101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)

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101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) OPERATION
IRAQI FREEDOM
SAFETY
LESSONS LEARNED
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BASE CAMP STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE

• OPERATIONS AND ACTIVITIES
• LIVING AREAS
• MAINTENANCE AND MOTOR POOL OPERATIONS
• POL OPERATIONS
• REFUELING OPERATIONS
• POL SUPPLY POINT REQUIREMENTS
• CONVOY OPERATIONS
• WEAPONS SAFETY
• AMMUNITION STORAGE SITES (AHA / WSP)
• COLD WEATHER OPERATIONS
• HOT WEATHER OPERATIONS
• ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION PROGRAM

• SAFETY PROGRAMS
• ACCIDENT REPORTING INVESTIGATION
• WORKPLACE SAFETY
• VEHICLE TRANSPORTATION SAFETY
• RANGE SAFETY
• EXPLOSIVE, UXO, IED SAFETY
• AVIATION SAFETY
• TACTICAL SAFETY
• RADIATION SAFETY

• ANNEXES
• REFERENCES
• SAFETY ASSESSMENTS INSPECTIONS
• SAFETY TRAINING PROGRAM
• SUPPORTING CHECKLISTS
• SAFETY GRAPHIC TRAINING AIDS

• RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAM
• FOUR BASIC RULES OF THE RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS
• NORMAL RESPONSIBILITIES WITHIN THE RM PROCESS
• FIVE STEPS OF THE RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS
• TYPES OF RISK ASSESSMENTS
• RISK MANAGEMENT WORKSHEETS

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ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION
TRAINING
LESSONS LEARNED SAFETY SPECIALIST ASPECTS
BASE CAMP INSPECTIONS
UNIQUE SITUATION RECOMMENDATIONS
4

• LESSONS LEARNED PRE-COMBAT PHASE OF OPERATION
  IRAQI FREEDOM
• ISSUE SAFETY SPECIALIST ROLE (S) DURING
  DEPLOYMENTS.
• BACKGROUND SAFETY PERSONNEL WERE DEPLOYED AS
  PART OF THE MAIN BODY WHICH PROVIDED IMMEDIATE
  RESPONSE TO DEVELOPING SITUATIONS.
• DISCUSSION
• DEPLOYMENT OF SAFETY SPECIALISTS UP FRONT
  PROVIDED
• - AN ADDITIONAL SET OF EYES FOR THE COMMANDER.
• - PROACTIVENESS VERSUS REACTIVENESS.
• - IMMEDIATE RESPONSE TO PROBLEMS OR ACCIDENTS.
• - SAFETY LINK FROM DIVISION TO BRIGADE AND TO
  HIGHER AND VICE VERSA.
• - STAFF ASSISTANCE WITH RISK MANAGEMENT DURING
  THE MDMP PROCESS.
• - UNITS WITH PERSONNEL FOCUSING ENTIRELY ON
  SAFETY DURING COMBAT.
• WHAT WENT WELL
• - INTEGRATION OF SAFETY WITH OPERATIONS.
• - COMMAND EMPHASIS OF NOTED PROBLEMS OR
  POTENTIAL PROBLEMS BASED ON SAFETY
  RECOMMENDATIONS.
• WHAT REQUIRES IMPROVEMENTS
• ACCIDENT REPORTING DURING COMBAT OPERATIONS WAS
  INTERMITTENT. ONE SAFETY SPECIALIST PER BRIGADE
  COMBAT TEAM WILL WORK BUT ASAD AUGMENTATION COULD
  PROVIDE ADDITIONAL FLEXIBILITY.
• REPORTING PROCESS MUST BE SIMPLIFIED INITIALLY.
  ECOD AND PATIENT STATUS MAY NOT BE KNOWN FOR DAYS
  OR WEEKS.
• RECOMMENDATION REVISE REPORTING REQUIREMENTS TO
  PROVIDE SOME FLEXIBILITY.

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• LESSONS LEARNED PRE-COMBAT PHASE OF OPERATION
  IRAQI FREEDOM
• ISSUE DEPLOYMENT OF CIVILIAN PERSONNEL AND
  SUPPORTING PUBLICATIONS
• BACKROUND UPON NOTIFICATION OF DEPLOYMENT,
  CIVILIAN PERSONNEL BECAME PART OF THE TROOP
  LISTS. PREPARATION WAS COMPLETED WITH GUIDELINES
  PUBLISHED FOR DEPARTURE.
• DISCUSSION
• PREPARATION OF SRP PACKETS DURING INITIAL
  INPROCESSING SPED UP THE PROCESS.
• THE LITERATURE CONTAINED WITHIN DA PAM 690-47,
  DA CIVILIAN EMPLOYEE DEPLOYMENT GUIDE, NOV 95,
  WAS USEFUL BUT COULD USE UPDATING IN SOME AREAS.
  
• REQUIREMENTS TO INCLUDE SHOTS OR EQUIPMENT WERE
  NOT SPECIFICALLY DESIGNATED TOWARDS CIVILIAN
  PERSONNEL AND REQUIRED GUIDANCE FROM OUTSIDE THE
  DIVISION.
• QUESTIONS WERE RAISED AS TO WHETHER CIVILIAN
  PERSONNEL WOULD BE PLACED ON TCS ORDERS OR TDY
  ORDERS. TCS ORDERS PERMITTED UNITS TO SUPPLY
  CIVILIAN PERSONNEL.
• RECOMMENDATIONS
• CONDUCT A REVIEW OF DA PAM 690-47 AND UPDATE AS
  REQUIRED.
• DETERMINE WHETHER CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES SHOULD
  DEPLOY ON TCS ORDERS IN ORDER TO FACILITATE
  SUPPORT FROM SUPPORTED UNITS.
• PUBLISH A ONE SOURCE DOCUMENT ON CIVILIAN PAY
  AND ENTITLEMENTS OR EXPAND DA PAM 690-47 TO
  INCLUDE FINANCIAL DOCUMENTATION.

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• LESSONS LEARNED PRE-COMBAT PHASE OF OPERATION
  IRAQI FREEDOM
• ISSUE UNDER THE BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM (BCT)
  CONCEPT, ADDITIONAL SAFETY PERSONNEL ARE
  REQUIRED.
• BACKROUND DIVISION SAFETY OFFICES ARE NOT
  ALLOCATED SUFFICIENT JOB POSITIONS TO SUPPORT
  SAFETY COVERAGE AT THE BCT LEVEL.
• DISCUSSION
• EACH MANEUVER BRIGADE, DIVISION SUPPORT COMMAND,
  DIVISION ARTILLERY BRIGADE, DIVISION REAR SUPPORT
  AREA, AND DIVISION MAIN COMMAND POST, REQUIRE A
  SAFETY SPECIALIST (TOTAL OF 7 GS EMPLOYEES).
• THE ARMY SAFETY AUGMENTATION DETACHMENT (ASAD)
  SHOULD BE INCORPORATED AT THE TIME OF NOTICE OF
  DEPLOYMENT IN ORDER TO LEARN THE UNIQUE ASPECTS
  OF THE DIVISION. ONE ASSIGNED TO EACH GS
  EMPLOYEE. ( TOTAL 7).
• THE ASAD PROVIDES ABILITY TO ROTATE AMONG
  COMPANY BATTALION LEVEL ORGANIZATIONS AS WELL
  AS PROVIDE THE NECESSARY SUPPORT TO THE BCT
  COMMANDER.
• SAFETY SPECIALISTS AVERAGED 12 TO 18 HOURS PER
  DAY WHEN OPERATING AT THE BCT LEVEL.
• RECOMMENDATIONS
• DIVISION SAFETY OFFICES SHOULD BE FUNDED TO
  SUPPORT TACTICAL SAFETY COVERAGE AT ALL BRIGADE
  SIZE ELEMENTS TO INCLUDE FUNDING OF REQUIRED
  SAFETY EQUIPMENT.
• ASAD PROGRAM SHOULD BE EXPANDED IN ORDER TO
  ALLOW TRAINING WITH THE DIVISIONAL UNITS PRIOR TO
  DEPLOYMENT.
• ASADs SHOULD BE DEPLOYED WITH THE UNIT THEY WILL
  BE SUPPORTING.

