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Title: Lecture Nine


1
Lecture Nine
  • Scientific Economic Methodology

2
Recap
  • Neoclassical Microeconomic Basis of Finance
    theory
  • Keyness perspective
  • uncertainty, not risk
  • conventions, not estimating expected returns
  • beat the market, not efficient markets
  • This lecture
  • Methodology of science/economics

3
Popper What is a Science?
  • Philosopher writing at time of collapse of
    Austro-Hungarian empire (1912-1919)
  • Once convinced, then disillusioned by Marxist
    theory of history
  • Characterises these, psycho-analysis, astrology,
    etc. as pseudo-science
  • Posed question 'What is wrong with Marxism,
    psycho-analysis...? Why are they so different
    from physical theories...?' ... these ...
    theories, though posing as sciences, had ... more
    in common with primitive myths than with
    science... Conjectures Refutations

4
Popper What is a Science?
  • Rejected conventional explanations (empirical
    inductive method) because pseudo-sciences (e.g.
    astrology heavily empirical)
  • Noticed characteristic of pseudo-sciences
    confirmation
  • admirers ... were impressed ... by their
    apparent explanatory power. These theories
    appeared to be able to explain practically
    everything that happened within the fields to
    which they referred
  • A Marxist could not open a newspaper without
    finding ... confirming evidence for his
    interpretation of history ... in the news, ...
    its presentation and especially of course in
    what the paper did not say.

5
Popper What is a Science?
  • Argued that confirmation meaningless every
    conceivable case could be interpreted in the
    light of the relevant theory they could not
    be refuted
  • Therefore, by exclusion, a true science was one
    which could be refuted
  • Developed 6 principles to
  • distinguish science from pseudo-science
  • distinguish good from bad scientific behaviour

6
Popper What is a Science?
  • Confirmations should count only if they are ...
    risky ..., if, unenlightened by the theory ...,
    we should have expected an event which ... would
    have refuted the theory.
  • Every 'good' scientific theory is a prohibition
    it forbids certain things to happen...
  • A theory which is not refutable by any
    conceivable event is non-scientific...
  • Every genuine test of a theory is an attempt to
    falsify it, or to refute it...
  • Confirming evidence should not count except when
    it is ... a serious but unsuccessful attempt to
    falsify the theory

7
Popper What is a Science?
  • ...re-interpreting the theory ad hoc in such a
    way that it escapes refutation... is always
    possible, but ... rescues the theory from
    refutation only at the price of ... lowering, its
    scientific status.
  • In summary
  • the criterion of the scientific status of a
    theory is its falsifiability...

8
Popper How does a Science develop?
  • The pre-history of a science is myth
  • historically speaking all---or very nearly
    all---scientific theories originate from myths
    ...
  • How to draw the line between myth science?
  • to be scientific, must be capable of
    conflicting with possible, or conceivable,
    observations
  • Myths may be important
  • a myth may contain important anticipations of
    scientific theories

9
Popper How does a Science develop?
  • Humans seek regularities, explanations for
    reality theory precedes observation
  • Myth provides theories (conjectures) about the
    world
  • We test theories by experience some experiences
    contradict myth (refutations)
  • Science develops out of myth by conjectures
    refutations
  • scientific theories were not the digest of
    observations, but ... inventions--conjectures
    boldly put forward for trial, to be eliminated if
    they clashed with observations with observations
    which were rarely accidental but as a rule
    undertaken with the definite intention of testing
    a theory by obtaining, if possible, a decisive
    refutation.

10
Popper The nature of science
  • Dogmatism criticism are polar opposites
  • Some dogmatism needed to avoid early abandonment
    of theories but
  • science is critical (attempts to refute
    theories), psuedo-science is dogmatic (attempts
    to verify)
  • science develops by conjecture and refutation ..
    boldly proposing theories ... trying ... to show
    that these are erroneous ... accepting them
    tentatively if our critical efforts are
    unsuccessful.

