Francisco Bencosme

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NUCLEAR FORENSIC SCIENCE

• Francisco Bencosme
• Instructor Ms Villani

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Nuclear Forensics

• Nuclear forensics is the protection of nucleic
  materials and facilities. It also deals with the
  prevention and detection of illegal trafficking
  of nuclear and radioactive materials.

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Nuclear Forensics and Scientists

• To identify the nature of the seized material
• To assess the immediate danger involved and
  advise the law enforcement authorities on the
  procedures to be followed
• To confirm whether an offence has been committed
  under the appropriate Nuclear Regulations
• To locate the original source of the material if
  possible
• To identify the possible route it has taken up to
  the point of seizure
• To give an opinion on the probable intended use
  of the material.

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History of Nuclear Forensics

• Nuclear forensics began at the Laboratory under
  the leadership of scientist Sid Niemeyer in the
  mid-1990s, and Livermore has maintained a leading
  role because of a collective group effort. The
  Laboratory has been involved in nuclear forensics
  and attribution for more than 15 years, since the
  collapse of the Soviet Union sparked concerns
  about the diversion of nuclear materials from
  former Soviet nuclear laboratories and other
  sites. Livermores capabilities in radiochemistry
  and nuclear physics, originally developed for the
  nations underground nuclear testing program,
  were adapted for use in nuclear forensics and
  attribution.

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What Nuclear Researchers Do

• Nuclear forensic covers a broad spectrum of
  possible substances. A main point is the
  detection, recovery and investigation into the
  origins of a stolen container of the chemicals.
• Researchers analyze the chemicals and isotope
  composition. They measure the amount of trace
  elements and the ratio of parent isotope to
  daughter isotope. They also measure the shape,
  size, and texture of the chemical sample.
• These measurements help determine the source,
  location, and the age of the sample.

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What Instruments do they use?

• Researchers use techniques such as electron
  microscopy, x-ray diffraction, and mass
  spectrometry to analyze interdicted radiological
  and nuclear materials.

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Nuclear Forensics and Signatures

• Nuclear Forensic focuses also on identifying
  signatures. These are physical, chemical, and
  isotopic characteristics that make nucleic and
  radiological materials different from each other.
  
• Livermore scientists and the Office of Laboratory
  Counsel have compiled a library that is used to
  check unknown samples against a database. They
  use statistics to identify unique signatures in
  each chemical sample.

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How can they stop Terrorism?

• Nuclear forensics is able to explore the origins
  of a nuclear missile, thereby using it in solving
  nuclear warfare.
• Scientists can measure ratios of certain isotopes
  to find out how long the chemicals have been in
  the reactor.
• Scientists can measure ratios of isotopes in
  uranium to find out its original location.
• Scientists can trace for impurities like
  gadolinium to find out how to bomb was created.

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Fighting Nuclear Terrorism

• Awareness after September 11.
• Every possibly available means might be used by
  terrorists.
• Prevention.
• Safeguarding and securing nuclear material.
• Fighting illicit trafficking.
• Early detection.
• Preparedness.
• Develop model action plan.
• Assistance in analyzing fall-out.
• Evaluation of scenarios.

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Threats Posed by Nuclear Terrorism

• Crude Nuclear Weapon.
• (requiring larger amount of nuclear material and
  expertise in
• construction, means of delivery)
• Dirty parcel or letter bombs.
• (conventional explosive bomb laced with nuclear
  or radioactive
• material, easy to construct, no specific amount
  of nuclear material necessary, no delivery
  problems)
• Quiet dispersion of nuclear material.
• (direct physical dispersion, no specific amount
  of nuclear or radioactive material required)

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What can happen?

• Extinction!!!
• Mohammed SidAhmed in 2004 explains
• What would be the consequences of a nuclear
  attack by terrorists? Even if it fails, it would
  further exacerbate the negative features of the
  new and frightening world in which we are now
  living. Societies would close in on themselves,
  police measures would be stepped up at the
  expense of human rights, tensions between
  civilisations and religions would rise and ethnic
  conflicts would proliferate. It would also speed
  up the arms race and develop the awareness that a
  different type of world order is imperative if
  humankind is to survive. But the still more
  critical scenario is if the attack succeeds. This
  could lead to a third world war, from which no
  one will emerge victorious. Unlike a conventional
  war which ends when one side triumphs over
  another, this war will be without winners and
  losers. When nuclear pollution infects the whole
  planet, we will all be losers.