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• LESSONS LEARNED PRE-COMBAT/COMBAT PHASE OF
  OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM
• ISSUE TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS FOR
  SAFETY PERSONNEL.
• BACKROUND DIVISION DOES NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT
  ORGANIC VEHICLES TO SUPPORT TACTICAL SAFETY
  OPERATIONS NOR RADIOS OR ALTERNATE COMMUNICATIONS
  CAPABILITY.
• DISCUSSION
• SAFETY SPECIALISTS REQUIRE TRANSPORTATION IN
  ORDER TO PERFORM THEIR MISSION AND TO REACT TO
  REPORTED ACCIDENTS.
• SAFETY PERSONNEL HAVE TO RELY ON THE SUPPORT OF
  THEIR BCT.
• MOVEMENT IS HINDERED TO THOSE AREAS WHERE THE
  FOCUS SHOULD BE AND PREVENTS REACTION TO CLASS A
  AND CLASS B ACCIDENT SITES (SAFETY PERSONNEL GO
  FROM PROACTIVE TO REACTIVE MODE).
• DIVISION ASSETS ARE NOT AVAILABLE TO SUPPORT
  SAFETY REQUIREMENTS DUE TO MTOE CONSTRAINTS.
• RECOMMENDATION
• AR 385-10 SHOULD BE CHANGED TO REFLECT SPECIFIC
  SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS REQUIRED AT EVERY DIVISIONAL
  SAFETY OFFICE.
• THE UNITED STATES ARMY SAFETY CENTER, SUPPORTED
  BY THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, MUST ESTABLISH A
  TDA IN SUPPORT OF DIVISIONAL SAFETY OFFICES WHICH
  INCLUDES TRANSPORTATION, EQUIPMENT, AND
  COMMUNICATION REQUIREMENTS.

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• LESSONS LEARNED PRE-COMBAT/COMBAT PHASE OF
  OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM
• ISSUE LOCATION OF SAFETY PERSONNEL IN SUPPORT
  OF BCTs.
• BACKROUND UNITS COULD NOT DETERMINE HOW THEIR
  SAFETY SPECIALIST SHOULD BE EMPLOYED IN SUPPORT
  OF THE BCT MISSIONS AND RELIED ON THEIR
  SPECIALIST TO PROVIDE INPUT.
• DISCUSSION
• AT HOME STATION, SAFETY SPECIALISTS CAN MONITOR
  ALL ASPECTS OF DEPLOYMENT TO INCLUDE VEHICLE
  PREPARATION, MOVEMENT BETWEEN VARIOUS CHECK
  STATIONS, RAIL AND AIR OPERATIONS.
• SAFETY SPECIALISTS CAN PERFORM AS ANOTHER SET OF
  EYES FOR THE BCT COMMANDER IF PLACED IN THE RIGHT
  PLACE AT THE RIGHT TIME.
• SAFETY SPECIALISTS MUST SUPPORT THE SPOD AND
  MOVEMENT FROM PORTS TO CAMPS (AND VICE VERSA UPON
  REDEPLOYMENT).
• SAFETY SPECIALISTS MUST MONITOR ACTIONS AT THE
  BASE CAMPS.
• DURING TRANSITION TO COMBAT ACTIONS, SAFETY
  SPECIALISTS SHOULD REMAIN WITH THE BRIGADE
  SUPPORT AREA ELEMENTS TO MONITOR DEPARTURE OF THE
  OTHER GACs.
• RECOMMENDATION
• DEVELOP A DOCUMENT EXPLAINING
• THE ROLE OF THE SAFETY SPECIALIST
• WHAT THE SAFETY PROGRAM/SPECIALIST PROVIDES IN
  SUPPORT OF A DEPLOYMENT
• HOW THE SAFETY SPECIALIST SUPPORTS OPERATIONS
• SAFETY SPECIALIST ROLE IN COMBAT

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OUTWARD FACING SEATING INITIATIVE
FUEL CAN RACK
FORCE PROTECTION VERSUS SAFETY
GUN MOUNTS
TCP DEVICES
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VEHICLE SEATING REDESIGN
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SAFETY ASSESSMENT OF NEW BENCHES
OLD SEATS SOLDIERS STANDING IN VEHICLE IN ORDER
TO LOOK OUT.

• FROM A FORCE PROTECTION STANDPOINT
• MAKES MORE SENSE. ELIMINATES PROBLEMS DISCUSSED
  ON THE RIGHT.
• FROM A SAFETY STAND POINT
• Soldiers lose ability to have a hand hold (loss
  of side running bar).
• Does Provide seating while increasing Force
  Protection
• RECOMMENDATION
• Use rolled canvas top in order to provide
  protection from the sun. Soldiers can still see
  out.
• Add sandbags to bed of truck/metal plates to
  side.
• Use and re-evaluate/try to provide hand hold
  (5/50 cord?) Should use slat type seats or pad
  the seats for long distances.
• Add head support bar across top.

Only the air guard has ability to return fire
effectively.
SOLDIERS NOT BOTHERING TO KEEP SITUATIONAL
AWARENESS
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Centerline Troop Seats (Shown on 5T Cargo Truck)

• Uses existing seats for installation
• Configuration allows space for equip
• Seats are removable (bolt to bed)
• Soldiers face outward IOT engage
• Seating capacity is the same

• Manufactured w/locally procured iron
• Relatively inexpensive
• Easy to install
• Minimal changes made to bed of truck

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• LESSONS LEARNED FORCE PROTECTION VERSUS SAFETY
  ISSUES (REDESIGN OF AMV SEATS)
• ISSUE CURRENT CONFIGURATIONS OF SEATS IN
  VEHICLES LIMIT SOLDIERS ABILITY TO FOCUS OUTSIDE
  THE VEHICLE. COMMANDERS HAVE DIRECTED CENTER
  BUILT, OUTWARD FACING SEATS TO BE ADDED TO CARGO
  TRUCKS AND IN SOME CASES, HMMWVS.
• BACKROUND OIF BROUGHT TO LIGHT THAT NORMAL
  TRAINING AND EQUIPMENT DESIGN DID NOT PREPARE THE
  FORCE ADEQUATELY FOR THE POST-CONFLICT ATTACKS
  AND EXPLOSIVE/IED THREATS. CONVOY MOVEMENTS
  OCCURRED OVER LONG DISTANCES AND A REQUIREMENT
  FOR ALL AROUND OBSERVATION TO INCLUDE FRONT AND
  REAR SECURITY SURFACED.
• DISCUSSION
• SOLDIER LOSSES FROM GUERILLA STYLE TACTICS,
  UXO/IED AND SECURITY CONCERNS INDICATED A NEED TO
  FIND NEW MEANS OF PROVIDING VEHICLE/CONVOY FORCE
  PROTECTION.
• DESIGN OF CENTER SEATS TO PROVIDE THE ABILITY TO
  HAVE SOLDIERS FACING OUT WITH THE ABILITY TO
  PROVIDE IMMEDIATE RESPONSE OCCURRED. SAFETY OF
  THE SOLDIERS WITH THE IMPROVISED SEATS HAS
  MINIMAL CHANGE HOWEVER, DESIGN OF A SEAT WHICH
  PROVIDES HAND HOLDS AND LAP BELT OR SHOULDER/LAP
  BELT COULD IMPROVE SAFETY. SEAT SHOULD ALSO BE
  COLLAPSIBLE IN ORDER TO PROVIDE CARGO HAULING
  CAPABILITY WITHOUT BUILDING SECONDARY LOADS WHICH
  CREATE SAFETY HAZARDS.
• FOREIGN NATION VEHICLES HAVE BEEN CONVERTED TO
  ALLOW OUTWARD FACING SOLDIERS WHO ARE READY TO
  ENGAGE THE ENEMY IF REQUIRED.
• RECOMMENDATIONS
• DESIGN A PERMANENT COLLAPSIBLE SEAT AFFIXED TO
  THE CENTER OF THE TRUCK BED THAT PROVIDES FOR
• SEATBELT OR LAP BELT WITH SHOULDER HARNESS
  DESIGN BUILT INTO THE SEAT.
• HEAD RESTRAINT TO PREVENT WHIPLASH.
• USE THE UH60 HELICOPTER SEATS AS A BASELINE FOR
  DEVELOPMENT.
• NOTE SEE FOLLOWING SLIDES FOR IMPROVISED
  SEATING INITIATIVES.

