the nature of death

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(No Transcript)
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subjectivism

• 6.28-29.06

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naturalism

• it is not the case that Ss life is meaningful
  only if S has a certain relation with some purely
  spiritual realm
• Ss life is meaningful if S is or acts in the
  natural world in a certain way
• subjectivism
• Ss life is meaningful if Ss life is (or certain
  of its parts are) the object of a proattitude or
  another mental state
• objectivism
• Ss life is meaningful if Ss life has (or
  certain of its parts have) feature F, where F is
  not merely the feature of being the object of a
  certain sort of proattitude

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proattitudes

• a proattitude is a mental state which is, or is
  very much like, desire
• wish care like enjoy choose love
• proattitudes are typically tied to action in a
  certain manner namely, they are motivational.
• this distinguishes proattitudes from mental
  states which are not proattitudes, such as belief
  (and other cognitive attitudes)
• perceive judge remember pretend

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subjectivism

• SUB Ss life is meaningful if Ss life is (or
  certain of its parts are) the object of a certain
  mental state(s)
• SUB does not entail that life is meaningful
• SUB does not say that being the object of a
  certain mental state is necessary for a
  meaningful life, only that it is sufficient.
• SUB holds that the content of the mental state
  does not matter at all.

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subjectivism, cont.

• SUB is consistent with different conceptions of
• which mental state(s)
• whose mental state(s)
• the status of the mental state(s) (e.g., freely
  chosen, rational, etc.)
• whether the mental state is satisfied or not.

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pure subjectivism

• pure subjectivism (mental state only)
• desiring something
• loving something
• being happy (i.e., enjoying pleasurable
  experiences)
• being satisfied with ones choices or absorbed by
  ones activities
• adopting purposes and acting to realize them
• ps (mental state plus its satisfaction)
• desiring something and getting it (some/all wrt
  oneself/wrt others)
• loving something and being satisfied with/by that
  love
• being satisfied with successful choices or
  absorbed by activities that one has done well at
• adopting purposes and realizing them
• achieving what one judges to be important

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moderate subjectivism

• moderate subjectivism (informed/rational mental
  state)
• adopting, and acting to realize, purposes or
  desires that one would favor if one were to
  reflect on them from an impersonal standpoint
• loving what one deems worthy of love upon
  reflection
• ms (informed/rational mental state plus its
  fulfillment)
• obtaining what one would favor if one were to
  reflect on it from an impersonal standpoint
• loving what one deems worthy of love upon
  reflection, and being satisfied with/by that love

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taylors pure subjectivism

• we cannot hope for ultimate consequences, since
  all of our achievements are ephemeral. but one
  may live a meaningful life even if ones actions
  are ultimately pointless, like Sisyphus.
• if Sisyphus had a keen and unappeasable desire
  to be doing just what he found himself doing,
  the, although his life would not produce any
  ultimate consequences, it would nevertheless
  havemeaningSo, we can reintroduceour own
  wills, our deep interest in what we find
  ourselves doingto ground the meaning of life
  (26).
• The meaning of life is from within us (28).

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sisyphus

• when Sisyphuss actions are pointless and he is
  not interested in (absorbed by) what he is doing,
  his life is meaningless.
• when Sisyphuss actions are pointless and he is
  interested in (absorbed by) what he is doing,
  then his life is meaningful.
• Let us suppose that the godswaxed perversely
  merciful by implanting in Sisyphus a strange
  and irrational impulse, namely a compulsive
  impulse to roll stonesWhere otherwise he might
  profoundly have wished surceasehis life is now
  filled with mission and meaning, and he seems to
  himself to have been given an entry to heaven
  (22).

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taylors main arg

• p1. Sisyphus life is meaningful if his life is
  (or certain parts of it are) the object of his
  own personal interest.
• p2. we are like Sisyphus in all relevant respects
  so, what is true of him is true of us.
• c. so, for all subjects S, Ss life is meaningful
  if Ss life is (or certain parts of it are) the
  object of Ss own personal interest.

