Title: Computational Coherence
1Computational Coherence
- Daniel Schoch
- Chiang Mai University
- Department of Economics
2Content
- Terminology
- Coherentist Epistemology
- Inferential Coherence
- Thagards Computational Model
- Qualitative Decision Theory
- COHEN
31. Terminology Belief System
- A Belief System is a consistent set S of
propositions. - It is normally considered to be deductively
closed, i.e. any sentence p, which can be derived
from a subset S?S, is contained in S. - Propositions p not in S are called disbelieved
(not to be mixed up with p being believed).
4Terminology Evidences
- In epistemology, two kinds of propositions are
distinguished - Evidences A singular statement describing a
basic belief, e.g. an observation or an utterance
of some person. - Non-evidential beliefs A general statement
having the power to explain evidences, e.g. a
theory or a hypothesis.
5Terminology - Inference
- In Coherence Theory we consider a general
inference relation between propositions,
p1,,pn -gt p - Logical deduction ? is a special case of
inference, others might be induction,
explanation, etc. Note that deduction in the
sense of Sherlock Holmes is abduction. - Propositions can be isolated or inferentially
connected Some propositions p1,,pn are
inferentially connected, if p1,,pk-1,pk1,,pn-gt
pk holds for some k.
62. Coherentist Epistemology
- Two epistemological paradigms compete
- Fundamentalism Justification based on evidences
Given some evidences, how justified is the belief
that p? - Coherentism Taking all formerly beliefs and new
incoming information, select some propositions to
form the most plausible belief system.
7Example
- Consider the following two propositions
- John is in Rome on Nov. 4th 2007, 1430.
- John is in Bangkok on Nov. 4th 2007, 1431.
- The two propositions do not logically contradict,
but together they are implausible (nobody can
travel that fast), they are incoherent. - Even if both information came from reliable
sources, we could not believe them simultaneously.
8Basic Beliefs
- The two epistemological paradigms differ in their
treatment of evidences - Fundamentalism Evidences have a distinguished
epistemological status from non-evidential
beliefs. In particular, they are justified
through the process of observation. - Coherentism Evidential and non-evidential
beliefs have the same epistemological status.
They are mutually justified through their
interferential connections.
9Justification and Inference
- Fundamentalism
- External Justification
- Coherentism
- Internal Justification
10Treatment of Evidences
- Fundamentalism It is decisive for evidences
through which process they emerge. They are
justified through the reliability of the process. - Coherentism Evidences are regarded as if they
spontaneously emerge in the mind of the subject.
Reliability is purely subjective and only plays a
subordinate role in justification.
11Computational Justification
- Fundamentalism
- External Justification
- Needs Meta-beliefs on reliability
- Probabilistic
- Bayesian Nets
- Bovens, Luc, and Stephan Hartmann, Bayesian
Epistemology (Oxford Clarendon Press, 2003).
- Coherentism
- Internal Justification
- No meta-beliefs required
- Gradational
- Inference algorithm
- Paul Thagard, Computational Philosophy of Science
(MIT Press, 1988, Bardford Book, 1993).
12Revision of Evidential Beliefs
- Fundamentalism
- Only conditional inference
- Bayesian Nets have fixed input and output
propositions - Evidential beliefs are given, no revision
- Coherentism
- Both conditional and unconditional inference
- Inference algorithm treats propositions equal
- Evidential beliefs can be revised
133. Inferential Coherence
- We assume that there is an abstract inference
relation p1,,pn -gt p between propositions. - Inferential Coherence is a measure of
plausibility of belief systems S, such that - For every p1,,pn,p?S with p1,,pn -gt p, the
degree of coherence rises. - For every p1,,pn,p?S with p1,,pn -gt p, the
degree of coherence sinks dramatically. - Inferential relations p1,,pn -gt p, p1,,pn -gt q
from common premises p1,,pn are better (more
coherent) than from different. - Inferences from fewer premises are better (more
coherent) than from more.
14Explanatory Coherence
- Thagard interpretes the inference relation
p1,,pn -gt p as an explanation of p (explanandum)
by the explanans p1,,pn. The conditions then
read - A successful explanation increases coherence.
- An explanatory anomaly decreases coherence.
- A unified explanation by a single explanans is
better than two unrelated explanations. - A simple explanation with fewer premises is
stronger and therefore has higher coherence. - For condition 3 see Bartelborth, Thomas,
Explanatory Unification, in Synthese 130 (2002),
91-207 for condition 4 see Schoch, Daniel,
Explanatory Coherence, Synthese 122/3 (2000),
291-311.
