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Timothy OConnor, Agent Causation

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The first objection that we'll consider appears on p. 268. TO quotes C.D. Broad: ... because of her friendship with the lecturer.'(290) 36. Review ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Timothy OConnor, Agent Causation


1
  • Timothy OConnor, Agent Causation
  • The first task that TO sets himself is to show
    how the concept of agent causation can be
    understood as a distinct species (from event
    causation) of the primitive idea, which Ill term
    causal production, underlying realist or
    non-Humean conceptions of event causation. (258)
  • That is a mouthful. Here is what TO is going to
    do
  • 1. Articulate a certain conception of causality
    (or causal production). This conception is
    going to be realist and non-Humean. Well
    see what this means later on.
  • 2. Show how the notion of agent causation is
    recognizable as a species of the kind of
    causality articulated in (1).

2
  • Lets start with the Humean conception of
    causality to which TO is opposed. Humean
    refers to David Hume.
  • On the Humean conception, the essential component
    of the concept of causality is the idea of a
    regularity in nature. On this conception, the
    truth of the claim that C caused E depends on a
    regular connection in nature between events
    like C and events like E.
  • There are two ways of making this more precise.
  • (a) C caused E it is a law of nature
    that whenever events like C occur events like E
    follow
  • - law-like connection between C and E
  • (b) C caused E had C not happened
    then E would not have happened
  • - counterfactual connection between C and E

3
  • TO calls this Humean conception of causality a
    reductive account. He thinks it is an attempt
    to reduce the notion of causality to the notions
    of law-like connection or counterfactual
    connection. By calling the opposing, anti-Humean
    view realist, he also shows that he views the
    Humean view as somehow skeptical or
    anti-realist about causality.
  • TO points out that if the Humean conception of
    causality is correct, then the notion of agent
    causation is incoherent.
  • Let A be an agent, and consider what the claim
    that A caused E would have to imply on the two
    different versions of the Humean view
  • A caused E it is a law of nature
    that whenever events like A occur events like E
    follow
  • A caused E if A had not
    occurred then E would not have occurred.
  • Since A is an agent, the statements to the right
    of the arrows dont make any sense.
  • So, if the Humean conception is right, then the
    notion of agent causation is incoherent (since
    claims about agent causation would have
    incoherent consequences.)

4
  • What TO wants to show is that there is a
    different conception of causality, the realist
    or anti-Humean conception, on which the notion
    of agent causation is not incoherent.
  • So what is the anti-Humean conception of
    causality?
  • TO ...the core element of the concept of
    causality is a primitive notion of the
    production or bringing about of an effect.
  • This anti-Humean view sees no connection between
    the concepts of causality and the concept of a
    regularity in nature. Rather, it understands
    causality in terms of the idea of an effect being
    produced or brought about by an object.
  • Anti-Humean conception
  • C caused E E was brought about
    by an object occurring in C

5
  • When we apply the anti-Humean conception of
    causality to agent causation, TO thinks that no
    incoherency results.
  • A caused E E was brought about by
    A
  • TOs next step is to articulate an account of
    causation that makes use of this primitive notion
    of production or bringing about.
  • To do this, TO first introduces the idea of a
    causal power.
  • An objects causal powers determine the effects
    that the object will produce when placed in
    different circumstances. This allows us to think
    of causal powers as functions from circumstances
    to effects.
  • Causal power function from circumstances to
    effects

6
  • Example a stick of dynamite. A stick of
    dynamite has the causal power to produce an
    explosion when placed in certain circumstances.
    In circumstances in which the fuse is lit and
    there is plenty of oxygen you will get an
    explosion.
  • circumstances effect
  • lit fuse explosion
  • sufficient oxygen
  • lit fuse no explosion
  • no oxygen
  • unlit fuse no explosion
  • sufficient oxygen

7
  • The causal powers possessed by an object are
    determined by that objects properties.
  • A stick of dynamite has certain chemical and
    physical properties. Because of these
    properties, the dynamite has a causal power that
    determines that it will produce an explosion when
    its fuse is lit and there is sufficient oxygen in
    the air.
  • A picture of event-causation is emerging. When
    an event C causes another event E the following
    is the case
  • - There is an object O which has certain
    properties that endow it with the causal power to
    produce E in certain circumstances.
  • - C is event which contains an object O in
    circumstances in which its causal power to
    produce E is activated.

