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CHAPTER 11 Capital Structure Decisions: Part II

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ksL = ksU (ksU - kd)(D/S). MM with Zero Taxes (1958) Finance 404. 6 ... 2. ksL increases with leverage at a slower rate when corporate taxes are considered. ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: CHAPTER 11 Capital Structure Decisions: Part II


1
CHAPTER 11Capital Structure DecisionsPart II
  • MM and Miller models
  • Hamadas equation
  • Financial distress and agency costs
  • Trade-off models
  • Asymmetric information theory

2
Who are Modigliani and Miller (MM)?
  • They published theoretical papers that changed
    the way people thought about financial leverage.
  • They won Nobel prizes in economics because of
    their work.
  • MMs papers were published in 1958 and 1963.
    Miller had a separate paper in 1977. The papers
    differed in their assumptions about taxes.

3
What assumptions underlie the MMand Miller
models?
  • Firms can be grouped into homogeneous classes
    based on business risk.
  • Investors have identical expectations about
    firms future earnings.
  • There are no transactions costs.

(More...)
4
  • All cash flows are perpetuities. This implies
    perpetual debt is issued, firms have zero growth,
    and expected EBIT is constant over time.
  • In their first paper (1958), MM also assumed that
    there are no corporate or personal taxes. Later
    relaxed.
  • The assumptions were necessary in order for MM to
    use the arbitrage argument to develop and prove
    their equations.

5
MM with Zero Taxes (1958)
Proposition I VL VU. Proposition II ksL
ksU (ksU - kd)(D/S).
6
Given the following data, find V, S,ks, and WACC
for Firms U and L.
  • Firms U and L are in same risk class.
  • EBITU,L 500,000.
  • Firm U has no debt ksU 14.
  • Firm L has 1,000,000 debt at kd 8.
  • The basic MM assumptions hold.
  • There are no corporate or personal taxes.

From the Mini Case
7
1. Find VU and VL.
EBIT ksU
500,000 0.14
VU
3,571,429. VL VU 3,571,429. Question Are
the MM assumptions required?
8
2. Find the market value of Firm Ls debt and
equity.
VL D SL 3,571,429
3,571,429 1,000,000 SL
SL 2,571,429.
9
3. Find ksL.
ksL ksU (ksU - kd)(D/S) 14.0 (14.0 -
8.0)( ) 14.0 2.33 16.33.
1,000,000 2,571,429
10
4. Proposition I implies WACC ksU. Verify
for L using WACC formula.
WACC wdkd wceks (D/V)kd (S/V)ks
( )(8.0) (
)(16.33) 2.24 11.76
14.00.
1,000,000 3,571,429
2,571,429 3,571,429
11
Graph the MM relationships between capital costs
and leverage as measured by D/V.
Without taxes
Cost of Capital ()
26 20 14 8
ks
WACC
kd
Debt/Value Ratio ()
0 20 40 60 80 100
12
  • The more debt the firm adds to its capital
    structure, the riskier the equity becomes and
    thus the higher its cost.
  • Although kd remains constant, ks increases with
    leverage. The increase in ks is exactly
    sufficient to keep the WACC constant.

13
Graph value versus leverage.
Value of Firm, V ()
4 3 2 1
VL
VU
Firm value (3.6 million)
0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5
Debt (millions of )
With zero taxes, MM argue that value is
unaffected by leverage.
14
Find V, S, ks, and WACC for Firms U and L
assuming a 40 corporatetax rate.
With corporate taxes added, the MM propositions
become Proposition I VL VU
TD. Proposition II ksL ksU (ksU - kd)(1 -
T)(D/S).
15
Notes About the New Propositions
  • 1. When corporate taxes are added,VL ? VU. VL
    increases as debt is added to the capital
    structure, and the greater the debt usage, the
    higher the value of the firm.
  • 2. ksL increases with leverage at a slower rate
    when corporate taxes are considered.