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evaluation

• a
• a
• a
• a

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vs. pure subjectivism and ps (darwall)

• pure subjectivism (mental state only)
• ps (mental state plus its satisfaction)
• what gives meaning to our lives cannot itself be
  based on our own individual responses as such
  (164).
• there is a distinction between
• favoring x (e.g., chocolate ice cream)
• taking x (e.g., selfless labor) to be meaningful
• the first is a mere personal preference the
  second is different it is taken to matter, and
  not merely to oneself.

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darwall

• That which endows our life with meaning must be
  something whose value we regard as
  self-transcendentwhat is required to see ones
  life as meaningful is to see it as a worthwhile
  kind of life for anyone like oneself. Any
  attitude that endows something with value
  sufficient to support our sense of
  meaningfulnessmust be an impersonal one (165).

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darwalls moderate subjectivism

• intersubjective
• not dependent on any particular individuals
  mental state
• based on an impersonal standpoint
• all of our own idiosyncracies are excluded
• available to all within a relevant group of
  valuable beings, whether members of a particular
  culture or the human race
• impersonal, but not purely impersonal (since it
  does not abstract from the information that one
  is a member of the relevant valuing community)
• anyone within the relevant group capable of
  appreciating it would come to favor it if they
  were to reflect on it from an impersonal
  standpoint
• so, intersubjective depends on the groups
  mental state

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darwalls main arg

• p1. if the meaning of life is purely subjective,
  then there is no difference between that which
  makes ones life meaningful and mere personal
  preferences (e.g., chocolate ice cream).
• p2. there is a difference between that which
  makes ones life meaningful and mere personal
  preferences (e.g., chocolate ice cream).
• c1. so, the meaning of life is not purely
  subjective.
• p3. objectivism is queer (spooky), so the
  meaning of life is either purely subjective or
  moderately subjective.
• c2. so, the meaning of life is moderately
  subjective.

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args for/against subjectivism

• 3 args for subjectivism
• arg from queerness
• arg from difference
• arg from variety
• 2 args against subjectivism
• arg from arbitrariness
• arg from absurd implications

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arg from queerness

• p1. supernaturalism is false or unjustified.
• p2. objective, mind-independent meaning would be
  queer (spooky).
• p3. if supernaturalism is false or unjustified
  and objective, mind-independent meaning would be
  queer (spooky), meaning must be constructed
  (i.e., entirely up to us).
• c. so, meaning must be constructed (i.e.,
  entirely up to us).

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vs. p2

• p2. objective, mind-independent meaning would be
  queer (spooky).
• why believe that?
• many objective, mind-independent properties are
  not queer (spooky) e.g., roundness.
• unless we have a really good reason to think that
  meaning is relevantly different from roundness,
  we have no reason to accept p2 if objective,
  mind-independent roundness is not queer (spooky),
  then objective, mind-independent meaning is not
  queer (spooky) either.

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vs. p3

• p3. if supernaturalism is false or unjustified
  and objective, mind-independent meaning would be
  queer (spooky), meaning must be constructed
  (i.e., entirely up to us).
• there could be objective, mind-dependent meaning
• Meaning arises when subjective attraction meets
  objective attractiveness (Wolf).
• on Wolfs view, meaning is mind-dependent but
  its not constructed (i.e., entirely up to us),
  since the objective world contributes something,
  too.
• this shows that even if supernaturalism is false
  or unjustified and objective, mind-independent
  meaning would be queer (spooky), meaning could be
  objective.

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arg from difference

• p1. different people have different ideas about
  what is meaningful or the source of lifes
  meaning.
• p2. if different people have different ideas
  about what is meaningful or the source of lifes
  meaning, then meaning is subjective entirely up
  to the individual/culture/religion.
• c. so, meaning is subjective entirely up to
  the individual/culture/religion.

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vs. p2

• p2. if different people have different ideas
  about what is meaningful or the source of lifes
  meaning, then meaning is subjective entirely up
  to the individual/culture/religion.
• general principle if different people have
  different ideas about x, then x is subjective
  entirely up to the individual/culture/religion.
• problem 1 this principle is open to
  counterexamples
• unless we have a really good reason to think that
  meaning is relevantly different from these
  counterexamples, we have no reason to accept p2.
• problem 2 cant make sense of real disagreement

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arg from variety

• p1. several different types of meaningful lives
  are possible.
• p2. meaning is always meaning to or for someone.
• p3. if several different types of meaningful
  lives are possible and meaning is always meaning
  to or for someone, then meaning is subjective
  (i.e., entirely up to an individual).
• c. so, meaning is subjective (i.e., entirely up
  to an individual).

