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Get Big Fast

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Describes how the top management team ... In 1978 TCI played an important role in HBO's early success. TCI started providing HBO to 700,000 of its subscribers. ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Get Big Fast


1

Tele-Communication, Inc
2
TELE-COMMUNICATIONS, INC.
  • ACCELERATING DIGITAL DEPLOYMENT

3
Overview
  • Introduction
  • Company History
  • Goals and Strategies
  • GBF??
  • 20-20 Hindsight

4
Introduction
  • Describes how the top management team at
    Tele-Communications, Inc. (TCI), the largest U.S.
    cable company, conceived and implemented a
    dramatic operational turnaround and a radical new
    technology strategy over an18-month period
    beginning in late 1996.
  • The problem is whether to move to digital
    converters (first or second generation) to
    response to market pressures and move into the
    ISP market

5
TCIs History Facts
  • TCI was founded in 1956 by Bob Magness, an
    Oklahoma cottonseed salesman and part-time
    rancher.
  • In 1970 the company was taken public.
  • In 1978 TCI played an important role in HBOs
    early success. TCI started providing HBO to
    700,000 of its subscribers.
  • In early 1980s TCI expanded by acquiring suburban
    and small town cable systems.
  • In 1990s the company expanded to the UK and other
    international markets.

6
TCIs History Facts
  • TCIs managers had long been prolific deal
    makers between 1973 and 1994 the company had
    completed 650 acquisitions, divestitures, and
    joint ventures.
  • IN 1993 TCI collaborated with Microsoft. Also in
    1994, the company and three other large MSOs
    joined Sprint in a joint venture called Spectrum.

7
TCIs History Facts
  • By year end of 1996 they wanted to expedite the
    deployment of first-generation digital
    converters.
  • In 1996 the largest US cable system operator.
    With 14 million subscribers.
  • TCI diversified beyond its core US cable system
    business by investing in programming,
    telecommunications services, direct to home
    satellite broadcasting, and international cable
    television businesses.
  • TCI also invested in joint ventures that employed
    digital technologies to deliver new
    telecommunications services

8
UBIQUITOUS DEPLOYMENT OF ADVANCED DIGITAL
CONVERTERS
  • Cost of advanced digital converter in 1999 300
  • Less cost of advanced analog converter in 1999
    150
  • Less value of gi warrants/converter 40
  • Equals incremental cost/converter of accelerated
    deployment in 1999 110
  • 1999 advanced digital converter penetration of
    basic subscriber base with accelerated
    deployment 80 of 14 million basic subs 11.2
    million advanced digital subs
  • 1999 advanced digital converter penetration of
    basic subscriber base under business as usual
    scenario, i.e., Deploying converters only for
    customers that respond to solicitations 20, or
    2.8 million subs
  • So, incremental capital cost is 110/converter x
    8.4 million subs 924 million
  • Can TCI create that much value?

9
Key Stakeholders
  • Customers
  • 94 Million households had access to cable in 1996
    (97 of all households in US)
  • 68 market penetration
  • Regulatory
  • FCC, PUCs, Municipal Governments
  • 1996 1998 Telecommunications Acts
  • Judicial (Anti-trust)

10
Key Stakeholders
  • Management
  • John Malone, CEO
  • Leo Hindery, COO
  • Donne Fisher, CFO
  • Investors

11
Managing Strategy at TCI
  • TCI had evolved into a large global company. The
    companys top management had to attend to
    multiple markets, including cable systems, cable
    programming, telephony, DHT satellite
    broadcasting, and Internet services.
  • It was critical for the company to establish and
    revise strategic priorities.

12
Managing Strategy at TCI
  • TCIs CEO Malone had an exceptionally strong and
    flexible intellect. In meetings he verbalized his
    thought processes not just conclusions.
  • Compared with many CEOs, Malone was more secure
    in his position and therefore more willing to act
    decisively in the face of uncertainty. He owned a
    large block of TCI stock and controlled 40 of
    shareholder votes in late 1997.

13
Trouble in Late 1996
  • In late 1996 TCI reported an unexpected loss of
    70,000 subscribers, due largely to competition
    from DHT services.
  • TCI also had deterioration in the spread between
    their pricing and programming costs. The company
    became dysfunctional.
  • Changes
  • After analyzing TCIs margins, Malone set a goal
    of cutting SGA costs by 100 million through a
    workforce reduction.
  • Malone formulated a plan to reduce TCIs
    programming expenses by about 200 million by
    dropping certain programming services.

14
Trouble in Late 1996
  • Malone froze capital expenditures, pending a
    review of the companys technology strategy.
  • By early 1997, Malone had concluded that TCI
    needed to accelerate the deployment of digital
    converters to respond to competition from
    satellite broadcasters.
  • TCI planned simultaneously to launch digital
    video, telephone, and high-speed Internet access
    services.
  • Malone believed that the new technology strategy
    would conserve capital, allowing TCI to boost
    free cash flow and reduce its debt.

