AMST 3100 The 1960s Vietnam 19641968 - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

1 / 21
About This Presentation
Title:

AMST 3100 The 1960s Vietnam 19641968

Description:

Their hawkish advice to LBJ ignored CIA warnings that Vietnam might be un ... LBJ ignored CIA evidence that bombing attacks would have little overall effect. ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

Number of Views:99
Avg rating:3.0/5.0
Slides: 22
Provided by: zaxi
Category:
Tags: 1960s | amst | cia | vietnam

less

Transcript and Presenter's Notes

Title: AMST 3100 The 1960s Vietnam 19641968


1
AMST 3100 The 1960sVietnam 1964-1968
  • Powerpoint 10
  • Read Chafe Chapter 10 Farber Chapter 7

2
Vietnam, 1964
  • The assassination of Kennedy placed LBJ in power
    immediately, and he inherited a Vietnam policy
    that was in shambles with the killing of Diem
    only weeks earlier.
  • South Vietnam was in chaos due to the military
    coup. Perhaps 40 of southern Vietnamese were
    supporters of Ho Chi Minh in 1964.
  • The Americans thus far had not won over the
    hearts and minds of the indigenous population.
    The Viet Cong were growing in popularity, and
    ARVN soldiers (who were conscripts) were
    deserting.
  • By 1964, the Americans had repeated many of the
    same errors the French had committed. What would
    follow would be a series of failed puppet
    governments in South Vietnam, all propped up by
    the Americans. None would be popular among the
    Vietnamese people.

Vice President Johnson toured South Vietnam in
1961. He is seen here meeting with Diem. Diem had
been a stubborn ruler, and with his death in late
1963 Johnson had an opportunity to pursue his own
plans for Vietnam. Diem would not approve of a
massive incursion of U.S. troops and was secretly
negotiating with the North for a peace. His death
removed a key obstacle in escalating the war.
3
LBJ
  • To any outside observer, the events of late 1963
    were clear warning signs that the U.S.
    nation-building effort was failing.
  • Yet the military brass never acknowledged this,
    and neither did LBJ.
  • Their hawkish advice to LBJ ignored CIA warnings
    that Vietnam might be un-winnable.
  • Johnsons advisors urged him to step up the
    bombing of North Vietnam and increase the ground
    war and that is what he wanted to hear. LBJ, a
    hawk, did not like dovish counsel from his
    advisors.

LBJ surrounded by war advisors. Their advice
escalate the war.
4
Vietnam, 1964
  • Unlike JFK, LBJ was not interested in any exit
    strategies. To LBJ, Vietnam was a commitment, he
    would honor it, and he felt the worlds strongest
    superpower could build South Vietnam.
  • LBJ continued JFKs Operation Ranch Hand,
    involving spraying defoliant over the countryside
    to reduce Viet Cong hiding cover. Agent Orange
    was one of the defoliants.
  • LBJ continued Operation Sunrise, the Strategic
    Hamlet program begun under JFK. By early 1964
    there were more than 11,000 strategic hamlets
    constructed.
  • LBJ decided to expand the air war against North
    Vietnam, but not excessively. LBJ ignored CIA
    evidence that bombing attacks would have little
    overall effect.
  • The American problem was the same the French had
    encountered. This brought a tough question
  • How do you bomb an indigenous peasant population,
    distributed throughout the rural countryside,
    into compliance? Who do you target?
  • The Americans had adopted a conventional warfare
    strategy, just as the French had done, and like
    the French, the Americans were losing.

Operation Ranch Hand was highly unpopular among
Vietnamese peasants, as it damaged their crops,
livestock, and livelihood and caused serious
health problems.
5
Vietnam, 1964
  • Johnson stepped up the war, yet Vietnam policy
    continued to drift in the early months of his
    administration.
  • By the summer of 64, there were roughly 20,000
    advisors in Vietnam.
  • 1964 was an election year, and the Goldwater
    Republicans felt they could make gains on the
    Democrats disorganized foreign policy. The
    Republicans, trying to out-hawk the Democrats,
    called for even more military actions.
  • LBJ felt he had to show toughness because he
    feared being labeled soft on communism.
  • LBJ felt needed to take a bold step. To justify
    escalating the war, LBJ took advantage of a small
    naval incident in August 1964 at the Gulf of
    Tonkin.

