Dtente

1
Détente

• From William Keylor, The Twentieth Century World
  An International History (Oxford Oxford
  University Press, 1996), pp.317-347

2
Progressive politics?

• Pre-Cuban Missile Crisis American superiority
• Progressive rhetoric Kennedy administration
  positive ideological component previously lacking
• Commitment to nation building (attraction to
  impoverished masses)
• Counterinsurgency reforms from American aid
  should be evolutionary not revolutionary
• Kennedys America contest for the hearts and
  minds of the underdeveloped and uncommitted
  peoples of the world

3
A new world post-1962?

• Only in realm military power SU capable
  challenging US global supremacy
• Cuban crisis revealed SU military inferiority
• Lessons from Cuba led to adoption 2 strategies
• diplomatic quest for peaceful coexistence,
  interrupted by probes in Berlin and Cuba 1958-62
• military acceleration long-range programme,
  seeking transform Russia from land power to
  global power

4
Nuclear Arms Strategies

• Peaceful coexistence significant developments
  in arms control
• Baruch Plan 1946 US offered turn all nuclear
  weapons to UN, agreement no other nation produce
  them (SU rejected)
• 1954 session UN GA Soviet delegate called for
  moratorium on manufacture nuclear weapons
• 10 May 1955 Kremlin formally proposed gradual
  reduction conventional forces to fixed levels,
  and destruction of nuclear stockpiles once those
  levels reached

5
Nuclear Arms Strategies

• 1955 Geneva Summit, Eisenhowers open skies
  proposal provided for mutual aerial surveillance
  legalise espionage! (SU)
• 1959 speech to UN GA Khrushchev advocated general
  and total disarmament within 4 years
• However, talks foundered on questions
  verification infringement of sovereignty (SU)

6
Nuclear Arms Limitation

• Superpower disarmament proved impossible goal
• After Cuba, both sides concentrated on modest and
  attainable objective imposition limitations on
  testing, deployment, and proliferation of nuclear
  weapons in the future
• August 1963 SU, US and GB signed treaty banning
  nuclear tests in the atmosphere and the sea
• January 1967 above France agreed to keep outer
  space free of nuclear weapons

7
Proliferation of weapons

• hotline est. 20 June 1963
• Greater concern potential threat to delicate
  strategic balance other nations acquiring
  nuclear weapons
• Refusal by SU share nuclear tech. or weapons with
  European and Asian allies
• US tried dissuade Atlantic partners from
  developing nuclear capabilities promised
  American protection
• Mid-1960s duopoly expanded GB 1952, France 1960,
  China 1964

8
Non-proliferation

• July 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, came
  into force 5 March 1970
• US, SU, GB 94 other countries (not China and
  France)
• Nuclear powers pledged never to offer nuclear
  weapons or tech., non-nuclear promised not to
  produce or acquire
• Intl. inspection team est. Vienna UN
  International Atomic Energy Administration to
  verify compliance

9
Results

• International agreements 1960s forbade testing,
  devt., deployment nuclear weapons but
• Nothing to limit stockpiling strategic weapons
  and expansion/perfection delivery systems
• SU no incentive to endorse strategic arms control
  to freeze nuclear forces would permanently
  relegate to 2nd place

10
Missile gap

• Latter ½ 1960s America military budget Vietnam
• Missile gap that helped force Khrushchev back
  down 1962 was bridged by end of decade

Number of ICBMs From William Keylor, The
Twentieth Century World An International History
(Oxford Oxford University Press, 1996),
pp.317-347
11
SU military parity 1960s

• Navy capacity increased under leadership Admiral
  Sergei Gorshkov (appointed 1957)
• 1964 Soviet Mediterranean Squadron made first
  appearance
• 1968 regular Soviet naval presence Indian Ocean
• Lack of overseas bases and refueling stations
• Narrowing strategic gap late 1960s supplied
  stimulus for first successful arms control
  negotiation

12
New Decade, New Leadership

• Talk in mid-1960s, no progress (conflict, power
  struggle)
• Inauguration new President, Nixon, and emergence
  undisputed leader Brezhnev 1969 revived hopes
• Simultaneous appreciation numerous advantages
  from relaxing tensions
• Both sides gained from curbing arms race neither
  could win
• Economic advantages from deceleration military
  spending

