Title: Scaling Up Agricultural R
1Scaling Up Agricultural RD in AfricaUsing
Prizes to Reward Adoption of Successful
InnovationsWilliam A. MastersPurdue
Universitywww.agecon.purdue.edu/staff/masters
2Motivation Why we need prizes
- Africa needs farm productivity growth
- worsening malnutrition and rising rural
population
- delayed adoption of improved varieties
- Successful RD aims for three Cs
- Concordance (investing proportionally to size of
target)
- Complementarity (investing in things ignored by
others)
- Catch-up (investing in imitation of successes
elsewhere)
- To hit targets need a mix of funding
instruments
- Grants contracts to build capacity
- IPRs to provide incentives for marketable
innovations
- Prizes to provide incentives for non-marketable
innovation
3Africas food crisis is worsening
Figure 2. Data and projections for malnutrition
by region, 1995-2015
4Undernutrition remains the worlds leading health
burden, causing vulnerability to many diseases
Attribution of disease burden to major risk
factors (estimates for high-mortality developing
countries, 2000)
5The rural poor are particularly undernourished
Stunting by residence and wealth
Source FAO (2004), The State of Food Insecurity
in the World 2004. Rome, FAO.
6Food production in Africa involves a a wide
variety of crops
Food production in Africa by crop, 1961 and 2002
7Food-crop output makes the difference
8More and more Africans haveno choice but to be
farmers
9Africa faces an unusually severe and prolongued
demographic burden
10Africa has a lot of catch-up to do
11Existing techniques are not very profitable
12The difference is not due to governance
13The difference is linked to tech. adoption
14and linked to low RD investment
15RD levels vary across countries but have not
grown over time
16RD payoffs vary but are consistently high
Estimated return to agricultural research and
extension (/year)
Source Alston, J.M., M.C. Marra, P.G. Pardey,
and TJ Wyatt. 2000. "Research returns redux A
meta-analysis of the returns to agricultural
RD." Australian Journal of Agricultural and
Resource Economics, 44(2) 185-215.
17but sustaining sufficient public investment has
been difficult!
18How prizes would work
- We propose to help donors
- pay innovators proportionally to the economic
gains from new technologies
- to accelerate and extend innovations beyond what
is now being achieved,
- using verifiable data submitted by innovators
after initial adoption,
- subject to adjudication by expert panels.
19Schematic Overview of the Proposal
Donors specify lines of credit for target doma
ins
Innovators submit data on new techniques after
adoption
The secretariat makes the market
-- technical assistance -- dispute resolution
-- payouts per measured gains
Other innovators make counter-claims and imitat
e successes
Other donors see successes, expand prizes and co
ntracts
20Step 1. Donors specify lines of credit
- Target domains and institutional eligibility
- Prizes are to be paid in proportion to net
benefits,
- after any value capture through input sales
- to reward spillovers from private activity
- Initially, use fixed time period/variable share
system
- accept all applications received by deadline
- pay out proportionally
- rate depends on funds available / measured
benefits
- e.g., with a 1 m. fund and 10 m. in
benefits, rate is 10
21Step 2. Innovators submit data
- After initial adoption, innovators could submit
- technology data, following guidelines
- experimental data on input/output change
- survey data on extent of adoption
- market data on prices and quantities
- assumptions and elasticities
- agreement on attribution of effort, e.g.
- Bt cotton -- 45 Monsanto, 45 NARS, 10 NGO
- New forage -- 33 IARC, 33 NARS, 34 Extension
22Data needed for prize application
to compute annual economic gains from an
innovation
23Data needed (contd.)
to estimate adoption rates over time
Fraction of surveyed domain
Other survey (if any)
First survey
Projection (max. 3 yrs.)
Linear interpolations
Year
First release
Application date
24Data needed (contd.)
to cumulate gains over time
Discounted Value (US)
Statute of limitations (max. 5 yrs.?)
