Strawson: Their meaning is the body of linguistic ... Eve

1
Meaning and Reference

• Strawson On Referring

2
Strawsons Agenda

• Prologue (pp. 320-321) Strawson notes that
  sentences and other linguistic expressions have a
  variety of different uses (echoing a
  Wittgenstinean theme dont ask for the
  meaningask for the use)
• Exposition of Russells theory of descriptions
  (pp. 320-323)
• Critique of Russells theory (pp. 320-324)
• Strawsons account of meaning as use (pp.
  324-329) Strawson distinguishes linguistic
  expressions, their uses and utterances.
• Strawson argues that assertion presupposes
  reference (pp. 329-335)
• Strawson argues that all sentences are
  context-dependent (pp. 335-341)
• Epilogue (pp. 341-344) reflections on indefinite
  reference, identity statements and the
  Aristotelian Square of Opposition.

3
Ideal Language or Ordinary Language?

• Underlying the Russell-Strawson Debate is a deep
  disagreement about what philosophy can and should
  do.
• Should we be searching for an ideal language
  which, on some accounts, displays the structure
  of reality, or concerning ourselves with ordinary
  language as a human activity?
• Strawsons critique of Russell is directed
  against his philosophical program which, Strawson
  suggests
• is motivated by bad epistemology, assuming that
  all were acquainted with are current
  sense-datathe referents of logically proper
  names
• and promotes bad metaphysics the idea that an
  ideal language contrived for the purposes of
  logic and foundations of mathematics reveals the
  structure of reality and answers questions about
  what there is.

4
Meaning as Use

• Contra Russell words don't referpeople do!
• We very commonly use expressions of certain
  kinds to mention or refer to some individual
  person or single object or particular event or
  place or process in the course of doing what we
  should normally describe as making a statement
  about that person, object, place, event or
  process. I shall call this way of using
  expressions the uniquely referring use.
• referring and asserting (making a statement)
  are actionsthings people do with words
• rather than classifying words as, e.g. denoting
  expressions in virtue of their form (as Russell
  does) we should classify the uses people make of
  words and other linguistic expressions, e.g. the
  uniquely referring use.
• Example the whale isnt always used to refer
  to an individual

5
Uniquely referring expressions

• Expressions which typically have a uniquely
  referring use include
• demonstratives (this, that)
• proper names (Ducati, George Wilson)
• pronouns (he, she)
• definite descriptions (the chocolate lab, the guy
  who wrote Narration in Light)
• NB Strawson includes indexicals, which figure
  importantly in natural languages
• Indexicals are words whose reference depends on
  context of utterancetypically pronouns and
  demonstratives
• Strawson suggests that proper names and definite
  descriptions are also sensitive to context
  consider, e.g. George Wilson!

6
Russells Theory of Descriptions

• Russell distinguishes the (surface) grammatical
  form of sentences from their logical form
• Sentences that purport to be about ordinary
  things arent really subject-predicate sentences
• Only sentences whose subjects are logically
  proper names are really subject-predicate
  sentences
• Logically proper names are mere tags whose
  meanings are just the things they designate
• The meanings of logically proper names are
  objects of acquaintence about which we cant be
  mistakenRussells theory of descriptions is
  entangled with his epistemology!

7
Sentences, Uses and Utterances

• Strawson distinguishes
• sentences (sentence types)
• uses of sentences (to make various statements)
• utterances of sentences (sentence tokens)
• and correspondingly
• expressions (expression types)
• uses of expressions (including their uniquely
  referring use)
• utterances of expressions (expression tokens)

8
Sentences and Utterances

• It is in the sense in which it would be correct
  to speak of one and the same sentence being
  uttered on all these various occasions that I
  want to use the expression a sentence. There
  are, however, obvious differences between
  different occasions of the use of this sentence.
• Sentences and utterances are not different
  things but different ways of counting the same
  things
• The distinction between sentences and
  utterances is an example of the type/token
  distinction
• Type and token are not different things but
  different ways of counting the same things

