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Title: comments by Evren


1
comments by Evren ÖRSHEC Paris
45th Conference on Bank Structure Competition
Session on Bank Structure Competition
2
Session on Bank Structure Competition
  • - U.S. banking market deregulation the banking
    firm
  • - Zarutskie does deregulation push banks to
    specialize in the lending market?
  • - Brickley, Linck and Smith how do community
    banks respond to market entry by their
    correspondent banks?
  • - U.S. banking market deregulation the borrower
    firm
  • - Santos and Winton how do the power-plays
    between banks and borrowers get resolved?
  • - Cetorelli does banking deregulation affect
    the nature of cohorts of borrower firms?

3
Zarutskie Competition Specialization
  • - Does deregulation push banks to specialize in
    the lending markets?
  • - evidence suggests that large banks specialize
    in hard-info real-estate loans whereas small
    banks specialize soft-info unsecured CI and
    personal loans.
  • - comments/suggestions
  • - discussion to clarify the impact of
    securitization on B/S-observed loan amounts and
    loan losses
  • - lnTA lnTA2
  • - what are the marginal effects of size? what
    are the economic significances?
  • - community bank, mid-size bank, large
    bank indicator variables instead?
  • - are members of a BHC treated as a single
    institution?
  • - identification tests for the IV regressions
    and standard errors clustered at the bank-level
    (instead of state level).

4
Brickley, Linck Smith Bankers Banks
  • - How do community banks respond to increased
    market competition and entry by their
    corresponding banks?
  • - safeguarding proprietary information by
    creating/joining bank co-ops (bankers banks) in
    order to avoid sharing critical information on
    their borrowers.
  • - comments/suggestions
  • - an alternative to true, full-blown vertical
    integration
  • - community banks approach has a precedent,
    even if histories differ credit unions and
    their corporate-CUs
  • - other potential test variables
  • - number of small establishments in the local
    market (from the Census Bureau)
  • - number of small banks in a market using a
    correspondent bank (rssd9043)
  • - amount of loans originated by small banks
    (rcon3431 available 1983-1993)
  • - Any evidence from small- to large-bank
    switches in DealScan? If yes, under what terms?

5
Santos Winton Bank-Firm Power Plays
  • - How do the power-plays between lenders and
    borrowers get resolved?
  • - Tests of Diamond and Rajan (2000) hypothesis
    are robust after controlling for business cycle
    effects whereas tests of Boot, Greenbaum and
    Thakor (1993), Sharpe (1990) and Rajan (1992)
    hypothesis show that once business cycle effects
    are controlled for, bank capital matters even for
    firms with access to markets.
  • - comments/suggestions
  • - everything but the kitchen sink approach
    robust results
  • - exploiting time-series/within-firm variation
    to know more about the dynamics
  • - do low-CF/low-Cap borrowers switch to
    high-Cap banks when CF improves?
  • - do high-Cap banks have difficulty renewing
    loans when their capital worsens?

6
Cetorelli Deregulation Nature of Firms
  • - Do structural changes in the credit
    availability affect firms nature?
  • - Post-deregulation cohorts of firms failure
    hazard is higher than that of pre- deregulation
    cohorts, pre-dereg firms do not necessarily adapt
    to their new environment lower availability of
    credit appears to imprint pre-dereg firms.
  • - comments/suggestions
  • - what is more predominant the managers or the
    corporate culture (i.e., policies)?
  • - is it possible to keep track of managers? if
    yes, additional testable hypotheses
  • - pre- vs. post-dereg firm frailty when
    managers change
  • - frailty of post-dereg establishments
    acquired by pre-dereg establishments, or
    vice-versa
  • - more details about the dataset would be
    welcome
  • - plant closings vs. bankruptcies
  • - what are the mechanisms? i.e., what are the
    implications for the capital structure choices
    and investment decisions?
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