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Selfaudit report of AIST GRID CA

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National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and ... LUNA CA3. FIPS 140-1 Level3. Physical controls. CA system is located in AIST Tsukuba Center. ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Selfaudit report of AIST GRID CA


1
Self-audit report ofAIST GRID CA
  • Yoshio Tanaka (yoshio.tanaka_at_aist.go.jp)
  • Information Technology Research Institute
  • AIST, Japan

2
Contents
  • Overview and organization
  • CA Architecture
  • Results of self auditing
  • 9 B scores
  • 4 C scores

3
Introduction of AIST
  • One of the largest Natl Labs in Japan
  • Research topics include
  • Environment
  • Material
  • Bio/Life science
  • Standards (JIS/OSI)
  • Geographical survey
  • Semiconductor device
  • Computer Science
  • etc.
  • 3,500 employees

AIST Tsukuba Main Campus
7 other campuses across Japan
Tsukuba
40km
Narita
50km
Tokyo
50km
4
Overview of AIST Grid CA
  • Identification
  • AIST 1.3.6.1.4.1.18936
  • GRID 1.3.6.1.4.1.18936.1
  • AIST GRID CA 1.3.6.1.4.1.18936.1.11
  • AIST GRID CA CP 1.3.6.1.4.1.18936.1.11.2
  • Community and Applicability
  • Issue certificates for
  • Researchers in AIST
  • Researchers in out side of AIST who have research
    collaboration with AIST
  • Issue certificates for Grid authentication

5
Issued certificates
  • User certificates 136
  • Valid 31
  • Invalid (revoked or expired) 105
  • Host certificates 1706
  • Valid 509
  • Invalid (revoked or expired) 1197
  • LDAP certificates 262
  • Valid 33
  • Invalid (revoked or expired) 229

6
Root CA Certificate
Data Version 3 (0x2) Serial
Number 1 (0x1) Signature Algorithm
sha1WithRSAEncryption Issuer CJP,
OAIST, OUGRID, CNCertificate Authority
Validity Not Before Oct 19 102835
2004 GMT Not After Oct 18 102835
2009 GMT Subject CJP, OAIST, OUGRID,
CNCertificate Authority Subject Public
Key Info Public Key Algorithm
rsaEncryption RSA Public Key (2048
bit) Modulus (2048 bit)
.. X509v3 extensions X509v3
Key Usage critical Certificate
Sign, CRL Sign X509v3 Basic
Constraints critical CATRUE
X509v3 Authority Key Identifier ..
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier ..
7
Organization
8
Organization (contd)
9
CA system Online CA NAREGI CA Software
Secure protocol Limited port
Web server (repository)
RA server (dedicated)
CA server (dedicated)
HSM
SafeNet LUNA CA3 FIPS 140-1 Level3
10
Physical controls
  • CA system is located in AIST Tsukuba Center.
  • A dedicated CA room inside the machine room.
  • Multiple-levels of authentication for access to
    the CA room
  • To enter the building
  • To enter the 2nd floor
  • To enter the machine room
  • To enter the CA room
  • Only Security Officers and CA Operators are able
    to enter the CA room.

11
Physical controls (contd)
12
Procedure for certificate enrollment
  • Notification bysigned email
  • Application by email

RA (user admin)
  • F2F vetting
  • Encrypted LICENSE IDby email
  • Passphrase by FAX

CA operator
RA server (dedicated)
CA server (dedicated)
HSM
13
Results of self-auditing Score B
  • Whenever there is a change in the CP/CPS the
    O.I.D. of the document must change and the major
    changes must be announced to the responsible PMA
    and approved before signing any certificates
    under the new CP/CPS.
  • New OID is not assigned for minor (editorial)
    changes
  • The CP/CPS documents should be structured as
    defined in RFC 3647.
  • CP/CPS is structured based on RFC2527.

14
Results of self-auditing Score B
  • The pass phrase of the encrypted private key must
    also be kept on offline media, separated from the
    encrypted private keys and guarded in a secure
    location where only the authorized personnel of
    the CA have access. Alternatively, another
    documented procedure that is equally secure may
    be used.
  • We do keep the pass phrase on offline media and
    stored in a safe place where separated from the
    encrypted private keys, but no description in
    CP/CPS.

15
Results of self-auditing Score B
  • Certificate revocation can be requested by users,
    the registration authorities, and the CA. Others
    can request revocation if they can sufficiently
    prove compromise or exposure of the associated
    private key.
  • The CP/CPS does not describe that others can
    request revocation.
  • The CA must react as soon as possible, but within
    one working day, to any revocation request
    received.
  • The CP/CPS does not describe but within one
    working day.
  • An end entity must request revocation of its
    certificate as soon as possible, but within one
    working day after detection of
  • The CP/CPS does not describe but within one
    working day.

16
Results of self-auditing Score B
  • Certificates (and private keys) managed in a
    software token should only be re-keyed, not
    renewed.
  • Certificates may be renewed or re-keyed for more
    than 5 years without a form of identity and
    eligibility verification, and this procedure must
    be described in the CP/CPS.
  • The CP/CPS does not clearly distinguish re-key
    and renew.
  • The CA shall provide their trust anchor to a
    trust anchor repository, specified by the
    accrediting PMA, via the method specified in the
    policy of the trust anchor repository.
  • Currently, AIST GRID CA does not provide its
    trust anchor to a trust anchor repository.

17
Results of self-auditing Score C
  • When the CAs cryptographic data needs to be
    changed, such a transition shall be managed from
    the time of distribution of the new cryptographic
    data, only the new key will be used for
    certificate signing purposes.
  • The overlap of the old and new key must be at
    least the longest time an end-entity certificate
    can be valid. The older but still valid
    certificate must be available to verify old
    signatures and the secret key to sign CRLs
    until all the certificates signed using the
    associated private key have also expired.
  • The CP/CPS does not describe the transition
    procedure

18
Results of self-auditing Score C
  • Revocation requests must be properly
    authenticated.
  • Authentication of revocation requests descried in
    the CP/CPS is applicable only for the following
    case
  • A user, who has a valid certificate and
    corresponding private key, requests revocation of
    her/his/host certificate.
  • Over the entire lifetime of the CA it must not be
    linked to any other entity.
  • Currently, not yet implemented.
  • Need to consider how to implement.

19
Summary
  • Revision of the CP/CPS and operation will be made
    in 2 months
  • Our Root CA certificate will be expired in
    October next year.
  • Need to establish the transition procedure by
    this Spetember!
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