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Lecture Nine: Macroeconomics

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Title: Lecture Nine: Macroeconomics


1
Lecture Nine Macroeconomics
  • From Says Law to Emergent Properties

2
Macroeconomics is
  • Micro considers
  • Behaviour of individuals firms
  • Behaviour of markets
  • Macro considers
  • The behaviour of the whole economy
  • And special markets
  • Labour
  • Money
  • And key variables
  • Rate of employment, growth, inflation
  • In the beginning (before Keynes or Walras or even
    Smith), in Macro there was
  • Quite a lot of debate!

3
Mercantilists on Macro
  • Mercantilism in part justified tariffs, etc., on
    basis that it would increase employment
  • 5. The frugal expending likewise of our own
    natural wealth might advance much yearly to be
    exported unto strangers and if in our rayment we
    will be prodigal, yet let this be done with our
    own materials and manufactures,
  • where the excess of the rich may be the
    employment of the poor, whose labours would be
    more profitable for the Commonwealth,
  • if they were done to the use of strangers.
  • (Thomas Mun, Englands Treasure by Forraign
    Trade. or The Ballance of our Forraign Trade is
    The Rule of our Treasure)
  • i.e., an excess of exports over imports will
    increase employment

4
Physiocrats (Quesnay)
  • The Tableau Economique
  • First ever input-output model of whole economy
  • First systematic attempt to think about
    relationship between productivity and output at
    level of whole economy
  • Basic ideas
  • Objective of production to generate a net
    surplus over inputs
  • Agriculture seen as only source of surplus
  • Converts free energy of sun into plants, animals
  • Manufacturing just transforms free gift no added
    value
  • Three classes
  • Farmers the productive class
  • Manufacturing workers/firms the sterile class
  • Feudal lords/clerics the proprietor class

5
Physiocrats (Quesnay)
  • But manufactures needed to generate rural net
    product
  • interdependence (multiplier, input-output
    concepts)
  • Agriculture generates a surplus
  • 1 unit of output requires lt 1 unit of input
  • Sow 1 kilo of wheat as seed, get 10 kilos of
    wheat as crop
  • Manufacturing simply converts form
  • 1 unit of input, 1 unit of output (but in
    different form)
  • Surplus key to wealth Wealth can be increased if
    gap between inputs and output in agriculture can
    be increased.

6
Physiocrats (Quesnay)
  • An example in modern terms
  • Old technology with 100 hectares of land
  • 1 hectare land 7/10 bushels wheat 1/10 kilo
    steel produces 1 bushel wheat
  • 0 hectare land 1/10 bushel wheat 9/10 kilo
    steel produces 1 kilo steel
  • 70 wheat 10 steel -gt 100 wheat
  • 10 wheat 90 steel -gt 100 steel
  • Net output 20 bushels wheat, 0 kilos steel

7
Physiocrats (Quesnay)
  • New technology with 100 hectares of land
  • 1/10th less bushels of wheat used
  • 1 hectare land 6/10 bushels wheat 1/10 kilo
    steel produces 1 bushel wheat
  • 0 hectare land 1/10 bushel wheat 9/10 kilo
    steel produces 1 kilo steel
  • 60 wheat 10 steel -gt 100 wheat
  • 10 wheat 90 steel -gt 100 steel
  • Net output 30 bushels wheat, 0 kilos steel
  • Benefits of improved technology
  • 16 reduction in inputs (from 7/10ths 6/10ths
    bushels)
  • 50 increase in net product (from 20 to 30
    bushels)
  • Means more wealth for proprietors, more
    employment making for workers making carriages

8
From Physiocrats to Smith
  • Smiths rejected Physiocratic idea that
    agriculture the only source of wealth
  • Artificers and manufacturers, in particular,
    whose industry, in the common apprehension of
    men, increases so much the value of the rude
    produce of land, are in this system represented
    as a class of people altogether barren and
    unproductive (Wealth of Nations Ch. 9)
  • But input-output surplus concepts lost as well
  • Smith much less concerned about macroeconomic
    issues
  • The big macroeconomic debate amongst classical
    economists was Malthus vs Ricardo

9
Ricardo vs Malthus
  • Malthus asserted that
  • Aggregate demand could be less than supply
  • A general glut
  • Technological progress could lead to unemployment
  • Ricardo confident that aggregate demand would
    always be sufficient
  • Mr. Malthus asks
  • how is it possible to suppose that the increased
    quantity of commodities, obtained by the
    increased number of productive labourers should
    find purchasers,
  • without such a fall of price as would probably
    sink their value below the cost of production,
    or, at least, very greatly diminish both the
    power and the will to save?

10
Ricardo vs Malthus
  • To which I Ricardo answer that
  • the power and the will to save will be very
    greatly diminished, for that must depend upon the
    share of the produce allotted to the farmer or
    manufacturer.
  • But with respect to the other question
  • where would the commodities find purchasers?
  • If they were suited to the wants of those who
    would have the power to purchase them, they could
    not fail to find purchasers, and that without any
    fall of price.
  • Ricardo, Notes on Malthus' "Principles of
    Political Economy (pp. 160-161)
  • Ricardo accepted there could be gluts of
    individual commodities, but not an overall
    excess of supply over demand

11
Ricardo vs Malthus
  • Mistakes may be made, and commodities not suited
    to the demand may be producedof these there may
    be a glut
  • they may not sell at their usual price
  • but then this is owing to the mistake, and not to
    the want of demand for productions.
  • For every thing produced there must be a
    proprietor.
  • Either it is the master, the landlord, or the
    labourer.
  • Whoever is possessed of a commodity is
    necessarily a demander,
  • either he wishes to consume the commodity
    himself, and then no purchaser is wanted
  • or he wishes to sell it, and purchase some other
    thing with the money

