The Origins of the WW II 19351939

1
The Origins of the WW II (1935-1939)

• By the second half of the 1930s, the states
  favouring the maintenance of the status quo
  wanted to set up a barrier against Germanys
  revisionism. France wanted closer ties with the
  Little Entente states (Yugoslavia,
  Czhecoslovakia, Romania) and direct English
  participation in a rearmament effort, also to
  attract Italy and the USSR into a European
  concert.

2

• There was an agreement with Italy in Stresa in
  spring 1935 and a pact with the USSR in May 1935.
  However, six months later accord with Italy
  collapsed, the pact with the Soviet Russia was
  shaky, and the way was again free for German
  revisionism and expansionism.

3

• At Stresa, Italy agreed with Britain and France
  to oppose any unilateral rejection of treaties
  endandering the peace in Europe. Preceded by
  French-Italian diplomatic talks about Tunisia,
  France appeared to give free hand to Italy in
  Ethiopia, as the Stresa accord applied only to
  Europe.
• British foreign policy was vague about
  commitments concerning Austria, sanctions were to
  be only economic, not military. Thus, there was
  an incomplete solidarity between the three
  powers. Mussolini did not give up the Italian
  expansionism in Africa, while Britain was
  opposed, so Italy sought French support in
  exchange for a joint military convention on
  Central Europe.

4

• In their 1935 pact, France and Russia promised to
  assist each other if any of them was victim of an
  unprovoked aggression, without signing any
  military convention. However, the main purpose
  was only to worry Hitler and there was no real
  cooperation.
• In fall 1935, Italy faced British and French
  resistance to its expansion in Ethiopia. Britain
  concentrated a naval force in Egypt to scare
  Italy. Yet on October 2, 1935 Mussolini declared
  war on Ethiopia.

5

• Britain did not close the Suez canal, only
  prohibited arms shipments, then oil exports to
  Italy and imports from it. France reluctantly
  followed Britain with similar sanctions, which
  did not stop Italian military operations. A
  mediation plan could give parts of Ethiopia to
  Italy but the Ethiopian Negus refused. Italy
  denounced the Stresa accord in December 1935.
• Some French politicians were critical of the
  sanctions, saying that they could push Italy to
  the arms of Hitler. Others invoked the principle
  of collective security and stressed the
  importance of the accords with Britain and the
  USSR.

6

• In Britain, the emphasis was on the principle of
  collective security and sanctions. But, the
  Stresa Accord collapsed and the principle of
  collective security was defeated in front of
  expansionisms.
• Attention
• France was unable to both satisfy Italy and
  remain faithful to its League commitments and
  Britain never dared to go as far as using force
  to stop Mussolini.

7

• Reoccupation of the Rhineland
• The prospect of a British-Italian conflict
  helped Germany to obtain in 1935 a first
  advantage the British acceptance of German naval
  rearmament up to 35 of the strength of the
  British navy. Britain wanted to prevent a
  German-Italian cooperation over the Question of
  Ethiopia. As Ethiopia was about to collapse,
  Hitler ended in March 1936 the demilitarized
  status of the Rhineland which was a risky move
  but the Nazi Führer believed France would not
  react by use of force.

8

• Indeed, France tolerated this new violation of
  the Versailles Treaty and lost the security given
  to the Hexagone by a demilitarized Rhineland.
• France did not dare to react because of the
  following reasons
• - The Polish government informed France that
  while it remained faithful to its alliance with
  France, it did not consider the German move as a
  cause for war.
• - Britain advised France to remain calm, to take
  no military action and to study Hitlers offer of
  a non-aggression pact. Only if Germany attacked
  France, Britain would come to the aid of the
  French Republic.

9

• - The French government was timid, wanted first
  guarantees of Polish and British military aids.
  Morally it was not ready to use arms and had
  never really studied the possibility of stopping
  German forces in the Rhineland.
• The international crisis of 1935-36 dealt a heavy
  blow to the League of Nations and to the
  principle of collective security. The neutral
  countries soon announced that they no longer
  considered the sanction system under the Article
  16 mandatory. The Little Entente was also
  falling apart, with Czechoslovakia criticizing
  the foreign policy of Romania and Yugoslavia.

