Title: Functionalism
1Functionalism
- Albert Parker
- May 3, 2001
2Two Camps
- Dualist
- Mind is formal and abstract
- Substance two radically different kinds of
substances in the universe material objects and
immaterial minds (Descartes) - Property - two radically different kinds of
properties in the universe material properties
(like weight) and immaterial properties (like
pain)
- Materialist
- Mind is the wet and slimy stuff in our heads
- Behaviorism mind reduces behavior or
dispositions to behavior - Physicalism mental states are brain states
- Functionalism mental states are defined by
causal relations - Strong AI minds are programs implemented in
computers
- (Searle MLS, p46-7 and SA 31)
3How do we observe the mind?
- Dualists Problem Metaphysical Gap
- The mind can be observed through introspection.
It is just the minds of others that cannot be
observed. - Materialists Problem Leibniz Gap
- It must be confessed, moreover, that perception,
and that which depends on it, are inexplicable by
mechanical causes, that is, by figures and
motions. And supposing that there were a
mechanism so constructed as to think, feel and
have perception, we might enter into it as into a
mill. And this granted, we should find only on
visiting it, pieces which push one against
another, but never anything by which to explain a
perception. This must be sought in the simple
substance, and not in the composite or in the
machine (CMB, Cummins 4)
Analysis of consciousness bogged down for lack of
analytical tools! (Psychology crippled and
behaviorism was spawned by taking the mind out of
psychology) (6-7)
4What to do?
- For the materialist, Functionalism provides a
bridge over the Leibniz gap Mental states are
defined in terms of their abstract causal roles
within the wider information processing system.
A given mental state is characterized in terms of
its abstract causal relations to environmental
input, to other internal states and to output
(Churchland, NP, 351). - Example 1 Pump is a functional kind, being
implemented by hearts, propellor and case,
vibrator and one-way valve, centrifuges, piston
and sleeve arrangements (MBC, Cummmins 7). - Example 2 Mouse Trap is a functional kind, being
implemented by spring traps, cage traps, a sack
of grain attached to a trip wire, a cat or
specially bred killer rat - Example 3 Being in pain is a state carried out
characterized by its causal relations to - behavior wincing and crying out
- external input skin being burned
- other internal states the desire to make the
pain go away and belief of what will bring
relief. - Functional kinds are specified by their roles and
- not by the material in which they are
instantiated. (Churchland, NP, 351).
5How does Functionalism Deal with the Leibniz Gap?
- Functionalism mental concepts are revealed
through function not in terms of intrinsic
features. That is, deal with function, to heck
with the form. - Leibniz Gap occurs because function cant be read
from form - Hence, Functionalism is a bridge over the Gap.
- trying to understand perception by studying
only neurons is like trying to understand bird
flight by studying only feathers (Marr 27) - once we have explained the causal basis of
consciousness in terms of the firing of neurons
in the various cortical layers, it seems we still
have a phenomenon left over (Searle MLS, p55)
6Whose Idea was this?
- Emile Durkheim created the functional orientation
by codifing the distinction of structure and
function in the social sciences. He published
his functional analysis in a number of empirical
studies - The Division of Labor in Society (1893)
- The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (1912)
- Durkheim recognized the potential problems
of functionalism that critics like John Searle
and Patricia Churchland still espouse today in
reaction to neurophilosophical functionalism -
- To discover the need that a structure
functions to meet does not necessarily reveal its
cause - the sequence of events that created the
structure in the first place. To assume it does
puts the cart before the horse. (Turner 17) - J. Dewey The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology
(1896) is the opening shot of Functionalism in
Psychology (Bergmann 678). - H. Putnam Minds and Machines in Dimensions of
the Mind (1960) was the first to argue that minds
are things that we can conceive solely in terms
of input, output, and various functional
relations. (Hardcastle 2-3)
7Some Functionalist Achievements
- von Neumann architecture (1943-1957) Still used
in todays desk-tops, lap-tops, calculators and
palm pilots that grace every office and half the
homes in America (von Neumann xii) - Barlows First Dogma (1972) A description of
that activity of a single nerve cell which is
transmitted to and influences other nerve cells
and of a nerve cells response to such influences
from other cells, is a complete enough
description for a functional understanding of the
nervous system (Barlow 380) - Theory of the Cellebar Cortex (1969) This
regular - cortical structure is interpreted as a
simple but powerful memorizing - device for learning motor skills (Marr
14)
8 something was going wrong
- I was myself caught up in this excitement (of
the 60s). Truth, I also believed, was
basically neutral, and the central aim of all
research was a thorough functional analysis of
the structure of the central nervous system the
way seemed clear but somewhere underneath,
something was going wrong the cerebellar study
suggested that one could hope to understand
cortical structure in functional terms but at
the same time it did not much enlighten one
about the motor system - it did not, for example,
tell one how to go about programming a mechanical
arm (Marr 14-15) - Functionalism looks nice on paper to those who
know nothing about how brains work. (Freeman
115). - Functionalism is merely the last gasp of
classical psychology. (Bergmann 678) - The functionalist strategem is a smoke screen
for the preservation of error and confusion It
needs to be revealed for the shortsighted and
reactionary position it is. (MBC, Churchland
506-7) - If you are tempted to functionalism, I believe
you do not need refutation, you need help.