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GUN MOUNT REDESIGN
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• LESSONS LEARNED FORCE PROTECTION VS SAFETY
  ISSUES (REDESIGN/USE OF GUN MOUNTS)
• ISSUE CONVOY PROTECTION IS PROVIDED BY HMMWVs
  IN THE FRONT AND REAR USING GUN MOUNTS.
• BACKROUND CONTINUED ATTACKS AGAINST CONVOYS
  REQUIRED OUTFITTING THE HMMWV FLEET WITH GUN
  MOUNTS THAT COULD HOLD M249 SAWS, M240BS OR .50
  CALIBER MACHINEGUNS.
• DISCUSSION
• GUN MOUNTS WERE DESIGNED TO PROVIDE FRONT AND
  REAR SECURITY WITH NORMAL CARGO OR COMMAND
  CARRIER HMMWVS.
• GUN MOUNTS BEING PRODUCED IN IRAQ HAVE
  ADVANTAGES OVER THE MILITARY ISSUE GUN MOUNT AND
  ENHANCES SAFETY IN THE FOLLOWING WAYS
• - BOLT STOP ADDED WHICH PREVENTS DEPRESSION OF
  THE MUZZLE WHERE IT COULD JEOPARDIZE SAFETY OF
  DRIVER AND TC.
• - PEDESTAL HOOK PROVIDED FOR ATTACHMENT OF A
  SOLDIERS SAFETY HARNESS.
• - TRUCK BED PROTECTION INCREASED FROM THE STEEL
  SHEET WHICH HOLDS THE PEDESTAL.
• - MOUNTS INTO EXISTING TIE DOWN BOLT HOLES
  ELIMINATING THE NEED TO DRILL INTO THE BED OR
  FRAME OF THE VEHICLE.
• - ALTERNATE MOUNTING LOCATIONS FOR THE PEDESTAL
  PROVIDED.
• - TEST FIRING FOUND LESS VIBRATION AND BETTER
  CONTROL.
• RECOMMENDATIONS
• IMPROVE GUN MOUNT SYSTEMS IN HMMWVS OR CHANGE
  MTOE TO PROVIDE MORE HARD SHELL HMMWVS WITH
  TURRET GUN MOUNT RINGS FOR CS AND CSS UNITS.
• ADD ROLLOVER PROTECTION TO PROTECT THE GUNNER.

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FABRICATED GUN MOUNT
HAS ADJUSTABLE BOLT STOP IN ORDER TO PREVENT
DEFLECTION WHERE DRIVER/ASST DRIVER ARE
THREATENED.
MOUNTS USING EXISTING TIE DOWN HOLES REPLACE
WITH LONGER BOLT, LOCK WASHER AND TWO NUTS TO
PREVENT LOOSENING.
PROBLEMS NOTED WITH MILITARY ISSUE MOUNT
REQUIRED DRILLING INTO VEHICLE
BODY/FRAME NOT AUTHORIZED.

COMING LOOSE BODY SPLITTING
BOLTS LOOSE. CAN BE DEPRESSED
JEOPARDIZING DVR/TC.
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SEATBELTS
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LESSONS LEARNED FORCE PROTECTION VERSUS SAFETY
ISSUES (SEAT BELTS) ISSUE CURRENT SEATBELT
CONFIGURATION DOES NOT PROVIDE ABILITY TO BUCKLE
WHEN SOLDIERS WEAR ALL REQUIRED EQUIPMENT.
SOLDIERS ARE ELECTING NOT TO WEAR THE SEATBELT
BECAUSE OF A FEAR THEY WONT BE ABLE TO REACT TO
ENEMY CONTACT. BACKROUND THE ARMY IS WORKING
SEATBELT MODIFICATIONS BY CHANGING FROM THE LAP
BELT TO THE 3 POINT SYSTEM HOWEVER, THE 3 POINT
SYSTEM, EVEN WITH THE ADDITIONAL 18 STRAP STILL
DOES NOT MEET EXPECTATIONS. SOLDIERS WANT THE
FREEDOM TO BE ABLE TO MANEUVER IN THE SEAT AND
ARE ELECTING NOT TO WEAR THE BELT AT
ALL. DISCUSSION MWOS TO REPLACE THE TWO POINT
SEATBELT HAS BEEN EXTENDED TO 2007. THE 18
EXTENSION FOR THE 3 POINT SYSTEM HAS BEEN ORDERED
BY UNITS BUT NOT DELIVERED. FORCE PROTECTION
CONCERNS WITH BEING ABLE TO REACT TO ENEMY
CONTACT FINDS THAT SOLDIERS ELECT NOT TO WEAR THE
BELT WHEN OUTSIDE THE BASE CAMPS. COMPLAINTS
ABOUT THE PUSH BUTTON RELEASE LOCKING UP BECAUSE
OF DIRT AND SAND HAVE SURFACED REPEATEDLY. SOLDIER
S PREFER A FLEXIBLE RESTRAINT SYSTEM WITH A QUICK
RELEASE TYPE LOCKING DEVICE. IT HAS BEEN NOTED
THAT ZERO SOLDIERS HAVE BEEN LOST BECAUSE THEY
COULD NOT GET OUT OF THE VEHICLE TO ENGAGE THE
ENEMY HOWEVER, NUMEROUS FATALITIES AND SEVERE
INJURIES HAVE OCCURRED BECAUSE SOLDIERS WERE NOT
WEARING THE SEAT RESTRAINT SYSTEM AND WERE THROWN
OUT OR FELL OUT OF THE VEHICLES. RECOMMENDATIONS
REPLACE CURRENT BELT SYSTEMS WITH A 4 POINT
SYSTEM AS DESIGNED IN THE UH60 BLACK HAWK
HELICOPTER. LAP PORTION MUST BE ADJUSTABLE ON
ONE SIDE AND RETRACTABLE ON THE OTHER IN ORDER TO
CENTER THE BUCKLE. SHOULDER HARNESSES MUST BE
RETRACTABLE WITH SUFFICIENT BELT LENGTH TO
PROVIDE PULLING FORWARD AND SIDEWAYS IN ORDER TO
REACH OBJECTS OR ENGAGE THE ENEMY IF REQUIRED.
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HARNESSES MUST ALLOW ENOUGH FREEDOM TO REACH THE
FLOOR IN FRONT OF THE SEAT AND TO DO SIDEWAYS
MOVEMENTS BUT ALSO LOCK DURING ACCIDENTS.
Retractable harnesses