10

• The new Berlin-Rome Axis announced in Fall 1936
  was to pave the way to World War II.
• Although there were some thesis about a joint
  front of France, Britain, and Italy to discourage
  the German expansionism, the fascist Italys
  expansion policy in the Mediterranean was bound
  sooner or later to clash with British and French
  interests. In order to maintain the Stresa
  solidarity and the status quo in Austria and
  Germany, Britain and France would have been
  obliged to give free hand to Italy not only in
  Ethiopia but in the entire Mediterranean
  unthinkable for them.

11

• First threats of general war
• The danger of a great war grew in the summer of
  1936. During the previous three years, there
  were the Italian campaign in Ethiopia, the
  hostilities without declaration of war between
  Japan and China in Shanghai but there was no
  threat of general war. However, the Spanish
  Civil War (1936-1939), the Sino-Japanese war, and
  Hitlers actions in Central Europe were directly
  to threaten the general peace.

12

• The Spanish Civil War
• Causes were purely Spanish. The monarchy
  collapsed in April 1931 but the new republic was
  opposed from within by the landowner aristocracy,
  the army leaders and the Catholic clergy. The
  general elections of 1936 witnessed the victory
  of a coalition of communists, socialists,
  anarchists and radical liberals (Frente Popular)
  with an anti-clergy program. A Pro-monarchy
  military insurrection occured in July 1936, led
  by general Francisco Franco in Spanish Morocco,
  took over in six weeks half of the country
  failing to take Madrid in November 1936.

13

• During the following two years, the reorganized
  Republican government was pushed back slowly
  toward Barcelona and finally Francos nationalist
  forces invaded Catalonia and gained victory in
  March 1939.
• The Spanish Civil War was important because of
  Spains geostrategic location in the
  Mediterranean (Gibraltar). Both Republicans and
  Nationalists sought to obtain arms, airplanes and
  military advisors from abroad. By sending arms
  or volunteers, four big European powers became
  involved in the civil war.

14

• The conflict was one aspect of the ideological
  disputes between fascist, communist and
  democratic regimes in Europe. Fascist Italy was
  interested in preventing a marxist popular front
  in Spain, supported the nationalists in the hope
  of obtaining naval and air bases in the Balearic
  islands and threatening Gibraltar.
• Already in 1934, Italy had agreed with the
  pro-monarchist movement to recognize a restored
  monarchy in Spain and to guarantee Spanish
  possessions in the Mediterranean. Mussolini had
  also promised arms to the Spanish fascist
  leaders.

15

• Germany also supported the nationalists sending
  aerial aid (Condor Legion) to Franco in order to
  threaten France from South and also to obtain
  Spanish raw materials.
• France and Britain had enjoyed freedom of action
  in the Mediterranean in the 19th century due to
  Spains decline, so they did not want a strong
  Spanish government with an active foreign policy,
  possibly to change the status quo.
• France was concerned about communications with
  North Africa and Britain with Gibraltar.They were
  both anxious about a cooperation between Italy
  and Spain.

16

• Soviet Russia wished the defeat of the Spanish
  fascists and supported the communists fighting on
  the side of Republicans against Franco..
• Italy and Germany were the only two powers
  playing a real active role. They gave immediate
  aid to Franco to transport his troops by sea and
  air from Morocco to Spain. USSR also thought of
  sending help to the Republican government.
• France adopted a policy of non-intervention and
  called for all powers not to send any men or war
  material to belligerents.
• Italy pledged to restore social and political
  order in Spain sending weapons and 60,000 men to
  the Nationalists of Franco in 1937, and gave
  naval support. Germany sent war material,
  pilots, and a force of 14,000 men.

17

• Only in fall 1936 did the Soviet Russia sent a
  few airplanes and men.
• The French Communists called for armed assistance
  to the Spanish Republicans, but the majority of
  Frenchmen favoured non-intervention. For
  security reasons, Britain adopted the same policy
  and firmly implemented a non-intervention policy.
  