12
Ricardo vs Malthus
  • Ricardos analysis based on Says Law supply
    IS demand
  • Only reason someone produces something is
  • to sell it
  • and buy something of equivalent value
  • Hence supply is simultaneously demand (maybe with
    a little lag)
  • Whoever has commodities has the power to
    consume, and as it suits mankind to divide their
    employments, individuals will produce one
    commodity with a view to purchase another
  • Ricardo accepted arguments of Jean Baptiste Say
    here
  • M. Say has, however, most satisfactorily shown,
    that there is no amount of capital which may not
    be employed in a country, because demand is only
    limited by production. (Principles, Ch. 21)

13
Says Law
  • Says Law best put by Say himself
  • Every producer asks for money in exchange for
    his products, only for the purpose of employing
    that money again immediately in the purchase of
    another product
  • for we do not consume money, and it is not sought
    after in ordinary cases to conceal it
  • thus, when a producer desires to exchange his
    product for money,
  • he may be considered as already asking for the
    merchandise which he proposes to buy with this
    money.
  • It is thus that the producers, though they have
    all of them the air of demanding money for their
    goods, do in reality demand merchandise for their
    merchandise.
  • (Say, Catechism of Political Economy)

14
Says Law
  • Crises caused by disproportionality only
  • Excess supply in one market, excess demand in
    others
  • General gluts or general slumps impossible
  • Argument
  • Money only an intermediary in barter
  • People sell only to buy again (increase in
    utility the object)
  • Each persons supply is matched to his/her demand
  • Sum of all supply thus cannot exceed sum of all
    demand (no general gluts) but

15
Says Law
  • Slumps in one market can occur if supply of X
    exceeds demand for X at price producers of X
    want however
  • Unless government regulations, monopolies
    intervene
  • Price of X falls, demand for X rises
    equilibrium
  • Basic logic micro in nature
  • Hypothesis about behaviour of each individual in
    market system (micro)
  • Aggregate hypothesis to overall economy (macro)
  • Argument also essential real rather than
    monetary

16
Ricardo Say the Odd Couple
  • Ricardo accepted Say on macro
  • But differed on theory of value and price

Effort is the source of value
  • The value of a commodity depends on the
    relative quantity of labour which is necessary
    for its production
  • (Ricardo)

No it aint! Utility is
  • What do you understand by the word Products ?
  • all those things to which men have consented to
    give a value.
  • How is value given to a thing ?
  • By giving it utility
  • (Say)
  • Says Law dominated classical macroeconomics
    (even though neoclassical in origin) until

17
Marx Debunks Say
  • Marxs circuits of capital CMC
  • Of the part of the revenue in one branch of
    production (which produces consumable
    commodities) which is consumed in the revenue of
    another branch of production,
  • it can be said that the demand is equal to its
    own supply (in so far as production is kept in
    the right proportion).
  • It is the same as if each branch itself consumed
    that part of its revenue.
  • Here there is only a formal metamorphosis of the
    commodity C-M-C' Linen-money-wheat. (Marx
    Theories of Surplus Value, 1861 p. 233)
  • Supply implies demand aggregate balance the rule

18
Marx Debunks Say
  • But there is also MCM
  • The circuit C-M-C starts with one commodity, and
    finishes with another, which falls out of
    circulation and into consumption.
  • Consumption, the satisfaction of wants, in one
    word, use-value, is the end and aim.
  • The circuit M-C-M, on the contrary, commences
    with money and ends with money.
  • Its leading motive, and the goal that attracts
    it, is therefore mere exchange-value. (Marx,
    Capital I 1867, p. 148)
  • Demand in MCM can evaporate if expectations of
    profit collapse

19
Marx Debunks Say
  • Aggregate demand is thus sum of two circuits
  • CMC
  • Says Law applies
  • MCM
  • Says Law doesnt apply
  • Aggregate demand can therefore differ from
    aggregate supply
  • Marxs logical advance here lost in decline of
    classical school and rise of neoclassical
  • Neoclassical school adopts Says Law as Walrass
    Law
  • Sum of all excess demands is zero
  • No possibility of generalised slump
  • Dominates macroeconomic thinking before Great
    Depression

20
Pre-Keynesian Macro
  • Conventional neoclassical macroeconomic theory
    less elaborate than Walrass General
    Equilibrium model
  • Assumed fixed capital stock in short run,
    variable labor supply, etc., rather than
    everything variable as in Walras
  • Example Hickss typical classical theory
    (outlined in Hicks 1936, Mr Keynes and the
    Classics)
  • 2 industries Investment goods X consumption
    goods Y
  • 2 factors of production labor (variable)
    capital (fixed in short run)
  • Given capital stock in both industries

21
Hickss typical classical theory
  • Output a function of employment Nx Ny
  • Xfx(Nx) Yfy(Ny) where f has diminishing
    marginal productivity
  • Prices equal marginal costs marginal product of
    labour times wage rate (since labour is only
    variable input)
  • Marginal cost is increase in labor input (dNx
    dNy) for each increment to output (dx dy)
  • Pxw.dNx/dx Pyw.dNy/dy
  • Income value of output price times quantity
  • I Ix Iy w.(dNx/dx) .x w.(dNy/dy) .y

22
Hickss typical classical theory
  • Quantity of Money M a given, and fixed relation
    between M and income I (transactions demand for
    money only money a veil over barter)
  • M k.I (k constant velocity of money)
  • Demand for investment goods a function of
    interest rate
  • IxC(i)
  • Supply of savingsa function of interest rate
  • IxS(i)
  • Higher savings meanshigher investment (a
    familiar argument?)

