Roderick Chisholm Human Freedom and the Self

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• Roderick Chisholm Human Freedom and the Self
• Chisholm starts by characterizing the problem of
  human freedom in the following way. On the one
  hand
• - Human beings are responsible agents.
• But this view seems to conflict with determinism,
  which on Chisholms formulation is
• - Every event that is involved in an act is
  caused by some other event.
• Lets start by focusing on these two views,
  because this way of starting may seem puzzling.
  What does the problem of human freedom have to do
  with the fact that human beings are responsible
  agents? This brings out the connection between
  freedom and responsibility.
• If S is responsible for her action A then S
  performed A freely.

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• Human beings are responsible agents.
• Human beings are sometimes responsible for their
  actions.
• Human beings sometimes act freely.
• Some actions that people perform are such that
  they could have done otherwise.
• Read pp.26-27, first quote.
• Chisholms version of determinism says
• Every event that is involved in an act is caused
  by some other event.
• RC thinks these two views conflict with one
  another (hes an incompatibilist.)

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• But Chisholm also presents another wrinkle in the
  problem. He says that
• Human beings are responsible agents.
• Also conflicts with indeterminism
• ...the act, or some event that is essential to
  the act, is not caused at all...
• The reason these are supposed to conflict is
  different from the previous case.
• Human beings are responsible agents.
• Human beings are sometimes responsible for their
  actions.
• Human beings sometimes bring about or produce or
  generate their actions.
• Read p.27, 2nd quote
• The idea is that this consequence conflicts with
  the idea that the act, or some event that is
  essential to the act, is completely uncaused -
  its completely random, or a blind accident.

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• This leads to a dilemma
• Consider any particular human action. It is
  either caused by a previous event or it was not
  caused at all. Suppose it is caused by a
  previous event. Then, if freedom conflicts with
  determinism, it cannot be that the person who
  performed the act is responsible for it.
• On the other hand, if the act was not caused at
  all then the person cannot be responsible, given
  that responsibility and indeterminism conflict.
• This is the dilemma that Chisholm wants to try to
  solve in this paper.
• It should be clear at this point that Chisholm
  is an incompatibilist. Otherwise there wouldnt
  be any dilemma.

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• Lets look at Chisholms example one man shot
  another.
• Suppose the man was responsible for his action.
  If so then
• (i) the man could have refrained from firing the
  shot
• (ii) the firing of the shot was something the
  man brought about, it was in his power to
  perform or not to perform
• But if the firing of the shot was caused by some
  previous event, then (i) is not true. Suppose we
  say that the firing of the gun was caused by the
  mans beliefs and desires. He desired to kill
  the other man, and believed that by firing the
  gun he could do so. This desire and belief cause
  him to fire the gun, let us say.
• RC ...if these beliefs and desires in the
  particular situation in which he happened to have
  found himself caused him to do just what it was
  that we say that he did do, then since they
  caused it, he was unable to do anything other
  than just what it was that he did do.(27)
• Suppose someone else forced his hand upon the
  trigger. This other event caused the firing of
  the gun. In this case as well, it is not true
  that the man could have refrained from firing the
  shot (according to RC). RC thinks it makes no
  difference whether the antecedent cause is
  internal (beliefs and desires) or external (the
  other man).

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• Lets focus on the internal case, i.e. the case
  in which the mans own beliefs and desires caused
  him to fire the gun. Suppose the man is
  responsible for this belief and desire.
• RC It is true, of course, that if the man is
  responsible for the beliefs and desires that he
  happens to have, then he may also be responsible
  for the things they lead him to do. (27)
• belief desire firing of the gun
• The proposal now is that if the man is
  responsible for his belief and desire - and so he
  could have refrained from acquiring that belief
  and desire - then since that belief and desire
  caused the firing he is also responsible for the
  firing.
• RCs point is that the same problem occurs all
  over again for the belief and desire. Suppose
  the man is responsible for having acquired this
  belief and desire. Then he could have refrained
  from acquiring them. But if determinisn is true,
  then his acquiring the belief and desire was
  caused by some previous event (lets call it X).
  
• X belief desire firing of the gun

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• If X caused him to acquire the belief and desire,
  then it is not true that he could have refrained
  from coming to acquire them. So in fact he is
  not responsible for this belief and desire. So,
  then the question becomes whether he is
  responsible for X, but then everything starts all
  over again.
• OBJECTION there is no conflict between
  determinism and freedom.
• He could have done otherwise.
• means
• It he had chosen to do otherwise, then he would
  have done otherwise.
• The claim is that (a) and (b) mean the same
  thing, and further, there is no conflict between
• His firing of the gun was caused by a previous
  event
• (b)

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• Consider the following analogy.
• The barns burning down was caused by the cow
  kicking over the lantern.
• Does this conflict with
• If the cow had not kicked over the lantern, then
  the barn would not have burned down.
• No. No conflict here. So if (a) means the same
  as (b), then there is no conflict between
  determinism and (a). This is an argument for
  compatibilism.
• Here is RCs answer (a) and (b) do not mean the
  same thing.
• To show this, he uses the following principle
• If P and Q mean the same thing, then P implies Q
  and Q implies P.
• So, if Q doesnt imply P, then it cannot be that
  P and Q mean the same thing.

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• RC then goes on to argue that (b) does not imply
  (a).
• (b) If he had chosen to do otherwise then he
  would have done otherwise.
• (a) He could have done otherwise.
• RCs claim is that (b) implies (a) only in
  conjunction with (c)
• (c) He could have chosen to do otherwise.
• That is, (b) on its own does not imply (a), but
  (b) (c) together do. This is enough to
  establish that (b) and (a) do not mean the same
  thing.