8
  • So far weve been considering the anti-Humean
    conception of event causation. How does agent
    causation fit into this account of causality?
  • Two kinds of causal powers
  • Event-causal powers an object has a
    event-causal power to produce an effect E in
    certain circumstances if it is such that when the
    object is in those circumstances it necessarily
    produces E
  • Agent-causal powers an agent has an
    agent-causal power to produce an effect E in
    certain circumstances if the agent is such that
    when she is in those circumstances it is possible
    for the agent to produce E
  • Both notions invoke the primitive notion of
    something producing or bringing about an effect.
    The difference is that when an object exercises
    one of its event-causal powers in certain
    circumstances it must produce the effect that it
    produces. On the other hand, when an agent
    exercises one of her agent-causal powers in
    certain circumstances, she may or may not produce
    the effect.
  • Hopefully you can see how this is going to help
    with the problem of free will.

9
  • This anti-Humean, agent-causation account of
    causality gives us a picture of what happens when
    an agent performs an action freely.
  • Agent A has a certain property or properties that
    endow her with the agent-causal power to fire a
    gun when placed in the right circumstances (shes
    holding the gun, there is no one forcing her
    finger on the trigger, etc.).
  • A finds herself in the relevant circumstances in
    which her agent-causal power is activated. The
    activation of her agent-causal power makes it
    possible for her to produce a firing of the gun.
    It does not necessitate that she produces the
    firing. Her agent-causal power allows her to
    bring about the firing of the gun, but it does
    not necessitate that she will.
  • A fires the gun. But since it was not
    necessitated by her the activation of her
    agent-causal power to fire the gun, it is still
    the case that she could have refrained from
    firing the gun. Hence, her action was performed
    freely.
  • TOs main goal is just to show that there is a
    coherent notion of agent-causation, that allows
    for free action, which can be seen as a variety
    of a more general kind of causality.

10
  • This description of what happens when an agent
    acts freely does not precisely capture TOs view.
    The problem is that on this account, what the
    agent produces is the action of firing the gun.
    This is not how TO thinks of it. TO thinks that
    the effect produced by the agent is an intention
    or volition - a mental event that proceeds to
    cause the firing of the gun.
  • ac ec
  • agent volition firing of the gun
  • decision
  • TO calls the event of the agents causing the
    volition a decision.

11
  • Furthermore, TO thinks that we should call the
    action the whole sequence of events plus the
    agent at the beginning plus the existent causal
    relations.
  • ac ec
  • agent volition firing of the gun
  • action
  • TO In the case of an observable bodily movement
    such as waving my hand, my action consists of the
    causal relation I bear to the coming-to-be of the
    state of determinate intention volition to wave
    my hand, plus the sequence of events that flow
    from that decision.(266)
  • This may seem like an odd way of thinking of the
    action. Wouldnt we normally say that the action
    is just the firing of the gun (or the waving of
    the hand)? It is odd to say that the action
    itself includes the intention or volition that
    caused it.

12
  • TO thinks that the alternative to his way of
    individuating the action is wedded to the Humean
    conception of causality, which sees an action as
    part of a sequence of events. The intention is
    one event, it causes another event - the firing
    of the gun. The action is the firing of the gun,
    and it is caused by the previous intention.
  • If we adopt the anti-Humean conception of
    causality we will view things differently.
    Instead of seeing sequences of events, we see
    objects and agents producing effects. On this
    conception, the natural way to view an action is
    as something produced by an agent. The notion
    of an action includes the agent, and it includes
    the fact of being produced by the agent. The
    agent and the agents production are part of the
    action.
  • TO uses this way of individuating actions to
    respond to a dilemma raised by Davidson - but I
    dont want to talk about Davidsons dilemma. I
    leave this as an exercise for you how does
    individuating actions in the way TO proposes
    solve Davidsons dilemma?

