The SinoSoviet Split

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The Sino-Soviet Split
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Sino-Soviet Split

• In the immediate years after the Peoples
  Republic of China was proclaimed, the Soviet
  Union became its closest ally, united in
  Communism. The Soviets offered equipment and
  skilled labor to help industrialize and modernize
  the PRC. Eventually, the Chinese realised that
  the help that they were actually receiving from
  the Soviets was much less than what they had
  anticipated. Other factors such as differing
  policies in various areas also appeared.
• The Sino- Soviet split was a major diplomatic and
  occasionally military conflict between the PRC
  and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
  (USSR), beginning in the late 1950s, reaching a
  peak in 1960-1969 and continuing in various ways
  until the late 1980s.
• It led to a parallel split in the international
  Communist movement, although it may have had as
  much to do with Chinese and Soviet national
  interests as with the two countries' respective
  communist ideologies.

http//www.ibiblio.org/chinesehistory/contents/03p
ol/c05s04.htmlSino-20Soviet20Split
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General Differences Geo-political and historical
differences between Chinese and Russian
Revolutions

• The different levels of development of the
  productive forces was a main difference in the
  two Revolutions.
• In 1956-1960, the USSR was at a stage of
  development in which productive forces were no
  longer able to develop an economy in isolation
  from the worlds economy, while China was at an
  earlier stage in their construction of a planned
  economy.
• The dominant role of the peasantry in the Chinese
  revolution, as opposed to the Russian Revolution.
  
• The working class was the leading force in both
  cases, but the Russian Revolution was made in the
  cities, and was taken out to the countryside
  whereas the Chinese Revolution was made in the
  countryside, and brought in from the countryside
  to the cities.
• The different perspective in relation to
  imperialism.
• The USSR now felt slightly less threatened, both
  internally and externally, and would not shun
  trade with the West, while the Chinese felt more
  immediately threatened by imperialism perceived
  and real.

http//home.mira.net/andy/bs/bs3-1.htm
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Partners in Communism Early Sino-Soviet Relations

• 1949 PRC and USSR signed the Sino-Soviet Treaty
  of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance,
  which stated, according to a summary on the
  website of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign
  Affairs

The Two Contracting Parties undertake to carry
out jointly all necessary measures within their
power to prevent a repetition of aggression and
breach of the peace by Japan or any other State
which might directly or indirectly join with
Japan in acts of aggression. Should either with
Japan and thus find itself in a state of war, the
other Contracting Party shall immediately extend
military and other assistance with all the means
at its disposal. Neither of the Contracting
Parties shall enter into any alliance directed
against the other Party, or participate in any
coalition or in any action or measures directed
against the other Party. The two contracting
Parties undertake shall consul together on all
important international questions involving the
common interests of the soviet Union and China,
with a view to strengthening peace and universal
security. The two Contracting Parties undertake,
in a spirit of friendship and cooperation and in
accordance with the principles of equal rights,
mutual interests, mutual respect for State
sovereignty and territorial integrity, and
non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other
Party, to develop and strengthen the economic and
cultural ties between the soviet Union and China,
to render each other all possible economic
assistance and to effect the necessary economic
cooperation.

• The Treaty remained in place for 30 years after
  it was signed on February 14, 1950, voiding an
  earlier 1945 treaty that did not put such a
  strong emphasis on partnership.

• http//www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/ziliao/3602/3604/t1801
  1.htm

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Policy Splits Stalins Death and Krushchevs new
policy

• PRC and USSR policy was already divided over
  economic development Mao was a proponent of
  agricultural growth whereas Stalin (and his
  experts sent to China) emphasized heavy industry
• Upon Stalins death in 1953, Nikita Krushchevs
  new policies furthered and overshadowed that
  divide
• Krushchev feared nuclear war with the USA far
  more than Stalin had, and thus was anxious to
  reach détente
• The PRC accused the USSR of revisionism, of
  perverting the original goals of their shared
  communism, betraying the Marxist principles of
  spreading communism, and of selling out to the
  USA

Ross, Stewart. (1988). China Since 1945. Hove
Wayland
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First Quarrels