Quick Connect/Disconnect Buckle
Reverse adjustable and retractable pieces on
passenger side
Adjustable Harness (Driver's Side)
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WORN TIRES NO SPARES AVAILABLE
SIDE WALL RUPTURES WORN TIRE BLOW OUTS
SPARE TIRE KITS
SPARE TIRE MOUNT END PRODUCT
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• LESSON LEARNED SPARE TIRE KITS
• ISSUE
• EXCESSIVE TIRE WEAR LEADING TO BLOWOUTS WITHOUT
  SPARE TIRES BEING AVAILABLE.
• BACKGROUND
• VEHICLES DEPLOYED FOR OPERATIONS INITIALLY MET
  10/20 STANDARDS HOWEVER, TIRES ALREADY EXPOSED
  TO VARIOUS ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGES WERE DRY ROTTED
  RESULTING IN EARLY FAILURE AND WEAR OUT WHICH
  WASNT VISIBILE DURING PMCS. RADIAL AND BIAS
  TIRES ARE NOT INTERCHANGEABLE AND LED TO
  ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS.
• DISCUSSION
• EXTENSIVE MILEAGE WAS PLACED ON THE VEHICLES
  DURING THE CONFLICT AND DURING SASO PORTIONS OF
  OIF. SPARE TIRES / RIMS WERE NOT AVAILABLE
  WITHIN THE THEATER RESULTING IN VEHICLES RUNNING
  WITH UNSERVICABLE TIRES. FOUR TIRES HAD TO BE
  CHANGED IN SOME CASES BECAUSE REPLACEMENTS
  WERENT THE TYPE ALREADY INSTALLED.
• EXCESSIVE HEAT BUILD UP IN THE ROADS AND TIRES
  RESULTED IN SIDE WALL BLOWOUTS.
• VEHICLES WERE NOT EQUIPPED WITH A MEANS OF
  CARRYING A SPARE TIRE.
• RADIAL TIRES WERE A BETTER TIRE FOR THE
  ENVIRONMENT.
• OFF THE SHELF REPLACEMENT TIRES WERE PURCHASED
  BUT DIDNT MEET MILITARY STANDARDS.
• RECOMMENDATIONS
• ALL VEHICLES DEPLOY WITH A SPARE TIRE (MOUNTED
  AND INFLATED ON A RIM).
• CHANGE TMs/SUPPORTING REFERENCES TO ADD A SPARE
  TO THE BII REQUIREMENTS.
• THEATER LEVEL LOGISTICAL PACKAGES ADD TIRE (RIM
  MOUNTED) REPLACEMENT QUANTITIES SUFFICIENT FOR
  INITIAL SUSTAINMENT PURPOSE.
• VEHICLES BE EQUIPPED WITH A ROOF RACK OR TIRE
  HOLDER WHICH CAN BE MOUNTED IN THE REAR FOR
  CARRYING THE SPARE TIRE (PRE-MOUNTED ON RIM).

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CHEMICAL FIRES
OTHER SAFETY ASPECTS
AMMUNITION HANDLING AND FIRE CONTROL
BROWNOUTS
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NCO SUPERVISION
CLEARING BARREL
ACCIDENTAL DISCHARGES
NEW ITEM "BULLET STOP" PORTABLE CLEARING BARREL
ON-THE-SPOT CORRECTIONS
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• LESSONS LEARNED- ACCIDENTAL DISCHARGES.
•  
• ISSUE ACCIDENTAL DISCHARGES CONTINUED
  THROUGHOUT THE DEPLOYMENT.
• BACKGROUND DIFFERENT REASONS WERE FOUND FOR
  SOLDIERS HAVING ACCIDENTAL DISCHARGES AND SEVERAL
  TECHNIQUES WERE USED TO ELIMINATE THEM. THEATER
  ACTIONS REQUIRED ADHERENCE WITH RED, AMBER AND
  GREEN WEAPONS STATUS.
• DISCUSSION
• WEAPONS STATUS MUST BE UNDERSTOOD BY ALL
  SOLDIERS. (RED ROUND IN CHAMBER ON SAFE
  AMBER MAGAZINE IN CHAMBER OR ROUNDS IN FEEDTRAY
  BUT NO ROUNDS CHAMBERED, WEAPONS ON SAFE GREEN
  WEAPONS CLEARED AND ON SAFE).
• THOROUGH RISK ASSESSMENTS MUST BE DEVELOPED FOR
  DAILY OPERATIONS THAT HAVE HAZARDS/INJURY RISK
  ASSOCIATED WITH THEM. ENSURE CONTROLS ARE IN
  PLACE AND UNDERSTOOD IN ORDER TO MITIGATE THE
  HAZARD.
• UNITS MUCH CONDUCT WEAPON CLASSES FOR
  FAMILIARIZATION AND PROPER CLEARING PROCEDURES.
• NCO SUPERVISION CONCENTRATING ON CLEARING
  PROCEDURES BUT ALSO LEADER INVOLVEMENT IN
  ENFORCEMENT OF CURRENT WEAPON STATUS.
• PMCS MUST BE CONDUCTED AND PERIODIC T/I OF ALL
  WEAPON SYSTEMS TO HIGHER LEVEL MAINTENANCE.
• LEADERS MUST REFRAIN FROM TRADING SAFETY AND
  ESTABLISHED STANDARDS FOR SPEED IN EXECUTION OF
  THE NEXT MISSION DO NOT ACCEPT SHORTCUTS.
•  
• RECOMMENDATIONS
• PORTABLE WEAPONS CLEARING CONTAINERS SHOULD BE
  PROCURED IN ORDER TO PROVIDE CLEARING BARRELS
  UPON ARRIVAL TO NEW LOCATIONS.
• THEATER LEVEL GUIDANCE SHOULD BE ISSUED THAT
  REDUCES THE REQUIREMENT TO BE CONTINUALLY GOING
  FROM RED TO GREEN SITUATION WHICH HAS CAUSED
  MOST ADs.
• REQUIREMENTS IN COMBAT ARENT TRAINED IN
  PEACETIME, CHANGE CTC REQUIREMENTS TO ACCOUNT FOR
  PROBLEMS FOUND DURING OIF.

25

• LESSONS LEARNED INDUSTRIAL CHEMICAL FIRE
  HAZARDS
• ISSUE UNIQUE SITUATIONS AROSE WHICH
  SOLDIERS/UNITS WERE NOT PREPARED TO HANDLE SUCH
  AS CHEMICAL FIRES.
• BACKGROUND DURING PRE-DEPLOYMENT, DISCUSSIONS
  WERE CONDUCTED CONCERNING OIL FIRES AND THE
  HAZARDS IF SOLDIERS HAD TO REMAIN IN PROXIMITY TO
  THE FIRES FOR ANY LENGTH OF TIME. NO RESOLUTION
  WAS FOUND.
• DISCUSSION
• OIL FIRES DID NOT OCCUR TO ANY EXTENT WHERE
  PROLONGED EXPOSURE WOULD HAVE BEEN A CONCERN.
• INDUSTRIAL CHEMICAL FIRES HAVE OCCURRED (SEE
  NEXT SLIDE) WHICH SOLDIERS WERE NOT PREPARED TO
  FIGHT OR DID NOT HAVE REQUIRED FIRE FIGHTING
  EQUIPMENT OR PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT.
• LOCAL FIRE DEPARTMENTS DID NOT HAVE ADEQUATE
  RESOURCES FOR CHEMICAL FIRES. BARRELS OF FIRE
  FIGHTING FOAM HAD TO BE SHIPPED IN.
• EQUIPMENT REQUIRED WASNT INITIALLY AVAILABLE
  DETECTOR, GAS, SULFUR DIOXIDE, 6665-01-204-8175
  RESPIRATORS IN LIEU OF OXYGEN BOTTLES WITH MASK
  (FORCED AIR TO ASSIST WITH INHALATION PROBLEMS).
• RECOMMENDATIONS
• EACH DIVISIONAL SIZE UNIT SHOULD HAVE A FIRE
  FIGHTING PACKAGE/RESPONSE KIT FOR INDUSTRIAL
  CHEMICAL FIRES OR UNKNOWN CHEMICAL
  HAZARDS/CONCERNS WHICH INCLUDES FULL RESPONSE
  SUITS AND REPLACEMENT OXYGEN BOTTLES.
• A SUPPLY OF OXYGEN MASK SYSTEMS SHOULD BE
  ESTABLISHED AS PART OF SUSTAINMENT PACKAGES (SOME
  INITIALLY SENT FORWARD WITH UNITS) AS A
  CONTINGENCY FOR OIL FIRES, CHEMICAL FIRES OR
  UNPLANNED INHALATION HAZARDS.
• FIRE FIGHTING FORCES (ARMY RESERVES) SHOULD
  RECEIVE CHEMICAL FIRE RESPONSE TRAINING AND HAVE
  MTOE CHANGED TO INCREASE CAPABILITY.

