Party Development

1
Party Development

• Overview
• Electoral Systems -gt Party Systems
• Electoral Systems -gt Candidate Behaviour
• Carey Shugart If electoral system encourages
  the building of personal reputation there a
  tension exists between party candidates and
  party leaders
• How can parties constrain their members ?
• Under what circumstances can candidates be
  constrained ?

2
Why Hungary ?

• Hungary is an interesting case to look at this
  issues
• First democratic election for 40 years held in
  1990.
• Many (who?) legislators feel the pressure to
  develop a personal reputation during in the first
  parliament.
• We get to see parties, and voters, respond to
  their behaviour.

3
The Hungarian Electoral System

• Mixed Electoral System
• 176 seats Single-member Districts
• (Run-off)
• 152 seats Multimember Districts (PR)
• 58 seats National District
• PR compensatory
• Incentives ?
• Consequences for legislative organization

4
The Legislature (Országgyüles)

• The Legislatures inherits the rules of the
  communist legislature
• Members have great freedom to
• Speak
• Offer legislative initiatives and amendments
• Questions
• Change party membership
• New rules adopted in 1994

5
Constitutional Changes

• Bargained transformation from Communism
• Two-thirds majority required to change
  legislative rules
• New (more restrictive) rules are passed in 1994
• Why ? Less freedom for legislators!

6
Legislative Behaviour

• Legislative initiatives, motions to speak,
  amendments
• Electoral base does not appear to influence
  legislative behavior
• However, difference in types of issues
• Territorial issues raised by legislators elected
  in SMD (or strong local ties)
• Perceptions of elites

7
Party composition

• Each party has both members elected in SMD and
  MMD.
• The parties differ in the ratios of members
  elected in SMD and MMD
• Consequences?
• Parties might favour different legislative
  structures

8
The Roots of the Party System

• The MDF and SZDSZ umbrella organization.
• Lack of coherent party platforms
• Musical chairs
• Very little party cohesion and discipline

9
Cohesion

• MDF and Independents low cohesion, many SMD
  members
• MSZP and Fidez higher cohesion, few SMD
  members
• Montgomery stats?

10
Electoral Success in 1994

• MSZP won one SMD in 1990, won 149 SMD in 1994
  a total of 209 seats -gt Majority party
• Question Would we expect MSZP preferences for
  legislative reform to change ?
• Yet the party adopts more restrictive
  legislative rules!

11
Learning from Elections

• In 1994 elections the disciplined parties
  gained, and the others lost
• Party members infer that strong parties in
  legislature are key to win re-election
• Did MPs deliver ? Only 40 of voters
  recognizing their MP said they would vote for
  them
• -gt Either MPs didnt deliver, or voters did not
  notice/care

12
Influence on Electoral Reform

• Most SMD legislators got kicked out
• MSZP leaders moved fast while the lesson is
  fresh in mind.
• Most MSZP members from previous legislature
  returned the core party still existed.
• -gt Electoral Reform passes without much of a
  fight.

13
Országgyüles 1998 (57.0 ) (Percentages of first
round) 386 Magyar Szocialista Párt (Hungarian
Socialist Party) MSzP 32.3 134 Fiatal Demokraták
Szövetsége (Alliance of Young Democrats) FIDESz
28.2 148 Független Kisgazda, Földmunkas és
Polgári Párt (Independent Party of Smallholders)
FKgP 13.8 48 Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége
(Alliance of Free Democrats, liberal) SzDSz
7.9 24 Magyar Igazság és Elet Pártja
(Hungarian Justice and Life Party, nationalist)
MIEP 5.5 14 Munkáspárt (Workers' Party,
communist) MP 4.1 - Magyar Demokrata Fórum
(Hungarian Democratic Forum, conservative/christia
n-democratic) MDF 3.1 17 Kereszténydemokrata
Néppárt (Christian-Democratic People's Party)
KDNP 2.6 -
14
Where do Political Institutions come from ?

• Hungary Party leaders adopt new institutions
  that strengthen their leadership
• Legislative institutions are not the only
  institutions that can be changed
• Electoral systems are also susceptible to change

15
Political Institution

• Not a matter of social engineering but a
  political choice
• It is political because, as we have seen,
  institutions condition outcomes
• What is necessary for them to be a political
  choice
• Parties have preference over policy
• Parties know electorate
• Parties understand the electoral rules

16
The Proposition

• Parties will seek to adopt an electoral system
  that favours them
• Maximize their number of seats but ?
• In parliamentary systems the relationship
  between number of seats and a seat in the cabinet
  is not straightforward

17
Post-war Germany

• Eleven Lander
• Parties
• SDP (left)
• CDU (right) CSU-Bavaria
• FDP (center)
• KPD communist
• Other small parties

18
Electoral System 1946

• Military Governors decided on electoral systems
  for the Landtage
• Election to the Landtage informed parties about
  their support at the national level
• The national electoral system was drafted by the
  Parliamentary Council (Proportional) and approved
  by the Conference of Minister-Presidenten

19
Deciding on an Electoral System

• The Basic Law Only requires free, direct, equal
  and secret elections
• Provisional system
• Drafted by Committee on Voting Rights (4 CDU, 4
  SDP, 1 KPD, 1 (chair) FDP)
• Possible majority coalitions the same in
  Committee, Council, Conference
• Coalition SPD, FDP, Z, KPD
• Adopt PR in favour of SMD. Why?

20
The Electoral System of 1949

• Bundestag 400 seats
• Single ballot
• 60 elected in SMD by plurality
• 40 elected by PR in each Land
• Land seats are compensatory, i.e., the goal is
  PR.
• SMD primarily influence who fills the party seat

21
PR or SMD?

• The alternative was FPTP (SMD)
• How would it have influence the election
  outcome?
• An easy way to approach the question is to
  compare the number of seats won using the
  mixed-member system and the alternative, SMD.
• Table 4
• Both CDU and SDP win less seats, FDP gains

22
PR and SMD?

• SDP wins more seats under alternative
• The possibility of forming a coalition, however,
  is not good
• CDU, on the other hand, wins close a close to
  the majority and would have many potential
  coalitions

23
Changes in 1953

• An electoral threshold 5 or three district
  seats
• Two votes One district (SMD) vote and one party
  vote
• A FPD voter can cast a vote for an SDP candidate
  w/out hurting FDP (much)
• The same parties supported the change

24
Ticket Splitting

• Parties expecting to win more party votes among
  ticket splitters favour the two ballot system
• Why do voters split tickets?
• Personal vote
• Government Connection
• Wasted Votes
• CDU most likely to win district votes on split
  tickets on each count

25
Do voters split their ticket ?

• How do we measure?
• Difference between district and party vote
• Incumbency DgtP
• Wasted votes Major parties DgtP
• Government Connections DgtP
• Support? Appears especially true for CDU -gt
  Change disadvantages CDU

26
Summary

• Does the German case match our expectations?
• Two major parties equal in strength -gt SMD/FPTP?
• The SDP wants to maximize it chances of forming
  a coalition government.