Class

1
Class 13-14 Nigeria

• Colonialism and post-colonialism
• The natural resource curse
• Corruption
• Military dictatorship
• Ethnic and religious conflict
• Consociationalism

2
Nigeria's Government

• US style presidential system, under which the
  president controls most of the political
  resources (President-elect Alhaji Umar Musa Yar
  Adua, since April 21).
• Bicameral legislature
• 109 senators elected by SMP three from each
  state and one from the Federal Capital Territory.
• 360 member House of Representatives, elected from
  single-member districts.

3
Nigeria's Government

• Federal structure 36 states plus the Federal
  Capital Territory of Abuja.
• Officially structured into state and local
  governments, but local power tends to concentrate
  into the hands of the governors and local big
  men.
• Central government controls most of the oil
  revenues, which the economy depends on, making
  federal institutions relatively weak.

4
Colonialism

• The extension of state sovereignty over
  territories beyond its border by the
  establishment of either settler colonies or
  administrative dependencies in which indigenous
  populations are either directly ruled or
  displaced.
• Settler colonies lands which are populated
  directly by immigrants from the colonial power
  (ex. the U.S., Australia)
• Administrative dependencies lands in which the
  indigenous population remains, but administrative
  sovereignty remains in the hands of the colonial
  power, who rules either directly or through local
  administrative units (Nigeria, India).

5
Additional types of colonialism

• Plantation colonies where white colonizers
  imported black slaves, who eventually became a
  majority (Jamaica, Haiti).
• Trading posts areas controlled by the
  colonizing power as an area for trade (Hong Kong,
  Singapore).

6
Eras of Colonialism

• Colonialism began in the 15th c. with the
  Portuguese conquest of Ceuta in north Africa.
• Generally motivated by economic and religious
  factors.
• To find the source of the spice routes to open up
  trade by sea.
• To find Christian communities surrounding the
  Ottoman Empire, and to spread Christianity.
• In 1488, Portuguese sailors proved that it was
  possible to round Africa, when Bartolomeu Dias
  rounded the Cape of Good Hope.

7
Eras of Colonialism

• The Spanish quickly followed, financing
  Christopher Columbus' voyage to the Bahamas in
  1492.
• Whereas the Portuguese focused primarily on
  developing sea power and trade routes, the
  Spanish colonialism involved the emigration of
  large populations to colonial holdings.

8
Portuguese Colonialism
9
Eras of Colonialism

• Northern European countries England, France,
  Netherlands -- began their own colonization in
  the Americas.
• Some of this was done for economic reasons
  involving private companies.
• Since gold was not present in their holdings,
  these usually involved trade in sugar, furs and
  other renewable raw materials.
• Others emigrated in order to establish new
  societies outside of Europe.

10
Eras of Colonialism

• First period of decolonization, 18th-19th c.
• 1776-1783 War of American Independence
• 1791-1804 The Haitian Revolution
• 1808-1821 wars for independence in Latin
  America
• 1898 Spanish-American War (ended Spanish
  control over Cuba, Puerto Rico and Philippines).
• 1822 Brazil declares independence from Portugal.

11
Eras of Colonization

• New Imperialism -- 1870-1914
• The Scramble for Africa -- European powers
  competed for colonial territories without
  explicit need for resources.
• Also brought European influence to Asia
• Russia and Britain fought over influence in
  Central Asia.
• Commodore Perry and the opening Japan.
• China opened to Western influence in the first
  and second Opium Wars.

12
European Colonization of Africa
13
Eras of Colonialism

• Decolonization (1945-1997)
• While movements for decolonization began much
  earlier, it was after World War II that they
  really gained momentum.
• Some gained independence through wars (ex.
  Algeria), others through formal agreements (that
  were often nonetheless bloody affairs).
• Supported by the US and the Non-Aligned Movement.

14
Decolonization in Africa
15
British Colonialism in Nigeria

• The legacy of British colonialism is mixed
• Unlike many other colonial empires, Britain used
  a system of indirect rule, allowing traditional
  structures and native bureaucracy to persist.
• Where authority was diffuse, Britain strengthened
  traditional chiefs and kings, or appointed
  warrant chiefs to maintain their authority.
• In addition, before leaving, Britain usually
  established a democratic system of elections
  within the Commonwealth, giving its former
  colonies some taste of democracy before full
  independence.

16
British Colonialism in Nigeria

• At the same time
• Britain promoted ethnic and social divisions to
  prevent organized political resistance to
  colonial rule.
• Borders set by British leaders did not correspond
  to ethnic or tribal lines (Housa-Fulani, Igbo,
  and Yoruba).

17
British Colonialism in Nigeria

• Outcomes
• Aware of democratic practices and ideals
• Some level of bureaucratic professionalization
  and capacity.
• Deeply divided societies.
• Norms of using power to reward tribal and ethnic
  groups.