11
Popper The nature of science
  • Evolutionary basis to science our conjectures,
    suffer in our stead in the struggle for the
    survival of the fittest.
  • Linear nature of science progresses from myth to
    science to better science
  • Incremental nature of progress can never attain
    complete truth but each conjecture/refutation
    brings us closer to it

12
Popper Problems
  • Argues that theory precedes observation but
  • Proposes that scientists more wedded to
    observation than theory (which they attempt to
    refute) contradictory
  • In practice hard to delineate between myth
    science
  • Example (shortly) was Ptolemys theory of
    astronomy myth or science?
  • Failure of Poppers Positivism as guide to
    History of Science led to Kuhns Paradigms

13
Paradigms
  • Scientific community wedded to its view of the
    world--its paradigm
  • Theory selects observations which tend to confirm
    it
  • Paradigm develops by extending range of phenomena
    it can explain normal science
  • Paradigm embodied in texts--previous paradigms
    ignored/forgotten/judged from point of view of
    dominant paradigm
  • Anomalies--things which contradict theory--at
    first resisted
  • At limits of paradigm, only anomalies left to
    resolve
  • Failure to resolve leads to revolution--often
    from outside

14
Paradigms
  • Paradigm includes
  • explanatory view of relevant phenomena (physics,
    chemistry, etc.)
  • set of unresolved puzzles
  • Normal science as process of resolving these
    puzzles
  • Paradigm starts to break down when some puzzles
    fail to be resolved key anomalies
  • Switch to new paradigm involves total change in
    world view
  • E.g., theory of the cosmos from Aristotle to
    Copernicus

15
Astronomy Aristotle/Ptolemy
  • Aristotle theory of ordered universe
  • 2 parts the earth the heavens
  • Earth the place of change
  • Heavens the place of perfection
  • 5 elements Earth, Water, Air, Fire, Aether
  • Earth heaviest, thus earth at centre (explains
    gravity)
  • Aether lightest, thus in heavens (explains
    orbits)
  • Heavenly bodies on circular orbits in concentric
    spheres around earth in order of Moon, Mercury,
    Venus, Sun, Mars stars

16
Astronomy Aristotle/Ptolemy
  • Universe finite, compact
  • Spheres fit tightly together
  • Fixed stars on outer sphere
  • Beyond the stars, nothing the Void
  • 2 sets of rules
  • On earth, decay/change a stone falls to earth...
  • In heavens, eternity heavenly bodies rotate
    forever
  • Fits with religious view Earthly corruption
    Heavenly perfection

17
Astronomy Aristotle/Ptolemy
The Void
The Elements
Earth
Water
The Heavens
Air, Fire
Aether
Moon
Sun
Stars
18
Astronomy Aristotle/Ptolemy
  • Aristotles system couldnt be maintained
  • Not all orbits circular
  • Planets reversed direction
  • sometimes moved to east across the sky, other
    times to west
  • Paradigmatic puzzle how to resolve observed
    behaviour of planets to core of paradigm that
    earth is centre of universe
  • Ptolemy solves puzzle with Excentric, epicycle,
    and equant motion

19
Astronomy Aristotle/Ptolemy
Eccentricity of orbits explained
Reversal of direction possible
Universal centre
Earth
Centre of rotation
  • Core of paradigm maintained
  • Puzzle now to accurately place heavenly bodies
    on spheres

20
Astronomy Aristotle/Ptolemy
  • Ptolemaic view breaks down by Renaissance
  • Astronomical tables lose accuracy
  • Navigation by mariners relies upon but also
    contradicts Ptolemaic celestial predictions
  • Calendar becoming inaccurate
  • Equinox moved from 21st to 11th Jan/July
  • Copernicus proposes alternative paradigm
  • Sun centre of universe (1st proposed by
    Archimedes, 212BC!)
  • Earth planets have circular orbits around it
  • Stars fixed at great distance (given parallax
    effect)
  • Alternative tables slightly more accurate than
    Ptolemaic
  • But explanation involves complete shift in
    viewpoint