13
SALT I Negotiations

• Day Nixons inauguration (20 Jan 1969) Kremlin
  publicly proposed Soviet-America negotiations for
  reciprocal limitation and reduction nuclear
  delivery vehicles and defensive systems
• Nixon gave speech endorsing Soviet proposal 1st
  time American President accepted strategic parity
• 17 Nov 1969 1st formal talks began Helsinki six
  subsequent sessions held alternately Helsinki and
  Vienna Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT)

14
SALT I Agreement

• 2 years negotiation, interim arms agreement
  signed 26 May 1972 during Nixons visit to Moscow
• Not focus on limiting nuclear bombs stockpiled,
  but
• Ceiling placed on no. ICBMs each side could
  deploy for 5 years (3 Oct 1972 - 3 Oct 1977)
• Antiballistic Missile System (ABM) limited to
  deployment 100 ABM launchers and interceptor
  missiles at 2 sites capital and ICBM missile
  base (North Dakota)

15
Results?

• SU retained superiority total number missiles
  covered by SALT I agreement
• Nixon maintained superiority in others
• Advantage long-range bombers
• SU no counterpart to bases in Europe
• British and French nuclear forces tipped balance
• Technological superiority e.g. MIRVs
• Despite SALT I each sides ability to destroy the
  other remained unimpaired
• However treaty was first successful effort to
  impose some restraints on nuclear arms race
  interim treaty 5 years

16
SALT II (START)

• Forced resignation Nixon Aug 1974 did not impede
  negotiations new agreement
• Continuity policy assured by retention Henry
  Kissinger
• Gerald Ford and Brezhnev able conclude interim
  agreement at Vladivostok summit conference 24 Nov
  1974, est. guidelines for SALT II (START) limit
  categories of strategic delivery vehicles not
  covered by SALT I e.g. MIRVs and long-range
  bombers
• Forecasting both sides that end to unrestrained
  competition for strategic superiority

17
Gradual disintegration of power blocs

• 3 impt. developments
• Appearance dozens newly independent states in 3rd
  World, swelled ranks non-aligned bloc
• Increasing assertive and independent posture of
  Americas allies in Europe
• Defection of China from Communist camp
• Produced more fluid international environment
  evolution of multipolar international system
  helped break impasse of the Cold War

18
Multipolar politics and France

• 1st challenge to Americas preeminent position in
  Europe
• Freedom from political and colonial burdens of
  recent past
• De Gaulles foreign policy derived from
  fundamental dissatisfaction with international
  order envisioned by leaders of US and SU at
  wartime conferences of Yalta and Potsdam
• Division of world into bipolar system
  intolerable for France and Europe

19
De Gaulles politics

• Deprived once proud and independent states
  freedom of action that de Gaulle saw as
  prerequisite of great power status (requirement
  rely on military support NATO and US, but
  nationalism viewed with skepticism)
• De Gaulles denunciation of W. Europes military
  dependence on US, exploited fear stimulated by
  nuclear arms race
• Fear of abandonment by US in case of Soviet
  aggression all or nothing replaced by
  Kennedys flexible response no longer
  unconditional American guarantee

20
Force de frappe

• 13 Feb 1960 France became member nuclear club
  start of force de frappe
• France rebuffed US efforts to strengthen NATO
  with French support
• French theory proportional deterrence
• Formation EEC 1957 made Americas future in
  Europe uncertain
• Franco-German ties strengthened
• Economically most impt. trading partners by end
  1950s
• France now secure because of nuclear capability -
  military advantage to balance German economic
  strength

21
Attempts to become a superpower?

• De Gaulle hoped to improve bilateral relationship
  with Germany and cut out America sought
  independent Europe
• Lapsed into insignificance after replacement of
  Adenauer by Ludwig Erhard October 1963, who
  reaffirmed Bonns close ties to Washington
• Incremental disengagement from NATO activities
  1956-66
• 1966 announced withdrawal all land and air forces
  from NATO, plus removal military headquarters
  from Paris and departure of American and Canadian
  troops from French territory

22
Inability to disrupt balance of power

• June 1966 de Gaulle visited Moscow, Kosygin
  visited Paris December
• Removal from NATO and détente with Moscow show
  attempt to become self-appointed spokesman for
  Western Europe
• Atlantic alliance proved capable withstanding the
  assertion of French independence
• Student protests in France and Prague Spring 1968
  showed weaknesses in French system and forced
  cohesion of Western bloc
• Abdication de Gaulle April 1969 end to grand
  design for Europe!