No name

1


2
State-Building versus Democracy in Georgia

• ORIGINS AND OUTCOMES OF THE ROSE REVOLUTION

Gia Areshidze
Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellow National
Endowment for Democracy June 4, 2008
The views expressed in this presentation
represent the analysis and opinions of the
speaker and do not necessarily reflect those of
the National Endowment for Democracy or its staff.
3
Presentation Outline

• Theory of Democratic Sequencing
• Georgia under Shevardnadze State-building and
  Democracy
• Origins of the Rose Revolution
• Georgia under Saakashvili State-building versus
  Democracy
• Georgia Today President and Opposition
• Conclusions
• Recommendations

4
The Theory of Democratic Sequencing

• Before you can have a democracy, you must have a
  state
• Democracy must wait until there exists not merely
  an adequate but a well-functioning state with
  capable, impartial institutions, and the capacity
  to develop, legislate, and implement effective
  policies
• Democratization without such pre-conditions as
  the rule of law and a well-functioning state may
  result in the emergence of illiberal or extremist
  leadership, or the outbreak of ethnic conflict
• Weak and failed states are the source of the
  worlds most serious problems

5
The State-building Challenge

• State-building Myth The firm, sober,
  authoritarian strongmen are natural state
  builders (a la Mustafa Kemal Ataturk or Otto Von
  Bismark) T. Carothers, The Sequencing Fallacy
  
• If SB means the development of certain
  governmental capacities to provide public goods
  and if the territorial question is settled, SB
  may be compatible with either liberalism or
  democracy
• The problem, as Carothers points out, is that
  the number of cases where one can find genuine
  development-minded autocrats is extremely
  small.F. Fukuyama, Liberalism Versus
  Statebuilding

6
Georgia Under ShevardnadzeAchievements and
Challenges

• Georgia under Shevardnadze had three strong
  suits
• Vibrant free media
• Active civil society
• Strong opposition (proved by the very possibility
  of the Rose Revolution)
• All three elements are necessary for a
  fully-functional democracy
• Georgia was mired in corruption, with a weak
  stateunable and unwilling to enforce its own
  laws or to fulfill its obligations
• Complicated and contradictory legislation
• Inefficient government
• Lack of reforms and privatization
• Unpaid pensions and salaries
• Unable to supply water, power and natural gas

7
Georgia Under ShevardnadzeAchievements and
Challenges

• On paper, the Shevardnadze government passed many
  reforms recommended to it by international
  advisors and donor organizations
• However, the regime failed to achieve democratic
  consolidation or significant economic development
• Georgia was an excellent example of the failure
  of the traditional approach to transition in
  Post-Soviet countries
• These factors contributed to the Rose Revolution
  and the rise of Mikheil Saakashvili in 2003

8
The Need for a New Approach

• There are unavoidable trade-offs between
  building an effective state and building a real
  democracy (in the Newly Independent States).
  S. Sestanovich
• Re-orientation State-building, as opposed to
  support for civil society, becomes the new focus
  for the international development community.
• President Saakashvilis noble and necessary goal
  was to strengthen the weak Georgian state
  without a strong state, it would be impossible to
  move Georgia forward on the road to democracy.

9
Georgia under Saakashvili State-building versus
Democracy

• Constitution is amended 5 times between
  20042007, without consultation with the
  opposition or public debate
• Justified as bringing state institutions under
  effective legal control
• Changes included
• The presidential power to dissolve the
  parliament, without providing parliament with
  effective countermeasures
• If the parliament rejects a PM-nominee 3 times,
  the president can dissolve the parliament and
  appoint the PM by decree
• If the parliament passes a vote of no
  confidence in the PM, the president can choose
  to either appoint a new PM, or dissolve
  parliament and keep old PM for a period of up to
  6 months

10
Georgia under Saakashvili State-building versus
Democracy

• Budgetary power becomes a de facto executive
  function
• PM is charged with budgetary development,
  president approves and submits it to the
  Parliament
• If the parliament rejects the budget, it may be
  resubmitted without changes
• If budget is rejected 3 times, president is
  empowered to dissolve the Parliament, call new
  elections, and approve the budget by decree
• Pro Efficiency, country never will be without
  budget
• Con Parliament cannot control the countrys
  finances Rejecting the budget
  is tantamount to suicide, as a vote of no
  confidence will result in the dissolution of
  parliament. Once new elections are held the
  presidents budget will eventually be approved.