21
Astronomy Copernicus
Explanation for why stars dont move completely
different
No apparent parallax for stars
Must be at enormous distance from earth
22
Astronomy Copernicus
  • Lukewarm to hostile initial reception
  • Clashed with Ptolemaic world view
  • How would stones fall to earth if it wasnt
    centre of universe?
  • How can stones thrown straight up fall in same
    place if earth rotates/moves?
  • Why is there a Void between Saturn the stars?
  • Clashes with bible, etc.
  • Eventually dominant after 25-50 years

23
Astronomy Copernicus
Completely different view of universe Not a
linear change from previous view (as in Popper)
but a complete change in vision a paradigm
shift
24
Paradigms vs Positivism
  • Ptolemaic view based on myth (religious view of
    universe)
  • But were Aristotle et al unscientific?
  • Complex model of universe, accurate tables, acute
    observations
  • Did they attempt to refute theory?
  • No, Ptolemys revised orbs maintains
    earth-centric view
  • Was Copernicus accepted as refutation of
    Ptomelys conjecture?
  • No, strong resistance
  • Paradigm approach regarded as more accurate model
    of scientific behaviour

25
The Paradigm develops
  • Later work by Feyerabend, Lakatos,
    extends/modifies concept of paradigm
  • Lakatos Methodology of Scientific Research
    Programs (MSRP)
  • Theories have hard core which adherents do not
    attempt to falsify
  • Hard core surrounded by protective belt of
    hypotheses which may be adjusted to defend hard
    core
  • Positive heuristic (like Kuhns puzzles
    normal science) where most development effort of
    program occurs
  • An MSRP can be progressive (expanding ive
    heuristic) or degenerative (simply adjusting
    protective belt to save hard core from attack)

26
Positivist v Paradigm view of Economics
  • Positivist view
  • ive Refinement of economic theory from
    Physiocrats to neoclassicals -ive utility as
    irrefutable
  • Paradigm/MSRP view
  • Sequence of paradigms, each with own world
    view, puzzles to solve, anomalies...
  • Competing MSRPs, part progressive, part
    degenerative
  • Any status as a science?
  • Absence of controlled experiment
  • Impact of observer on data
  • Is economics a science in same sense as
    physics, astronomy?

27
Within Economics Instrumentalism
  • Friedman (OREF II)
  • Proper test of a theory is by its predictions
  • Realism of assumptions irrelevant
  • the more significant the theory, the more
    unrealistic the assumptions a hypothesis is
    important if it explains much by little OREF
    203
  • as if assumptions--firms behave as if
    maximising expected returns, etc.--valid even if
    firms do not consciously do so.
  • Reason for paper to counter perennial criticism
    of orthodox economic theory as unrealistic
    OREF 213

28
Within Economics Instrumentalism
  • Problems with Instrumentalism
  • Friedmans defended his economics with
    instrumentalism
  • Used by others (see Sharpe on finance, last
    lecture) to likewise defend theories against
    attacks on basis of unrealistic assumptions
  • But how have the predictions of these theories
    fared?
  • Eventual abandonment of monetarism after
    continual failures to meet monetary growth
    targets
  • Current state of finance markets wildly at odds
    with predictions of Efficient Markets Hypothesis
  • Even on own grounds, instrumentalism not an
    effective defence of economic theory

29
Within Economics Instrumentalism
  • Intellectually, many problems with
    Instrumentalism
  • Not how orthodox economists actually behave
  • They judge theories on the basis of their
    assumptions
  • Development of orthodox macroeconomics driven by
    desire to make macroeconomics consistent with
    assumptions of neoclassical microeconomics
  • Critical of other theories (Marxian, Post
    Keynesian, etc.) on the basis of their
    assumptions
  • (Conventional Marxian) assumption of labor theory
    of value criticised by everyone from Bohm Bawerk
    to Samuelson
  • Papers submitted to journals often criticised for
    not making conventional assumptions (rationality,
    etc.)