26
PROTECTIVE MASK USED FOR INHALATION PREVENTION
PURPOSES FILTER BREAKDOWN WITHIN 20 MINUTES
SULFUR FIRE
UNIQUE FIRE FIGHTING REQUIREMENTS SULFUR FIRE
(CHEMICAL FIRE) REQUIRED COOLING BY USING FIRE
FIGHTING FOAM AND BURYING TO PREVENT OXYGEN FROM
REACHING THE SULFUR. TEMPERATURES EXCEEDED 1400
DEGREES, SAND MELTED UPON CONTACT WITH THE MOLTEN
SULFUR.
MELTING SULFUR PILES
27
Propellant Fire
Stored Ammunition Fire
UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES
Ammunition Supply Point Explosion
Secondary Explosions
28

• LESSONS LEARNED UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE (UXO)
• ISSUE ENORMOUS CACHES WERE DISCOVERED THROUGHOUT
  IRAQ AND SOLDIERS WERE NOT TRAINED FOR PROPER
  HANDLING.
• BACKGROUND AS UNITS DISCOVERED IRAQI AMMUNITION
  AND ABANDONED AMMUNITION, SOLDIERS WERE REQUIRED
  TO RECOVER THE MATERIAL AND CONSOLIDATE INTO AMMO
  SUPPLY POINTS. PRIOR TRAINING HAD NOT OCCURRED
  AND HAZARDS WERE NOT KNOWN UNTIL ACCIDENTS
  OCCURRED.
• DISCUSSION
• AS THE IRAQI ARMY ABANDONED THEIR POSITIONS,
  AMMUNITION WAS LEFT BEHIND, SOME OF WHICH HAD
  BEEN DAMAGED BY FIRE OR MISHANDLING. ENORMOUS
  PILES OF PROPELLANT AND OTHER HAZARDOUS
  STOCKPILES WERE UNCOVERED DAILY.
• EOD PERSONNEL WERE IN SHORT SUPPLY SO A QUALITY
  CHECK OF MATERIALS COULD NOT BE COMPLETED IN
  ADVANCE.
• CIVILIAN PERSONNEL WOULD POINT OUT MISCELLANEOUS
  ITEMS HOWEVER, THEIR DISREGARD FOR SAFETY
  RESULTED IN THEM PICKING THE MATERIAL UP TO SHOW
  THE U.S. FORCES AND CAUSING DETONATIONS.
• A PSYOP CAMPAIGN TARGETING CIVILIANS BEGAN AS
  WELL AS TRAINING OF AMERICAN FORCES IN PROPER
  HANDLING TECHNIQUES AND USE OF EOD IN DETERMINING
  IF MATERIAL WAS SAFE FOR MOVEMENT TO DESIGNATED
  ASPs.
• RECOMMENDATIONS
• DEVELOP UXO TRAINING KITS WHICH INCLUDE ALL
  KNOWN TYPES OF EXPLOSIVES AND CONDUCT HANDLING
  PROCEDURES PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT. DESIGN DEVICES
  TO PROVIDE A SIGNATURE IF MISHANDLED.
• ADD TRANSPORTATION OF UXO IN THE MASTER DRIVERS
  AND HAZMAT TRAINING PROGRAMS FOCUSING ON
  SAFEGUARDS.
• HANDOUTS CONTAINING HAZARDS NEEDS TO BE PRODUCED
  AS A POCKET GUIDE.

29
CACHE OPERATIONS AMMUNITION SUPPLY POINTS
30
FIRE STARTED BY CIGARETTE SMOKER AMMO IN LIVING
AREA EXPLODED
PROPELLENT FIRE STARTED BY FAILURE TO FOLLOW
PROCEDURES
ASP FIRE STARTED BY BURNING HUMAN WASTE
31

• LESSONS LEARNED CACHE RECOVERY AMMUNITION
  SUPPLY POINTS (ASP)
• ISSUE ASP ESTABLISHMENT FIRES RESULTED IN
  AMMUNITION EXPLOSIONS AND SECONDARY AFFECTS.
  PROBLEM WAS COMPOUNDED BY ENORMOUS AMOUNT OF
  CACHES REQUIRING STORAGE.
• BACKGROUND CACHES WERE TRANSPORTED TO OLD IRAQI
  AMMUNITION STORAGE FACILITIES OVERLOADING THE
  CAPACITY AND AUTHORIZED EXPLOSIVE LIMITS. FIRES
  STARTED AS A RESULT OF CIGARETTE SMOKING AND
  BURNING OF TRASH/HUMAN WASTE WHICH SPREAD TO
  AMMUNITION STORAGE POINTS WHICH WERE NOT PROPERLY
  PREPARED FOR STORAGE OF AMMUNITION.
• DISCUSSION
• GUIDANCE IN ARMY PUBLICATIONS IS VERY TECHNICAL.
  GUIDANCE IS OFTEN CONFLICTING AND IMPRACTICAL
  FOR FIELD OPERATIONS.
• AMMUNITION HOLDING AREAS COULD NOT BE INITIALLY
  BUILT DUE TO CONTINUAL MOVEMENT OF FORCES AND
  FORCE PROTECTION CONCERNS UPON INITIAL ARRIVAL TO
  LOCATIONS. QRF AND UNITS BASIC LOADS WERE PLACED
  INTO BUNKERS AND OTHER HARD STANDS WHERE SOLDIERS
  RESIDED. EXISTING FACILITIES DID NOT MEET U.S.
  STANDARDS.
• TRASH AND HUMAN WASTE BURNING WAS REQUIRED
  RESULTING IN HOT EMBERS BEING BLOWN OR WIND
  FLAMING FUEL IN THE HUMAN WASTE RECEPTACLES,
  IGNITING GRASS AND OTHER FLAMMABLE MATERIALS,
  WHICH SPREAD TO STORED AMMUNITION LOCATIONS.
• RECOMMENDATIONS
• DESIGN A QUICK GUIDE TO ESTABLISHMENT OF
  TEMPORARY AMMUNITION SUPPLY POINTS WHICH EXPLAINS
  THE BASIC SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS.
• PROVIDE TABLES OF EXPLOSIVE QUANTITIES BASED ON
  NORMAL BASIC LOADS FOR VARIOUS PLATOON ELEMENTS,
  SUCH AS A BRADLEY PLATOON, INFANTRY PLATOON,
  ETC., TO INCLUDE COMPATABILITY GUIDANCE.
• PRODUCE A COMPATABILITY GUIDE BASED ON IRAQI AND
  FOREIGN AMMUNITION DISCOVERED DURING OPERATION
  IRAQI FREEDOM.