11
Georgia under Saakashvili Revisions to the
Electoral Code

• Electoral laws, have been changed 6 times between
  20042007, without consultation or public debate
• December 2005 Confident of its support,
  Saakashvilis United National Movement replaces
  the single-member system with a multi-mandate,
  winner-take-all system
• March 2008 Following events of November 2007,
  UNM, no longer confident of its electoral
  victory, stipulates 75 single-mandate seats a
  reduction of proportional MPs from 15075

12
Georgia after the Rose Revolution Building the
State

• Accomplishments
• Integration of Adjara
• Withdrawal of Russian military bases
• NATO and EU integration as policy priorities
• 14-fold budget increase high tax rate collection
  (x2.5 more)
• Anti-corruption campaigns and crime-reducing
  policies
• Provision of public goods (reconstruction and
  development of communication networks, buildings
  and other infrastructure)
• Fulfillment of governments previous and current
  obligations
• Improved business legislation
• Extensive Reforms Military, Police,
  Privatization, Healthcare, Social Security,
  Education and etc.

13
Georgia after the Rose Revolution Building the
State

• Costs
• Constitutional reforms
• Hyper-concentration of power in the presidents
  hands
• Lack of checks and balances
• Decreasing independence of judiciary
• Violations of human and property rights
• Unequal and unfair application of the law
• Controlled media
• Lack of participation, weakened political
  process
• Weakening of pluralism
• Weaker NGO activity
• Weak opposition
• Culture of fear
• November 7th 2007
• Shortcomings of two recent snap polls

14
A Strongman and the Founding Fathers

• President Saakashvili People compare my style
  with that of JFK, but in terms of substance, I
  feel much closer to Ata Turk or Ben Gurion, or
  General de Gaullepeople who had to build
  nation-states. I have this honor to become one a
  founding father, along with my friends.
• Arkady Ostrovsky, Dinner with the President,
  Financial Times, 06.09.04.

15
Cultural Revolution

• Contradictory Projects
• Continuation and strengthening of national
  traditionsthis is the UNM. Batumi, 05.06.08,
  www.civil.ge.
• At several points Saakashvili argues that what he
  is really intent on is a project of cultural
  transformation for the countryto change it from
  a Soviet mentality to a Western one.
• Gideon Rachman, Lunch with the FT Mikheil
  Saakashvili, Financial Times, 04.25.08.
• Cultural arguments are used to justify
  governmental actions and place blame on public
  mentality.

16
Georgians Value Democracy
17
The State of Emergency November 2007

• September 2007 Saakashvilis former interior and
  defense minister launches accusations, sparking
  national crisis.
• November 7, 2007 Government uses massive force
  to disband peaceful protests calling for the
  presidents resignation, injuring over 500
  people.
• Following the incident, the president declares a
  15-day state of emergency.
• Excluding public broadcasters, TV stations are
  banned from reporting the news, and Imedi TV is
  shut down.
• The president proposes snap presidential and
  parliamentary elections to resolve the crisis.

18
High Stakes for Saakashvili

• 2008 Elections presidential, January 5
  parliamentary, May 21
• Crisis of legitimacy for UNM required a
  definitive win in a truly free and fair election
• Western support for Georgias NATO bid
• International support for Abkhazia against
  Russian provocation
• Repair his reputation as a democrat
• President forcefully calls on public officials
  not to falsify results, not to intimidate voters,
  and not to interfere with the democratic process
• Impotency of the Omnipotent Allegations of
  voters being bullied, pressured, and cajoled are
  reported even before ballots are cast.
• Local officials tell people that they can gain
  freedom for their imprisoned relatives by
  rustling up hundreds of votes from neighbors on
  behalf of the National Movement.

