HRG

1
HRG
HCG
HMG
HRI
HDI
HCI
HMI
HDA2
HCA
HDA1
HRA
HSA
HMIS
HDIS
HSIS
2
Conjectures on stringency of rules HR
-        HRG goods with crowding call for
stringent rules (Aggarwal and Dupont
1999) -        HRA heterogeneity of actors
call for lax/soft rules (Abbot and Snidal
2000) -        HRI limited information about
nature of the problem call for lax/soft rules
(Abbot and Snidal 2000)   Conjectures on
institutional delegation HD -        HDA1
large heterogeneity reduces delegation (McCall
Smith 2000) -        HDA2 low financial or
social capital among actors requires delegation
(Dupont and Knubel 2004 Ostrom 2000) -       
HDI limited information about other actors call
for delegation (Koromenos et al. 2001) -       
HDIS deep outside institutional setting limits
delegation (Aggarwal 1998)   Conjectures on
institutional centralization HC -        HCA
large number of actors call for centralization of
tasks (Koromenos et al. 2001) -        HCG
provision of goods with crowding requires
centralization (Dupont and Knubel 2004) -       
HCI need for increased information calls for
centralization (Koromenos et al 2001 Keohane
1984)   Conjectures on membership HM -       
HMG goods with crowding call for restrictive
membership (Aggarwal and Dupont 1999) -       
HMI limited information about other actors call
for strict rules of entry (Koromenos et al.
2001) -        HMIS deep vertical nesting
restricts membership (Aggarwal 1998, Dupont
1998b)   Conjectures on scope HS -       
HSA large number of actors increases
scope (Koromenos et al 2001 Lohman 1997 Keohane
1984) -        HSIS thick outside
institutional setting limits scope (Aggarwal
1998 Dupont 1998b)