Projection period (max. 3 yrs.?)
First release
NPV at application date, given fixed discount ra
te
25Guidelines for experimental data
- Goal is to measure difference in outputs and
inputs between the new technology and its
alternative
- The applicant must provide evidence of a standard
similar to that used in international scientific
journals of the relevant discipline
- The applicant must maintain appropriate
experimental records, and make them available to
the prize secretariat on request.
26Guidelines for survey data
- Goal is to measure the extent of adoption in each
year, as a fraction of some appropriate domain.
- The applicant must provide evidence that the
adoption domain has similar agroeconomic
conditions as the experiment sites, and that the
alternative techniques are similar. - The applicant must maintain appropriate survey
records, and make them available to the
secretariat on request.
27Guidelines for market data
- Goal is to measure the size of the market to
which the adoption and productivity gain
applies.
- The applicant must provide evidence that this
market is represented by the survey and
experiment.
- The applicant must use official data where
available, and provide survey evidence otherwise.
28Guidelines for assumptions and elasticities
- Cost reduction is constant
- experiments refer to average supplier
- Demand elasticity is zero
- quantity produced is fixed
- Supply elasticity is unitary
- pct. changes output and cost have equal value
- Discount rate is 5
- moderate incentive for earlier results
29Guidelines for attribution and prize-sharing
- Prize shares submitted with initial application
- Challengers data may be accepted by applicants
as amendment to initial application, or submitted
separately for adjudication
- Adjudication panel may accept part or all of the
data submitted, and use data from other sources.
30Step 3. Verification and adjudication
- Secretariat response within 60 days (?)
Site visits, documentation requests (if
any)
- Others challenges -- within 120 days (?)
- Acceptance of amended proposals (if any)
- Filing of alternative submissions (if any)
- Adjudication panels -- within 180 days (?)
- Appointment of panel from expert pool
- Decisions from adjudication panels (if any)
- Donor payouts within 210 days (?)
31Implementation and Governance
- Two governance models
- Initially, use existing institution
- e.g. AATF, AERC, FARA or SROs
- Eventually, build a fully independent
secretariat
- With an elected board of 12 trustees,
- 4 elected by donors, 4 by researchers, and 4 by
both
- each serving 4-year terms, so each elects
one/year
- and a ban on receiving funds while on the board,
- all participants would have continuous incentive
to maintain trustworthy prize-giving systems over
time.
32Implementing prizes whats done
- Road-testing and refinement
- at scientific meetings
- (US, Canada, Italy, Switzerland)
- in scientific journals
- (AgBioForum, Intl. J. of Biotechnology)
- for popular and policy audience
- (ABC News J. of International Affairs)
- Financial support
- Adelson Family Foundation of New York
- Advisory board
- Launched October 11th, 2004 in New York
33Members of the Advisory Board
- Simeon Ehui (World Bank)
- Robert Evenson (Yale)
- Richard Nelson (Columbia)
- Phil Pardey (Minnesota)
- Carl Pray (Rutgers)
- Jeffrey Sachs (Columbia)
- Pedro Sanchez (Columbia)
- Brian Wright (Berkeley)
- David Zilberman (Berkeley)
34Other endorsements
- Walter Alhassan (Ghana, former DG of CSIR)
- Julian Alston (UC Davis)
- Jock Anderson (World Bank)
- Alain de Janvry (UC Berkeley)
- Bruce Gardner (U of Maryland)
- Anil K. Gupta (Natl. Innovation Foundation,
India)
- Michael Kremer (Harvard)
- Oumar Niangado (Syngenta Foundation)
- George Norton (Virginia Tech)
- Rob Paarlberg (Wellesley)
- Prabhu Pingali (FAO)
- Per Pinstrup-Andersen (Cornell)
- Jim Ryan (Australia, former DG of ICRISAT)
- Eugene Terry (AATF, Nairobi, former DG of WARDA)