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What more can happen?

• Global Nuclear War!
• Louis Rene Beres explain the terminal impacts of
  nuclear terrorism
• Nuclear terrorism could even spark full-scale war
  between states. Such war could involve the entire
  spectrum of nuclear-conflict possibilities,
  ranging from a nuclear attack upon a non-nuclear
  state to systemwide nuclear war. How might such
  far-reaching consequences of nuclear terrorism
  come about? Perhaps the most likely way would
  involve a terrorist nuclear assault against a
  state by terrorists hosted in another state. For
  example, consider the following scenario Early
  in the 1990s, Israel and its Arab-state neighbors
  finally stand ready to conclude a comprehensive,
  multilateral peace settlement. With a bilateral
  treaty between Israel and Egypt already many
  years old, only the interests of the
  Palestiniansas defined by the PLOseem to have
  been left out. On the eve of the proposed signing
  of the peace agreement, half a dozen crude
  nuclear explosives in the one-kiloton range
  detonate in as many Israeli cities. Public grief
  in Israel over the many thousands dead ands
  maimed is matched only by the outcry for revenge.
  In response to the public mood, the government of
  Israel initiates selected strikes against
  terrorist strongholds in Lebanon, whereupon
  Lebanese Shiite forces and Syria retaliate
  against Israel. Before long, the entire region is
  ablaze, conflict has escalated to nuclear forms,
  and all countries in the area have suffered
  unprecedented destruction. Of course, such a
  scenario is fraught with the makings of even
  wider destruction. How would the United States
  react to the situation in the Middle East? What
  would be the Soviet response? It is certainly
  conceivable that a chain reaction of interstate
  nuclear conflict could ensure, one that would
  ultimately involve the superpowers or even every
  nuclear-weapons state on the planet. What,
  exactly, would this mean? Whether the terms of
  assessment be statistical or human, the
  consequences of nuclear war require an entirely
  new paradigm of death. Only such a paradigm would
  allow us a proper framework for absorbing the
  vision of near-total obliteration and the outer
  limits of human destructiveness. Any nuclear war
  would have effectively permanent and irreversible
  consequences. Whatever the actual extent of
  injuries and fatalities, such a war would entomb
  the spirit of the entire species in a planetary
  casket strewn with shorn bodies and imbecile
  imaginations.

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Can terrorists Acquire Nuclear weapons? Some Say
Yes

• Alyn Ware in Rule of Force or Rule of Law? Legal
  Responses to Nuclear Threats from Terrorism,
  Proliferation, and War, says
• "acquisition of a nuclear explosive device, by
  theft or construction, and its threat or use by a
  terrorist organization, is becoming more likely.
  In Russia, there is concern over security of
  their nuclear warheads, particularly those
  decommissioned and on their tactical delivery
  vehicles. There is particular concern regarding
  suitcase-sized "mini-nukes," though even larger
  nuclear weapons could be stolen with a large
  truck. n29 Of even greater concern is the
  possibility that a sub-national group could
  acquire the key ingredients for a nuclear
  warhead, highly enriched uranium or plutonium, to
  manufacture a bomb. The smuggling of highly
  enriched uranium has been intercepted on a couple
  of occasions, n30 as has the smuggling of
  plutonium. n31 While the construction of a
  nuclear bomb is difficult, the U.S. Office of
  Technology Assessment has reported that it is
  definitely within the capabilities of a non-state
  group
• A small group of people, none of whom have
  ever had access to the classified literature,
  could possibly design and build a crude nuclear
  explosive device. They would not necessarily
  require a great deal of technological equipment
  or have to undertake any experiments. The group
  would have to include at a minimum, a 250
  person capable of researching and understanding
  the literature in several fields and a
  jack-of-all trades technician. N32

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Can terrorist acquire Nuclear Weapons? Some Say No

