Title: Liability and Liquidity Management
1Chapter 18
- Liability and Liquidity Management
2Overview
- Depository institutions and life insurance
companies are highly exposed to liquidity risk.
This chapter discusses how these firms can
control liquidity risk, the motives for holding
liquid assets, and specific issues associated
with liability and liquidity risk management.
3Liquid Asset Management
- Examples T-bills, T-notes, T-bonds
- Benefits of holding large quantities of liquid
assets - Costs of holding liquid assets
- Regulatory requirements for minimum levels of
liquid assets
4Liquid Asset Management
- Reasons for regulating minimum holdings of liquid
assets - Monetary policy
- Multiplier effect of changes in reserve
requirements - Taxation
- Due to absence of interest on reserves requiring
reserves constitutes transfer of a resource to
the central bank. - Note interesting responses such as sweep programs
and ATM Cash Advantage program
5Composition
- Composition of liquid asset portfolio
- Liquid assets ratio
- Cash and government securities in countries such
as U.K. - Similar case for U.S. life insurance companies
(regulated at state level) - U.S. banks cash-based, but banks view government
securities as secondary, or buffer reserves.
6Return-Risk Trade-off
- Cash immediacy versus reduced return
- Constrained optimization
- Privately optimal reserve holdings
- Regulator imposed reserve holdings
7U.S. Cash Reserve Requirements
- Incremental reserve requirements for transaction
accounts - Less than 6.0 million 0.0
- 6.0 million to 42.1 million 3.0
- Over 42.1 million 10.0
8Web Resources
- For information on reserve requirements, visit
- Federal Reserve www.federalreserve.gov
9Reserve Management Problem
- Computation period runs from a Tuesday to a
Monday, 14 days later. Average daily reserves are
computed as a fraction of the average daily
deposits over the period. This means that Friday
deposit figures count 3 times in the average. - In the past, Weekend Game
- Sweep accounts
10Reserve Management
- The reserve maintenance period, begins 17 days
after the end of the computation period (or 30
days after the start of the computation period) - Lagged reserve accounting as of July 1998.
- Previously, contemporaneous (2-day lag).
- Benefits of lagged reserve accounting
11Undershooting/Overshooting
- Allowance for up to a 4 error in average daily
reserves without penalty. - Surplus reserves required for next 2-week period
- Undershooting by more than 4 penalized by a 2
markup on rate charged against shortfall. - Frequent undershooting likely to attract scrutiny
by regulators
12Undershooting
- DI has two options near the end of the
maintenance period - Liquidate assets
- Borrow reserves
- fed funds
- repurchase agreements
13Discount Window
- Reserve shortfalls in the past
- Discount window borrowing
- Primary credit
14Overshooting
- First 4 percent can be carried forward to next
period - Excess reserves typically low due to opportunity
costs - Knife-Edge management problem
15Funding Risk versus Cost
Funding Risk
16Liability Management
- Note the tradeoff between funding risk and
funding cost. - Demand deposits are a source of cheap funds but
there is high risk of withdrawal. - NOW accounts manager can adjust the explicit
interest rate, implicit rate and minimum balance
requirements to alter attractiveness of NOW
deposits.
17Deposit Accounts
- Passbook Savings Accounts Not checkable. Bank
also has power to delay withdrawals for as long
as a month. - Money market deposit accounts Somewhat less
liquid than demand deposits and NOW accounts.
Impose minimum balance requirements and limit the
number and denomination of checks each month.
18Time Deposits and CDs
- Retail CDs Face values under 100,000 and
maturities from 2 weeks to 8 years. Penalties
for early withdrawal. Unlike T-bills, interest
earned on CDs is taxable. - Wholesale CDs Minimum denominations of 100,000.
Wholesale CDs are negotiable.
19Fed Funds
- Fed funds is the interbank market for excess
reserves. 90 have maturities of 1 day. - Fed funds rate can be highly variable
- Prior to July 1998 especially around the second
Tuesday and Wednesday of each period. (as high as
30 and lows close to 0 on some Wednesdays). - Rollover risk
20Repurchase Agreements
- RPs are collateralized fed funds transactions.
- Usually backed by government securities.
- Can be more difficult to arrange than simple fed
funds loans. - Generally below fed funds rate
21Other Borrowings
- Bankers acceptances
- Commercial paper
- Medium-term notes
- Discount window loans
22Historical Notes
- Since 1960, ratio of liquid to illiquid assets
has fallen from about 52 to about 32.7. But,
loans themselves have also become more liquid. - Securitization and sales of DI loans
- In the same period, there has been a shift away
from sources of funds that have a high risk of
withdrawal.
23Historical Notes
- During the period since 1960
- Noticeable differences between large and small
banks with respect to use of low withdrawal risk
funds. - Differences in access to purchased funds and
capital markets - Reliance on borrowed funds does have its own
risks as with Continental Illinois.
24Liquidity Risk in Other FIs
- Insurance companies
- Diversify across contracts
- Hold marketable assets
- Securities firms
- Example Drexel Burnham Lambert
25Pertinent Website
- Federal Reserve Bank www.federalreserve.gov
26Chapter 19
- Deposit Insurance and other liabilities guarantees
27Overview
- The focus of this chapter is the mechanisms
designed to protect FIs from liquidity crises. - Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
- Securities Investors Protection Corporation
- Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
- Deposit Insurance schemes in other countries
28Background issues and History
- Bank runs can serve a useful purpose
- Contagion has more serious consequences
- FDIC created 1933
- Securities Investors Protection Corporation
(SIPC) 1970. - Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC)
created 1974.
29FDIC
- FDIC created in wake of banking panics.
- 10,000 failed commercial banks.
- Original coverage 2,500. Now 100,000.
- Between 1945-1980 FDIC worked. Failures
accelerated in 1980.
30FDIC (continued)
- In 1991 Borrowed 30 billion from Treasury and
still generated a 7 billion deficit. - FDIC Improvement Act 1991.
- The funds reserves now stand at a record high
with reserves exceeding 1.3 of insured deposits. - Caveat Superior Bank of Illinois
31FSLIC
- FSLIC covered SLs. Other thrifts often chose
FDIC coverage. - High levels of failed thrifts between 1980-88
generated losses of 42.3 billion. From 1989-92
additional 734 failures . Cost 78 billion. - Result FSLIC estimated net worth negative 40 to
80 billion. - Policy of capital forbearance.
32Demise of FSLIC
- Forbearance consequences
- Accumulation of greater losses.
- Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and
Enforcement Act, (FIRREA) 1989. - Management transferred to FDIC.
- Savings bank insurance fund became Savings
Association Insurance Fund (SAIF). Managed
separately from Bank Insurance Fund (BIF).
33Causes of depository fund insolvency
- Financial Environment
- Rise in interest rates.
- Collapse in oil, real estate and commodity
prices. - Increased competition.
34Depository Fund Insolvency (continued)
- Moral Hazard
- Deposit insurance encouraged underpricing of risk
and reduced depositor discipline. - Premiums not linked to risk.
- Role of implicit premiums
- Inadequate monitoring.
- Prompt Corrective Action (1992).
35Trade-off Moral hazard bank run risk
- Insurance was not actuarially fairly priced.
- Reduced incentive for runs.
- Increased moral hazard.
36Controlling DI Risk Taking
- Stockholder discipline
- Practical problems in applying option pricing to
insurance premiums - FDIC adopted risk-based premiums 1993
37Risk-Based Deposit Insurance
- Based on
- Categories and concentrations of assets
- Categories and concentrations of liabilities
- insured, uninsured, contingent, noncontingent
- Other factors that affect probability of loss
- Deposit insurers revenue needs.