Lecture: Psycholinguistics Professor Dr. Neal R. Norrick _____________________________________

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Lecture Psycholinguistics Professor Dr. Neal R.
Norrick_____________________________________

• Psycholinguistics

• Universität des Saarlandes
• Dept. 4.3 English Linguistics
• SS 2009

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• Organizational matters
• attendance dont miss more than 2 lectures!
• (make sure you sign into the
• Anwesenheitsliste every week)
• tutorial mandatory for magister,
• Erasmus (to get full credit),
• LAG alt (if youre taking the exam or
  wish to do 3 SWS)
• ? recommended for everyone as
  preparation for the final exam

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• there will be no lectures in July (7th, 14th,
  21th)!!!
• ? last lecture 6-30-09
• final exam will take place on 07-28-09 in the
  lecture hall (at the regular time)
• signing up for the exam (Neue Studiengänge)
• via sign-up list will be passed around
• in the last two weeks of the lecture in June
• (exact procedure to be announced later!)

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• updated script and bibliography
• are now online!!!
• website
• http//www.uni-saarland.de/fak4/norrick/index.html

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• 3.2 Sounds and phonemes
• phonemes as psychologically real entities
• abstract phoneme /p/
• versus positionally variant allophones
• aspirated ph word-initial, as in pill
• preglottalized ?p word-final, as in lip
• unaspirated p- after initial s, as in spill

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• these allophones are predictable variants
• they don't distinguish meanings
• ability to distinguish meanings defines
• phonemes
• hence minimal pair test
• pill - bill

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• but experiments show
• words are recognized faster than phonemes
• we recognize the letter b and the sound /b/
• faster in the word bat than in isolation
• words are more salient than phonemes
• suprasegmental features are also
• psychologically salient

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• intonation distinguishes statements
• and questions
• Sally's here. versus Sally's here?
• stress focuses on any constituent in questions
• Sally gave the new car to Judy today?
• can question whether it was Sally (not Suzy),
• whether she gave (not loaned) the car,
• whether it was the new (not the old) car etc

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• other salient suprasegmentals are volume
• and speed,
• they signal speaker attitudes
• and emotional states.

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• 3.3 Sentences and propositions
• sentences as grammatical representations
• of underlying meaning in the form of (logical)
• propositions
• ? propositions in language of thought clarify
  (logical) relations between words
• and sentences, represent entailments,
• inferences etc

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• versus
• ? sentences following the rules of some
• natural language
• grammar rules transform underlying
• meanings into grammatical sentences of
• natural language
• so a single underlying logical proposition
• has multiple possible representations in any
• given natural language, e.g.

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• the cat is on the mat, the cat is on
• top of the mat
• the mat is under the cat, the mat is
• beneath the cat etc

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• But where would such a logical language
• of propositions come from if not from
• communication in a natural language?
• But if our language of thought is some acquired
• natural language, then the specific
• characteristics of that language determine our
• patterns of thinking - and this leads to the
• Sapir Whorf Hypothesis.

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• 3.4 Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis
• Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis sees language and
• human cognition as related in non-arbitrary
• ways
• Sapir 1921, 1929, 1949, Whorf 1950, 1956
• proposed a relationship between language,
• meaning, culture, and personality, generally
• called the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis

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• The strong version of the hypothesis says
• our language determines our perception. We
• see the things and processes our language
• has names for and ignore or cannot see
• what our language doesn't name.
• The weak version of the hypothesis says our
• language influences our perception. We attend
• to the things and processes our language has
• names for and tend to ignore or find it difficult
  to
• attend to what our language doesn't name, e.g.

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• English speakers with only a single word wall
• find it difficult to understand and make the
• distinctions necessary for choosing Wand
• versus Mauer in German.
• German and English speakers group together
• all kinds of spherical objects with the single
• word ball, they would not normally distinguish
• the objects categorized in French as ball from
• those called ballon.

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• In French, speakers must attend to
• differences in size and determine whether
• an object is inflated or not to categorize it as
• ball versus ballon.
• Also, the grammar of the language we're
• speaking at any given time (be it our native
• language or not) forces us to think in certain
• ways.