Determines Nx
23
Hickss typical classical theory
  • Causal chain
  • M determines I (total output)
  • i determines Ix (output of investment goods)
  • Ix determines Nx (given w)
  • I-Ix determines Iy (output of consumption goods
    is a residual)
  • Iy determines Ny (given w)
  • Lower money wage means higher employment
  • Lower wage means lower prices
  • Unchanged money I means higher income relative to
    prices, so higher sales
  • Higher sales mean increased employment (and lower
    real wage due to diminishing marginal product)

24
Neoclassical Macro
  • Asserted unemployment due to excessive wages,
    until...

The Great Depression
Arguably began with Stock Market Crash
Just one week before
25
The economists were saying
  • Stock prices have reached what looks like a
    permanently high plateau.
  • I do not feel that there will soon, if ever, be a
    fifty or sixty point break below present levels,
    such as Mr. Babson has predicted.
  • I expect to see the stock market a good deal
    higher than it is today within a few months.
    (Irving Fisher, October 15 1929)
  • In the next few years, Irving Fisher lost12
    million dollars!
  • Thats 102 million in 2000 prices
  • Crash occurred on October 23rd 1929

26
A 120 Point Break in just 15 Days...
Crash continued for another 3 years
27
The Great Wall Street Crash
and thats the index the SP of 1948 had many
stocks which didnt exist in 1929, while many of
the 1929 entrants had gone bankrupt
SP 500 from 32 at its zenith
25 years to recover
To below 5at its nadir
in less than 3 years
Not only theStockmarketcrashed
28
The Great Depression
WW II
29
The Great Depression
To 25 in 3 years
WW II Brings Sustained Recovery
From effectively zero...
30
Keyness Revolution
  • A (partial) rejection of (neo)classical economics
  • Kept marginal product theory of factor returns
    but
  • Rejected theory of investment, money, savings
  • Key innovation proper treatment of uncertainty
  • Investment
  • in certain world, would be determined by interest
    rate
  • in uncertain world, motivated by expectations of
    profit
  • Expectations of profit volatile based on flimsy
    foundations
  • Expect current state of affairs to continue
  • Trust current prices, etc., as correct
  • Trust mass sentiment

31
Keyness Revolution Investment Savings
  • Investment (determined by expectations, output,
    capital stock) determines income via multiplier
  • If(E,Y,K) (E component highly volatile)
  • Yf(I)
  • Consumption a function of income
  • Ca c.Y (stable relationship)
  • YCICS (ex-post Investment ex-post Savings)
  • Savings a residual function of income
  • SY-C
  • Investment determines Savings
  • Attempt to increase Savings (by reducing MPC) may
    reduce investment hence output

32
Keyness Revolution Money
  • Neoclassical theory
  • money a veil over barter
  • transactions motive only for holding money
  • Keynes
  • Money ultimate source of liquidity in uncertain
    world
  • Not only transactions, but also speculative,
    precautionary finance motives for holding money
    (latter not in General Theory, but 1937 papers)
  • Rate of interest the return for foregoing
    liquidity
  • Liquidity preference highly volatile because
    based on expectations (as is Investment)

33
Keyness Revolution Critique Says Law
  • Expenditure has 2 components
  • D1, related to current output (consumption)
  • D2, not related to current output (investment)
  • Says Law (rejected by Keynes) requires
  • either D20 or
  • Increased savings causes increased D2
  • But
  • Decision to invest based on expectations of
    profit in uncertain future
  • Increased savings means decreased consumption now
  • May lead to lower expectations and less
    investment
  • Argument inspired by Marxs CMC/MCM, but
    Marx not citedprobably for political reasons

34
Keyness Revolution Critique Says Law
  • One of the rare occasions in which Keynes
    praised Marx occurred in a 1933 draft of the
    General Theory. Here Keynes credits Marx with the
  • pregnant observation that the nature of
    production in the actual world is not CMC',
    i.e.. of exchanging commodity (or effort) for
    money in order to obtain another commodity (or
    effort). That may be the standpoint of the
    private consumer.
  • But it is not the attitude of business, which is
    a case of MCM' , i.e.. of parting with money
    for commodity (or effort) in order to obtain more
    money (1971, Vol. 29, p. 81, Keynes's emphasis).
  • Dillard 1984 Keynes and Marx a centennial
    appraisal Journal of Post Keynesian Economics p.
    424
  • So Keyness published critique of Says Law not
    as clear as Marxs

35
In a nutshell...
  • The theory can be summed up by saying that,
    given the psychology of the public, the level of
    output and employment as a whole depends on the
    amount of investment...
  • More comprehensively, aggregate output depends on
    the propensity to hoard, on the policy of the
    monetary authority as it affects the quantity of
    money, on the state of confidence concerning the
    prospective yield of capital-assets, on the
    propensity to spend and on the social factors
    which influence the level of the money-wage.
  • But of these several factors it is those which
    determine the rate of investment which are most
    unreliable, since it is they which are influenced
    by our views of the future about which we know so
    little.
  • Keynes, 1937, The General Theory, p. 221

36
Keynes and Investment under Uncertainty
  • 1937 papers mark a shift from marginal concepts
    to two price levels
  • In most of the General Theory, Keynes argued that
    investment was motivated by relationship between
    marginal efficiency of investment schedule (MEI)
    interest rate
  • In Chapter 17 of General Theory, The General
    Theory of Employment and Alternative theories
    of the rate of interest (1937), spoke in terms
    of two price levels
  • investment motivated by the desire to produce
    those assets of which the normal supply-price is
    less than the demand price (Keynes 1936 228)
  • Demand price determined by prospective yields,
    depreciation and liquidity preference.
  • Supply price determined by costs of production

