The Cuban Missile Crisis

1
The Cuban Missile Crisis

• CHST 540
• May 26, 2005

2
American Policy Towards Cuba

• 1960 US reduces Cuban sugar quota, then imposes
  embargo Cuba nationalizes all US holdings
• January 1961 diplomatic relations severed
• April 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion US imposes
  embargo
• January 1962 at US urging, Cuba expelled from
  Organization of American States (OAS)

3
Cuban-Soviet Ties

• Cuba turns to the USSR
• Cuba had not been granted entrance to the Warsaw
  Pact
• Agreed to Operation Anadyr to deter US and to
  strengthen moral defense of sovereignty

Castro Khrushchev, 1960
4
CIA Assessments

• The Military Build-up in Cuba (NIE of Sept. 19,
  1962)
• misjudged Khrushchevs will to gamble
• missed crucial evidence of deployment of Soviet
  medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles
  to Cuba
• failed to link construction of SAM anti-aircraft
  sites and presence of Soviet combat forces to
  deployment of ballistic missiles

5
Khrushchevs Gamble

• Policy of bluff?
• Deterrent (to American invasion)?
• Balancing move?

6
The Crisis Begins

• October 14, 1962 first evidence of Soviet MRBM
  sites in Cuba (PSALM)
• EX-COMM (Executive Committee of NSC) meets
• Armed forces readiness raised to unprecedented
  DEFCON 2
• October 22, 1962 Kennedy goes public

7
Role of Intelligence Imagery

• National Photographic Intelligence Center (NPIC),
  headed by Arthur Lundahl
• U-2 reconnaissance flights

8
Imint MRBM Launch Site 1
9
Imint Close-ups of Missile Sites
Close-up of missile preparation area (taken
from altitude of 250 feet)

• Close-up of missile transporters and
  missile-ready tents

10
Role of Intelligence Human

• KGB Colonel Oleg Penkovsky
• Run jointly by the CIA and SIS (MI6)
• Ironbark reports
• Arrested by Soviets in Sept. 1962 later executed

11
Resolution of the Crisis

• October 28, 1962 Khrushchev ordered construction
  work stopped on installations in Cuba missiles
  to be dismantled, packed up and shipped back to
  USSR
• Khrushchev dropped demand that US withdraw
  missiles from Turkey

12
Excerpt from a post-crisis report
13
Soviet Intelligence

• Highly skilled at security and surveillance
  within their totalitarian system
• Khrushchev acts as own intelligence analyst
  rejects professionalization of intelligence
• KGB fails to influence policy-making
• Soviet intelligence fails to grasp sophistication
  of US technology

14
American Intelligence

• Analysis still weak and flawed at times
• Far greater ability than Soviet intelligence to
  influence policy-making
• Far more technically sophisticated than Soviets
  (U-2, etc.)

15
For further info

• James G. Blight, Intelligence and the Cuban
  Missile Crisis (Frank Cass, 1998)
• David Alvarez, American Signals Intelligence and
  the Cuban Missile Crisis Intelligence and
  National Security 151 (2000) 169-77.
• A.V. Fursenko, One Hell of a Gamble Khrushchev,
  Castro, and Kennedy, 1958-1964 (W.W. Norton,
  1997)