15Examples Explanation
- A successful explanation of an evidence is
performed by a theory and other evidences, e.g. a
falling ball can be described by the law of
gravitation plus air resistance. - An explanatory anomaly occurs, when an evidential
belief contradicts (or incoheres with) some
proposition, which is explained by other beliefs.
E.g. Bohrs atomic model contradicts Maxwells
electrodynamics. - A unified theory brings together formerly
separated parts of science, e.g. unification of
sublunar (Galilei) and celestial (Kepler) physics
by Newton. - A simpler theory supersedes a complicated one,
e.g. Keplers theory needs less parameters than
Kopernikus.
16Coherence and Belief
- Two Perspectives of Coherence
- Global (Belief Choice) Consider competing total
belief systems S1,,Sn, choose the most coherent
one. - Local (Belief Change) Given a belief system S
and a proposition p, investigate whether a.) p
can be accepted or not, andb.) S has to be
changed or not.
17The Dual Pathway Approach
- The local perspective is exemplified in Thagards
dual pathway model
184. Thagards Computational Model
- For simplicity, we take a set of (atomic)
propositions p1,,pN and consider only belief
systems S which can be formed by the pi and their
negation pi, that is, we take S to be the
deductive closure of a consistent subset of
Pp1,,pN, p1,, pN. - Then each such belief system S can be described
by assigning to every pk a truth value vk
with vk 1, if pk?S, vk 0, if pk?S, - vk ½, else.
- Thagard uses an artificial neural network model
to implement his theory of coherence.
19Biological Neurons
- A biological neuron has two states. If the sum of
the electrical inputs from the dendrites exceeds
a threshold, it transmits a signal to the output
axon. Otherwise it remains inactive. Dendrites
can be excitatory or inhibitory.
20Computational Neurons
- An artificial neuron is represented by a
mathematical function, f(x1,,xn), which is 1, if
SkwkxkgtS, and 0 else. Here, w1,...,wn are the
weights and S is the threshold. Positive weights
represent excitatory, negative weights represent
inhibitory connections.
21The Neural Network Model
- Thagard uses an Artificial Neural Network Model
to implement a measure of coherence - Each proposition corresponds to one neuron.
- Coherence between two propositions correspond to
excitatory relations between the corresponding
neurons. - Incoherence between two propositions correspond
to inhibitory relations between the corresponding
neurons. - In contrast to nature, Thagards Neuronal Nets
only have symmetric connections (Hopfield model)!
22Hopfield Contra Nature
- Biological Neural Net
- Asymmetric recurrent network, very difficult to
understand.
- Hopfield model
- Symmetric, thus theoretically well understood.
23Explanatory Relations
- Thagard reduces each explanatory relation to
binary relations between neurons. - If p1, . . . , pm explain p, then
- a.) For each i, pi and p cohere.
- b.) For each i, j, i?j, pi and pj cohere.
- c.) The degree of coherence is inversely
proportional to m.
24Critique
- Explanatory and competitive relations can not be
reduced to relations between two propositions
only. - For example, if three propositions p,q,r are
inconsistent, nevertheless each pair p,q,
p,r, and q,r can nevertheless be consistent. - If the rule p,q explains r is reduced to
coherence of the three pairs, it is
undistinguishable from p,r explains q. - Thus the Hopfield model can not adequately
represent explanatory coherence.
255. Qualitative Decision Theory
- Qualitative Decision Theory (QDT) deals with
preferences over certain propositions or goals
described by propositions. - For example, conditional constraints can be goals
in this sense. - A coherentist constraint could be that if p and q
incohere, they should not both be true. - Coherence Theory can be considered a QDT-
maximization problem over constraints Find the
belief system which satisfies the most
constraints.
26Quantitative Representation
- Although QDT deals with qualitative aspects, it
could nevertheless be represented quantitatively,
just as preferences over qualitative alternatives
can have numerical utility representation. - This makes the coherence problem easily
tractable one has to find the valuation v1,,vN
for the propositions p1,,pN which maximize the
coherence measure.
27Additive Representation
- The most straightforward representation for a
multi-factor utility is additive. - We assume that the total coherence is the sum of
all coherence measures for the individual
constraints of our coherence theory. - Additive representation guaranties some nice
invariance properties.
28Quantitative Coherence
- Consider, for example, the inference relation
p1,,pn -gt p If p1,,pn are true, then p must
also be true. - Assume p1,,pn are true
- If p is indeed true, a term of positive coherence
is added. - But if p is false, a negative punishment term
occurs.