37
Keynes and Investment under Uncertainty
  • Two price level analysis becomes more dominant
    subsequent to General Theory
  • The scale of production of capital assets
    depends, of course, on the relation between
    their costs of production and the prices which
    they are expected to realise in the market.
    (Keynes 1937a 217)
  • MEI analysis akin to view that uncertainty can be
    reduced to the same calculable status as that of
    certainty itself via a Benthamite calculus,
  • whereas the kind of uncertainty that matters in
    investment is that about which there is no
    scientific basis on which to form any calculable
    probability whatever. We simply do not know.
    (Keynes 1937a 213, 214)

38
What is uncertainty?
  • Very hard to grasp, even though essential aspect
    of our world we do not know the future
  • But we have worked out how to calculate risk
  • Most of Keyness examples were about how
    uncertainty is not risk
  • Negative exampleswhat uncertainty is notrather
    than what it is
  • By "uncertain" knowledge, let me explain, I do
    not mean merely to distinguish what is known for
    certain from what is only probable.
  • The game of roulette is not subject, in this
    sense, to uncertainty nor is the prospect of a
    Victory bond being drawn.

39
Keynes on Uncertainty
  • Or, again, the expectation of life is only
    slightly uncertain.
  • Even the weather is only moderately uncertain.
  • The sense in which I am using the term is that in
    which
  • the prospect of a European war is uncertain,
  • or the price of copper and the rate of interest
    twenty years hence,
  • or the obsolescence of a new invention, or the
    position of private wealth-owners in the social
    system in 1970.
  • About these matters there is no scientific basis
    on which to form any calculable probability
    whatever. We simply do not know.
  • Nevertheless, the necessity for action and for
    decision compels us as practical men to do our
    best to overlook this awkward fact and to behave
    exactly as we should if we had behind us a good
    Benthamite calculation of a series of prospective
    advantages and disadvantages, each multiplied by
    its appropriate probability, waiting to be
    summed.

40
What is uncertainty?
  • Imagine you are very attracted to a particular
    person
  • This person has accepted invitations from 1 in 5
    of the people who have asked him/her out
  • Does this mean you have a 20 chance of success?
  • Of course not
  • Each experience of sexual attraction is unique
  • What someone has done in the past with other
    people is no guide to what he/she will do with
    you in the future
  • His/her response is not risky it is uncertain.
  • Ditto to
  • individual investments
  • success/failure of past instances give no guide
    to present odds

41
How to cope with relationship uncertainty?
  • We try to find out beforehand
  • ask friendseliminate the uncertainty
  • We do nothing
  • paralysed into inaction
  • We ask regardless
  • compel ourselves into action
  • We follow conventions
  • follow the herd of the social conventions of
    our society
  • play the game hope for the best
  • So what about investors?

42
Keynes and Investment under Uncertainty
  • In the midst of incalculable uncertainty,
    investors form fragile expectations about the
    future
  • These are crystallised in the prices they place
    upon capital asset
  • These prices are therefore subject to sudden and
    violent change
  • with equally sudden and violent consequences for
    the propensity to invest
  • Seen in this light, the marginal efficiency of
    capital is simply the ratio of the yield from an
    asset to its current demand price, and therefore
    there is a different marginal efficiency of
    capital for every different level of asset
    prices (Keynes 1937a 222)

43
Keynes on Uncertainty and Expectations
  • Three aspects to expectations formation under
    true uncertainty
  • Presumption that the present is a much more
    serviceable guide to the future than a candid
    examination of past experience would show it to
    have been hitherto
  • Belief that the existing state of opinion as
    expressed in prices and the character of existing
    output is based on a correct summing up of future
    prospects
  • Reliance on mass sentiment we endeavour to fall
    back on the judgment of the rest of the world
    which is perhaps better informed. (Keynes 1936
    214)
  • Fragile basis for expectations formation thus
    affects prices of financial assets

44
Keynes on Finance Markets
  • Conventional theory says prices on finance
    markets reflect net present value capitalisation
    of expected yields of assets
  • But, says Keynes, far from being dominated by
    rational calculation, valuations of finance
    markets reflect fundamental uncertainty and are
    driven by whim
  • all sorts of considerations enter into the
    market valuation which are in no way relevant to
    the prospective yield (1936 152)
  • ignorance
  • day to day instability
  • waves of optimism and pessimism
  • the third degree

45
Keynes on Finance Markets
  • Ignorance due to dispersion of share ownership
    (shades of Telstra?)
  • As a result of the gradual increase in the
    proportion of equity ... owned by persons who ...
    have no special knowledge ... of the business...
    the element of real knowledge in the valuation of
    investments ... has seriously declined (1936
    153)
  • Anyone here got T2 shares?
  • Impact of day to day fluctuations
  • fluctuations in the profits of existing
    investments, which are obviously of an ephemeral
    and non-significant character, tend to have an
    altogether excessive, and even an absurd,
    influence on the market (1936 153-54)

46
Keynes on Finance Markets
  • Waves of optimism and pessimism
  • In abnormal times in particular, when the
    hypothesis of an indefinite continuance of the
    existing state of affairs is less plausible than
    usual ... the market will be subject to waves of
    optimistic and pessimistic sentiment, which are
    unreasoning and yet in a sense legitimate where
    no solid basis exists for a reasonable
    calculation. (1936 154)
  • The Third Degree
  • Professional investors further destabilise the
    market by attempting to anticipate its short term
    movements and react more quickly
  • As Geoff Harcourt once remarked, Keynes writes
    like an angel. The next few slides are in
    Keyness own words.