• Both nations were reluctant to split entirely,
  and maintained their friendly relations as much
  as possible throughout the early 1960s
• For example a memorandum on a conversation
  between the USSR Ambassador to the PRC,
  Chervonenko S.V., and Deng Xiaoping, General
  Secretary of the CC CCP
• Returning to the meeting in Paris, Deng Xiaoping
  said that the issue of developing a Chinese
  movement in support of N.S. Khrushchev's
  statement was being examined in the CC CCP. On
  May 18, the leaders of social organizations in
  the PRC will make statements in the press on this
  issue, and two to three days thereafter, when the
  circumstances become clearer, further steps will
  be taken in this direction. Our common position
  consists, he said, of exposing the imperialists
  and of explaining the correctness of the position
  of the countries in the socialist camp headed by
  the Soviet Union.
• Deng Xiaoping asked me to convey a warm greeting
  to comrade N.S. Khrushchev and to all of the
  members of the Presidium of the CC CPSU on behalf
  of comrades Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and all of
  the leaders of the CC CCP. The Americans are
  closing ranks against us, he said, but their
  closing of ranks is insecure. Our solidarity, and
  the solidarity of the countries of the socialist
  camp, is inviolable, since it is founded on a
  unity of ideas and goals.

• The biggest splits came over the USSRs desire
  for a nuclear nonproliferation treaty with the
  USA, along with such things as USSR support (or
  lack thereof) for Chinas interest in North
  Korea, or the USSRs wish for the PRC to support
  their initiatives in Cuba. (See Appendix A)

• Cold War International History Project
• Memorandum

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The Possibilty of War

• The possiblity of war between China and the
  Soviet Union became apparent when both countries
  began sending military forces to the Sino-Soviet
  border.
• This began in 1968, when there was a significant
  increase in Soviet deployment, from 12
  half-strength divisions and 200 airplanes (1961),
  to 25 divisions, 1,200 aircraft and 120
  medium-range missiles.
• This led to the Sino-Soviet Border Conflict in
  1969
• Important because the movement of Soviet troops
  to the Sino-Soviet border decreased the threat of
  a Soviet invasion of Central Europe

http//www.reference.com/search?r13qSino-Soviet
20border20conflict
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The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict

• A series of armed clashes between the USSR and
  the PRC along the Sino-Soviet border in 1969
• 658 000 Soviet troops against 814 000 Chinese
  troops
• March 2, 1969 - Soviet patrol vs. Chinese forces
• Both sides claimed the other was the aggressor,
  and published propaganda stating that they had
  fewer losses than the other side
• USSR responded by attacking Manchuria and
  storming Zhenbao Island
• After several more clashes, both sides prepared
  for nuclear confrontation

http//www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/p
rc-soviet.htm http//www.reference.com/search?r13
qSino-Soviet20border20conflict
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China Stops being a Soviet Puppet Relations
between USA and PRC

• The Sino-Soviet Split opened the possibility for
  separate negotiations with China by the West
• 1971 - The UN recognizes the PRC, and transfers
  Security Council authority
• 1972 - Nixon goes to China
• Nixon and Mao made efforts
• to negotiate normalization
• of US-China relations
• US recognized the need to resolve
• the Taiwan issue by peaceful means, and this
  was agreed to by China
• 1979 - US formally recognizes PRC, and breaks off
  relations with Taiwan

http//www.britannica.com/eb/article-214058/Richar
d-M-Nixon
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Sino-Soviet Relations and Vietnam

• Following Maos invitation to Nixon, the Vietnam
  Workers Party became more sympathetic to the USSR
• USSR wanted to back North Vietnam to show strong
  Communism in South-East Asia, and encircle China
• In order to support North Vietnam in the Vietnam
  War, USSR wanted to send weapons.
• This would require going through China.
• To everyones surprise, China allowed this.

http//www.reference.com/search?qSino-Vietnamese
20War
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Splitting of Communist Parties around the World
Long-Term Effects of the Split

• Significant reduction of Soviet influence in
  South-East Asia
• gave critics of Communism a counterexample to
  Marxs development theory

Although tension in Sino-Soviet relations was so
great that many Western scholars referred to it
as a "split," the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty
continued to exist.
- Bruce Elleman, Sino-Soviet Relations and the
February 1979 Sino-Vietnamese Conflict

• The split between the USSR and the PRC resulted
  in internal conflict within international
  communist parties over communist ideology
• This resulted in creation of Maoist Communist
  Parties (Marxist-Leninist Parties), and Stalinist
  Communist Parties (Communist Parties)
• The overall effect of this was reducing the
  influence of Communist organizations in other
  countries by focusing on internal conflicts
  rather than the overthrow of Capitalism

http//www.marxists.org/glossary/events/s/i.htm
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For More Information, see