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• Slobin's thinking for speaking notes that any
• language system enforces certain choices in
• grammar and lexis, no matter how our
• underlying thought patterns work,
• e.g. because of the tense/aspect system of
• English, all the following questions are relevant
  
• in talking about an event

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• When did the action take place?
• present versus past tense
• Is it completed?
• perfective versus simple aspect
• Was it an ongoing process or a momentary
  activity?
• progressive versus simple aspect
• Did it only happen once or does it always
• happen?
• progressive versus simple aspect

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• But in various languages, the questions below
• are important for determining grammatical
• forms (word order, cases)
• Did I (as speaker) see the event or just hear
  about it?
• Is this statement a fact or just my opinion?
• What kinds of words are typically subjects?
• And what kinds objects?

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• Compare
• I like it, mir gefällt es,
• mi piace, I'm cold,
• mich friert, mir ist kalt,
• isch hann kalt, j'ai frois
• If we must always attend to certain distinctions
• and ignore others, in speaking and thinking,
• shouldn't that influence the way we think?

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• Nevertheless, we manage to translate
• between languages and to learn other
• languages, so apparently our thought
• patterns can extend and adapt.
• We can grasp and learn to use words from
• other languages, even if they have no
• counterpart in our native language, e.g.
• Schadenfreude blind date

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• 4. Words in the Mental Lexicon
• Mental Lexicon versus dictionary
• words accessible via sound, meaning,
• related words
• Mental Lexicon versus encyclopedia
• Encyclopedia contains all kinds of knowledge,
• usually unnecessary for normal word use,
• e.g. for dog

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• perceptual four-legged, furry, barking sound etc
• functions used as pet, for hunting, guarding etc
• behaviors chases cats, chews bones,
• is territorial etc
• origins animal, mammal, bears litters of
• puppies etc
• history domesticated early, developed into
• pet etc
• facts Suzy has a puppy, Bill's dog chases
• cars etc

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• Encyclopedia contains entries for concepts not
• represented by individual words in lexicon
• e.g. for "aquatic mammals" and "famous
  scientists" or
• "favorite bars in town"
• assume that lexical entries specify only
• sound
• morphological irregularities
• syntactic properties
• core meaning for identification
• relations to other words
• perhaps spelling

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• 4.1 Word Association Tests (WATs)
• Experiments show
• we recognize concrete words like table
• faster than abstract words like trouble
• table ? chair faster, more consistent
• trouble ? bad lower, less consistent

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• we also recognize familiar words and short words
• faster than unfamiliar and long words
• compare
• A traveling salesman arrived in town
• An itinerate salesman arrived in town

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• WATs also show paradigmatic versus
• syntagmatic relations
• paradigmatic apple, pear, banana, plum
• syntagmatic apple, red, juicy, eat
• in WATs
• adults respond paradigmatically pillow ? bed
• children respond syntagmatically
• pillow ? soft

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semantic features (or components) are also
psychologically real for speakers Woman ?
human, adult, female . . . Man ? human, adult,
male . . . again kids don't analyze, responding
syntagmatically Man ? work instead of woman ?
adult or female
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• based on response times to questions like
• Can a canary sing?
• Can a canary fly?
• Does a canary have skin?
• Collins Quillan (1989) postulate
• memory structures

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But other tests show pure frequency of occurrence
in discourse counts for more than response times
in WATs A canary sings/is yellow more
frequent versus A canary flies/eats less
frequent
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WATs show faster recognition after associated
words we recognize roof faster after house than
after some unrelated word like apple so Lindsay
Norman (1972) postulate lexical networks
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• WATs are a questionable method
• WATs elicit unnatural verbal behavior
• WATs develop quantitative results, but they're
• always fuzzy
• WATs are usually limited to nouns, usually
• concrete but consider, e.g. colors,fruits,
  games etc
• WATs are unnecessary, given discourse analysis,
• especially now with computers available

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• 4.2 Tip-of-the-Tongue Phenomena
• Thinking on Tip-of-the-Tongue (TOT)
• phenomena begins with James (1890)
• James speaks of a gap that is intensively
• active in consciousness when we try to recall a
• forgotten name.
• Meringer and Mayer (1895), Fromkin (1973) kept
• personal catalogues of error types to gather
  natural
• data.