9
Count the letters . . .

• BANANA

10
Counting by TYPE

• BANANA

There are 3 letters of the alphabet in banana
11
Counting by TOKEN

• BANANA

There are 6 individual letters in banana
12
2 sentence tokens - 1 sentence type

• John is Pauls brother
• John is Pauls brother

TYPE and TOKEN arent different kinds of things
like apples and oranges--theyre just two
different ways of counting the same things. We
can count sentences by token or by type.
13
The Use of a Sentence

• (S) The king of France is wise
• Different tokens of the same type sentence or
  expression may have different uses.
• The use of a sentence or expression on any given
  occasion depends on context
• If one man uttered it S in the reign of
  Louis XIV and another man uttered it in the reign
  of Louis XV, it would be natural to say (to
  assume) that they were respectively talking about
  different people and it might be held that the
  first man, in using the sentence, made a true
  assertion, while the second man, in using the the
  same sentence, made a false assertion.
• Definite descriptions behave like indexicals!
• And the truth value of utterances in which these
  expressions occur depends on context!

14
The Use of a Name

• The same expression may be used to refer to
  different individuals
• Proper names also behave like indexicals!

15
Expressions with Referring Use
definite descriptions
degree of context dependence
indexicals
definite descriptions
pure names
extent of descriptive content
definite descriptions, indexicals
pure names
Ad hoc vs. general conventions
16
Functional Role Not Reducible to Form!

• Strawson notes once again that the character of
  an expression is determined by its use
• Definite descriptions can be used as names, e.g.
  The Old Pretender, The Holy Roman Empire
• And proper names can become common nouns or
  descriptions

17
Truth Value

• We cannot talk of the sentence being true of
  false, but only of its being used to make a true
  or false assertion.
• (S) The king of France is wise.
• S uttered during the reign of Louis XIV makes a
  true assertion
• S uttered during the reign of Louis XV makes a
  false assertion
• What about S uttered now, when there is no king
  of France?
• According to Strawson, an utterance of S now is
• significant (has meaning, isnt just gibberish)
• but has no truth value, i.e. is neither true nor
  false.

18
Meaning and Truth Value

• Meaningis a function of the sentence or
  expression mentioning and referring and truth or
  falsity, are functions of the use of the sentence
  or expression. To give the meaning of an
  expressionis to give general directions for its
  use to refer to or mention particular objects or
  persons to give the meaning of a sentence is to
  give general directions for its use in making
  true or false assertions.
• We can explain how sentences like S, with
  non-referring subject terms, can have meaning
  without recourse to Russells theory of
  descriptions
• An utterance of S has meaning in virtue of being
  an S-type sentence even when its subject term
  fails to refer
• Difference between Strawson and Russell
• Russell when there is no king of France S is
  false
• Strawson when there is no king of France S is
  neither true nor false

19
Sense and Reference

• The meaning of an expression is not the set of
  things or the single thing it may correctly be
  used to refer to the meaning is the set of
  rules, habits, conventions for its use in
  referring
• Meaning is ambiguous between sense
  (dictionary-meaning) and reference (picking out,
  as in I mean you!)
• Russell confuses the two and so imagines that for
  the subject term of a sentence to have meaning
  (and hence for the sentence to have meaning) it
  must succeed in referring.
• Hence the troublesome mythology of the logically
  proper name since logically proper names are
  supposed to pick out objects of acquaintance
  about which we cant be mistaken they cant fail
  to refer.

20
Presupposition

• Referring to or mentioning a particular thing
  cannot be dissolved into any kind of assertion.
  To refer is not to assert, though you refer in
  order to go on to assert.
• Reference and assertion are different acts
  assertion presupposes a successful act of
  reference.