16
1. Find VU and VL.
Note Represents a 40 decline from the no taxes
situation. VL VU TD 2,142,857
0.4(1,000,000) 2,142,857 400,000
2,542,857.
17
2. Find market value of Firm Ls debt and equity.
VL D SL 2,542,857 2,542,857
1,000,000 SL SL 1,542,857.
18
3. Find ksL.
ksL ksU (ksU - kd)(1 - T)(D/S)
14.0 (14.0 - 8.0)(0.6)( )
14.0 2.33 16.33.
1,000,000 1,542,857
19
4. Find Firm Ls WACC.
WACCL (D/V)kd(1 - T) (S/V)ks (
)(8.0)(0.6) (
)(16.33) 1.89
9.91 11.80. When corporate taxes are
considered, the WACC is lower for L than for U.
1,000,000 2,542,857
1,542,857 2,542,857
20
MM relationship between capital costs and
leverage when corporate taxes are considered.
Cost of Capital ()
26 20 14 8
ks
WACC
kd(1 - T)
Debt/Value Ratio ()
0 20 40 60 80 100
21
MM relationship between value and debt when
corporate taxes are considered.
Value of Firm, V ()
4 3 2 1
VL
TD
VU
Debt (Millions of )
0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5
Under MM with corporate taxes, the firms value
increases continuously as more and more debt is
used.
22
Assume investors have the following tax rates
Td 30 and Ts 12. What is the gain from
leverage according to the Miller model?
Millers Proposition I VL VU 1 -
D. Tc corporate tax rate. Td
personal tax rate on debt income. Ts personal
tax rate on stock income.
(1 - Tc)(1 - Ts) (1 - Td)
23
Tc 40, Td 30, and Ts 12. VL
VU 1 - D
VU (1 - 0.75)D VU
0.25D. Value rises with debt each 100 increase
in debt raises Ls value by 25.
(1 - 0.40)(1 - 0.12) (1 - 0.30)
24
How does this gain compare to the gain in the MM
model with corporate taxes?
  • If only corporate taxes, then
  • VL VU TcD VU 0.40D.
  • Here 100 of debt raises value by 40. Thus,
    personal taxes lower the gain from leverage, but
    the net effect depends on tax rates.

(More...)
25
When Miller brought in personaltaxes, the value
enhancement of debt was lowered. Why?
  • 1. Corporate tax laws favor debt over equity
    financing because interest expense is tax
    deductible while dividends are not.

(More...)
26
  • 2. However, personal tax laws favor equity over
    debt because stocks provide both tax deferral and
    a lower capital gains tax rate.
  • 3. This lowers the relative cost of equity
    vis-a-vis MMs no-personal-tax world and
    decreases the spread between debt and equity
    costs.
  • 4. Thus, some of the advantage of debt financing
    is lost, so debt financing is less valuable to
    firms.

27
What does capital structure theoryprescribe for
corporate managers?
  • 1. MM, No Taxes Capital structure is
    irrelevant--no impact on value or WACC.
  • 2. MM, Corporate Taxes Value increases, so
    firms should use (almost) 100 debt financing.
  • 3. Miller, Personal Taxes Value increases, but
    less than under MM, so again firms should use
    (almost) 100 debt financing.

28
Do firms follow the recommendationsof capital
structure theory?
  • Firms dont follow MM/Miller to 100 debt. Debt
    ratios average about 40.
  • However, debt ratios did increase after MM. Many
    think debt ratios were too low, and MM led to
    changes in financial policies.

29
Define financial distress andagency costs.
  • Financial distress As firms use more and more
    debt financing, they face a higher probability of
    future financial distress, which brings with it
    lower sales, EBIT, and bankruptcy costs. Lowers
    value of stock and bonds.

(More...)
30
  • Agency costs The costs of managers not behaving
    in the best interests of shareholders and the
    resulting costs of monitoring managers actions.
    Lowers value of stock and bonds.

31
How do financial distress and agency costs change
the MM and Miller models?
  • MM/Miller ignored these costs, hence those models
    show firm value increasing continuously with
    leverage.
  • Since financial distress and agency costs
    increase with leverage, such costs reduce the
    value of debt financing.