13
  • Lets now look at some objections and responses
    to this agent-causation account.
  • The first objection that well consider appears
    on p. 268. TO quotes C.D. Broad
  • Broad How can an event possibly be determined
    to happen at a certain date if its total cause
    contained no factor to which the notion of a date
    has any application? And how can the notion of a
    date have any application to anything that is not
    an event?(268)
  • Suppose that a volition comes-to-be at a certain
    time t, and it is caused by the agent.
  • agent volition
  • happens at t

14
  • Why does the volition occur at t, and not at some
    other time?
  • Usually when we ask this kind of question about
    an event we answer it by citing the previous
    event that caused it. Since that previous event
    occurred at a time immediately prior to when its
    effect occurred, we can understand why the effect
    occurred when it did.
  • But if the volition is caused by an agent and not
    by a previous event we cannot give this kind of
    explanation. The agent is not something that
    occurs at some time. Just citing the agent as
    cause of the volition seems to leave it
    completely mysterious why the volition occurred
    when it did.
  • TOs response the volition occurred at t because
    it was caused to occur at t by the agent.
  • TO Consider, for example, my consideration a
    while ago concerning whether to continue working
    on this paper for another hour or to stop and do
    something else. After a brief moment of
    consideration, I formed the intention (at time t,
    say) to continue working. According to the
    agency theory, we may suppose that at t I
    possessed the power to choose to continue working
    or to choose to stop, where this is understood as
    the capacity to cause either of these mental
    occurrences. And, in fact, the capacity was
    exercised at t in a particular way (in choosing
    to continue working.)(269)

15
  • agent volition
  • happens at t
  • The agent caused the volition at t. - this
    explains why the volition occurred at t.

16
  • This response seems sensible, but it immediately
    gives rise to another question
  • Why did the agents causing of the volition
    occur when it did?
  • Using TOs terminology, another way to put this
    is to ask
  • Why did the agents decision occur when it did
    (i.e. at t)?
  • And there is another closely related question
    that one might ask
  • Why did the agent cause the volition that she
    did cause?
  • or, equivalently
  • Why did the agent make the decision that she
    made?

17
  • Lets take the second question first
  • Why did the agent make the decision that she
    made?
  • Lets suppose that at a given time an agent
    causes the intention to X. Why did the agent
    make this decision?
  • TO points out that there will be reasons -
    desires and beliefs - that support X. For
    example, the agent wants to ?, and believes that
    by doing X she can accomplish ?. These are her
    reasons for causing the intention to X.
  • agent intention to X
  • This also answers the first question, because the
    desire and belief are present at some particular
    time, and so they explain why the agent caused
    the intention to X when she did.

desire to ? belief that by Xing, she can ?
18
  • Why did the agent decide to X?
  • - because she desired to ? and believed that by
    Xing she could ?
  • Why did the agent decide to X at t?
  • - because at t she desired to ? and believed
    that by Xing she could ?
  • The idea is that at t the agent found herself
    with this desire and belief. These are the
    circumstances that activate her agent-causal
    power to X.

19
  • 2 objections
  • To explain why the agent caused the intention to
    X we have to explain why she caused this
    intention and not any other intention. Just
    citing the reasons for X fails to explain why she
    didnt cause the intention to Y, or the intention
    to Z, or etc. and if we dont know why she didnt
    cause these other intentions, then we dont have
    an explanation for why she caused the intention
    to X.
  • Citing the agents reasons for causing the
    intention to X renders the appeal to
    agent-causation superfluous. The presence of the
    belief and desire on their own explain the
    coming-to-be of the intention to X. In
    explaining this intention, there is no additional
    need to bring in the fact that the agent caused
    the intention.

20
  • Lets start with the first objection. We are to
    imagine the following scenario
  • agent intention to X
  • intention to Y
  • The objection is that merely citing the reasons
    for X wont explain why the agent decided to X
    because the agent also had reasons for Y, and so
    we dont know why the agent didnt decide to Y on
    the basis of her reasons for Y. This means that
    merely citing the reasons for X wont explain why
    the agent decided to X - we also have to cite
    reasons that show why the agent didnt decide to
    Y.

reasons for X
reasons for Y
21
  • There is the threat of regress. It looks as
    though in order to explain why the agent chose X
    instead of Y on the basis of her reasons for X we
    have to cite some reasons she had for acting on
    her reasons for X rather than her reasons for Y.
    In other words, we have to explain why the agent
    decided to act on the reasons for X rather than
    the reasons for Y. This is another decision that
    needs to be explained by appealing to the agents
    reasons, and now the regress has started. Let
    X reasons for X
  • agent
  • Now the question is why did the agent cause the
    intention to act on X? To answer this, we have
    to appeal to further reasons - reasons for or
    against choosing the reasons for X. But then
    well need an explanation for why the agent
    favored the reasons for the reasons for X - and
    so on, into the night.