30
Within Economics Instrumentalism
  • Logical consistency of assumptions has been
    challenged (Sraffa), not just realism
  • Sciences do attempt to build theories which are
    essentially descriptions of reality
  • Musgrave (see OREF) argues Friedmans
    significant theory, unrealistic assumptions
    position invalid
  • Classifies assumptions into 3 classes
  • Negligibility assumptions
  • Domain Assumptions
  • Heuristic Assumptions

31
Within Economics Instrumentalism
  • Negligibility Assumptions
  • Assert that some factor is of little or no
    importance in a given situation
  • e.g., Galileos experiment to prove that weight
    does not affect speed at which objects fall
  • dropped two different size lead balls from
    Leaning Tower of Pisa
  • assumed (correctly) air resistance negligible
    at that altitude for dense objects, therefore
    ignored air resistance
  • Domain assumptions
  • Assert that theory is relevant if some assumed
    condition applies, irrelevant if condition does
    not apply

32
Within Economics Instrumentalism
  • e.g., Newtons theory of planetary motion
    assumed there was only one planet
  • if true, planet follows elliptical orbit around
    sun.
  • if false planets relatively massive, motion
    unpredictable. Poincare (1899) showed
  • there was no formula to describe paths
  • paths were in fact chaotic
  • planets in multiple planet solar systems
    therefore have collisions
  • present planets evolved from collisions between
    proto-planets
  • evolutionary explanation for present-day
    roughly elliptical orbits

33
Classes of assumptions
  • Heuristic
  • assumption known to be false, but used as
    stepping stone to more valid theory
  • e.g., in developing theory of relativity,
    Einstein assumes that distance covered by person
    walking across a train carriage equals
    trigonometric sum of
  • forward movement of train
  • sideways movement of passenger

Then says We shall see later that this result
cannot be maintained in other words, the law
that we have just written down does not hold in
reality. For the time being, however, we shall
assume its correctness. (Einstein 1916)
passenger
0.9 c
train
0.9 c
lt 1.0 c
sum
34
Within Economics Instrumentalism
  • Sun/planets example of the right way to use
    assumptions
  • Assume influence of other planets negligible
  • Then earth will follow elliptical orbit around
    sun
  • Other planets (Jupiter, Saturn) not negligible
  • Then elliptical orbit only applies in solar
    systems without large planets (domain assumption)
  • Drop assumption of non-impact
  • assumption heuristic device on way to more
    general theory
  • 3-body problem no general solution possible
  • Chaos theory explanation for planet orbits
  • More realistic assumption, more accurate theory

35
Classes of assumptions
  • Friedmans instrumentalism only valid with
    respect to negligibility assumptions, but
  • often used by economists to defend domain
    assumptions
  • or presented to students as if heuristic
    assumptions
  • i.e., implied that more sophisticated models
    remove restrictive assumptions, when in fact
    more sophisticated models often involve even more
    restrictive assumptions
  • example Sharpes Efficient Markets Hypothesis

36
Just where are markets efficient?
  • The Efficient Markets Hypothesis assume
  • All investors have identical accurate
    expectations of future
  • All investors have equal access to limitless
    credit
  • Negligible, Domain or Heuristic assumptions?
  • Negligible? No if drop them, then according to
    Sharpe The theory is in a shambles (see last
    lecture)
  • Heuristic? No, EMH was end of the line for
    Sharpes logic no subsequent theory developed
    which
  • replaced risk with uncertainty, or
  • took account of differing inaccurate assumptions,
    different access to credit, etc.

37
Within Economics Instrumentalism
  • Some assumptions can be challenged for validity
  • Risk as proxy for uncertainty (Keynes/Minsky)
  • Domain validity of Arrow-Debreu general
    equilibrium with risky but not uncertain future
  • cannot apply in this universe
  • Nature of fixed capital (Sraffa)
  • Internal consistency of marginal productivity
    theory of income distribution (Sraffa/Garengani)
  • Equilibrium as normal state of economy (next
    lecture)
  • Statics equilibrium as long-run outcome of
    dynamic processes (next lecture)
  • Linearity as valid approximation to nonlinear
    processes (next lecture)

38
Within Economics Instrumentalism
  • Logic aside, Friedmans Instrumentalism still
    dominant in economics
  • From critics point of view, simply a way to
    defend neoclassical theory from criticism
  • From Lakatos point of view, can be seen as
    protective belt hypothesis to shield hard
    core of neoclassicism from criticism
  • Next 3 weeks controversies, criticisms,
    alternatives
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