Skip Keynes Quotes
47
Keynes on Finance Markets
  • It might have been supposed that competition
    between expert professionals ... would correct
    the vagaries of the ignorant individual...
    However,... these persons are, in fact, largely
    concerned, not with making superior long-term
    forecasts of the probable yield of an investment
    over its whole life, but with foreseeing changes
    in the conventional basis of valuation a short
    time ahead of the general public... For it is not
    sensible to pay 25 for an investment of which you
    believe the prospective yield to justify a value
    of 30, if you also believe that the market will
    value it at 20 three months hence. (1936 154-55)

48
Keynes on Finance Markets
  • Of the maxims of orthodox finance none, surely,
    is more anti-social than the fetish of liquidity,
    the doctrine that it is a positive virtue on the
    part of investment institutions to concentrate
    their resources upon the holding of liquid
    securities. It forgets that there is no such
    thing as liquidity of investment for the
    community as a whole. The social object of
    skilled investment should be to defeat the dark
    forces of time and ignorance which envelop our
    future. The actual, private object of most
    skilled investment today is to beat the gun, as
    the Americans so well express it, to outwit the
    crowd, and to pass the bad, or depreciating,
    half-crown to the other fellow. (1936 155)

49
Keynes on Finance Markets
  • professional investment may be likened to those
    newspaper competitions in which the competitors
    have to pick out the six prettiest faces from a
    hundred photographs, the prize being awarded to
    the competitor whose choice most nearly
    corresponds to the average preferences of the
    competitors as a whole ... It is not a case of
    choosing those which, to the best of one's
    judgment, are really the prettiest, nor even
    those which average opinion genuinely thinks the
    prettiest. We have reached the third degree where
    we devote our intelligences to anticipating what
    average opinion expects the average opinion to
    be. And there are some, I believe, who practise
    the fourth, fifth and higher degrees. (1936 156)

50
Keynes on Finance Markets
  • If the reader interjects that there must surely
    be large profits to be gained from the other
    players in the long run by a skilled individual
    who, unperturbed by the prevailing pastime,
    continues to purchase investment on the best
    genuine long-term expectations he can frame, he
    must be answered, first of all, that there are,
    indeed, such serious-minded individuals and that
    it makes a vast difference to an investment
    market whether or not they predominate in their
    influence over the game-players. But we must also
    add that there are several factors which
    jeopardise the predominance of such individuals
    in modern investment markets.

51
Keynes on Finance Markets
  • Investment based on genuine long-term
    expectation is so difficult today as to be
    scarcely practicable. He who attempts it must
    surely lead much more laborious days and run
    greater risks than he who tries to guess better
    than the crowd how the crowd will behave and,
    given equal intelligence, he may make more
    disastrous mistakes. There is no clear evidence
    from experience that the investment policy which
    is socially advantageous coincides with that
    which is most profitable. It needs more
    intelligence to defeat the forces of time and
    ignorance than to beat the gun.

52
Keynes on Finance Markets
  • Moreover, life is not long enough--human nature
    desires quick results, there is a peculiar zest
    in making money quickly, and remoter gains are
    discounted by the average man at a very high
    rate. The game of professional investment is
    tolerably boring and over-exacting to anyone who
    is entirely exempt from the gambling instinct
    whilst he who has it must pay to this propensity
    the appropriate toll.
  • Furthermore, an investor who proposes to ignore
    near-term market fluctuations needs greater
    resources for safety and must not operate on so
    large a scale, if at all, with borrowed money...

53
Keynes on Finance Markets
  • Finally it is the long-term investor ... who
    will in practice come in for most criticism,
    wherever investment funds are managed by
    committees or banks. For it is in the essence of
    his behaviour that he should be eccentric,
    unconventional and rash in the eyes of average
    opinion. If he is successful, that will only
    confirm the general belief in his rashness and
    if in the short run he is unsuccessful, which is
    very likely, he will not receive much mercy.
    Worldly wisdom teaches us that it is better for
    reputation to fail conventionally than to succeed
    unconventionally. (Keynes 1936 156-58)
  • At the same time as Keynes was writing the
    General Theory, Irving Fisher put forward the
    very similar Debt Deflation Theory of Great
    Depressions

54
Fisher on Depression
  • Fishers reputation destroyed by prediction of no
    crash
  • afterwards, developed theory to explain it
  • The Debt Deflation Theory of Great Depressions
  • Neoclassical theory assumed equilibrium
  • but real world equilibrium short-lived since New
    disturbances are, humanly speaking, sure to
    occur, so that, in actual fact, any variable is
    almost always above or below the ideal
    equilibrium (1933 339)
  • As a result, any real world variable is likely to
    be over or under its equilibrium levelincluding
    confidence speculation
  • But two key problems are debt and prices

55
Debt Deflation Theory of Great Depressions
  • The two dominant factors which cause
    depressions are over-indebtedness to start with
    and deflation following soon after
  • Thus over-investment and over-speculation are
    often important but they would have far less
    serious results were they not conducted with
    borrowed money.
  • That is, over-indebtedness may lend importance to
    over-investment or to over-speculation. The same
    is true as to over-confidence.
  • I fancy that over-confidence seldom does any
    great harm except when, as, and if, it beguiles
    its victims into debt. (Fisher 1933 341)
  • When overconfidence leads to overindebtedness, a
    chain reaction ensues

56
Debt Deflation Theory of Great Depressions
  • (1) Debt liquidation leads to distress selling
    and to
  • (2) Contraction of deposit currency, as bank
    loans are paid off, and to a slowing down of
    velocity of circulation. This contraction of
    deposits and of their velocity, precipitated by
    distress selling, causes
  • (3) A fall in the level of prices, in other
    words, a swelling of the dollar. Assuming, as
    above stated, that this fall of prices is not
    interfered with by reflation or otherwise, there
    must be
  • (4) A still greater fall in the net worths of
    business, precipitating bankruptcies and