Barry Goldwater was even more hawkish than LBJ.
LBJ feared being labeled soft on communism and
this was an election year.
6
Gulf of Tonkin, August 1964
  • The Gulf of Tonkin incident was an alleged pair
    of attacks on U.S. warships by the North
    Vietnamese.
  • This incident probably never happened as it was
    described at the time, but it gave the military
    brass and Johnson the excuse they were looking
    for.
  • Johnson went on national TV and declared that the
    U.S. would fight to defend itself.
  • The next morning, LBJ pressured Congress to give
    the President more war-making powers and
    Congress overwhelmingly approved the Gulf of
    Tonkin Resolution. This resolution allowed
    Johnson to militarily assist any Southeast Asian
    country whose government was endangered by
    communist aggression.
  • The resolution provided Johnsons legal
    justification for dramatically escalating the
    Vietnam War. Now he could do as he pleased.

This photo was reportedly taken on August 2, 1964
and is said to depict three North Vietnamese
patrol boats closing in on the USS Maddox, a
destroyer that the U.S. claimed was in
international waters. The Pentagon claimed that
more than 20 torpedoes were fired at U.S.
warships over a series of two attacks, but none
found their mark and the attacking ships were
damaged, with one destroyed. Johnson used this
attack to secure the Gulf of Tonkin resolution.
Subsequent evidence suggests the U.S.
characterization was inaccurate.
7
Vietnam and LBJ
  • While Eisenhower got the U.S. into Vietnam, LBJ
    bears the brunt of the responsibility for
    escalating the war.
  • Johnson did get some opposing opinions from
    George Ball, Hubert Humphrey and Bill Moyers, but
    he chose to ignore their advice.
  • Johnson set up an office that consisted mostly of
    yes men and allowed groupthink to take over.
  • In groupthink, the advisors are afraid to rock
    the boat with debate and negativity because the
    overall peer pressure is toward consensus and
    agreement with the leader. In groupthink,
    discrepancies are ignored in order to conform to
    an emerging consensus.
  • Johnson wanted hawks in his inner circle. He set
    up an office of hawks and then deceived himself
    into thinking he was being objective in
    deciding to escalate the war.

LBJ is seen here with Robert McNamara, who was
Secretary of Defense from 1961-1968. McNamara
was a key advisor who was hawkish on the Vietnam
War. After the war, he publicly renounced his
hawkish policies on Vietnam. See the
Oscar-winning 2004 documentary, Fog of War for
a closer examination.
8
Vietnam 1965-1967 Escalation of the War
  • The first combat troops arrived in Vietnam in
    early 1965. It would be a jungle war.
  • LBJ initiated Operation Rolling Thunder in 1965,
    a sustained aerial bombardment campaign of mostly
    the southern region of North Vietnam. This
    operation was the most intensive air-ground
    battle of the war and would continue into 1968.
  • LBJ limited the scope of the bombing to specific
    targets only approved by his staff. This
    infuriated the generals, who wanted to pummel the
    North and hit military targets they had
    prioritized.
  • Between 1965 and 1967 LBJ would increase troop
    strength from roughly 200,000 to almost 500,000.
  • To accomplish this, LBJ escalated the draft
    system. In 1965, 106,000 were drafted. By 1966,
    339,000 were drafted. In doing so, he helped
    polarize the youth culture against his war
    policies.

9
LBJ
  • To some extent, Johnson was convinced of his own
    position too strongly to waver, but he secretly
    wondered by the mid-60s whether the war might be
    un-winnable. He compounded the problem by
    consistently deceiving the American people and
    Congress about the progress of the war.
  • The credibility gap would finally catch up with
    him by January 1968 when the Tet Offensive
    occurred.
  • Johnson was obsessed with keeping control in his
    own hands and this is partly what did him in.
  • His initially cocky sense that the U.S. could
    defeat the Viet Cong despite obvious cues to
    the contrary and his dogged determination to
    press on as though we were winning the war
    ultimately destroyed him and tore the United
    States apart.