18
British Empire in 1921
19
Military Dictatorship

• A form of government where authority resides in
  the military.
• Can take several forms
• Official vs. unofficial
• Junta vs. dictatorship
• Coup d'etat vs. evolutionary
• Direct vs. indirect
• Usually involve some type of martial law or state
  of emergency, declared on the basis of a real or
  perceived threat.

20
Military Dictatorship

• Goals of military regimes
• Establish stability.
• Preempt certain political changes, movements,
  election results.
• Strengthen the military establishment.
• Closely unite control and means of force.
• To rule.

21
Military Dictatorship

• In general, military regimes tend to be
  short-lived (Barbara Geddes)
• Divisions within the military about goals and
  outcomes.
• Relatively low costs of removal from leadership.
• Conflict between professional military and
  branches established for domestic enforcement of
  rule (Alfred Stepan).
• Military not generally structured in a manner
  that allows it to easily perform civilian
  functions.
• Loss of support from civilian sponsors.

22
Military Dictatorship in Nigeria

• January 1966 Civilian government deposed in a
  coup by General Aguiyi Ironsi, and Igbo.
• July 1966 Countercoup by General Yakubu Gowon,
  and Anga with northern support.
• July 1975 Military coup led by General Murtala
  Muhammed, a northerner, deposes Gowon.
• February 1976 Muhammed assasinated, General
  Olesugun Obasanjo, a Yoruba, assumes power
  (return to civilian rule in 1978).
• December 1983 military coup by General
  Muhammadu Buhari, a northerner.
• August 1985 Buhari overthrown by General
  Ibrahim B. Babangida, a Middle Belt Muslim
  (Presidential elections annulled in 1993).

23
Military Dictatorship in Nigeria

• August 1993 Babangida installs Ernest Shonekan
  as interim civilian president.
• November 1993 Defense Minister General Sani
  Abacha seizes power in a coup. Two year later he
  announces a three year transition to democracy
  and has himself nominated for president in 1998.
• June 1998 Abacha dies, succeeded by General
  Abdulsalami Abubakar, a Middle Belt Muslim, who
  quickly installs a new transition program.

24
Legacies of Military Dictatorship in Nigeria

• Strong centralized control over finances.
• Prebendalism patterns of political behavior
  that rest on the justification that official
  state offices should be utilized for personal
  benefit of officeholders as well as their support
  groups or clients.
• Strong presidential position.
• Heavy hierarchical control by big men over
  large patron-client networks.

25
Challenges to Democracy

• Cannot win elections without support of big men
• Distribution decisions heavily contention and cut
  along strong pre-existing divisions.
• Weak federal states.
• Weak economy outside of state-controlled finances
  (including para-statals, state-owned industries,
  and rents).

26
Consociationalism vs. Majoritarianism

• Arend Lijphart
• Looking primarily at the Netherlands, he contends
  that conflict between Calvinists and Catholics
  was prevented by a set of formal and informal
  institutional structures that encouraged
  power-sharing.
• Often used to describe governments in
  Netherlands, Switzerland, South Africa, Nigeria,
  Belgium, and Lebanon.
• Lijphart and Gunther contend that most states
  have at least some consociational attributes.

27
The Westminster Model

• Book definition -- A form of democracy based on
  the supreme authority of Parliament and the
  accountability of its elected representatives
  named after the site of the Parliament building
  in Westminster, a borough of London.
• Parliamentary democracy -- System of government
  in which the chief executive is answerable to the
  legislature and may be dismissed by it.

28
The Westminster Model

• Parliamentary sovereignty -- A constitutional
  principle of government (principally in Britain)
  by which the legislature reserves the power to
  make or overturn any law without recourse by the
  executive, the judiciary, or the monarchy. Only
  Parliament can nullify or overturn legislation
  approved by Parliament and Parliament can force
  the cabinet or the government to resign by voting
  a motion of no confidence.

29
Checks and Balances vs. Majority Rule
30
The Westminster Model (Theoretical Concept)

• Maximization of majority rule (Lijphart).
• Attributes
• Parliamentary sovereignty.
• Executive elected from parliament and backed by a
  majority in the legislature.
• Limited constitutional constraints, or no formal
  constitution.
• Unitary state
• Two-party system.
• Single-member plurality electoral system.

31
Consociational Democracy

• In contrast to the Westminster system,
  consociational democracies promote checks on the
  power of majority groups.
• In addition, consociationalism usually recognizes
  important social groups and explicitly gives them
  guaranteed power in the government.

32
General Characteristics of Consociationalism

• Grand coalitions including elites from all the
  important groups, who come together to rule for
  the country.
• Mutual veto the ability to block legislation
  that does not have consensus support among the
  major groups.
• Proportionality groups receive representation
  according to their general proportion in the
  population (with important exceptions).
• Segmental autonomy allowing culture-based
  community laws (ex. education).

