Securing the Seas in Southeast Asia

1
Securing the Seas in Southeast Asia
Jaime Burnell International Centre for
Political Violence and Terrorism Research,
Singapore
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"Uranium could also lead to the construction of
bombs. A single bomb of this type, carried by
boat and exploded in a port, might very well
destroy the whole port together with some of the
surrounding territory."
Letter to US President Franklin Roosevelt on 2
August 1939
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Diving Instruction Manual Recovered from
Afghanistan
Let our goal to be the triumph of the religion
of Allah and invading the seas and diving to its
deeps, lets us make the necessary preparation and
power to triumph Islam Wa aiddu lahum
mastatatum min quwwatin wa min ribatilkhaili
And make ready against them all you can of
power, including steeds of war
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Overview

• The Context
• The Geography of Threat
• Importance of SEA SLOCs
• Assessing Terrorist Threat in the Maritime Domain
  
• Intention, Capabilities and Opportunities
• Groups with maritime terrorist capabilities in
  SEA
• Response

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Southeast Asia

• Ground zero of maritime threats, both from piracy
  and terrorism
• Home to several Islamist Terror Groups
• Al Qaeda network
• Planning for USS Cole attack
• Planning for attack against US naval facilities
  and assets
• KMM plan to attack an US ship in 2001
• Plan to attack an US ship in Surabaya, Indonesia
• SuperFerry 14 ( February 2004) worst maritime
  disaster

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Geography of Threat

• Straits of Malacca The busiest shipping line in
  the world - linking the Indian Ocean to the South
  China Sea and the Pacific
• Sunda and Lombok
• The Singapore Straits
• Located within or astride geographic
  archipelagoes, inhibited with large populations
  with less than ideal social, political and
  economic conditions
• Narrow channels, shallow reefs and thousands of
  tiny islands - ideal for piracy and other
  water-borne crimes

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Maritime Terrorism

• Terrorist attacks against maritime sectors
  generally rare- 1.9 of all international
  incidents over last 30 years
• Due to
• Most terrorists are tactically conservative
• Little experience of the maritime environment
• Requires specialist equipment and skills
• Profusion of other fixed land targets offering
  higher visibility and greater ease of access
• Overall impact potential low- unless very high
  profile (USS Cole) and sensational (Achille
  Lauro, 1985) than media-accessible land
  targets.

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High Profile Maritime Attacks

• 1974- Hijacking of a Greek freighter in Karachi
  (Pakistan)
• 1985- Seizure of the Achille Lauro
• February 2000- Bombing of a Phillipine ferry (45
  killed)
• October 2000- Suicide attack against USS Cole (17
  Killed)
• October 2000 LLTE Suicide attack against SL
  navy
• October 2002- French Tanker Limburg 158,000 t. of
  crude oil
• February 2004- Superferry 14
• Potential targets- Queen Mary 2

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Factors Increasing Perceived Threat Tactical

• Restricted operational space on land - Target
  hardening of land based targets and aviation
  sector
• Opaque and amorphous environment
• Vast areas of un-policed waters
• Lax port security, poor coastal surveillance,
  profusion of targets, trend toward skeleton
  crews
• Terrorists showing increasing tactical
  sophistication
• Increased terrorist resource constraints
• Increasing terrorist-criminal nexus esp. piracy

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Factors Increasing Threat Potential
Perceptual/Psychological/ Systemic

• Maritime Sector as conduit of Global activity
• Perception as alternative venue for mass casualty
  attacks, targeting LNG carriers/terminals,
  refineries, petrochemical installations, cruise
  ships and passenger liners
• Copy Cat Phenomenon Precedent of USS Cole
  bombing- generated enormous political capital,
  underscored vulnerability of vessels at port
• Lack of a coordinated International Response

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Assessing Terrorist Threat in the Maritime Domain
When rising interests meet with capability
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Motivation/Intention