32
IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES
33

• LESSONS LEARNED IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES
  (IED).
• ISSUE NUMEROUS SOLDIERS HAVE BEEN INJURED AND
  VEHICLES DESTROYED BY IED.
• BACKGROUND DURING STABILITY AND SUPPORT
  OPERATIONS, USE OF IED BY THREAT FORCES INCREASED
  IN EFFECTIVENESS. FORCE PROTECTION WAS INCREASED
  THROUGH INITIATIVES TO HARDEN VEHICLES.
• DISCUSSION
• SOLDIERS WERE NOT TRAINED ON REACTION TO IED
  THREATS.
• VEHICLES CANNOT WITH STAND THE BLASTS WITHOUT
  CHANGES/HARDENING OF THE FLOORS AND SIDES.
• INITIATIVES HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO INCREASE OVERALL
  FORCE PROTECTION BUT ADDITIONAL MODIFICATIONS TO
  THE FAMILY OF MILITARY VEHICLES IS REQUIRED.
• RECOMMENDATIONS
• INCORPORATE AN EXPLOSIVE HAZARDS TRAINING COURSE
  AS PREDEPLOYMENT MANDATORY TRAINING.
• PROVIDE UNITS WITH A TRAINING KIT CONTAINING
  KNOWN IED THAT CAN SIMULATE EXPLODING IF
  MISHANDLED.
• INCORPORATE IED THREATS INTO ALL PHASES OF CTC
  TRAINING. IED MUST BE DESIGNED TO DETONATE
  EITHER SMOKE OR OTHER SIMULATED EFFECTS IN ORDER
  TO PRODUCE RECOGNITION EFFECTS.
• DESIGN STEEL, TITANIUM PLATING OR BALLESTIC
  BLANKET KITS FOR EACH SPECIFIC MILITARY VEHICLE.
• PLACE BALLESTIC PROOF GLASS IN WINDSHIELDS OF
  VEHICLES.
• REPLACE ALL DOORS OR ADD TO EXISTING DOORS, A
  SCREEN MESH WHICH PROVIDES A STAND OFF FOR RPGs
  OR OTHER DEVICES WHICH NORMALLY EXPLODE WITHIN
  THE VEHICLE.
• REPLACE CS AND CSS HMMWVS WITH UP ARMORED HMMWVS
  FOR INCREASED PROTECTION.

34
ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS
REAR-END COLLISIONS
CONVOY OPERATIONS
VISIBILITY
ROLLOVERS
35
LESSONS LEARNED CONVOY OPERATIONS

• ISSUE NUMEROUS WRECKS AND ROLLOVERS OCCURRED
  DURING MOVEMENT THROUGH IRAQ DURING AND AFTER
  COMBAT OPERATIONS.
• BACKGROUND VEHICLE ACCIDENTS STARTED WITH
  ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGES THAT THE DRIVERS WERE NOT
  PREPARED FOR SUCH AS ROUGH TERRAIN, DUST
  OBSCURING VISION AND DAYS OF TRAVEL OVER LONG
  DISTANCES.
• DISCUSSION
• DRIVING HAZARDS EXISTED WHICH DRIVERS WERE NOT
  PREPARED FOR SUCH AS CROSS COUNTRY TRAVEL THROUGH
  THE DESERT, CREVICES, RAVINES, AND WASHOUTS,
  EXTREME DUST CONDITIONS LIMITING VISIBILITY, AND
  EXTENSIVE NIGHT DRIVING.
• ACCIDENT REPORTS INDICATE THE CAUSE FACTORS FOR
  MOST ACCIDENTS WERE FOLLOWING TOO CLOSE FOR
  ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS, SPEED LIMITING REACTION
  TIME, LIMITED VISIBILITY AND FAILURE TO ADJUST
  VEHICLE SPACING, STOPPING IN THE MIDDLE OF A DUST
  CLOUD RESULTING IN REAR END COLLISIONS.
• NUMEROUS VEHICLES REAR ENDED EACH OTHER OR
  ROLLED OVER IN DUST CONDITIONS. CONVOYS WERE
  PASSING EACH OTHER CREATING ADDITIONAL HAZARDS IN
  THE ENVIRONMENT.
• RECOMMENDATIONS
• BUILD DRIVING COURSES AT ALL CTCs DESIGNED TO
  DUPLICATE ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS FOUND IN
  DESERT TYPE ENVIRONMENTS. INCLUDE RUBBER
  VEHICLES OR HAZARDS THAT WILL NOT DAMAGE MILITARY
  EQUIPMENT IF COLLISIONS OCCUR.
• MASTER DRIVERS PROGRAM MUST BE EXPANDED TO
  REQUIRE SOLDIERS TO NEGOTIATE HAZARD TYPE
  COURSES.
• DRIVERS MUST GAIN EXPERIENCE IN BASE CAMP
  SURROUNDING AREAS PRIOR TO EXECUTING COMBAT
  DRIVING (IF TIME PERMITS).

36
INEXPERIENCED DRIVER SPEED, OVER BRAKING LOOSE
CARGO 3 FATALITIES, 6 INJURED
IMPROPER TOWING PROCEDURES COMBINED WITH SPEED 1
FATALITY
ACCIDENTS
FOLLOWING TOO CLOSE FOR CONDITIONS STOPPING IN
DUST 2 VEHICLES TOTAL LOSS
UNFAMILIAR TERRAIN SPEED 3 INJURED
37
37
LESSONS LEARNED DRIVING IN IRAQ

• ISSUE SOLDIERS WERE NOT TRAINED FOR
  ENVIRONMENT NOR TRAFFIC HAZARDS ASSOCIATED WITH
  DRIVING IN IRAQ OR THE CITIES.
• BACKGROUND VEHICLE ACCIDENTS STARTED WITH
  ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGES THAT THE DRIVERS WERE NOT
  PREPARED FOR AND CULMINATED WITH CLAIMS BY
  CITIZENS POINTED TO THE U.S. MILITARY AS THE
  CAUSE OF VEHICLE ACCIDENTS, MANEUVER DAMAGE, AND
  PEDESTRIAN ACCIDENTS.
• DISCUSSION
• DRIVING HAZARDS SUCH AS LIVESTOCK, CHILDREN,
  BROKEN DOWN VEHICLES, VEHICLES TRAVELING ON THE
  WRONG SIDE OF THE ROAD, OR VEHICLES DRIVING AT
  NIGHT WITHOUT HEADLIGHTS ARE A COMMON OCCURRENCE.
• ACCIDENT REPORTS INDICATE THE CAUSE FACTORS FOR
  MOST ACCIDENTS ARE DRIVING TOO FAST FOR
  THE ROAD CONDITIONS FOLLOWING TOO CLOSE TO THE
  VEHICLE IN FRONT DRIVER IMPAIRMENT SUCH AS
  FATIGUE, MEDICATION, EXPERIENCE, OVERCONFIDENCE,
  AND ATTITUDE.
• COMBAT OPERATIONS RESULTED IN SOLDIERS
  RESPONDING WITHOUT ADHERENCE TO LOCAL TRAFFIC
  LAWS. POPULACE OBSERVED AND MIMICKED DRIVING
  HABITS OF SOLDIERS.
• IRAQ DOES NOT HAVE A DRIVING PROGRAM PEOPLE
  ARE SELF TAUGHT AND ARE ONLY REQUIRED TO PASS AN
  EYE TEST, PROVE THEY CAN READ ARABIC AND HAVE A
  FORM OF ID.
• RECOMMENDATIONS
• EXPAND THE MASTER DRIVERS PROGRAM TO ACCOUNT
  FOR LESSONS LEARNED IN THE MIDDLE EAST.
• DEVELOP A FILM WHICH DEMONSTRATES THE UNIQUE
  ASPECTS OF MIDDLE EASTERN DRIVING.
• DEVELOP A DRIVING SITUATION AT CTCs WHICH
  REQUIRES NEGOTIATING OBSTACLES EQUIVALENT TO
  THOSE FOUND OVERSEAS.

