Title: Cross-layer Analysis for detecting Wireless Misbehavior
1Cross-layer Analysis for detecting Wireless
Misbehavior
Anand Patwardhan Ph.D Candidate eBiquity
Group Computer Science and Electrical Engineering
Department
October 19, 2005
2Securing MANETs
- Security for resources
- Malicious behavior (Activity monitoring)
- Misuse (Resource protection)
- Response/recourse (Accountability)
- Trust in other resources
- Dependence on recommendations (Identities and
Reputations) - Reliability of information
3Security Issues
- Wireless communication
- Short range (802.11, Bluetooth etc.)
- Open medium
- Identification and Authentication
- PKI based solutions infeasible
- No prior trust relationships
- Routing
- Based on dynamic cooperative peer relations
- Key to survival of MANET
- Device constraints
- Power Conservation
- Finite Storage
- Computation power
4Intrusion Detection Challenges
- Identity
- Use SUCVs
- Mobility, congestion, radio interference
- False positives
- Scalability
- Large radio-ranges or dense networks
- Aggregation of data
- Communicate intrusions data to warn others
5Packet Forwarding
6Stateful Packet Monitoring
7Threats
- MAC/PHY level attacks
- RTS, CTS attacks gain unfair share of
bandwidth, disruption - Routing attacks
- gray holes, black holes, worm holes
- Attacks on data traffic
- Dropping, mangling or injecting data packets
- Trustworthiness of resources, reliability of
information - Identities, reputations, trust evolution
8MAC vulnerabilities
- Wireless Misbehavior
- MAC protocols have no inbuilt mechanism to
prevent unfair contention resolution - Adversaries can
- gain unfair share of bandwidth
- temporarily stall parts of the network, affect
the routing process - Prevention
- Misbehavior-resilient backoff for contention
resolution - Challenges and shortcomings
- Require core MAC protocol to be changed
- Colluding adversaries can still subvert the
scheme
9Related Work
- Proposed approaches
- Game theoretic models
- Incentives for fair-sharing
- Misbehavior resistant MAC contention
- Drawbacks
- Colluding adversaries can subvert these schemes
- Require changing core MAC protocol
- Inefficient
- Cannot prevent jamming
10Sophisticated attacks
- Classical attacks are easy to detect using
thresholds - Packet dropping, mangling,misrouting etc.
- To evade detection attacker must stay under the
detection threshold (insignificant disruption) - However more sophisticated attacks are possible
- Launching attacks at multiple levels, e.g.
Combining RTS attacks and packet drops - Any single attack signature might not suffice for
detection - Observations on a single layer in isolation will
be inconclusive
11Intrusion Detection challenges
- Classifying intrusions
- Threshold based
- False positives mobility, environmental
conditions, limited radio range, short period of
observations - Increase accuracy and efficiency by
- Incorporate factors like mobility, congestion and
distance in classifying intrusions - Use signal strengths, response times to judge
distance - Monitor media contention and incoming traffic to
judge congestion
12Cross-layer Analysis
Trust evolution, reputation management, recourse
Intrusion Detection
Application
Commendations Accusations (to other devices)
Packet dropping, Mangling, injection
Transport
Routing attacks, disruptions
Link
Unfair contention, Jamming
MAC/PHY
Response
13Neighbor table size
14True positives (no RTS attack)
15True positives (RTS attack)
16Goodput with RTS attacks
17References
- Jim Parker et al., Cross Layer Analysis for
Detecting Wireless Misbehavior, Proceedings of
CCNC 2006 - Anand Patwardhan et al., "Active Collaborations
for Trustworthy Data Management in Ad Hoc
Networks", Proceedings of the 2nd IEEE
International Conference on Mobile Ad-Hoc and
Sensor Systems, November 2005 - Anand Patwardhan et al., "Secure Routing and
Intrusion Detection in Ad Hoc Networks",
Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference
on Pervasive Computing and Communications, March
2005 - Jim Parker et al., "On Intrusion Detection in
Mobile Ad Hoc Networks", 23rd IEEE International
Performance Computing and Communications
Conference -- Workshop on Information Assurance ,
April 2004