32
Heres a valuation model which includes financial
distress andagency costs
  • X represents either Tc in the MM model or the
    more complex Miller term.
  • Now, optimal leverage involves a tradeoff between
    the tax benefits of debt and the costs associated
    with financial distress and agency.

33
Relationships between capital costs and leverage
when financial distress and agency costs are
considered.
Cost of Capital ()
ks
14 4
WACC or ka
kd(1 - T)
Debt/Value Ratio ()
D
34
Relationship between value and leverage.
Note that value is maximized and WACC is
minimized at the same capital structure.
Value of Firm V ()
4 3 2 1
Debt ()
D
35
Tradeoff theory (Static Tradeoff Theory)
  • The optimal capital structure involves a balance
    between
  • the tax-shield benefits of leverage and
  • the costs associated with financial distress and
    agency problems.
  • rationalizes moderate borrowing
  • mature firms with tangible assets should borrow
    more than growth firms

36
Implications of Tradeoff Theory
  • Firms with more business risk ought to use less
    debt than lower risk firms
  • Firms that have tangible, readily marketable
    assets such as real estate can use more debt than
    firms whose value is derived from intangible
    assets.
  • Firms that are currently paying taxes at the
    highest rate should use more debt than firms with
    lower current/ or prospective tax rates.

37
Reality
  • Firms prefer to finance with internally generated
    funds - retained earnings and depreciation.
  • Firms set their target payout ratios based on
    their expected future investment opportunities
    and expected future cash flows
  • Dividends are sticky in the short run.
  • There is a pecking order of financing, not the
    balanced approach that is called for under the
    tradeoff theory.

38
How are financial and business risk measured in a
market risk framework?
ksL kRF (kM-kRF)bU (kM -
kRF)bU(1 - T)(D/S)
.
(Hamadas equation)
Pure time value
Business risk premium
Financial risk premium
ksL
39
Hamadas equation for beta b


bU Unlevered beta, which reflects the business
risk of the firm Business risk
bU(1 - T)(D/S) Increased volatility of the
returnsto equitydue to the use of
debt Financialrisk
40
What is the asymmetric information, or signaling,
theory of capital structure?
  • Theory recognizes that market participants do not
    have homogeneous expectations--managers typically
    have better information than investors.
  • Thus, financing actions are interpreted by
    investors as signals of managerial expectations
    for the future.

(More...)
41
  • Managers will issue new common stock only when no
    other alternatives exist or when the stock is
    overvalued.
  • Investors recognize this, so new stock sales are
    treated as negative signals and stock price
    falls.
  • Managers do not want to trigger a price decline,
    so firms maintain a reserve borrowing capacity.
  • Managers act in the best interests of current
    shareholders.

42
Important implication
  • Because managers are reluctant to take actions
    which lower their firms stock price, they try to
    maintain a reserve borrowing capacity which can
    be tapped if external equity is needed. They do
    not want to be forced into a new equity issue at
    the wrong time.

43
What is the pecking order theoryof capital
structure?
  • Results of a survey by Donaldson and the
    asymmetric information theory.
  • Firms follow a specific financing order
  • First use internal funds.
  • Next, draw on marketable securities.
  • Then, issue new debt.
  • Finally, and only as a last resort, issue new
    common stock.

44
Does the pecking order theory make sense?
Explain.Is the pecking order theory consistent
with the trade-off theory?
  • It is consistent with the asymmetric information
    theory, in which managers avoid issuing equity.
  • Especially true for mature companies which go to
    the markets infrequently.
  • It is not consistent with trade-off theory.

45
Organizational Theory of Capital Structure
  • Maximize Corporate Wealth
  • Organizations act in their own interest
  • The most profitable firms borrow the least
  • Some regard the substitution of Debt for Equity
    as a Good Change

46
Conclusion
  • MM and Miller models
  • Financial Distress and Agency Costs
  • Hamada Equation
  • Tradeoff Theory
  • Asymmetric Information Theory
  • Pecking Order Theory
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