First you catch your fish!
21
Subject and Predicate

• One of the main purposes for which we use
  language is the purpose of stating facts about
  thingsIf we want to fulfill this purpose, we
  must have some way of forestalling the question,
  Whatare you talking about? as well as the
  question, What are you saying about itThe task
  of forestalling the first question is the
  referringtask. The task of forestalling the
  second is the attributivetask. In the
  conventional English sentencethe performance of
  these two tasks can be roughly and approximately
  assigned to separable expressionswhich
  corresponds to the conventional grammatical
  classification of subject and predicate.
• The subject-predicate distinction is one of
  function what makes an expression the subject or
  predicate of a sentence is the job we use it to
  do
• The job of the subject term is to refer the job
  of the predicate is to assign some attribute to
  the object picked out by the subject term.

22
Beware of Bad Metaphysics!

• This functional distinction between subject and
  predicate has cast long philosophical shadows.
  The distinctions between particular and
  universal, between substance and quality, are
  such pseudo-material shadows.
• Failure to recognize that the distinction is one
  of use or function leads to bad metaphysics
  imagining that the subject-predicate distinction
  somehow reflects the structure reality
• Russells programme for abolishing
  particulars by replacing ordinary proper names
  and definite descriptions with logical machinery
  represents an attempt to get rid of the
  metaphysical unknownrecognizing only
  logically proper names which refer to objects
  about which we can be certain.
• But if we recognize that the subject-predicate
  distinction is one of use with no metaphysical
  baggage attached this program is unmotivated

23
Epilogue

• Concluding remarks about indefinite descriptions,
  identity statements and the logic of subjects
  and predicates in Aristotelian Logic according
  the the Square of Opposition.
• The universal propositions of the fourfold
  schedule, it is said, must either be given a
  negatively existential interpretationor they
  must be interpreted as conjunctions of negatively
  and positively existential statementswhichever
  of the above alternatives is selected, some of
  the traditional laws have to be abandoned.
• All the more reason for holding that in asserting
  subject-predicate sentences of the form all S
  are P or No S are P we do not assert the
  existence of Ss but rather presuppose it
• Hence that where there are no Ss the sentences
  in question are neither true nor false.

24
Traditional Square of Opposition
All S are P
No S are P
contrariety
subalternation
subalternation
contradiction
subcontrariety
Some S are not P
Some S are P
25
Boolean Square of Opposition
No S are P
All S are P
contradiction
Some S are not P
Some S are P
26
Russells Response to Strawson

• Ordinary language philosophers are persuaded
  that common speech is good enough not only for
  daily life, but also for philosophy. I, on the
  contrary am persuaded that common speechrequires
  modificationfor technical purposes, technical
  languages differing from those of daily life are
  indispensible.
• Strawson confuses the problem of descriptions
  with the problem of egocentricity
• We can understand that as the problem of dealing
  with language that includes indexicals like I,
  here, now etc. which assume a point of view
• The Theory of Descriptions isnt meant to do that
  job
• The purpose of the theory of descriptions isnt
  to analyze ordinary language but to produce an
  ideal language that corrects it

27
Some bads in ordinary language

• Vagueness
• Bad for scientific and mathematical purposes
• Also generates the Sorites Paradox when we apply
  legitimate patterns of inference to vague
  statements
• Misleading subject-predicate form leads to bad
  substance-accident metaphysics
• The subject-predicate logic to which we are
  accustomed depends for its convenience upon the
  fact that at the usual temperature of the earth
  there are approximately permanent things
• Truth value gaps
• Bivalence is a convenient idealization (for
  classical logic)
• Compare to the idealized truth-functional
  conditional of classical logic.

28
Not all language is egocentric

• It isnot difficult to give other examples of the
  use of descriptive phrases from which
  egocentricity is wholly absentas the following
  the square-root of minus one is half the
  square-root of minus four.
• It is of the essence of a scientific account of
  the world to reduce to a minimum the egocentric
  element in an assertion
• I agreewith Mr Strawsons statement that
  ordinary language has no logic
• So we should adopt whatever conventions do the
  job for our purposes, regarding the square of
  opposition and everything else

29
Who won?
The present king of France is bald
No truth value.
False.