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vs. p3

• p3. if several different types of meaningful
  lives are possible and meaning is always meaning
  to or for someone, then meaning is subjective
  (i.e., entirely up to an individual).
• recall Wolfs view
• Meaning arises when subjective attraction meets
  objective attractiveness (Wolf).
• on Wolfs view, several different types of
  meaningful lives are possible and meaning is
  always meaning to or for someone
• but meaning is not subjective (i.e., entirely up
  to an individual), since the objective world
  contributes something, too.
• this shows that even if several different types
  of meaningful lives are possible and meaning is
  always meaning to or for someone, meaning could
  be objective.

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is subjectivism crazy?

• before we turn to args against subjectivism, it
  is worth highlighting the general motivation for
  rejecting subjectivism
• appearance vs. reality
• something can seem one way, but actually be
  another way.
• subjectivism denies this a life is meaningful so
  long as it seems meaningful.
• many find this crazy
• why must we get it right?
• couldnt we possibly be wrong?
• in general, such questions serve as motivation
  for the args against subjectivism.

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arg from arbitrariness

• Which issues are significant, I do not
  determine. If I did, no issue would be
  significant. Why? Because the very idea of
  significance includes not being arbitrary.
• p1. if the meaning of life is subjective, then
  lifes significance is arbitrary.
• p2. the very notion of significance includes not
  being arbitrary.
• c. so, the meaning of life is not subjective.

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arg from absurd implications

• p1. if the meaning of life is subjective, then
  lives are significant which are not significant
  (see Metz, 795).
• p2. but it is not the case that lives are
  significant which are not significant.
• c. so, the meaning of life is not subjective.

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stepping back two tests

• how do we figure out what matters to us, what we
  really think makes life meaningful?
• we sometimes believe that we think one thing,
  even though we actually think another.
• fortunately, there are various tests we can use
  to determine what we think makes a life
  meaningful.
• here are two
• eternal recurrence
• machines

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eternal recurrence (nietzsche)

• four steps
• consider the scenario
• determine how you would respond
• modify your life appropriately
• repeat

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machines (nozick)

• experience machine
• What else can matter to us, other than how our
  lives feel from the inside? (228)
• we want to do certain things, and not just have
  the experience of doing them.
• we want to be a certain way, to have a certain
  character, and one cannot be kind, sincere,
  intelligent, courageous, etc if one plugs in.
• we want to experience reality, not an artificial
  world constructed by a human-made machine.

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machines, cont. (nozick)

• we want to be a certain way, to have a certain
  character, and one cannot really be kind,
  sincere, intelligent, courageous, etc if one
  plugs in.
• transformation machine
• then
• experience machine

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machines, cont. (nozick)

• perhaps the reason we want to experience reality,
  and not something artificial, is that we want to
  make a real difference thats what would make
  our lives meaningful.
• result machine
• then
• experience machine

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nozicks lesson (1) and (3)

• we want to do certain things, and not just have
  the experience of doing them.
• we want to experience reality, not an artificial
  world constructed by a human-made machine.
• We learn that something else matters to us in
  addition to experience by imagining these
  machines and then realizing that we would not
  use themWhat is most disturbing about them is
  their living of our lives for usPerhaps what we
  desire is to live (an active verb) ourselves, in
  contact with reality (229).

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today

• SUB Ss life is meaningful if Ss life is (or
  certain of its parts are) the object of a certain
  mental state(s)
• varieties of subjectivism
• pure (Taylor) vs. moderate (Darwall)
• 3 args for subjectivism
• arg from queerness
• arg from difference
• arg from variety
• appearance vs. reality
• 2 args against subjectivism
• arg from arbitrariness
• arg from absurd implications
• stepping back two tests

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for wednesday

• read
• (CP) Parfit, "What Makes Someone's Life Go Best?"
  
• (CP) selections from the writings of Buddha and
  Aristotle
• (CP) Wolf, "Happiness and Meaning Two Aspects of
  the Good Life
• Study for Wednesdays quiz
• Draft of Paper