29Fuzzy Logic
- To be more precise, we choose a system of fuzzy
logic with values between 0 (false) and 1 (true)
Negation is represented by the function 1-x,
conjunction is represented by multiplication - If vp is the value of p, then vp 1 - vp is
the value of p. - If vp is the value of p, and vq is the value of
q, then vpq vp vq is the value of pq. - This is a valid system of fuzzy logic according
to Gottwald. - Gottwald, Siegfried, Fuzzy Sets and Fuzzy Logic,
Vieweg, 1993.
30Fuzzy Coherence
- Now we can specify the value function for the
inference rule p1,,pn -gt p - For the case of p1,,pn incohering, we obtain
- We see that the latter is a special case of the
former for vp0!
316. COHEN
- Coherence Optimization of Hypotheses Explanatory
Nets - The program COHEN accepts as an input a list of
weighted inference rules of the form w
p1,,pn -gt p - Here, w is an optional number giving the weight
of the rule.
32COHEN Syntax
- Each rule p1,,pn -gt pis regarded as an
explanatory relation. - Negation is designated by an ! prefix.
- An incoherence/competitive relation between
p1,,pn is written as p1,,pn -gtwhich is
interpreted as p1,,pn explaining a
contradictory statement. - Evidential support is written as an explanatory
relation without premises, -gt p
33Termination Conditions
- The program stops when one of the following
events occur - The net is exactly stable (within standard
numerical accuracy). - The net is approximately stable.
- There is no further progress in coherence.
34Lavoisiers Oxygen Hypothesis (1)
- Around 1785, two competing theories explained
chemical combustion and calcination processes - Phlogiston Theory (Becher 1667, Stahl)
Phlogiston was considered an element contained
within combustible bodies, and released during
combustion and calcination. - Oxygen Theory (Lavoisier 1775-77)Lavoisier
formulated the principle that every reaction
preserves mass, and observed weight increase
during calcination, which he explained by
absorbtion of a substance he called oxygen. - Thagard, Paul, Explanatory Coherence, in
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (1989), 435-502.
35Lavoisiers Oxygen Hypothesis (2)
- The following evidences have to be explained
- E1 During combustion, heat and light are given
off. - E2 Inflammability is transmittable from one body
to another. - E3 Combustion only occurs in the presence of
pure air. - E4 The increase of weight in an incinerated body
is exactly equal to the weight of air absorbed. - E5 Metals undergo calcination.
- E6 During calcination, bodies increase in
weight. - E7 During calcination, volume of air diminishes.
- E8 During reduction, effervescence appears.
36Lavoisiers Oxygen Hypothesis (3)
- Oxygen Hypotheses
- OH1 Pure air contains oxygen principle.
- OH2 Pure air contains matter of fire and heat.
- OH3 During combustion, oxygen from the air
combines with the burning body. - OH4 Oxygen has weight.
- OH5 During calcination, metals add oxygen to
become calxes. - OH6 During reduction, oxygen is given off.
- Phlogiston Hypotheses
- PH1 Combustible bodies contain phlogiston.
- PH2 Combustible bodies contain matter of heat.
- PH3 During combustion, phlogiston is given off.
- PH4 Phlogiston can pass from one body to
another. - PH5 Metals contain phlogiston.
- PH6 During calcination, phlogiston is given off.
37Lavoisiers Oxygen Hypothesis (4)
The interesting point about this example is that
there are only two analytical contradictions.
There is no need to implement the main hypotheses
OH1 and PH1 as competing.
- Oxygen Explanations
- OH1 OH2 OH3 -gt E1
- OH1 OH3 -gt E3
- OH1 OH3 OH4 -gt E4
- OH1 OH5 -gt E5
- OH1 OH4 OH5 -gt E6
- OH1 OH5 -gt E7
- OH1 OH6 -gt E8
- Phlogiston Explanation
- PH1 PH2 PH3 -gt E1
- PH1 PH3 PH4 -gt E2
- PH5 PH6 -gt E5
- Competetive Relations
- 20 PH3 OH3 -gt
- 20 PH6 OH5 -gt
38Lavoisiers Oxygen Hypothesis (5)
- The program COHEN stops with an exactly stable
net. All evidence and all oxygen hypotheses are
exactly accepted with value one, PH3 and PH6 are
exactly rejected with value zero. The other
phlogiston hypotheses PH1, PH2, PH4 and PH5
exactly receive the indifferent value ½. This is
plausible, since according to the reconstruction
they conflict with some part of the oxygen theory
system. - Thagards program ECHO tends towards the same
result (relative to his scale)! Some minor
deviations, e.g. in OH2 and OH6, which remain
below the value of full acceptance, seem to be
numerical artifacts - possibly caused by the
connectionist algorithm.