AMS02 Safety Summary

1
AMS-02 Safety Summary
2
AMS-02 Safety

• Topics to be Discussed
• Payload Safety Review Panel Meeting History
  Summary
• Safety Analysis/Hazard Report Since Phase I
• Significant Changes Since Phase I
• Action Item Status
• Operational Controls
• Hazard Report/Pre-Review Discussion Results

3
AMS-02 Safety

• Meeting History

4
AMS-02 Phase 0/I

• 11 Unique Hazard Reports Reviewed
• 1 Standardized Form 1230 Hazard Report Reviewed
• All Approved at Phase I
• 3 Action items assigned

5
AMS-02 Phase 0/I

• Action Items Assigned

6
Vacuum Jacket SDM

• Topics Discussed
• Overpressurization of the Payload Bay During
  Ascent
• Caused by Loss of Vacuum
• Originally Total Loss of Vacuum (Instant) Was
  Assumed
• Deemed Unrealistic Credible Maximum Leak Sized
  Established
• Action Item 3 from Phase 0/I Closed by S. Loyd

7
Gauss Limit SDM

• Topics Discussed
• Acceptable Hole Size for Vacuum Loss Analysis
• Agreement to
• Qualification and Acceptance Testing of AMS-02
  Structural Test and Flight Units
• Independent testing of Flight O-Rings of Vacuum
  Case
• Monitoring of Vacuum Case Leading up to T-9
  minutes.
• Gauss Limits of EMU
• Changing EMU limits to 300 Gauss

8
AMS-02 TIM

• Topics Discussed
• Burst Disks
• Certification as Equivalent of Single Fault
  Tolerant
• Reverse Acting Circumferentially-Scored with
  Cutting Teeth Burst Disks
• Venting due to Burst Disk Operation Causing
  Overpressurization of Payload Bay
• Three Burst Disks Used in Series

9
Significant Changes In AMS-02

• Major Hardware No Longer Part of AMS-02
• Synchrotron Radiation Detector (SRD)
• AMS-02 Crew Operations Post (ACOP)
• ACOP Was Only ISS Interior Element of AMS-02
• Natural Design Evolution Presented in
  SDP/Presentations
• Series/Reflown Hardware
• No Elements or Systems of AMS-02 Are Considered
  Series or Reflown As They Were At Phase 0/I
• All of AMS-02 Considered in the Unique
  Configuration and Environments of this Mission in
  Hazard Reports
• Facilitates Integrated Safety Control and
  Verification Efforts

10
Significant Changes In AMS-02

• Zenith Radiators and Cryocooler Loop Heat Pipes
  added to design.
• Lower Radiator Panels Removed (Still Visible in
  Some Graphics)
• Folding ROEU Support Bracket Incorporated in the
  Design
• Addition of Star Trackers and GPS Receiver
• AMS-02 Tilted 12 for Clearance and Viewing
• Weight Has Increased

11
Safety Analysis

• After Phase I AMS-02 Project Revisited the Safety
  Analysis to Prepare the Phase II SDP
• Three Year Effort to SDP Submittal
• New System and Subsystem Level Safety Analyses
  Performed and Documented in SDP
• Energy Analysis
• Historical Comparative Analysis
• Maintenance Safety Analysis

12
Hazard Reports

• Hazard Report Generation
• Phase I Hazard Reports (HRs) Served as Foundation
  for Phase II HRs
• Reorganization and Additional HRs Required.
• NEW Designators Assigned to HRs
• Use Of Flight F Designator And A Two Digit
  Number To Differentiate Between Phase I And Phase
  II HRs

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Hazard Reports

• Custom Hazard Report Form
• Compliant with NSTS/ISS 13830
• Grouping of Controls and Safety Verification
  Methods Together
• New Control, Cause and Safety Verification
  Methods Numbering System
• aa.bb.cc
• aa Cause Reference
• bb Control Reference
• cc Safety Verification Method and Status
  Reference

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Hazard Reports
15
Hazard Reports Phase II

• Two Standard Hazard Reports Used
• Exterior Elements of the AMS-02(Shuttle Payload
  Bay, ISS Exterior Environment)
• Interior Elements of AMS-02 (Present in Shuttle
  Habitable Environment)
• 20 Unique Hazard Reports
• 1 Withdrawn as Non-Hazardous Condition
• Due to New Safety Analysis and Rewrite, Phase II
  SDP is Effectively Entirely New Package Compared
  to Phase I (Re Agreement 3.2 Phase I Safety
  Review)

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Operational Hazard Controls

• New Hazard Report Format Provides for Ready
  Identification of Operational Hazard Controls.
• Last Column Indicates Operational Control Present
  and Vehicle Association
• S Shuttle, I ISS, G Ground

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Operational Hazard Controls
18
Operational Hazard Controls
19
Operational Hazard Controls
20
Operational Hazard Controls
21
Operational Hazard Controls
The following controls have been established
subsequent to AMS-02 Phase II SDP submittal.
22
Launch Commit Criteria

• One Safety Related LCC
• During pre-launch activities, the status of the
  superfluid helium tank will be monitored for
  signs of loss of thermal isolation (vacuum case
  breach/leak). In the event that there is an
  increase in pressure indicating the loss of
  thermal isolation, launch will be scrubbed.
  Monitoring will continue at a minimum to within
  L-9 minutes. Credible loss of thermal isolation
  at L-9 minutes can not manifest to an
  over-pressurization of the Orbiter payload bay
  hazard in the time available.