(Searle, TRM, 9)
9Whats wrong with Functionalism?
- ABSURDITIES CAN BE DEFENDED for example,
alchemy, in the face of elemental chemistry, can
be defended using the functionalist stratagem,
thusly - Ensouled in mercury or sulphur is an
abstract functional state. Mercury, for
example, actually refers to the disposition to
reflect light,to liquefy under heat, to unite
with other matter, etc. (these are functional
kinds). It is the total syndrome of occurent and
causal properties of a metal or substance that
matters, not the corpuscularian details of the
substrate (function matters, not the
implementation). Alchemy, it is concluded,
comprehends a level of organization in reality
that is distinct from, and irreducible to, the
organization found at the level of corpuscularian
chemistry. (MBC Churchland 507). - NEED DETAILS! - the success of implementing
Neural Networks illustrates that an elementary
understanding of brain microstructure funds a
fertile conception of what cognition really is.
(MBC Churchland 198) - QUALIA can not be reduced to something else,
because if you could they would be something
else, and they are not something else. (Searle,
RM 51)
10Lets Patch This Up!
- Oceans of Ink have been spilled in the debate
over functionalism (Hasker 29) - Valerie Hardcastle Functionalism is neither
very strong nor very controversial. - Jaegwon Kim global reductionism is not possible,
but some local reductions are qualia are
intrinsic properties if anything is, and to
functionalize them is to eliminate them as
intrinsic properties. (Hardcastle 29). - Elliot Sober Functionalism got off on the wrong
foot. The problem is that function is ambiguous
(97)
11New Paradigm or Paradigm Shift?
- John Searle Most of the recently fashioned
materialist concepts of the mind such as
behaviorism, functionalism and physicalism end
up denying that there are any such things as
minds as we ordinarily think of them Now, why
do they do that? (MBS 15). (We need to stop
using) the antique and obsolete vocabulary of
mental and physical, mind and body (MLS
47). Any satisfactory account of the mind must
take into account consciousness, intentionality,
subjectivity, and mental causation (MBS 17). - Reactions Many of them, especially
the younger - generation, agree with me, but I am amazed
at the - number and vehemence of the defenders (SA
29) - David Marr Almost never can a complex system of
any - kind be understood as a simple
extrapolation from the - properties of the individual components
(there are three) - levels at which an information processing
device must be understood (24-5)
Computational Theory What is goal of computation
and logic of the strategy?
Representation and algorithm What is
representation of the input and output and the
algorithm map?
Hardware Implementation How are the
representation and the algorithm realized
physically?
12My Take
- Cummins states that if a theory is any good, it
must be explanative in and of itself. Some
functionalist defenses to attacks sound like the
non-intuitive hook-hook argument illustrated on
page 3 of MBC handout. - Functionalism has problems in its pure form
(everything is function, defined in terms of
inputs and outputs). NOTE The new paradigms
presented here (at least Marrs) have
functionalist components. - Searles paradigm may be a new one. Marrs is
a shift.
13References
- H. B. Barlow. Single snits and sensation a
neural doctrine for perceptual psycology?
Perception 1. - G. Bergmann. The Contribution of John B.
Watson. J. M. Scher editor. Theories of the
Mind. The Free Press. New York, 1962. - P. S. Churchland. Neurophilosophy. The MIT
Press. Cambridge, 1986. - R. Cummins and D. D. Cummins. Minds Brains and
Computers The Foundations of Cognitive Science.
Blackwell Publishers. Malden, MA, 2000. - W. J. Freeman and C. A. Skarda. Mind/Brain
Science Neuroscience on Philosophy of Mind. E.
Lepore and R. V. Gulick editors. John Searle and
His Critics. Basil Blackwell. Cambridge, 1991. - V. Hardcastle. How to Build a Theory in
Cognitive Science. State University of New York
Press. New York, 1996. - W. Hasker. The Emergent Self. Cornell
University Press. Ithaca, 1999. - D. Marr. Vision. W.H. Freeman and Company. New
York, 1982. - J. von Neumann. The Computer and the Brain.
Yale University Press. New Haven, 2000. - J. Searle. Is the Brains Mind a Computer
Program?. Scientific American. Jan 1990, p
118. - J. Searle. Minds, Brains and Science. Harvard
University Press. Cambridge, 1984. - J. Searle. Mind, Language, and Society. Basic
Books. New York, 1998. - J. Searle. Rediscovery of the Mind.. The MIT
Press. Cambridge, 1992. - E. Sober. Putting the Function Back into
Functionalism. W. G. Lycan editor. Mind and
Cognition. Basil Blackwell. Cambridge, 1990. - J. H. Turner and A. Maryanski. Functionalism.
The Benjamin/Cummings Publishing Company. Menlo
Park, CA, 1979.