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Brown and McNeill (1966) collected intuitions on
remembering in diary studies, e.g. unable to
recall the name of the street on which a
relative lives, one of us thought of Congress
and Corinth and Concord and then looked up the
address and learned that it was Cornish.
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Brown and McNeill also induce TOT states, by
reading definitions of uncommon words to
subjects, who then answer questions about their
search for the missing word, e.g. subjects
asked to identify the target word sextant based
on a dictionary definition A navigational
instrument used in measuring angular distances,
especially the altitude of sun, moon and stars at
sea.
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• Burke et al. (1991) write, When a TOT occurs, a
• lexical node in a semantic system becomes
• activated, giving access to semantic information
• about the target word, but at least some
• phonological information remains inaccessible.
• Subjects in the TOT state often report that a
  word
• related to the target comes repeatedly and
• involuntarily to mind, yielding
  blockers,interlopers
• or persistent alternates, e.g.
• sexton or sextet for sextant

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Burke et al. (1991) developed an experimental
task, using prompts like those in a trivia game
presented on a computer, where subjects typed
responses, e.g. What is the old name of
Taiwan? target Formosa foils Taipei,
Canton, Ceylon The foils often acted as
blockers for the target word
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• They then asked questions like
• How familiar do you think the word is?
• How certain are you that you can recall the
  word?
• What is the first letter or group of letters in
  the word?
• Burke et al. (1991) identify a semantic system or
  
• network of nodes connecting concepts
• the concept chastity is connected with is a
  virtue,
• take a vow of etc
• the concept baker with bake bread get up
  early sell cakes knead dough etc

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• Compare scripts of Schank and Abelson (1977),
• cognitive models of Lakoff (1987)
• Cognitive model for chastity would identify
• prototypes for the virtue like saints, and
  distinguish
• characteristics like is a virtue from
  linguistic
• constructions in which the word chastity occurs
  such
• as take a vow of chastity.
• Cognitive model for baker would identify
  prototypes
• for profession like the owner of the bakery at
  the foot
• of the hill.

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• Burke et al. (1991) say one word may prime,
• i.e. facilitate recognition of, another word,
• the activation of nurse facilitates activation of
• doctor because priming spreads and summates
• via these many shared connections.
• Cognitive processes recoded in diary studies
• and lab experiments differ from TOT searches
• in real conversation, e.g.

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• 1 Helen in Hammond, north Hammond. Junior Toy
  Company.
• 2 they used to make toys, little tricycles
  and scooters and everything.
• 3 David and where was it?
• 4 Helen I don't remember the street.
• 5 Hoffman?
• 6 No.
• 7 it was a little beyond right here, you
  know,
• 8 it wasn't right in north Hammond.
• 9 t was around that street that turns into
  Illinois,
• 10 there when you go to the cemetery.
• 11 here's a tavern on one side and a VFW on
  one side.
• 12 forget the street.
• 13 David Gosselin?
• 14 Helen Could be, I don't know.
• 15 I don't know,
• 16 but that's where Junior Toy was in the
  low corner there.

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• Helen expresses her forgetfulness at line 4 with
• I dont remember the street.
• She takes a guess at the name in line 5, but
• immediately rejects the guess in line 6.
• She begins an extended description of the area in
  
• terms of landmarks in lines 7-11.
• She concludes, I forget the street at line 12,
• but David offers a guess of his own, since hes
• familiar with the local neighborhood.
• Helen expects help with name or at least
  assurance that David can identify the place.

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• Storytellers often name landmarks and major
• streets, not phonetically similar words.
• Note references to cemetery (l. 10),
• tavern and VFW (l.. 11)
• Description in the low corner implies that the
• teller can visualize the scene.
• So why not search corpora for natural
• instances of TOT?