• Gary Milhollin a Director of the Wisconsin
  Project on Nuclear Arms Controlcites cites
  several nuclear scientists who conclude that the
  risk is low.
• There are essentially two ways for a terrorist
  group to lay its hands on a nuclear weapon
  either build one from scratch or somehow procure
  an already manufactured one or its key
  components. Neither of these is likely.
• Building a bomb from scratch would confer the
  most power a group that could build one bomb
  could build several, and a nuclear arsenal would
  put it front and center on the world stage. But
  of all the possibilities, this is the
  unlikeliest-"so remote," in the words of a senior
  nuclear scientist at the Los Alamos National
  Laboratory, "that it can be essentially ruled
  out." The chief obstacle lies in producing the
  nuclear fuel-either bomb-grade uranium or
  plutonium-that actually explodes in a chain
  reaction. More than 80 percent of the effort that
  went into making America's first bombs was
  devoted to producing this fuel, and it is no easy
  task.
• To make bomb-grade uranium, a terrorist group
  would need thousands of high-speed gas
  centrifuges, machined to exact dimensions,
  arranged in series, and capable of operating
  under the most demanding conditions. If they
  wanted to produce the uranium by a diffusion
  process, they would need an even greater number
  of other machines, equally difficult to
  manufacture and operate. If they followed Saddam
  Hussein's example, they could try building a
  series of giant electromagnets, capable of
  bending a stream of electrically charged
  particles-a no less daunting challenge. For any
  of these, they would also need a steady supply of
  natural uranium and a specialized plant to
  convert it to a gaseous form for processing.
• Who would sell these things to would-be nuclear
  terrorists? The answer is nobody. The world's
  nuclear-equipment makers are organized into a
  cooperative group that exists precisely to stop
  items like these from getting into unauthorized
  hands. Nor could a buyer disguise the destination
  and send materials through obliging places like
  Dubai (as Iran does with its hot cargoes) or
  Malta (favored by Libya's smugglers). The
  equipment is so specialized, and the suppliers so
  few, that a forest of red flags would go up. And
  even if the equipment could be bought, it would
  have to be operated in a place that the United
  States could not find.

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International Effort Against Nuclear Terrorism

• Strengthening the Worldwide Effort The Nuclear
  Smuggling International Technical Working Group
  (ITWG) was chartered in 1996 to foster
  international cooperation in combating illicit
  trafficking of nuclear materials. The ITWG was
  formed with the recognition that nations must
  work together, says geochemist David Smith of
  the Nonproliferation, Homeland and International
  Security Directorate. The ITWG was cofounded by
  Livermore scientist Sid Niemeyer and has been
  cochaired by Lawrence Livermore since its
  inception. The ITWG works closely with the
  International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to
  provide member countries with support for
  forensic analyses. Priorities include the
  development of common protocols for the
  collection of evidence and laboratory
  investigations, organization of forensic
  exercises, and technical assistance to requesting
  nations. Experts from participating nations and
  organizations meet annually to work on issues
  concerning illicit trafficking of nuclear
  materials. The 2006 meeting was sponsored by the
  European Commissions Institute for Transuranium
  Elements in Karlsruhe, Germany. To promote the
  science of nuclear forensics within the ITWG, the
  Nuclear Forensics Laboratory Group was organized
  in 2004. In that year, Livermore scientists wrote
  a comprehensive description of a model action
  plan to guide member states in their own nuclear
  forensic investigations. The plan provides
  recommendations governing incident response,
  sampling and distribution of materials,
  radioactive materials analysis, traditional
  forensic analysis, and nuclear forensic
  interpretation of signatures. In 2006, the IAEA
  published the model action plan as a Nuclear
  Security Series Technical Document. Participating
  countries have adopted the plan and used it in
  their own nuclear forensics investigations.

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Problems faced by Nuclear Forensics Today

• Due to huge costs and insignificant funding,
  nuclear forensics has been restricted to only a
  few national and international labs. Most
  scientists have not yet had the chance to learn
  how to handle the proper chemicals in order to
  work in a lab. Also, the standards for collecting
  and examining evidence that is suspected of being
  of a nuclear smuggling is still developing.

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Sources of Nuclear Materials

• Nuclear materials can be placed into three
  categories.
• Special Nuclear Materials (SNM)
• IAEA categories of High Enriched Uranium (HUE),
  which includes the sub category of Weapons Grade
  Uranium (WGU) and Weapons Grade Plutonium (WGPu).
• Reactor Fuel
• IAEA categories of Low Enriched uranium (LEU),
  Reactor grade Plutonium (RGPu), Fuel Grade
  Plutonium (FGPu), and Mox Grade Plutonium (MGPu).
• Commercial Radioactive Sources
• Chemically purified sources that decay by the
  emission of alpha, beta, or gamma rays.