57
Debt Deflation Theory of Great Depressions
  • (5) A like fall in profits, which in a
    "capitalistic," that is, a private-profit
    society, leads the concerns which are running at
    a loss to make
  • (6) A reduction in output, in trade and in
    employment of labor. These losses, bankruptcies,
    and unemployment, lead to
  • (7) Pessimism and loss of confidence, which in
    turn lead to
  • (8) Hoarding and slowing down still more the
    velocity of circulation. The above eight changes
    cause
  • (9) Complicated disturbances in the rates of
    interest, in particular, a fall in the nominal,
    or money, rates and a rise in the real, or
    commodity, rates of interest. (1933 342)

58
Debt Deflation Theory of Great Depressions
  • Fisher thus concurs with ancient charge against
    usury, that it maketh many bankrotts (Jones
    1989 55)
  • Bankruptcy an individual problem in feudal system
  • in capitalist economy, chain reaction can drag
    the economy into crisis
  • Theory nonequilibrium in nature
  • we may tentatively assume that, ordinarily and
    within wide limits, all, or almost all, economic
    variables tend, in a general way, towards a
    stable equilibrium
  • but though assumed stable, equilibrium is
  • so delicately poised that, after departure from
    it beyond certain limits, instability ensues
    (Fisher 1933 339).

59
Debt Deflation Theory of Great Depressions
  • Two classes of far from equilibrium events
    explained
  • Great Depressions,
  • when overindebtedness coincides with deflation
  • the more debtors pay, the more they owe. The
    more the economic boat tips, the more it tends to
    tip. It is not tending to right itself, but is
    capsizing (Fisher 1933 344).
  • Cycles, when one occurs without the other
  • with only overindebtedness or deflation,
  • economic growth eventually corrects situation it
  • is then more analogous to stable equilibrium
    the more the boat rocks the more it will tend to
    right itself. In that case, we have a truer
    example of a cycle (Fisher 1933 344-345)

60
Debt Deflation Theory of Great Depressions
  • Fishers new theory ignored
  • Old theory made basis of modern finance theory
  • Debt deflation theory revived in modern form by
    Minsky (a future lecture)
  • Fishers macroeconomic contribution (which
    emphasised the need for reflation and 100
    money during the Depression) overshadowed by
    Keyness General Theory
  • Many similarities and synergies in Keynes and
    Fisher, but different countries meant one largely
    unaware of others work

Skip Keynes Quotes
61
Keynes and Debt-deflation
  • Some consideration of debt-deflation in General
    Theory when discussing reduction in money wages
    (the neoclassical proposal for ending the Great
    Depression--see last lecture)
  • Since a special reduction of money-wages is
    always advantageous to an individual entrepreneur
    ... a general reduction ... may break through a
    vicious circle of unduly pessimistic estimates of
    the marginal efficiency of capital... On the
    other hand, the depressing influence on
    entrepreneurs of their greater burden of debt may
    partially offset any cheerful reactions from the
    reductions of wages. Indeed if the fall of wages
    and prices goes far, the embarrassment of those
    entrepreneurs who are heavily indebted may soon
    reach the point of insolvency--with severe
    adverse effects on investment. (Keynes 1936 264)

62
Keynes and Debt-deflation
  • The method of increasing the quantity of money
    in terms of wage-units by decreasing the
    wage-unit increases proportionately the burden of
    debt whereas the method of producing the same
    result by increasing the quantity of money whilst
    leaving the wage-unit unchanged has the opposite
    effect. Having regard to the excessive burden of
    many types of debt, it can only be an
    inexperienced person who would prefer the
    former. (1936 268-69)
  • Thus 2 reasons for favouring reflation/inflation
    as means to end Great Depression
  • accepted neoclassical argument that real wage had
    to fall for employment to rise (next slide)
  • impact of rising price level on debt far safer
    than that of a falling price level.

63
Keynes on Wages
  • Since accepted marginal product theory, accepted
    that real wages had to fall for employment to
    rise

Increased output
Output
  • But argued
  • cutting money wage would cut pricesno effect on
    real wage
  • solution to depression was reflation, not
    deflation
  • increase output, real wages will fall

Employment
real wage
Marginal Product of Labour
Nf
Nu
Reduces real wage
64
Keynes on Policy
  • Reflate domestic economy to escape Depression
  • Government deficit funding of public works
  • Multiplier impact on output, employment
  • Boost to investor expectations
  • Maintain low interest rates
  • International Balance of Payments system to avoid
    beggar my neighbour currency devaluations
  • Central world monetary authority
  • Fixed exchange rates, IMF approval for variation
  • Trade deficit economies must deflate economies to
    reduce imports
  • Trade surplus economies must reflate to boost
    imports

65
Keynesian Policy in Practice
  • Domestic policy recommendations became the norm
  • Budget deficits to increase employment during
    slumps (but surpluses rarely achieved during
    booms for political reasons)
  • Low interest rates
  • International recommendations only half followed
    in Bretton-Woods agreement
  • Fixed exchange rates, IMF, etc. (US as standard)
  • Pressure on deficit countries to deflate but
  • No pressure on trade surplus countries to reduce
    surplus (USA then major creditortrade
    surplusnation)

66
The interpretation of Keynes
  • General Theory highly influential, but read by
    few economists (let alone economic journalists!)
  • Most relied upon summaries and textbook
    interpretations
  • GT itself not precise plenty of room for
    interpretation
  • Key interpretation Hicks 1936, Mr Keynes the
    Classics IS-LM rendition of Keynes
  • Hicks sets out typical classical theory
  • Mk.I (money supply output), IxC(i)
    (investment demand), IxS(i) (savings supply)
  • Argues that Keyness innovation is the
    proposition that the demand for money should obey
    marginal analysis

67
A marginal interpretation of Keynes
  • On grounds of pure value theory, it is evident
    that the direct sacrifice made by a person who
    holds a stock of money is a sacrifice of
    interest
  • and it is hard to believe that the marginal
    principle does not operate at all in this field
    Hicks, 1936
  • Proposes that
  • ML(i) (demand for money a decreasing function of
    interest rate) is Liquidity Preference
  • this Keyness main innovation
  • Multiplier Ix S(I) comparatively
    insignificant