33
Favorable Conditions for Consociationalism

• Multi-axis balance of power 3 or more groups,
  none of whom constitute a majority.
• Multi-party system more than 2 parties, with
  none holding a majority, forcing coalitions to
  form.
• Small country size countries that are smaller
  are more likely to have elites that regularly
  interact, making compromise easier.
• Overarching loyalty all the groups feel some
  sense of loyalty to the country.
• Tradition of elite accomodation groups are used
  to dealing with and working out a compromise with
  each other.
• Strong hierarchical leadership leaders are able
  to bring their supporters into agreement with
  elite bargains.

34
Consociational Institutions

• Attributes
• Collective executive
• Coalition legislature
• Strong formal constitution
• Federalism
• Multi-party system
• Proportional representation
• Strong judicial review
• Norms or requirements of consensus on important
  legislation.

35
Majoritarian vs. Consociational Institutions

• Parliamentary sovereignty
• Executive backed my majority in legislature
• Limited or no formal constitutional constraints
• Unitary state
• Two-party system
• Single-member Plurality electoral system

• Collective executive
• Coalition legislature
• Strong formal constitution with judicial review
• Federalism
• Multi-party system
• Proportional representation
• Norms or requirements of consensus on important
  legislation.

36
Arguments for Consociationalism

• Elite bargains can overcome popular division.
• By guaranteeing all relevant groups influence,
  they are less likely to resort to violence and/or
  authoritarian government.
• Leaving important groups out of government make
  them more likely to become violent.
• By forcing groups to work together, they are more
  likely to resolve their differences.
• Better than any alternative for dealing with
  democratic governance in fragmented societies.

37
Criticisms of Consociationalism

• Guaranteeing groups representation in government
  and in federal states gives them a springboard to
  separatism.
• Consociationalism only works in a very
  restrictive set of circumstances, and these can
  change over time.
• It is difficult to discern how consociational
  governance in a country is and how much it needs
  to be for stability.
• Consociational institutions promote gridlock.
• True key to consociationalism is the elites not
  the institutions.

38
Where have I seen this before?...

• Can anyone describe for me how the design of
  Iraq's government has been influenced by
  consociationalism?
• What about the government of Nigeria?

39
The Natural Resource Curse

• It's the devil's excrement. We are drowning in
  the devil's excrement. -- Juan Pablo Perez
  Alfonso, founder of OPEC.
• We are in part to blame, but this is the curse
  of being born with a copper spoon in our mouths.
  -- Kenneth Kaunda, President of Zambia.
• All in all, I wish we had discovered water. --
  Sheik Ahmad Yamani, Oil Minister for Saudi Arabia.

40
Economic Aspects of the Natural Resource Curse

• On average, countries that are more dependent on
  fuel and mineral exports have lower rates of
  growth (Richard Auty, Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew
  Warner).
• From 1965-1998, economic growth in OPEC countries
  averaged -1.3, compared to 2.2 in the rest of
  the developing world.

41
What Happened?

• Dutch Disease
• Revenue Volatility
• Excessive Borrowing
• Corruption
• Conflict
• Authoritarian Government
• Enclave Effect
• Corruption
• 'Oil Mania'

42
Are natural resources and economic curse?

• Some contend that saying countries are worse off
  for having natural resources is akin to saying a
  person is more likely to become rich if they
  don't win the lottery.
• Others contend that it is about policy design,
  not inherent characteristics of the natural
  resources themselves.
• To this end, a number of different strategies
  have been used, such as special offshore oil
  accounts, for handing new oil discoveries.

43
Political aspects of the curse

• Countries that are more reliant on natural
  resources tend to be less democratic than we
  would expect, given their level of economic
  development (Michael Ross).
• This is used to explain why some relatively rich
  countries, such as the oil monarchies in the
  Middle East, have remained traditional
  authoritarian despite their economic growth.

44
Why is this the case?

• Political Dutch Disease (Lam and Wantchekon)
• State Ownership (Pauline Jones Luong)
• State Buyoffs (Michael Ross)
• Corruption
• Elimination of Need for Taxation (Michael Ross)
• Reduced Bureaucratic Accountability
• Increased Spending on Repression
• Increased Political and Social Conflict (Collier
  and Hoeffler)
• Absence of International Pressure
• Lack of Development Outside of Natural Resources
  (Michael Ross)
• Heavy Inequality (Carles Boix)
• Immobility of Assets (Carles Boix)

45
Methods of Dealing with The Curse

• International Oil Savings Accounts
• Shared Sovereignty over Oil Money (World Bank)
• Pressuring Oil Companies to Demand Greater
  Political Rights
• Attempting Greater Transparency through Reporting
  of Fuel Income (either through the state or the
  oil companies)
• Refusing international support or loans for oil
  development projects.

46
Basic Questions yet to be answered

• What underlies the curse in an inter-regional
  setting? (ex. stability or instability?)
• Is this really an exception to modernization
  theory, or just a flaw in how we measure
  development?
• Can the problems of distribution be solved in a
  political system of sovereign states?
• What factors explain different outcomes among
  high oil exporters?