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Expectations and Attributions of Forensics
Scientists

• Determining how and where legitimate control of
  nuclear material was lost and tracing the route
  of the material from diversion through
  interdiction are important goals for any nuclear
  attribution. It is equally important to
  determine whether additional devices or materials
  that pose a threat to public safety are
  available on the black market. The answer to
  these questions depends on determining the
  source of the material and its method of
  production. Nuclear forensics provides essential
  insights into methods of production and sources
  of illicit radioactive materials. It is most
  powerful when combined with traditional methods
  of investigation, including intelligence sources
  and traditional detective work. Nuclear
  forensics can play a decisive role in
  attributing and prosecuting crimes involving
  radioactive materials. Some of the current
  limitations of nuclear forensics are a result of
  the emerging nature and increasing urgency of
  this discipline. For example, the worlds
  nuclear powers are only now beginning to share
  information about their nuclear processes and
  materials. Numerous databases exist in many
  countries and organizations that could be
  valuable for the future development and
  application of nuclear forensics. The contents
  of many of these databases will never be directly
  shared, but the development of a distributed
  comprehensive database (see Section 6.3) will
  benefit international efforts. In addition,
  countries are beginning to combine the expertise
  of traditional forensics experts, normally found
  in police organizations, and nuclear experts,
  normally found in universities and government
  laboratories. Nuclear forensics will always be
  limited by the diagnostic information inherent in
  the interdicted material. For example, the
  clever criminal can minimize or eliminate the
  important markers for traditional forensics
  (fingerprints, stray material, etc.). Some
  nuclear materials inherently have isotopic or
  chemical characteristics that serve as
  unequivocal markers of specific sources,
  production processes, or transit routes. Other
  nuclear materials do not. Fortunately, the
  international nuclear engineering enterprise has
  a restricted number of conspicuous process steps
  that makes the attribution process easier.
  Finally, it will always be difficult to
  distinguish between materials that reflect
  similar source or production histories, but are
  derived from disparate sites.

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References

• FP 6 - Press briefing, Wed. 13 Novmeber, 1045
  Small technologies versus big crime
  nanotechnlogies for safety, security Klaus
  Lützenkirchen, JRC - ITU, Nuclear Forensic
  Science http//ec.europa.eu/research/conferences/2
  002/pdf/presspacks/presentations/3-2-4-ppt_en.pdf
• http//www-cmls.llnl.gov/?urlabout_cmels-centers_
  and_institutes-fsc
• http//www-cmls.llnl.gov/?urlscience_and_technolo
  gy-chemistry-nuclear_forensics Identifying the
  Source of stolen nuclear materials Arnie Heller
• Scientific Support to Terrorism Investigations,
  Randall S. Murch, Deputy Assistant Director,
  Science Federal Bureau of Investigation
  Washington, DC, http//www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/fsc/back
  issu/july1999/murchltr.htm
• "The Risk Of Nuclear Terrorism And Next Steps
  To Reduce The Danger Committee On Homeland
  Security and Governmental Affairs, United States
  Senate Testimony, Managing the Atom Project,
  Harvard University April 2, 200,
  http//belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/18
  187/risk_of_nuclear_terrorism_and_next_steps_to_re
  duce_the_danger.html
• Mohamed Sid-Ahmed 2004 (Al-Ahram Weekly political
  analyst, "Extinction!" 8/26, http//weekly.ahram.
  org.eg/2004/705/op5.htm)
• Beres 1987 (Louis René- Professor of Political
  Science and International Law at Purdue
  University, Terrorism and Global Security The
  Nuclear Threat, p. 42-43)
• Gary Milhollin, Director of the Wisconsin Project
  on Nuclear Arms Control, 2002 (Commentary
  Magazine, 2/1, p. 45-9, Can Terrorists Get the
  Bomb?)
• Gregg Easterbrook, WIRED, November 7, 2003
  (http//www.wired.com/wired/archive/11.07/doomsday
  .html)
• Arms Control Today, October 2006 Who Did It?
  Using International Forensics to Detect and Deter
  Nuclear Terrorism (William Dunlop and Harold
  Smith)
• New tools for a new world order, Nuclear
  forensics touted as method to trace bomb
  materials, deterrent for rogue nations Matthew B.
  Stannard, Chronicle Staff Writer, Sunday, October
  29, 2006, http//www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cg
  i?f/c/a/2006/10/29/MNG32M27K61.DTL