X
Y
intention to act on X
22
  • TOs response is to reject one of the assumptions
    on which the objection is based.
  • The objection makes use of two assumptions
  • 1. Citing the agents reasons for X does not
    explain why the agent didnt choose to Y or to Z
    or etc.
  • 2. Unless the explanation can explain why the
    agent didnt choose to Y or to Z or etc. it
    cannot explain why the agent chose to X.
  • TO accepts the first assumption but rejects the
    second.
  • In simply assuming that an explanation of the
    action will cite all the salient psychological
    features of the agent at the time of his
    decision, Kane is clearly presuming that there is
    only one type of adequate explanation of a
    choice, the type that explains why only that
    choice could have been at that point in the
    agents psychological history. But that is
    unsupported.(276)

23
  • Compare
  • The wall collapsed into a pile of rubble because
    the stick of dynamite exploded.
  • The question is does this successfully explain
    why the wall collapsed into a pile of rubble? Do
    we also have to show why the wall didnt do
    something else, e.g. fall over flat, remain
    standing, split in half, etc.?
  • If the 2nd assumption is correct, merely citing
    the explosion of the dynamite is not enough to
    explain why the wall collapsed into a pile of
    rubble. We would also have to explain why the
    wall didnt do anything else. TOs point is that
    this is an unreasonable demand on successful
    explanation.

24
  • Recall the second objection
  • Citing the agents reasons for causing the
    intention to X renders the appeal to
    agent-causation superfluous. The presence of the
    belief and desire on their own explain the
    coming-to-be of the intention to X. In
    explaining this intention, there is no additional
    need to bring in the fact that the agent caused
    the intention.
  • TOs view
  • agent intention to X
  • desire and belief
  • Objection
  • desire and belief intention to X

explains
intention to X
explains
25
  • agent intention to X
  • To allow for freedom and responsibility the
    explanation of the intention to x which appeals
    only to the belief and desire would have to be a
    non-causal explanation. If the belief and desire
    cause the intention, then the agent is not
    responsible for the action that that intention
    ends up causing.
  • TOs response ..the agents free exercise of
    his causal capacity provides a necessary link
    between reason and action, without which the
    reason could not in any significant way explain
    the action. It allows us to claim that the
    reason had an influence on the production of the
    decision, while not causing it. Were we to
    remove the element of causal production of
    decision altogether, and simply claim that the
    decision was uncaused, then noting the fact that
    the agent had a reason that motivated acting in
    that way would not suffice to explain it
    ....(277)

desire belief
desire belief cannot cause intention to X
26
  • Randolph Clarke Toward a Credible Agent-Causal
    Account of Free Will
  • The problem of rational action
  • RC ...if an agents action is not caused by her
    having certain reasons for action, then it is
    unclear how she can be said to have acted on
    those reasons and how her action can be said to
    be rational (and rationally explicable).(286)
  • On OConnors account, an action is not caused by
    the agents reasons. Remember reasons
    desire belief
  • For OConnor, the agent is the one who causes the
    action (or rather, the intention which then
    causes the action). RC thinks this shows that
    for OConnor, no actions are rational.