68
Keynes according to Hicks
  • Mr Keynes begins with three equations,
  • ML(i), IxC(i), IxS(I)
  • in contrast to (neo)classical theory ... the
    demand for money is conceived as depending upon
    the rate of interest (Liquidity Preference).
  • On the other hand, any possible influence of the
    rate of interest on the amount saved out of a
    given income is neglected.
  • Although it means that the third equation becomes
    the multiplier equation, which performs such
    queer tricks, nevertheless this second amendment
    is a mere simplification, and ultimately
    insignificant.
  • (ML(i) is money demand money supply M is
    assumed to be exogenous)

69
Keynes according to Hicks
  • In this model
  • Money demand/supply determines i

Ms
i
  • i determines Ix
  • Ix determines I via the multiplier
  • Increase Ms-gtincrease I
  • Increase propensity to invest, or to consume-gt
    increase I

Md
70
Keynes special theory, according to Hicks
Ms
i
Investment
Money marketdetermines int. rate
i
interest ratedetermines Investment
Md (liquidity preference)
Ixf(i)
Ix
M
I (output)
I (output)
Output determines employment
InvestmentdeterminesOutput
Ix
N (employment)
If(Ix)The multiplier
71
Keynes special theory, according to Hicks
Ms
i
Investment
Money marketdetermines int. rate
i
interest ratedetermines Investment
Increasing Ms increases N
Md (liquidity preference)
Ixf(i)
Ix
M
I (output)
I (output)
Output determines employment
InvestmentdeterminesOutput
Ix
N (employment)
Employment grows more than output because of
diminishing marginal product
If(Ix)The multiplier
72
Keynes special theory, according to Hicks
Ms
i
Investment
Money marketdetermines int. rate
i
interest ratedetermines Investment
Reducing LP increases N
Md (liquidity preference)
Ixf(i)
Ix
M
I (output)
I (output)
Output determines employment
InvestmentdeterminesOutput
Ix
N (employment)
If(Ix)The multiplier
Employment grows more than outputbecause of
diminishing marginal product
73
Keynes general theory, according to Hicks
  • something appreciably more orthodox OREF 31
  • The dependence of the demand for money on
    interest does not ... do more than qualify the
    old dependence on income. However much stress we
    lay upon the 'speculative motive', the
    'transactions motive' must always come in as
    well.
  • Hickss version of Keyness GT
  • ML(I,i), IxC(i), IxS(I).
  • vs Hickss version of typical classical theory
  • Mk.I, IxC(i), IxS(i)

74
Keynes general theory, according to Hicks
  • The LL (LM) curve
  • Fixed Ms Md fn of i Md fn of I

The LM curve
Exogenous Ms
i
i
Md1 (I2)
Md1 (I1)
I
I2
I1
M
75
Keynes general theory, according to Hicks
I (income)
I (income)
IxS(I)
The IS curve Investment demand a fn of i
IxC(i) Savings supply a fn of Income IxS(I)
Savings a function of income
S
I (income)
i
Investment a function of interest rate
i
The IS curve
Multiplier
IxC(i)
I(output)
Ix (Investment)
76
Keynes general theory, according to Hicks
  • The product IS-LM analysis

i
LL (now LM)
IS
I (output)
77
Keynes general theory, according to Hicks
  • Keynes as a marginalist neoclassical, according
    to Hicks
  • Income and the rate of interest are now
    determined together ... just as price and output
    are determined together in the modern theory of
    demand and supply.
  • Indeed, Mr Keynes's innovation is closely
    parallel, in this respect, to the innovation of
    the marginalists.
  • Integrating Keynes and the Classics
  • Slope of LM curve
  • almost horizontal for low levels of I
  • almost vertical for high levels of I

78
Keynes general theory, according to Hicks
  • In Keynesian region, rightward shift of IS
    curve (by fiscal policy, etc.) mainly boosts
    income
  • In Classical region, rightward shift of IS
    curve (by fiscal policy, etc.) mainly boosts
    interest rate
  • the General Theory of Employment is the
    Economics of Depression, Classical is Economics
    of full employment

i
LM
Classical region
IS
Keynesian region
I (output)
79
Nice theory, but is it Keynes?
  • Whatever Happened to Uncertainty Expectations?
  • Hicks Ixf(i) Investment demand a function of
    the rate of interest (and income in more general
    model)
  • Keynes Our knowledge of the factors which will
    govern the yield of an investment some years
    hence is usually very slight and often
    negligible OREF 4
  • It would be foolish, in forming our
    expectations, to attach great weight to matters
    which are very uncertain... therefore, we are
    guided ... by the facts about which we feel
    somewhat confident, .... the facts of the
    existing situation enter disproportionately,
    into the formation of our long-term
    expectations
  • Why not Ixf(i,I,E) where E is expectations?

80
Nice theory, but is it Keynes?
  • Keynesian Economics as practised
  • Keynes minus uncertainty expectations
  • Keynes without uncertainty is something like
    Hamlet without the Prince. (Minsky, John Maynard
    Keynes, 1975, p. 57)
  • Evolved towards the Neoclassical synthesis
  • IS-LM macro grafted onto neoclassical micro
  • Key architects Hicks Samuelson
  • Revival of neoclassical economics as Keynes
    criticised for having bad microfoundations
  • Protest group of economists (Post-Keynesians)
    try to develop uncertainty-based interpretation
    of Keynes in opposition to dominant neoclassical
    synthesis view
  • Curiously, one protester was John Hicks!