19
President, UNM, and Opposition

• Saakashvili admits that he can no longer ignore
  the opinions of his opponents (RFE/RL, 01.11.08)
• Our task is to give more rights to them
  opposition, as well as to give them more sense
  of responsibility and involvement.
• We are ready to give them a number of positions,
  including that of Vice-Speaker, as well as
  posts in the parliamentary committees. We
  have gained the majority... but we are ready to
  offer them various positions in the government as
  well, if they accept itbecause Georgia needs to
  be united.
• Under Shevardnadze, however, by-laws reserved
  select posts for parliamentary minority
• Vice-Prime Minister
• Vice-Speaker
• Deputy Chairman of all committees
• Minority leader had formal privileges on the floor

20
The Opposition Today

• Adopting counterproductive stances
• Boycott parliament, establish an alternative
  convention, and disrupt opening session of
  newly-elected parliament
• In Georgia, there is no president, and now there
  is no parliament.sentiment voiced by main
  opposition parties
• Voicing increasingly radical sentiments
• I do not care what the Americans think and I do
  not care what the Europeans think.
• The struggle is not simply against the regime
  it is the struggle against American interests.
• To build a free country by free people and not
  under the instructions of Americans.

21
Question

• Was it possible to build this strong state
  without undermining the elements of democratic
  society that were present in Georgia?

22
Conclusion

• Georgia under Saakashvili is a curious type of
  hybrid regime A combination of liberal
  autocracy and illiberal democracy, brought about
  by an attempt to introduce some liberal measures
  by means of autocratic methods and illiberal
  discourse
• The state justifies its means by its goals of
  building a modern and liberal state and society,
  via cultural and mental transformation of the
  people.
• The source of power for two-thirds of Georgias
  parliamentarians and for all of Georgias
  ministers and bureaucrats stems not from the
  people, but from the president.
• The new parliament is the most timid in Georgian
  history No initiative can be launched or
  supported without the presidents sanction.

23
Conclusion (continued)

• Super-centralized executive branch, dominated by
  presidential power, risks further reinforcing a
  lack of initiatives, ineffectiveness, existing
  culture of corruption, and networks of patronage.
• The regimes tendency to use the issues of
  reintegration and tension with Russia for its own
  political advantage could help Russia in
  realizing its strategy of provoking Georgia into
  a disastrous military conflict.

24
Immediate Recommendations

• Form a Government of National Unity
• President must rid himself of all advisors and
  ministers with authoritarian instincts, who
  believe and practice the end justify means
  theory of governance
• Reinstate freedom of the media
• Remove political pressure on business community

25
Further Recommendations

• Undertake a complete reformulation of the
  constitution, in which the public ultimately
  determines government mandate
• Restore the separation of powers
• Encourage dialogue between all parties and
  citizens concerning the distribution of power
• Promote public dialogue regarding the division of
  power between central and local authorities
• Hold new parliamentary elections
• If free and fair, more representative of diverse
  view points
• Institute liberal reforms and policies, in order
  to get the government out of the way.

26
Implications for U.S. Policy in Georgia

• U.S. should use its unparalleled influence in
  Georgia to play an active role in returning the
  Georgian government to the path of democracy.
• State Department and U.S. Embassy should do their
  best to better defend and promote U.S. interests
  in Georgia through a policy of tough love.
• If the Georgian government acts more responsibly,
  U.S. should support Georgias bid to start formal
  accession talks with NATO (MAP)
• If government fails to meet its obligations, U.S.
  should reconsider Georgias relationship with
  MCC.
• USAID should reorient part of its programs from
  state-building to civil society.

27
State-Building versus Democracy in Georgia

• ORIGINS AND OUTCOMES OF THE ROSE REVOLUTION

Gia Areshidze
Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellow National
Endowment for Democracy June 4, 2008
The views expressed in this presentation
represent the analysis and opinions of the
speaker and do not necessarily reflect those of
the National Endowment for Democracy or its staff.