38
LESSONS LEARNED HEAT INJURIES

• ISSUE HEAT INJURIES RESULTED IN SOLDIER
  HOSPITALIZATION, LOST TIME AND DEATH.
• BACKGROUND LACK OF ACCLIMATIZATION AND FAILURE
  TO PLAN FOR OR EXECUTE REST AND WORK CYCLES
  RESULTED IN NUMEROUS HOT WEATHER INJURIES.
• DISCUSSION
• COMBAT ACTIONS AND FORCE PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS
  FOUND SOLDIERS WORKING IN EXTREME HEAT WHILE
  WEARING IMPROVED BODY ARMOR, KEVLAR AND OTHER
  PROTECTIVE ITEMS IN TEMPERATURES REACHING ABOVE
  120 DEGREES.
• SOLDIERS WERE NOT ALWAYS PROVIDED A PERIOD OF
  ACCLIMATIZATION OR HAD VARIED PERIODS OF
  ACCLIMATIZATION UPON ARRIVAL TO THEATER.
• SOLDIERS DEHYDRATION SLOWLY PROGRESSED OVER A
  PERIOD OF DAYS DUE TO INADEQUATE PRE-HYDRATING
  PRIOR TO MISSIONS. IMPROVED LIVING CONDITIONS
  WERE ALSO DETRIMENTAL TO HYDRATION DUE TO
  AVAILABILITY OF WATER ALTERNATIVES, A SENSE OF
  WELL BEING FROM SLEEPING LIVING IN COOLER
  ENVIRONMENTS AND ACCESS TO SUGAR/CAFFIENE
  PRODUCTS.
• MEDICAL LITERATURE LEADS ONE TO BELIEVE THAT THE
  SYMPTOMS OF HEAT INJURIES ARE PROGRESSIVE
  HOWEVER, THE HIGH TEMPERATURES COMBINED WITH THE
  EQUIPMENT WORN RESULTED IN HEAT STROKE EVEN
  THOUGH SOLDIERS WERE PROFUSELY SWEATING.
• RECOMMENDATIONS
• DEVELOP AND INCORPORATE UNIT IN-PROCESSING
  PROCEDURES TO DETERMINE PRE-EXISTING CONDITIONS
  ON ALL SOLDIERS ARRIVING TO THEATER AND PLAN FOR
  DOCUMENTATION IN THE INDIVIDUALS TEMPORARY
  MEDICAL RECORD, ALL TREATMENT RENDERED.
• UNITS CONDUCT TRAINING AND WORK AS PER GUIDANCE
  RECOMMENDED IN GTA 5-8-12 (WORK/REST/WATER
  CONSUMPTION TABLES)
• MANDATE A PERIOD OF ACCLIMATIZATION PRIOR TO
  ARRIVAL IN THEATER.
• ENSURE MEDICAL LITERATURE ADDRESSES THE
  POSSIBILITY OF HEAT STROKE ONSET WITHOUT HAVING
  CRAMPS OR OTHER LESSER HEAT SYMPTOMS.

39

• LESSONS LEARNED BURNING OF HUMAN WASTE/TRASH
• ISSUE SEVERAL INJURIES WERE INCURRED AND FIRES
  STARTED AS A RESULT OF MOGAS USED FOR BURNING
  HUMAN WASTE AND TRASH.
• BACKGROUND ABOVE GROUND BURNING FOR HUMAN WASTE
  AND TRASH IGNITED GRASS AND OTHER FLAMMABLE
  OBJECTS WHEN WIND CAUGHT THE FLAMES.
• DISCUSSION
• MOGAS AS A FIRE STARTER OR IN COMBINATION WITH
  JP8 FOR BURNING OF HUMAN WASTE SHOULD BE
  ELIMINATED.
• ADDITIONAL FUEL ADDED TO ALREADY BURNING FIRES
  OR FAILURE TO ALLOW BURN PITS TO COOL BEFORE
  ADDING ADDITIONAL FUEL RESULTED IN FLASH FIRES.
• FIRE PREVENTION CONTROLS AND ADEQUATE FIRE
  FIGHTING EQUIPMENT WAS NOT PRESENT AT FUEL
  SOURCES.
• MAJORITY OF FIRES RESULTING IN SEVERE BURNS
  OCCURRED DURING UNSUPERVISED OPERATIONS WHERE
  SOLDIERS ADDED ADDITIONAL FUEL TO HOT PITS OR
  WASTE CANS.
• THE AMOUNT OF BURNABLE TRASH ACCUMULATED EXCEEDS
  ABILITY TO TRANSPORT WITH UNITS RESULTING IN
  DISPOSABLE ALONG ROUTES OR BURNS PRIOR TO
  MOVEMENT.
• RECOMMENDATIONS
• ELIMINATE REQUIREMENTS FOR USING FUEL AS A BURN
  PRODUCT THROUGH DEVELOPMENT OF PORTABLE DEVICES.
• DESIGN/PRODUCE A COMPACT LATRINE FACILITY WHICH
  USES DISPOSABLE BAGS (SEAT WITH FOLDING TRIPOD
  LEGS) FOR HUMAN WASTE. POP UP POLE SUPPORT
  SYSTEM WITH CURTAIN CAN PROVIDE A QUICK MEANS OF
  PRIVACY IF REQUIRED.
• PROVIDE LITERATURE ON PROPER MEANS OF TRASH
  BURNING INCLUDE PIT SIZES AND SAFEGUARDS BUT
  ELIMINATE MOGAS AS PART OF THE SOLUTION. ALSO
  RECOMMEND FIRE FIGHTING PROTECTION SUCH AS FIRE
  EXTINGUISHERS, SHOVELS, WATER ETC.

40
BROWNOUT ACCIDENTS
HARD STAND MITIGATES BROWNOUT
41

• LESSONS LEARNED BROWN OUT CONDITIONS
• ISSUE SEVERAL AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS OCCURRED AS A
  RESULT OF BROWNOUT CONDITIONS.
• BACKGROUND AREAS REQUIRING AIR OPERATIONS
  CONSISTED OF DESERT REGIONS CONTAINING LOOSE
  POWDERED DIRT RESULTING IN ENORMOUS BROWNOUT
  AREAS AND LOSS OF VISIBILITY.
• DISCUSSION
• ALTERNATE LANDING SITES PROVIDING A HARD STAND
  COULD NOT BE FOUND DURING CERTAIN PHASES OF THE
  OPERATION.
• DUST MITIGATION BASED ON LESSONS LEARNED FAILED,
  SUCH AS FUEL POURED ON LANDING PADS. INITIALLY
  EFFECTIVE BUT AFTER ONE OR TWO LANDINGS, PROBLEM
  RETURNED.
• MOBI-MATTING WAS NOT AVAILABLE UPON INITIAL
  INSERTION OF FORCES.
• CRUSHED ROCK PROVIDED A TEMPORARY SOLUTION
  HOWEVER, NOT FEASIBLE FOR SHORT DURATION
  OCCUPATIONS.
• AH64 COMBAT LOADS EXCEEDED WEIGHT NORMALLY
  TRAINED CREATING ADDITIONAL COMPLICATIONS.
• PILOTS HAD TO ENSURE THEY WOULD LAND AGAINST THE
  WIND IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN CONTROL.
• NUMEROUS GO AROUNDS HAD TO BE EXECUTED WHEN
  FLYING IN STICKS.
• RECOMMENDATIONS
• DEVELOP A ROLL OUT MATTING WHICH CAN BE
  TEMPORARILY USED UNTIL A FIXED SITE IS REQUIRED.
• SELECT HARD STAND LZ/PZs WHEN FEASIBLE.
• IMMEDIATELY HARDEN FARPS, LZs AND PZs WITH
  MOBI-MATTING WHEN PRO-LONGED OPERATIONAL
  REQUIREMENTS WARRANT.

