347,300 cubic feet of Methane
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Roof Fall Hypothesis

• next

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Potential Ignition Sources
Three roof fall areas noted prior to sealing.
Roof fall areas noted as having occurred before
1/27/06 during exploration after the explosion.
Roof fall areas noted during investigations after
1/27/06.
Origin of the Explosion
X Sandstone beds noted in top of roof fall
cavity sample collected.
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Roof Fall Hypothesis

• Shale is the predominant rock type visible in the
  rubble. It is laminated siltstone with low
  quartz content in a soft matrix that inhibits
  quartz grain-to-grain contact.
• Laminated siltstone is not as conductive to
  frictional heating or piezoelectric sparking as
  sandstone.

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Potential Ignition Sources
Roof Falls in the Sealed Area
Although a roof fall cannot be definitively
excluded as a potential ignition source for this
explosion, it is a highly unlikely source.
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Roof Fall Hypothesis

• No roof falls in proximity of explosion origin.
• Considered possibility of wicking of methane
• Methane layer must in 5-15 explosive range.
• Generally associated w/ being near roof
• Burning methane layer eventually contacts larger
  accumulation of methane, resulting in explosion
• Turbulence caused by roof fall, distance,
  elevation, and uneven roof conditions from the
  observed falls make this a highly unlikely
  ignition source.

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Lightning-Induced Explosion Hypothesis

• next

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Lightning-Induced Explosion Hypothesis

• MSHA contracted with Sandia National Laboratory
• Performed modeling and testing to simulate
  whether lightning energy could enter the mine by
  direct contact or indirect inductive coupling.
• Compared energy levels recorded at Sago with
  levels required to initiate an arc.
• Concluded "that lightning-induced electrical
  arcing was not only plausible, but highly likely"

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Sandia National Laboratory

• "Current in a lightning strike has an associated
  electro-magnetic field. Due to the relatively
  low frequency content of lightning (lt100kHz),
  electromagnetic energy can readily propagate
  through hundreds of feet of earth and induce a
  voltage onto an antennae or receiver. This
  process is referred to as indirect coupling."
• "An electromagnetic field propagates through the
  earth as a result of a cloud to ground lightning
  strike, or a long, low-altitude horizontal
  current channel from a cloud to ground strike.
  Unlike direct coupling, indirect coupling does
  not require the presence of metallic conductors
  in a continuous path from the surface to areas
  inside the mine."

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Abandoned submersible pump retrieved from
previously sealed area of mine
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Sandia National Labs Report

• Insulation on the power conductors is rated for
  2,000 volts. The red conductor failed the test
  at 700 volts and the black conductor at 1,600
  volts. Each of the two ground conductors failed
  when 24 volts were applied to them.
• Sandia tests revealed that during a lightning
  strike the insulated conductors of the abandoned
  pump cable could receive voltages as high as
  20,500 volts. This voltage would be of a short
  duration but the energy generated would be
  adequate to cause an arc to ignite methane.

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Sandia National Labs Report

• Sandia's field measurements and analysis indicate
  that significant electromagnetic energy can be
  coupled into the sealed area of the mine. The
  electromagnetic field is similar to the magnetic
  field produced between the north and south poles
  of a magnet.
• The electromagnetic energy created by the
  lightning discharge would have then radiated
  through the earth onto the pump cable, which
  could act as a receiver or antenna. The
  electromagnetic energy could induce a voltage
  onto the pump cable which generates an arc near
  the explosive methane mixture in the sealed area.

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Source WVOMHST, Sago Report, 2006
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Sandia National Labs Report

• "Measurements and analyses indicate that the pump
  cable is the most likely receiver of
  electromagnetic energy in the sealed area. This
  is the most likely ignition source for this
  explosion."

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MSHAs Root Cause Analysis of Explosion

• Seals were not capable of withstanding the forces
  generated by the explosion.
• The atmosphere within the sealed area was not
  monitored and it contained explosive methane/air
  mixtures
• Lightning is the most likely ignition source for
  this explosion with the energy transferring onto
  the abandoned pump cable in the sealed area and
  providing an ignition source for the explosion.

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United Mine Workers of America Report, March 2007
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United Mine Workers of America Report, March 2007

• Though the miners at the Sago mine were not
  members of the UMWA or any other union, the UMWA
  was designated under federal regulations as a
  miners rep after this incident.

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United Mine Workers of America Report, March 2007

• The Union believes that there is absolutely no
  clear evidence to support the theory that
  lightning was the cause of the explosion.
• Further, there is no evidence that lightning
  striking the ground near a mining operation has
  ever traveled in the underground area of a mine,
  without the presence of a conduit from the
  surface into the mine, and then caused an
  ignition or explosion of gas or dust.

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United Mine Workers of America Report, March 2007

• The lightning strike theory is based entirely on
  circumstantial evidence and is so remote as to be
  practically impossible.

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United Mine Workers of America Report, March 2007

• The Union has determined that the most likely
  cause of the explosion was conditions contained
  solely within the sealed area of the mine where
  the explosion occurred.
• The Union concludes that the most likely cause
  of the explosion was frictional activity from the
  roof, roof support or support material which
  ignited the methane-air mixture.

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Honoring their Memory
Are underground coal mines safer today, and mine
emergency preparedness better today, than 2 years
ago?
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MINER Act of 2006

• Required
• Written ERP for each mine, updated every 6 months
• Require wireless 2-way comm/tracking by June 2009
• Two mine rescue teams within 1 hour for each mine
• Raised criminal penalty cap to 250,000 for first
  offenses and 500,000 for second offenses
• Established max civil penalty of 220,000 for
  flagrant violations

Became law June 15, 2006
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Other MSHA Changes

• Mine Evacuation ETS (Mar/Dec06)
• SCSR hands-on and realistic training
• 48 hours supply of oxygen stored lifelines
• Evacuation drills lifeline more methane
  detectors
• Increased civil penalties (Sept/March 2007)
• Two staff assigned for Mine Emergency Ops
• SCSR electronic tracking
• 50 psi requirement for seals (July 2006)
• Mine Rescue

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Other MSHA Changes

• Mine Evacuation ETS (Mar/Dec06)
• SCSR hands-on and realistic training
• 48 hours supply of oxygen stored lifelines
• Evacuation drills lifeline more methane
  detectors
• Increased civil penalties (Sept/March 2007)
• SCSR electronic tracking
• 50 psi requirement for seals (July 06)

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Other MSHA Changes

• Approved first wireless tracking system (Jan 08)
• Mine rescue teams (Sept 06/Feb 08)
• Knowledgeable person at mine at all times annual
  training
• Two certified mine rescue teams for each mine
  available within one hour form mine rescue
  station.
• Training underground at assigned mines knowledge
  of ventilation
• Annual smoke or simulated smoke training
• 96 hours of training annually
• Mandatory participation annually in two mine
  rescue contest
• Allows four types of teams on-site, composite,
  contract and state-sponsored

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West Virginia Initiatives

• Required mine operators to have a plan by April
  07 for an emergency shelter
• 48 hours of life-support (SCSRs or other)
• Heat and pressure/force survivability
• Four shelters approved by WV (March 07)
• 40,000 more SCSRs are underground in WV
• Written plans for communication tracking by Aug
  07

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Mine Health Safety Solutions Huntington, Utah
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MSHAs Internal Review

• June 2007
• 208 pages