81
IS-LM An Explanation
  • In 1979/80, Hicks commented that
  • The IS-LM diagram, which is widely, though not
    universally, accepted as a convenient synopsis of
    Keynesian theory, is a thing for which I cannot
    deny that I have some responsibility. (Hicks
    1979/80)
  • saw two key problems with IS-LM as an
    interpretation of Keynes
  • 2nd problem was time-period of model
  • Hickss used a week,
  • Keynes used a short-period, a term with
    connotations derived from Marshall we shall not
    go far wrong if we think of it as a year (Hicks
    1980).

82
IS-LM An Explanation
  • Not unreasonable to hold expectations constant
    for a weekand therefore ignore them.
  • But keeping expectations constant over a year in
    an IS-LM model does not make sense, because
  • for the purpose of generating an LM curve, which
    is to represent liquidity preference, it will not
    do without amendment. For there is no sense in
    liquidity, unless expectations are uncertain.
    (Hicks Explanation)
  • I.e., why hold money for precautions/speculation,
    if expectations were constant?
  • Cant validly derive LM curve, because
    transactions are only reason for holding money
    when expectations constant

83
IS-LM An Explanation
  • If expectations constant, then cant be out of
    equilibrium
  • if out of equilibrium, expectations must change!
  • I accordingly conclude that the only way in
    which IS-LM analysis usefully survivesas
    anything more than a classroom gadget, to be
    superseded, later on, by something betteris in
    application to a particular kind of causal
    analysis, where the use of equilibrium methods,
    even a drastic use of equilibrium methods, is not
    inappropriate
  • When one turns to questions of policy, looking
    towards the future instead of the past, the use
    of equilibrium methods is still more suspect. For
    one cannot prescribe policy without considering
    at least the possibility that policy may be
    changed. There can be no change of policy if
    everything is to go on as expectedif the economy
    is to remain in what (however approximately) may
    be regarded as its existing equilibrium. (Hicks
    Explanation)

84
Keynesian Theory in Practice
  • Despite Hicks disavowal of his own model, the
    interpretation of Keynes was dominated by IS-LM,
    and Aggregate Demand-Aggregate Supply (AS-AD)
    analysis
  • Emphasis upon fiscal policy
  • No attention to issue of expectations
  • Policy focus post-Depression, WWII
  • Full employment primary
  • Australian 1945 White Paper on Employment
  • "maintain such a pressure of demand on resources
    that for the economy as a whole there will be a
    tendency towards a shortage of men instead of a
    shortage of jobs"
  • Price stability secondary

85
Keynesian Theory in Practice
  • Although we have defined the boundary of the
    full-employment zone in terms of registered
    unemployment of 1.0 to 1.5 per cent of the work
    force, this is by no means to say that Australia
    should be content with this degree of
    unemployment. It should be possible to maintain
    employment at a higher level than this and avoid
    the difficulties arising from shortages and
    bottlenecks Vernon Committee, 1966
  • The scorecard
  • Recovery from Great Depression
  • Years of high stable growth, low inflation
  • Ending with rising inflation during Vietnam War
    Years, and severe collapse in 1973 (before OPEC!)

86
Breakdown of Keynesianism Philips Curve
  • 1958 study identifies relationship between
    unemployment rate of change of money wages
  • Consonant with Keynes on real wages and
    employment
  • Inc. output gt decrease real wages gt prices must
    rise
  • Inflation-unemployment trade-off perceived as
    core of Keynesian policy
  • 1960s--accelerating inflation. Breakdown of
    Philips Curve opens door to Friedmans monetarism

87
The Phillips Curve
  • 3 factors which might influence rate of change of
    money wages
  • Level of unemployment (highly nonlinear
    relationship)
  • Rate of change of unemployment
  • Rate of change of retail prices operating
    through cost of living adjustments in wage rates
    when retail prices are forced up by a very rapid
    rise in import prices or agricultural
    products. Economica 1958 p. 283-4
  • Cost-based perspective on prices
  • Developed curve from UK wage change/unemployment
    statistics from 1861-1913
  • Only 1st of 3 causal factors shown in curve

88
The Phillips Curve
  • Found a clear tendency for
  • inverse relation between U and rate of change of
    money wages (Dwm)
  • Dwm above curve when U falling, and v.v
  • Fitted exponential curve to data

89
The Phillips Curve
Deviations from trend because of
Fitted through average wage change U for
0-2,2-3,3-4, 4-5,5-7,7-11 unemployment
Wage-price spiral due to wars falling U
Rising unemployment
90
The Phillips Curve fitted to 1913-1948 data
Rapid rise in U 13 fall in M prices cost of
living agreements
War-induced rise in M prices
91
The Phillips Curve 49-57 data with time lag
Close fit of 50s UK data to curve
Import price rise
92
The Phillips Curve
  • Conclusion Phillips extrapolates from money
    wages to price inflation
  • Ignoring years in which import prices initiate
    a wage-price spiral, which seems to occur very
    rarely except as a result of war, and assuming an
    increase in productivity of 2 p.a., for a
    stable level of product prices unemployment
    would be 2.5. For stable wage rates about
    5.5 p. 299
  • An inflation-unemployment trade-off?
  • But Phillips main purpose for developing it was
    to provide an input for his dynamic models in
    which unemployment, output, etc., varied
    cyclically.

93
The Phillips Model
  • RECOMMENDATIONS for stabilising aggregate
    production and employment have usually been
    derived from the analysis of multiplier models,
    using the method of comparative statics.
  • This type of analysis does not provide a very
    firm basis for policy recommendations, for two
    reasons.
  • First, the time path of income, production and
    employment during the process of adjustment is
    not revealed. It is quite possible that certain
    types of policy may give rise to undesired
    fluctuations, or even cause a previously stable
    system to become unstable, although the final
    equili
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