27
  • RC ...if an agents action is not caused by her
    having certain reasons for action, then it is
    unclear how she can be said to have acted on
    those reasons and how her action can be said to
    be rational (and rationally explicable).(286)
  • As stated, this is the claim
  • action is not caused by reasons R
  • This is equivalent to
  • the agent acted on reasons R the action
    was caused
  • by R
  • An action is rational if and only if in
    performing the action the agent acted on reasons.

implies
the agent did not act on R
implies
28
  • The obvious question for RC is why believe these
    claims, i.e. why believe that
  • acting rationally
  • TO would undoubtedly deny this claim. Why does
    RC think that it is so obvious?
  • An example will be helpful. Suppose an agent has
    a number of different reasons for the same
    action.
  • agent
  • Suppose R1, R2, and R3 are all reasons for
    doing X. Suppose the agent does X, and she does
    X for reasons R1 - not for R2 or R3. How do we
    explain this notion of doing something for a
    particular reason?

implies
being caused to act by ones reasons
R2
R3
R1
29
  • Heres an example to flesh this out
  • Suppose Claire voted for Ralph Nader in the last
    election. Before she voted, she had two reasons
    for voting for Nader
  • Reason 1 she wanted to reduce the power of
    corporations in American politics
  • Reason 2 she wanted to annoy her parents, who
    are Democrats
  • When Claire actually voted for Nader, she voted
    for Reason 1 - i.e., the reason on which she
    acted was her desire to reduce corporate power.
  • How should we make sense of this notion of the
    reason on which Claire acted?
  • RC thinks the only way to make sense of this is
    to say that Reason 1, and not Reason 2, is the
    reason that caused Claire to vote for Nader.
    This is not something that TO can say.

30
  • So lets suppose RC is right and that in order
    for an action to be rational it has to be caused
    by the agents reasons. How do we allow for
    rational action on an agent-causal view of
    action?
  • RCs main idea
  • ... what an agent directly causes, when she acts
    with free will, is her acting on (or for) certain
    of her reasons rather than on others ...(290)
  • On TOs view, what the agent causes is an action
    (or, rather, an intention which then causes the
    action).
  • agent intention action
  • RC thinks that agents cause actions for reasons
  • agent action for a reason

31
  • Remember that for RC, acting for a reason is
    being caused to act by a reason. So his view is
    that what the agent causes is that her reasons
    cause her action.
  • agent
  • Claire

reason action
vote for Nader
desire to reduce corporate power
32
  • There is another wrinkle in Clarkes account.
    The kind of event-causation that happens between
    reason and action is indeterministic or
    probabilistic. Prior to the agent causing the
    action, each of her reasons has some probability
    of event-causing one of various actions.

R1
R2
R3
30
30
40
agent
action1
action2
action3
33
  • The probabilistic nature of the event-causal
    relation between reasons and actions is crucial
    to Clarkes account. Otherwise, if this relation
    were necessitating - i.e. if the presence of a
    reason necessitated the occurrence of the action
    - then there would be no role for agent-causation
    to play and no room for freedom and
    responsibility.

R1
R2
R3
0
0
100
agent
action1
action2
action3
34
  • There is another wrinkle.
  • Clarke ...what an agent directly causes, when
    she acts with free will, is her acting on (or
    for) certain of her reasons rather than on
    others, and her acting for reasons ordered in a
    particular way by weight, importance or
    significance as the reasons for which she
    performs that action.(290)
  • Suppose that in a given situation I have a number
    of different reasons for performing different
    actions, and for any one of these actions I have
    more than one reason for performing it.

R2
R3, R4, R5
R1
4
agent
1
25
30
40
action 1
action 2
action 3
35
  • agent

R4 R5 R3
action 3
Clarke Pam attends a lecture on Mapplethorpe,
say, primarily because she is interested in his
work and secondarily because she knows the
speaker. She might also have some desire to
accompany a second friend to an interesting movie
that is showing at the same time. But she causes
her acting on the first set of reasons, and on a
particular ordering of them, instead. What she
directly causes is her attending the lecture
primarily because of Mapplethorpes work and
secondarily because of her friendship with the
lecturer.(290)
36
  • Review
  • 1. Chisholms dilemma argument for a
    libertarian, agent-causal account of human
    responsibility and freedom.
  • 2. Humean vs. Anti-Humean causation
  • 3. OConnors account of agent-causation in
    terms of agent-causal powers
  • 4. OConnor on the relation between reasons and
    actions
  • 5. Clarke on rational action action for a
    reason action caused by a reason
  • 6. Clarkes version of agent-causation
  • Next week van Inwagen, An Argument for
    Incompatibilism
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