• The Cold War International History Project a
  project documenting the Cold War from all
  possible perspectives, with a virtual archive
  that is organized into sections tracing all
  events through primary sources such as telegrams
  and conversations. The initiative was formed
  under the auspices of the Woodrow Wilson
  International Centre for Scholars.
• Sino-Soviet Relations
• Sino-Soviet Split

• The UN Documentation Centre an online repository
  for all resolutions, documents, reports, etc.
  which the UN has ever published. Often organized
  by committee and/or year.
• Link

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Appendix A Letter from Gomulka to Krushchev,
outlining the Soviet interpretation of relations
with the PRC. 10/08/1963
Dear Comrade Krushchev! I am of the opinion that
neither a nonproliferation treaty nor any other
understandings of serious international
importance can be concluded without consulting
the Communist Party of China or in spite of the
Peoples Republic of China. If we continue
further down such a path, it will inevitably lead
to the division of the socialist camp and to
fierce factional struggles within the
international communist movement and within the
communist and workers parties in individual
countries. We already see today what great damage
arose in this regard from the fact that the
Moscow Treaty ... was concluded without
consulting the Communist Party of China.
Undoubtedly, such a consultation would not have
led the Peoples Republic of China to alter its
stance on achieving the production of its own
atomic bomb. However, it might have been that as
a result of such a consultation, the Moscow
Treaty would have applied only to the states
participating in the negotiations. Because the
treaty was concluded for all states, this led to
an angry reaction on the part of the Communist
Party of China, which interpreted the treaty as
an effort to isolate the Peoples Republic of
China both among the socialist states and in the
international arena. In the running debate with
the Communist Party of China, we should not
permit the debate to lead to a split of the
socialist camp into two factions. There cannot be
two socialist camps. It must remain one despite
all the internal differences. A split of the
socialist camp would alter in a fundamental way
the world balance of forces between socialism and
imperialism to the benefit of the latter. Despite
its smaller productive potential, the socialist
camp has predominated and may still have the
advantage over imperialism thanks only to its
unity. All the basic principles of our policy,
our tactics and strategy in the struggle with
imperialism over peace and peaceful coexistence
of states, for disarmament, for the victory of
socialism on a world scale, rest upon the unity
of the socialist camp. We must be fully aware of
this fact. We must be aware of the consequences
that would arise from a split in the socialist
camp. In the name of maintaining the unity of
the socialist camp, we must reach an
understanding with the Communist Party of China.
The socialist camp numbers over one billion
people. Lets not forget that for even a moment,
and lets appreciate the importance of the fact
that the Chinese are almost two-thirds of this
population. Without the Peoples Republic of
China, nothing can be achieved in terms of the
socialist camps international policy. We should
seek a compromise and move towards the conclusion
of a compromise in the debate with the
Communist Party of China and the People's
Republic of China. In this situation, the
Peoples Republic of China can insure its
influence over decision making with regard to
various international questions only through the
socialist camp, or speaking more precisely,
through the Soviet Union, from whom it demands
that it consult with China on its political
initiatives in the international arena and in its
relations with the imperialist states. When it
turned out that the Soviet Union did not always
consider it proper to take into account the
reservations of the Peoples Republic of China in
its policy, there began to grow in the Communist
Party of China a rebellion against the CPSU,
which after the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty
... spilled out in the forms known to us now.
Yes, as I see the matter, the Communist Party of
China has already decided upon even a split in
the socialist camp and the international
communist movement, unless the Soviet Union
agrees to coordinate its policy in the
international arena with the Peoples Republic of
China. An understanding with the Chinese
Communist Party on the basis of a sensible
compromise is thus necessary from every point of
view. I assume that if the Soviet Union will
consult with and gain the approval of the
Peoples Republic of China for its more important
political initiatives in the international arena,
the Chinese Communist Party will desist from its
propaganda and attacks against the CPSU and that
a closer point of view can be achieved with
regard to a number of controversial questions. It
will not be possible to achieve a full unity of
views. Ideological differences will remain for a
long time, but they should be kept within limits
that will not tear apart the unity of the
socialist camp.? am not outlining a platform here
for an understanding with the Communist Party of
China. It can be worked out later. The most
important thing is to move towards a halt in
public and direct ideological polemics even if
everyone maintains for a certain time their own
views on controversial issues. We must voice our
views in a positive form, without polemics with
other parties, and even more without attacking
other parties, whether by direct or indirect
means. The likelihood exists that over time the
differences will diminish or become outdated, and
this will permit a return to ideological unity.
With communist greetings, W. Gomulka
Cold War International History Project