23
Flight Rules

• Flight Rules in Hazard Reports

24
Pre-Review Activity

• In response to comments, working group
  discussions and new data on AMS-02 System, Hazard
  Reports have been updated
• Six (6) were unchanged since submittal March 19th
  with safety data package.
• Fifteen (15) were changes as a result of
  necessary modifications.

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Unmodified Hazards

• AMS-02-F02, Toxic Material Offgassing
• AMS-02-F10, Flammable Materials in the Payload
  Bay
• AMS-02-F15, Thermal Extremes from Cryogenics
• AMS-02-F18, Rapid Safing/Payload
  Reconfiguration
• AMS-02-F20, Crew Exposure to Coherent Light
• STD-AMS-02-F02, Standard Hazard Report, Orbiter
  Interior Elements

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Modified Hazard Reports

• AMS-02-F01, Structural Failure of Hardware
• SVM/STATUS Updates
• Editorial Clarification on Definition of
  Structural Fasteners in Control and SVM
• Updated Attached Tables for Main and Tracker
  Radiators

27
Modified Hazard Reports

• AMS-02-F03, Rupture of Superfluid Helium Tank,
  Vacuum Case and/or Cryosystem Pressurized System
  Element
• Added Description of BD18 to Note and Tables.
• Editorial Added Acronyms to List
• Updated Cryosystem Pressure System Tables
• Updated Cryosystem Schematic for Warm Helium
  System Update.
• Updated References in Pressure Tables

28
Modified Hazard Reports

• AMS-02-F04, Overpressurization of Orbiter
  Payload Bay
• Deleted Oscillating Heat Pipe from Hazard Report
• Editorial fixes
• Added clarification to powered status during
  ascent
• Updated Schematics with Latest Revisions (Warm
  Helium Update)

29
Modified Hazard Report

• AMS-02-F05, Rupture of AMS-02 Pressurized
  Systems
• Revised Warm Helium System MDP
• Removal of High Pressure Burst Disk
• Removal of Oscillating Heat Pipe
• Updated TTCS Accumulator Heat Pipe MDP
• Corrected description in control of heater
  control for TRD tank heaters.
• Editorial Changes
• Updated Pressure Tables to reflect new and
  corrected values.
• Updated Schematics

30
Modified Hazard Report

• AMS-02-F06, Excessive Thrust/Overturning
  Moments
• Corrected electrical bus references in control
• Updated Schematics
• AMS-02-F07, Excessive Field Strengths EMI,
  Magnetic (DC Field)
• Editorial Corrections, change wording to remove
  radiated from magnetic descriptions.
• Clarified SSRMS Power Bus Reference
• Clarified to have UMA separated for SSRMS Grapple

31
Modified Hazard Report

• AMS-02-F08, Electric Shock/Discharge
• Added Bonding/Grounding Diagrams for PDS and CAB
• AMS-02-F09, Exposure of the Crew to Excessive
  Ionizing Radiation
• Closed SVM 1.1.1
• Clarified JSC Form 44 will have to be
  resubmitted, opened SVM Status, added note
• Added Description of composite straw/tube within
  calibration tube isolating Fe55 further
• Clarified graphic error in JSC Form 44
• Added/Updated graphics

32
Modified Hazard Report

• AMS-02-F11, Mechanism Failure
• Editorial Change
• Clarified Open Status of SVM 5.4.3, 5.4.4
• AMS-02-F12, Mate/Demate of Connectors
• Change, SSRMS will demate prior to UMA being
  connected. Update Control and added SVM.

33
Modified Hazard Report

• AMS-02-F13, Battery Failure (Leakage/Rupture)
• SVM Status with Closed Status and TBD Document
  Reference was changed to Open
• AMS-02-F14, EVA/EVR Hazards
• Editorial Clarifications
• Added ISS Flight Rule to require AMS-02 to have
  magnetic field removed prior to EVA to AMS-02.

34
Modified Hazard Report

• AMS-02-F16, Shatterable Material Release
• Added Control to State there are no glass
  materials in proximity to EVA translation paths
  that may be impacted by EVA tools.
• AMS-02-F17, Electrical Power Distribution
  Damage
• Added Control to preclude interconnecting
  different RPCM Buses, UMA to SSRMS

35
Modified Hazard Report

• STD-AMS-02-F01, Standard Hazard Report, Exterior
  Elements
• Editorial Changes
• Ignition Source Table Updated
• Cryosystem Vacuum Pump speed and mass updated in
  table