Title: Data and Applications Security Developments and Directions
1Data and Applications Security Developments and
Directions
- Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham
- The University of Texas at Dallas
- Lecture 6
- Multilevel Secure Database Management Systems -
II - January 27, 2005
2Outline
- MLS/DBMS Designs and Prototypes
- Challenges
- Multilevel Secure Data Models
- MLS/DBMS Functions
- Directions
3Overview of MLS/DBMS Designs
- Hinke-Schaefer (SDC Corporation) Introduced
operating system providing mandatory access
control - Integrity Lock Prototypes Two Prototypes
developed at MITRE using Ingres and Mistress
relational database systems - SeaView Funded by Rome Air Development Center
(RADC) (now Air Force Rome Laboratory) and used
operating system providing mandatory access
control and introduced polyinstation - Lock Data Views (LDV) Extended kernel approach
developed by Honeywell and funded by RADC and
investigated inference and aggregation
4Overview of MLS/DBMS Designs (Concluded)
- ASD, ASD-Views Developed by TRW based on the
Trusted subject approach. ASD Views provided
access control on views - SDDBMS Effort by Unisys funded by RADC and
investigated the distributed approach - SINTRA Developed by Naval Research Laboratory
based on the replicated distributed approach - SWORD Designed at the Defense Research Agency in
the UK and there goal was not to have
polyinstantiation
5Some MLS/DBMS Commercial Products Developed
(late 1980s, early 1990s)
- Oracle (Trusted ORACLE7 and beyond)
Hinke-Schafer and Trusted Subject based
architectures - Sybase (Secure SQL Server) Trusted subject
- ARC Professional Services Group
(TRUDATA/SQLSentry) Integrity Lock - Informix (Informix-On-LineSecure) Trusted
Subject - Digital Equipment Corporation (SERdb) (this group
is now part of Oracle Corp) Trusted Subject - InfoSystems Technology Inc. (Trusted RUBIX)
Trusted Subject - Teradata (DBC/1012) Secure Database Machine
- Ingres (Ingres Intelligent Database) Trusted
Subject
6Some Challenges Inference Problem
- Inference is the process of forming conclusions
from premises - If the conclusions are unauthorized, it becomes a
problem - Inference problem in a multilevel environment
- Aggregation problem is a special case of the
inference problem - collections of data elements
is Secret but the individual elements are
Unclassified - Association problem attributes A and B taken
together is Secret - individually they are
Unclassified
7Some Challenges Polyinstantiation
- Mechanism to avoid certain signaling channels
- Also supports cover stories
- Example John and James have different salaries
at different levels
8Some Challenges Covert Channel
- Database transactions manipulate data locks and
covertly pass information - Two transactions T1 and T2 T1 operates at Secret
level and T2 operates at Unclassified level - Relation R is classified at Unclassified level
- T1 obtains read lock on R and T2 obtains write
lock on R - T1 and T2 can manipulate when they request locks
and signal one bit information for each attempt
and over time T1 could covertly send sensitive
information to T1
9Multilevel Secure Data Model Classifying
Databases
10Multilevel Secure Data Model Classifying
Relations
11Multilevel Secure Data Model Classifying
Attributes/Columns
12Multilevel Secure Data Model Classifying
Tuples/Rows
13Multilevel Secure Data Model Classifying
Elements
14Multilevel Secure Data Model Classifying Views
15Multilevel Secure Data Model Classifying
Metadata
16MLS/DBMS FunctionsOverview
17MLS/DBMS FunctionsSecure Query Processing
18MLS/DBMS FunctionsSecure Transaction Management
19MLS/DBMS FunctionsSecure Integrity Management
20Status and Directions
- MLS/DBMSs have been designed and developed for
various kinds of database systems including
object systems, deductive systems and distributed
systems - Provides an approach to host secure applications
- Can use the principles to design privacy
preserving database systems - Challenge is to host emerging secure applications
including e-commerce and biometrics systems