LBJ, in 1968, listening to a tape sent to him
from a soldier in Vietnam. By now he was
anguishing over his war policies.
10
U.S. Troop Strength, Vietnam
Troop Deaths (rough estimate)
537,000
1965 1900
1966 5100
1967 9300
1968 16800
1969 9400
Total GI deaths 58,000
Total Vietnamese deaths 3-5 million
1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution leads to dramatic
escalation.
1966 heaviest bombing raids of the war.
1968 Tet Offensive credibility gap is apparent
Nixon elected.
1967 massive anti-war demonstrations ML King
denounces the war.
1969 Moratorium March.
1965 LBJ escalates the draft first major war
protests first combat troops arrive.
1970 Nixon invades Cambodia Kent State.
11
LBJ A Limited War
  • The Johnson administration found itself trapped
    in a difficult situation. He had chosen to
    escalate the war, yet an all out war against
    North Vietnam might trigger a world war. He
    recalled the Korean War experience with China.
  • Given this situation, he chose a limited war
    using a conventional army to achieve limited
    political and military objectives.
  • The goal was to create a relatively stable South
    Vietnam that could stand on its own.
  • The purpose of his limited bombing of the North
    was to get them to bargain away the South and
    bring them to talks.
  • The Vietnam war became a war of attrition. LBJ
    would not cater to Republican hawks like Curtis
    LeMay, who wanted to bomb North Vietnam back
    into the Stone Age or to liberal Democratic
    doves, who were not committed to nation building.
    He took what he saw as the middle ground.

LBJ visits with the troops in 1966. To right-wing
hawks, Johnson needed to use more military force,
particularly by heavily bombing military targets
in Hanoi and the North, while to left-wing doves
Johnson was carrying out a policy of military
imperialism in Vietnam in violation of Americas
own principles.
12
Selling the War
  • Fighting a limited war had liabilities. It was
    difficult to define what progress meant. There
    was no front line to claim victory or defeat by.
    There were no capitals or kings to capture.
  • Instead LBJ had to create and sell indicators of
    progress to an increasingly skeptical public.
    Enemy body counts were emphasized from 1965 to
    1967, and the creation bizarre terms like
    pacification zones played to the image of
    geographic success.
  • To many, it appeared that the administration was
    resorting to a Public Relations campaign to sell
    the war.

U.S. soldier examines dead Viet Cong, Ia Drang
Valley battle, 1965.
13
Selling the War
  • In 1967, the Johnson administration launched an
    extensive public relations campaign to convince
    Americans that there was light at the end of the
    tunnel.
  • Johnson brought in General William Westmoreland,
    the top American commander, to highlight American
    progress in the war. Initially it appeared he may
    have succeeded a bit, but in January of 1968 the
    Viet Cong and North Vietnamese launched their Tet
    Offensive.

LBJ meets with General Westmoreland, who assured
Americans we were winning the war while
consistently requesting that more troops be sent
to Vietnam.
14
Khe Sahn, January 1968
  • The Tet Offensive was preceded by the siege at
    Khe Sahn.
  • On January 21, 1968, the North Vietnamese army
    attacked a remote American outpost. The surprise
    attack conjured up fears that this could be a
    repeat of the infamous French defeat at the 1954
    battle of Dien Bien Phu.
  • Military commanders ordered the soldiers at Khe
    Sahn to hold the fort, despite being surrounded
    by the well dug-in enemy. The highly-televised
    siege lasted 2 months and the enemy was finally
    turned back after the Americans reinforced the
    base.
  • The image Americans at home got of this
    media-saturated siege was that our military was
    not in control the way the generals and President
    had claimed. The fort had almost been overrun.
  • But this was just the beginning. The subsequent
    Tet Offensive was much more damaging to Johnsons
    credibility.