• Supplies of war material played a decisive role
  in the civil war, with Franco having air
  superiority with some 700 planes. The policy of
  non-intervention played in his favour.
• Italy tried to benefit from the war with a
  recognition from Britain of a naval parity in
  the Mediterranean.

18

• In the accord of 1937, Italy promised to respect
  the status quo in the Mediterranean, including
  the Baleares, and in Suez in exchange for
  recognition of its occupation of Ethiopia.
• Attention
• Britain thus renounced its hegemony in the
  Mediterranean but Franco gave no naval or air
  bases to Italy and Germany in the Mediterranean
  in the following years.
•  

19

• The new fascist government in Spain signed a
  treaty of friendship with Germany in March 1939
  but was to remain neutral in case of a European
  war. Minor gains as France was not threatened by
  Spain or in the Mediterranean. But Hitler and
  Mussolini were then aware that French and British
  governments were willing to make sacrifices in
  order to avoid a general war.

20

• Sino-Japanese War
• After its protectorate over Manchukuo in 1932,
  the Imperial Japan wanted to dominate economic
  and political life in China. Japan tried to
  increase its sales to China through more
  favourable customs terms but China was not
  willing. China also wanted British and American
  capital to industrialize, and also to modernize
  its army. Japan felt that it was running out of
  time.
• From 1932 to 1936, there was a domestic policy
  conflict in Japan between nationalists and
  moderates, with the nationalists helped by the
  economic crisis and the drop in Japanese exports
  due to world-wide trade barriers gaining the
  control of the country in 1937.

21

• The military thought of Japanese expansion and
  domination over South-East Asia, by war if
  necessary.
• The Nationalist Chinese government resisted to
  the Japanese expansionism so Japan started war in
  July 1937, a war which will last 8 years.
• USSR was paralyzed by internal crisis, Britain
  and France were worried about Spanish civil war.
• In November 1936 Germany and Japan signed the
  anti-Comintern Pact for close cooperation against
  communism, also directed against the USSR.
  Britain, USA and USSR felt that the Japanese
  expansion policy had German support.

22

• Britain gave in spring 1937 credits to China, and
  USSR advised Chinese communists to cooperate with
  the nationalists. But there was no concerted
  British-Soviet action.
• Japan issued an ultimatum to China in July 1937,
  landed troops in Shanghai, which was taken with
  Beijing and Nankin by the end of 1937, conquest
  of coastline of southern China and of 42 of
  Chinese territory was achieved in 1938.
• However, the nationalist Chinese government of
  Chang Kai-chek fought back the Japanese army
  together with the Chinese communists stopping the
  10-year civil war in 1937.

23

• The League of Nations condemned the action but
  did not dare to declare Japan as aggressor and to
  impose sanctions. There were only diplomatic
  protests from Britain and the USA.
• The USSR fought in August 1939 a ten-day battle
  against Japanese troops on its border with
  Manchukuo but when Stalin suggested economic
  sanctions against Japan, Britain declined.

24

• Attention
• Japan could get free hand because of the
  situation in Europe where the Soviet Russia and
  Britain were more worried about the growing
  German power in Central Europe.

25

• German expansion in Central Europe
• Europe was shocked in 1938 by Germanys
  annexation of Austria in March and of the Sudeten
  region (Südetenland) of Czechoslovakia, inhabited
  mainly by Germans, on 30 September 1938.
• In November 1937, Hitler was already determined
  to settle the questions of the German populations
  in Austria and Czechoslovakia. In February 1938
  he imposed to the Austrian chancellor a
  national-socialist as interior minister (police)
  to prepare the Anschluss from within. Hitler
  also encouraged the leader of the separatist
  Germans in Czechoslovakia to demand
  administrative autonomy and to request German
  citizenship, then the right of self-determination.
  

26

• In both cases, there was resistance. The
  Austrian chancellor called for a referendum and
  Czech president Benes refused any autonomy
  status. Germany replied with ultimatums,
  thinking that the other powers would not
  intervene. The Austrian government and president
  gave in as the Austrian army could not resist a
  German invasion. Benes surrendered at the Munich
  conference of September 1938 the Sudeten region
  (with 2.8 milion Germans and 700,000 Czechs)
  after realizing that no outside help would come.