42

• LESSONS LEARNED FIRE EXTINGUISHERS/FIRE
  OPERATIONS
• ISSUE PROPER FIRE EXTINGUISHERS WERE NOT
  SHIPPED OR AVAILABLE IN SUFFICIENT QUANTITIES
  ONCE IN COUNTRY.
• BACKGROUND DURING PRE-DEPLOYMENT, DIFFICULTIES
  IN SHIPPING OF FIRE EXTINGUISHERS (NON-VEHICLE
  EXTINGUISHERS) RESULTED IN DECISIONS AT THE UNIT
  LEVEL NOT TO SHIP THEM.
• DISCUSSION
• FIRE EXTINGUISHERS SHOULD HAVE BEEN COLLECTED
  (UNITS) AND TAKEN TO THE HAZMAT PHARMACY TO BE
  PACKAGED IN STANDARD HAZMAT MATERIAL. UNITS DID
  NOT SEE A NEED FOR NON-VEHICLE EXTINGUISHERS
  DURING PREPARATION.
• REPLACEMENT EXTINGUISHERS OF SUFFICIENT
  QUANTITIES AND TYPES WERE NOT AVAILABLE IN MIDDLE
  EASTERN COUNTRIES. FIRE EXTINGUISHER ORDERING
  THROUGH ULLs WAS POSSIBLE BUT RECEIPT OF THE
  ORDERED ITEMS WAS EXTREMELY SLOW.
• OTHER FIRING FIGHTING EQUIPMENT WAS NOT
  AVAILABLE TO SUPPLEMENT FIRE EXTINGUISHERS
  RESULTING IN LARGE LOSSES OF VEHICLES AND
  EQUIPMENT.
• EXPERIENCE IN USING FIRE EXTINGUISHERS WAS
  LACKING, SEVERAL REQUIRED DURING FIRE FIGHTING
  DUE TO INEFFECTIVE USE BY THE OPERATOR.
• RECOMMENDATIONS
• USE THE INSTALLATION HAZMAT PHARMACY TO
  PREPACKAGE EXTINGUISHERS IN SUFFICIENT QUANTITIES
  TO COVER TENTS AND FACILITIES IF OCCUPIED.
• PREDETERMINE REQUIREMENTS FOR FIRE FIGHTING AS
  PART OF THE RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS AND SHIP AS
  PART OF A SUSTAINMENT PACKAGE.
• AVIATION UNITS PREPARE AND SHIP BAMBI BUCKETS
  (CHINOOK CAPABLE AT 2000 GALLON DROPS/UH60 AT 660
  GALLONS) TO FIGHT GRASS, TREE, OTHER LARGE FIRES.
  
• ATTACH/OPCON FIRE FIGHTING DEPARTMENTS (RESERVE
  UNITS) TO ACTIVE DUTY UNITS AS PART OF THE
  DIVISION DEPLOYMENT PACKAGE.

43

• LESSONS LEARNED- TRAINING SOLDIERS
•  
• ISSUE
• SAFETY CHALLENGE GETTING THE WORD TO THE
  SOLDIER IN A WAY THAT CATCHES THEIR ATTENTION.
• BACKGROUND
• NUMEROUS CLASSES WERE CONDUCTED DURING SAFETY
  STAND DOWNS USING CHARTS, VIDEO, AND BRIEFINGS.
  FEEDBACK INDICATES SOLDIERS ATTENTION SPAN
  DECLINED DRAMATICALLY AND THE INTENT OF THE
  CLASSES MAY NOT HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED.
• DISCUSSION
• CURRENT METHODS OF TRAINING ARE NOT CAPTURING
  THE ATTENTION OF THE SOLDIERS TO THE EXTENT
  REQUIRED TO MITIGATE SAFETY CONCERNS.
• HANDS ON TRAINING HAS MORE EFFECT THAN OTHER
  METHODS.
• ATTENTION GETTER POSTERS HAVE EFFECTS IF TOO
  MUCH DETAIL IS NOT PROVIDED.
• RECOMMENDATION
• DEVELOP AS MUCH HANDS ON TRAINING AS POSSIBLE.
• BUILD PORTABLE TRAINING KITS FOR AMMUNITION
  HANDLING, EXPLOSIVES, IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE
  DEVICES.
• ENSURE VIDEOS USE UP TO DATE AND REAL WORLD
  INFORMATION WHICH NOT ONLY EXPLAINS WHAT MAY GO
  WRONG BUT SHOWS ACTUAL ACCIDENTS OR SCENES WHICH
  DEMONSTRATE THE EFFECTS.

44
RECAP OF PRESENTATION RECOMMENDATIONS

1. REVISE ACCIDENT REPORTING REQUIREMENTS TO PROVIDE
   FLEXIBILITY.
2. OES AND NCOES COURSES SHOULD BE REVIEWED FOR
   SAFETY INFORMATION CONTENT.
3. CONDUCT A REVIEW OF DA PAM 690-47 PUBLISH A
   ONE SOURCE DOCUMENT.
4. FUND SAFETY OFFICES IN ORDER TO PROVIDE SAFETY
   SPECIALISTS TO THE BCT LEVEL AND PROVIDE FOR
   TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATION ASSETS.
5. TRAIN AND WORK ASADS WITH THE UNIT THEYLL
   SUPPORT ON DEPLOYMENTS.
6. DEVELOP A PUBLICATION EXPLAINING THE ROLE OF THE
   SAFETY SPECIALIST.
7. SUPPORT THE FORCE PROTECTION INITIATIVES BY
   FINDING VIABLE WAYS TO MITIGATE SAFETY CONCERNS
   WITH SEATING, GUN MOUNTS, SEATBELTS, SPARE TIRE
   KITS AND TIRE MOUNTING DEVICES.
8. HOLD A FORUM TO DISCUSS MITIGATION MEASURES FOR
   SPECIFIC AREAS SUCH AS ACCIDENTAL DISCHARGES,
   FIRE AND EXPLOSIVE HAZARDS.
9. PROVIDE SUPPORT TO ENHANCE FIRE FIGHTING
   CAPABILITY OF DEPLOYING UNITS.
10. DEVELOP AND ISSUE TRAINING KITS FOR EXPLOSIVE AND
    IED TRAINING ALONG WITH SIMPLIFIED POCKET GUIDES
    FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF AMMO SUPPLY POINTS.
11. ASSIST IN INCREASING SAFETY BY DESIGNING VEHICLE
    KITS FOR BALLESTIC PROTECTION.
12. DEVELOP ADDITIONAL TRAINING AREAS AND
    REQUIREMENTS AT COMBAT TRAINING CENTERS TO
    PROVIDE DRIVING AND FLYING EXPERIENCE IN
    DIFFERENT ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS.
13. ENHANCE THE MASTER DRIVERS PROGRAM TO ADD IN
    LESSONS LEARNED DURING OIF.
14. DO ADDITIONAL RESEARCH ON HEAT INJURIES AND
    REVISE PUBLISHED LITERATURE AS REQUIRED.
15. CONTINUE TO FIND WAYS TO GET THE WORD TO THE
    SOLDIER IN A MANNER THAT ENHANCES REMEMBERANCE OF
    THE MAIN POINTS.

45
QUESTIONS?