American soldiers held out valiantly at Khe Sahn.
Indeed, the Americans never lost a battle in
Vietnam. But this point obscures two realities
(1) the communists used guerilla style tactics
and thus were not playing for winning battles per
se and (2) the American public was getting weary
of the war, which had proved to be very costly.
This drawn out siege helped change the publics
mind about the war and LBJs credibility.
15
Tet Offensive, January 1968
  • The Tet Offensive is generally regarded as the
    turning point in the war for the Americans. After
    this point, most Americans would not delude
    themselves into thinking there was light at the
    end of the tunnel.
  • On the morning of January 31, 1968, ten days
    after the start of the Khe Sahn seige, the Viet
    Cong and the North Vietnamese army launched
    attacks on more than 100 cities across South
    Vietnam, including 35 of the 44 provincial
    capitals.
  • Even Saigon was attacked, and the American
    embassy was briefly penetrated by the Viet Cong.
  • The Tet Offensive caught the Americans off guard,
    especially after General Westmorelands earlier
    reassurances that we were in control. If the war
    was being won, how could the enemy mount such a
    massive campaign?

16
Tet Offensive
  • The Tet Offensive was very bloody and overlapped
    with the siege at Khe Sahn. In January and
    February of 1968 there was daily television and
    newspaper coverage of events that seared the
    horror of Vietnam into the American public mind.
  • It ultimately took several months for the U.S. to
    reestablish quasi-control of all the provinces,
    but by then the American press and public were
    beginning to turn against the war.

A suspected Viet Cong was spontaneously executed
on the streets of Saigon during the Tet
Offensive. This film, along with other war
scenes, was shown on national TV. Americans were
shocked to see the visceral horror of war. Many
began to shift against it at this point.
17
Tet Offensive
  • The Tet Offensive highlighted something new about
    warfare Vietnam was the first televised war.
    Americans could see how the media coverage
    compared with what the administration said.
  • Before 1968, media coverage largely echoed what
    the administration claimed. But 1968 was the
    turning point in media coverage of the war.
  • By January 1968 the American press began to ask
    tough questions about the war. It was CBSs
    Walter Cronkite (the most trusted man in
    America) who openly began to challenge the
    administrations version of the war. Cronkite
    famously claimed in a Feb. 27, 1968 TV editorial
    that the war was headed for a stalemate.
  • LBJ and his generals were caught in a credibility
    gap the reality of the situation contradicted
    their rosy characterization. He had lost the
    peoples trust.
  • When Johnson heard about Cronkites comment he
    said, Thats it I've lost middle America." LBJ
    would withdraw from the Presidential race on
    March 31 and he would begin to pursue peace
    negotiations after the events of early 1968.

A village is attacked with napalm by ARVN planes.
This famous photograph captures a little girl
whose clothes and skin are burning from napalm as
she and others run from the attack. She survived,
after many treatments, and later moved to the
U.S. Images such as these affected American
attitudes toward the war.
18
Tet Offensive
  • While the Tet Offensive was ultimately a military
    victory for the Americans, it was a political
    victory for the Viet Cong.
  • According to researcher Dennis Simon, the
    American public was strongly affected by the
    offensive, judging from Gallop polls.

  • Pre-TET
    Post-TET
  • Approves Johnson's handling of job as president
    48 36
  • Approves Johnson's handling of Vietnam
    39 26
  • Regards war in Vietnam as a mistake
    45 49
  • Proportion classifying themselves as hawks
    60 41

19
Support for the Vietnam War
SUPPORT FOR THE WAR AS MEASURED BY "NO" RESPONSES
TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTION "In view of
developments since we entered the fighting in
Vietnam, do you think the U.S. made a mistake
sending troops to fight in Vietnam?" (Gallup)
20
1968 the Turning Point
  • By early 1968, the tide had turned and Americans
    were openly re-thinking their role in Vietnam.
  • This was due to the huge casualty tolls, the
    failure to clearly define the terms of success,
    the fallout from the Tet Offensive, an
    increasingly skeptical media, a widening
    credibility gap, political pressure from the
    left, and the rise of a massive counterculture
    that had galvanized to oppose the Vietnam War.

21
AMST 3100
End
Write a Comment
User Comments (0)
About PowerShow.com