27

• Attention
• The result of these annexations was the
  formation of a Great Germany (Grossdeutschland)
  of 80 million inhabitants ending the German
  Dualism with important industrial resources, and
  the dismantlement of the French system of
  alliances in Central Europe.

28

• Moreover, German prestige and influence were
  growing in the Danubian region and the Balkans.
  In November 1938, Hungary recovered area in
  southern Slovakia with 1 million people through
  German-Italian mediation, Bulgaria claimed
  Dobrudja, and King Carol of Romania oriented his
  policy toward Germany.
• There was also a major change in Italys attitude
  in 1936, from sharp rejection of any Anschluss to
  advice to Austria to seek an accord with Germany
  while remaining independent.

29

• But after joining the Axis with Nazi Germany,
  Mussolini gave in and accepted the German
  annexation of 1938.
• France also hesitated to warn Germany without the
  agreement and participation of Britain. In
  February 1938, Italy proposed Britain an accord
  to save Austrias independence. Italy wanted in
  exchange the recognition of Italys annexation of
  Ethiopia and of its interests in the
  Mediterranean.
• However, Britain had given no guarantees to
  Austria and informed it that Britain could not
  protect it. Britain was shocked but unwilling to
  risk war and Mussolini moved even closer to the
  German foreign policy.

30

• The Czechoslovak government gave up the Sudeten
  region because of pressure by France and Britain.
  Britain had never committed itself actually to
  defend the Czech borders while France had done so
  in the 1925 alliance treaty. Russia also had a
  treaty with Czechoslovakia since 1935 but would
  give armed aid only if France acted first. When
  the Czech government asked for aid in September
  1938, Russia did not intervene because of the
  French decision not to help. As the German threat
  became imminent France informed Czechoslovakia
  that if it would continue to refuse abandoning
  the Sudeten region, France could not give armed
  assistance because of the need to avoid a war.

31

• As a consequence, Munich agreement was adopted by
  an overwhelming majority by French parliament.
• France gave up the alliance because of the
  weakness of its military means, the reservations
  of the other powers. The Italian army could
  threaten the French border, France also needed to
  ask Belgium for free passage of French troops
  (Belgium could refuse) to avoid Germanys
  fortified Siegfried line. France also doubted
  about Poland and Romania letting Russian troops
  move through their territory.

32

• France could not prevent the invasion of
  Czechoslovakia.
• Poland had signed in 1934 a treaty with Germany
  and was cool to Czech plight and France could not
  count on it.
• USSR mentioned that it was ready to fulfill its
  commitment if France fulfilled its. But France
  and Britain were skeptical about the efficiency
  of the Russian army just purged by Stalin. The
  Polish government declared that it would not
  allow the passage of Soviet troops and Romania,
  afraid of losing Bessarabia to Soviet Russia,
  said the same.

33

• France hoped for the support of Britain but
  Britain was not ready to defend Czechoslovakia.
  It tried to mediate in August then only offered
  its support to France if France would be
  threatened by a German invasion.
• Britain tried to avoid a general war when it
  could engage only two divisions.
• The USA remained a spectator during all these
  developments.
• The Czech government was also anxious to avoid a
  war and would have resisted only if it could be
  given aid by France and Britain.

34

• Attention
• I. The Munich decision by France and Britain was
  due to the belief that a general war had to be
  avoided in 1938, and the hope that Hitler would
  stop his expansion. If he could not be stopped,
  Britain and France hoped to gain more time for
  confronting him later. But military potential of
  Germany was now increased by the acquisition of a
  vast industrial zone (Czech heavy industries,
  Skoda factories), also by loss of 30 Czechoslovak
  divisions, by incorporation of Czechoslovakia in
  German Lebensraum, and by spread of German
  influence in Romania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia.

35

• II.Worse, there was a growing Russian distrust of
  France as an ally. Moscow felt eliminated from
  the big powers club by the pact of Munich.
  Although Hitler was not afraid of going as far as
  a war, he preferred at the last minute to
  negotiate in Munich, afraid that Italy would not
  follow Germany and perhaps also worried about
  German public opinion and a possible coup by army
  generals against him.