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• If the cow had not kicked over the lantern, then
  the barn would not have burned down.
• Does this imply?
• The barn might not have burned down.
• RCs point is that it does only if we are allowed
  the additional premise that the cow might not
  have kicked over the lantern.
• So far all of this has been an argument for the
  first half of the dilemma - the idea that
  determinism conflicts with freedom. RC doesnt
  think that he needs to argue for the second half
  of the dilemma, the idea that indeterminism
  conflicts with responsibility.

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• Lets take a closer look at the dilemma.
• Either an act was caused by a previous event or
  the act was not caused at all.
• The disjunction is not exhaustive! Suppose the
  act was caused by something other than an event.
  Then it was not caused by an event, nor was it
  not caused at all. This is how RC will steer a
  middle course through the horns of this dilemma.
  For this to work, he has to make sense of the
  notion of an action being caused by something
  that is not an event.
• RCs idea is that in the case of a free action
  for which the agent is responsible, the agent
  herself is the cause of the action. When the man
  shot the other man, the firing of the gun was not
  caused by any event, it was caused by the man
  himself.
• Two kinds of causation transeunt causation or
  event causation
• vs.
• immanent causation or agent causation
• The first is a relation between events. The
  second is a relation between an agent and an
  event.

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• It is important to be clear about what RC is
  proposing. We do sometimes say that an agent
  caused something, but this is not necessarily a
  claim about immanent causation.
• For example, we will say
• The cow caused the barn to burn down.
• But this can be regarded as shorthand or an
  elliptical way of saying something about
  transeunt causation, i.e. that the cows kicking
  over the lantern caused the barn to burn down.

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• The question now is can we make sense of agent
  causation? Is there any such thing as agent
  causation?
• Here, I think, is the picture that RC is working
  with. Consider the action of picking up a staff.
  This is an event. It was caused, transeuntly,
  by a previous event, e.g. the contraction of
  certain muscles. These events were transeuntly
  caused by another previous event, e.g. a
  neurological event in the mans brain. So we
  have a chain of transeunt causes.
• tc tc
• brain event muscle contractions
  picking up the staff
• Where does immanent causation fit in? Right at
  the beginning. The man is the immanent cause of
  the brain event.
• ic tc tc
• the man brain event muscle contractions
  picking up staff
• RC relies on a distinction between doing
  something and making something happen. In this
  example, the man does the picking up of the
  staff, and he makes the other events happen.

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• At this point RC considers an objection. He is
  saying the brain event was immanently caused by
  the man. There is no event that causes the brain
  event. It is simply caused by the man himself -
  the agent - who is not to be considered as an
  event.
• Since A was not caused by any other event, then
  the agent himself cannot be said to have
  undergone any change or produced any other event
  (such as an act of will of the like) which
  brought A about. (32)
• The question is what does the mans causing the
  brain event consist in? If no event caused the
  brain event, what does it mean to say that the
  man caused the brain event?
• RC puts the problem in the following way what is
  the (metaphysical) difference between the brain
  events merely happening and the brain event
  being immanently caused by the man? It cannot be
  that in the latter case there is another event
  that preceded the brain event and caused it to
  occur. By hypothesis there is no such event. So
  what difference - i.e. what difference in the
  world - is there between the brain events merely
  taking place and its being caused by the agent?

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• RC doesnt come out and answer this question
  directly. He tries to finesse the problem by
  showing that if this is really a problem for
  immanent causation, then it is also a problem for
  transeunt causation.
• What is the metaphysical difference between one
  event C happening and then another event E
  happening and C causing E to happen.
• C happened and then E happened vs. C
  caused E ?
• RC thinks it is also not clear what to say about
  this case. So the fact that we dont know what
  to say about this difference shows that there is
  a general problem about understanding causality -
  not a particular problem for immanent causation.
• But I think there are some things we can say here
  that do raise problems for RCs notion of
  immanent causation.
• If C caused E then had C not occurred, then E
  would/ might not have occurred
• This is something that (may) distinguish a case
  where E merely follows C and a case where C
  causes E.

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• But it doesnt look like we can say the same
  thing about immanent causation. It apparently
  doesnt make any sense to say
• If the man had not occurred then the brain event
  would/might not have occurred.
• The man is not an event. What sense does it make
  to say the man would/might not have occurred?
• Another (possible) feature of transeunt causation
  is the connection between causation and laws of
  nature. When one event causes another we think
  that there must be some law-like connection
  between these two kinds of events.
• The photons hitting the electron caused the
  electron to jump up one energy level.
• This particular instance of causation seems to
  depend on a more general connection between
  events of these kinds
• Whenever a photon hits an electron the electron
  will increase in energy.

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• The problem for immanent causation is that it
  doesnt seem to make sense to fit instances of
  immanent causation into general laws.
• The man caused the brain event.
• Whenever the man occurs (?) then a brain event of
  type such-and-such occurs. - doesnt make sense.
  
• The larger point here depends on the connection
  between causality and explanation. I mentioned
  yesterday the important connection between
  explanation and causation. When we want to
  explain why an event took place we cite its
  causes. This helps us understand why that event
  took place because we can see how the event fits
  into larger patterns - we see the event as an
  instance of some more general pattern in nature.
  
• If part of the point of the concept of causality
  is its role in explanation, and its role in
  explanation depends on the connection with laws
  or generalizations, then there is something
  essential about the concept of causality missing
  from the notion of immanent causation.