15
Accelerating TCIs Turnaround
  • Leo Hindery, former CEO of InterMedia Partners
    which controlled 1.4 million cable subscribers,
    accepted Malones offer to join TCI.
  • His first step was to rebuild the top management
    team. Within a few weeks of Hinderys arrival, 25
    senior executives left the company.
  • TCI reduced costs of marketing by clustering its
    geographically scattered systems into a few
    regions.

16
Accelerating TCIs Turnaround
  • Through the partnerships, and by trading some
    systems with other MSOs, TCI was able to
    concentrate its system portfolio into six major
    markets where it was the dominant MSO (Chicago,
    Dallas, Denver, Pittsburgh, San Francisco, and
    Seattle) and ten other big cities where it
    controlled a large share of cable customers.

17
Accelerating Digital Deployment
  • Early in the year of 1997, Malone had focused the
    company on a defensive technology strategy that
    would accelerate the deployment of
    first-generation digital converters. By year-end,
    however, TCI was planning the rapid and
    widespread rollout of second-generation digital
    converters. These converters would deliver more
    video channels, also provide high-speed Internet
    access, integrate Web content with traditional
    television signals, and enable cable systems to
    provide telephone service.

18
The Case for Ubiquitous Digital Deployment
  • By early 1998, the specifications for TCIs
    second-generation digital converter were set.
  • The rapid, ubiquitous deployment of
    second-generation digital converters offered 2
    other potential benefits.
  • First, it could tap the unmet demand for
    interactive services in households that had not
    yet acquired a personal computer.
  • Second, ubiquitous deployment would preempt
    competition from telephone companies seeking to
    deliver digital services.

19
GBF?
  • Tci followed a get big fast strategy
  • Payoff
  • Scale economies in programming procurement,
    system operations
  • Leverage to acquire equity stakes in programming
    and technology ventures
  • Risks
  • Overextend balance sheet
  • Chaotic post-merger integration
  • Strain management capabilities (especially given
    reliance on ceo as architect of strategy)

20
GBF?
  • Network Effects were Low for cable providers
  • Scale economies are great
  • Customer retention rates for Cable customers are
    high but not so for digital services (many
    competitors)

21
GBF?
  • Risks and rewards of pursuing scale for access
    providers
  • Payoff from vertical integration and walled
    gardens
  • Causes of organizational inertia in large,
    established companies advantages and limitations
    of top down management approach for addressing
    inertia

22
TCI LESSONS
  • Traditional bottom up resource allocation
    processes are not ideal in risky, turbulent
    environments
  • Division managers understand substance of
    strategy corporate managers typically do not, so
    they base their decisions on the reputations of
    division managers
  • Division managers must protect their reputations
    they propose projects that are consistent with
    the accepted concept of corporate strategy, and
    with the companys reward system
  • Bottom up process is slow, political, and
    inherently conservative

23
TCI LESSONS
  • Top down process is faster, and shifts
    responsibility for bet the company risks to the
    ceo, who is better able to bear them
    (particularly true for owner-managers).
  • However, top down processes suffer from two
    limitations
  • Bounded rationality. In large, complex
    organizations, CEOs have too many competing
    demands for their attention to personally play
    the lead role in developing division level
    strategies.
  • Groupthink. Faced with a threat, management
    team often rallies around a strong leader,
    offering uncritical support of the leaders
    policies. They ignore alternative strategies,
    edit out disconfirming data, and stifle criticism.

24
MALONES MANAGEMENT STYLE
  • Overcoming Bounded Rationality
  • Wide bandwidth network for collecting real time
    data from inside and outside TCI (e.g., from
    myriad joint venture partners)
  • 25 years of cable industry experience yields
    pattern recognition
  • Best Processor Of Information Among Fortune 500
    CEOs
  • Avoiding Groupthink
  • Constantly testing ideas thinks out loud
    looks for devils advocates
  • TCI culture encourages open flow of information,
    honest autopsy
  • Continuity of management team serves to buffer
    and translate malones ideas
  • Found coo with complementary skills and attitudes

25
  • I think its going to be very big and for me,
    what I really love is strategy. I like financial
    strategy. I like technical strategy. I hate
    running things, I hate getting subpoenas, I hate
    giving depositions, I hate getting called before
    a city council I hate all that. And I hate
    having 35,000 employees who need to be patted on
    the back. Thats great for Leo I hate that
    stuff. Just give me a corner somewhere where I
    can sit and scheme.
  • JOHN MALONE BROADCASTING CABLE
  • JULY 1998

26
ECONOMICS OF HFC APPLICATIONS
Source DLJ Research
27
Conclusion
  • TCIs operational turnaround program showed quick
    and impressive results. The company reported a
    31 increase in operating cash flow in fiscal
    1997, compared to 1996.

28
20-20 Hindsight
  • On March 9, 2002, ATT acquires
    Tele-Communications, Inc. (TCI), the second
    largest cable company in the United States. TCI
    is renamed ATT Broadband Internet Services.
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