• Terrorist Groups known to be using shipping for
  transport of banned and contraband goods as well
  as for human smuggling
• A shift in strategy towards economic targets
  Limburg, Bali, Kenya, Pakistan, Al- Khobar,
  Istanbul
• Al Qaeda- Inclination to target businesses -
  smuggling bombs including nuclear or radiological
  devices
• Demonstrated capability to deliver the same
  tactics time and time again
• Can replicate land capabilities in the maritime
  domain

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Terrorist Groups with Maritime Terrorist
capability

• The number of contemporary terrorist groups with
  a maritime capability is few
• The best known are
• PIRA
• LTTE
• Al Qaeda
• The Contras
• Palestinian Groups PFLP, Hamas
• ASG, GAM, MILF

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Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)

• ASG- Basilan Island
• Hybrid group about 50 traditional mariners
• Links with AQ, JI and LTTE

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Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)

• Nadzmi Sabdullah, _at_ Commander Global, planned
  many maritime operations including the kidnapping
  raids on Sipadan in 2000 and Palawan in 2001.
• Galib Andang, _at_ Commander Robot, led the 2000
  Sipadan maritime kidnapping raid.

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ASG Attacks

• Sasa Wharf, Davao City- 02 April 2003
• Filipina Princess
• Superferry 15
• These ships were pier-side Sasa wharf, Davao City
  when it was bombed

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ASG Attacks

• SuperFerry 14 - February 2004
• Joint operation by ASG, JI and RSM
• Worst maritime terrorist act

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Moro Islamic Liberation Front

• Largest, most capable rebel group in the
  Philippines
• Strong links to Al-Qaeda/JI
• Demonstrated capability
• Our Lady Mediatrix (2000)
• Small arms attack on Philippine Navy Ship (2000)
• Sasa Wharf, Davao City Bombing (2003)
• Allegedly made enquires with North Korea for a
  possible sale of a mini submarine
• Intent limited to their Area of Operations

Very Limited
Medium to high
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Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) Free Aceh Movement

• Straits of Malacca - Singapore, West Malaysia,
  Southern Thailand, and Myanmar and into the
  Indian Ocean as far west as Sri Lanka
• Contacts with smuggling syndicates ( narcotics
  people, stolen goods, petroleum, and arms) and
  pirate gangs operating across the Straits of
  Malacca

Very Limited
Medium to high
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Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM)

• Sympathizers among ethnic-Acehnese in Penang
  (Malaysia) and Islamic mariners in Southern
  Thailand (PULO)
• Kidnap for Ransom
• Tirta Niaga IV, Exxon Mobil Tender
• September 200- claimed protection money from the
  users of the straits

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Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM)

• Indonesian Marines burn suspected GAM crafts
• Impact of Tsunami
• Peace Agreement

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Al Qaeda

• Estimated to have 15 to as many as 300 vessels of
  varying sizes
• Prince of the Sea - Abdulrahim Mohammed Abda
  Al-Nasheri mMasterminded the October 2000 bombing
  of the USS Cole in Aden
• A 180-page file listing targets of opportunity,
  included large cruise liners sailing from Western
  ports
• Diving manual recovered from Afghanistan -Let
  our goal to be the triumph of the religion of
  Allah and invading the seas and diving to its
  deeps, lets us make the necessary preparation and
  power to triumph Islam

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Al Qaeda Attacks

• Plotted an attack on the British aircraft carrier
  HMS Ark Royal as it passed through the Gibraltar
  Straits to participate in the US led coalition
  war against Iraq supported by Salafia Jihadia
• Plan to attack NATO ships in the Straits of
  Gibraltar, thwarted by the Moroccan authorities
• Plans to bomb the Fifth Fleet Headquarters in
  Bahrain
• February 2002 plan to hijack a passenger airliner
  and crash it onto a US warship in the Indian
  Ocean (AQ Ass. Groups in SA)

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Jemaah Islamiyah

• No dedicated maritime organization
• Used maritime domain extensively for sending
  recruits to training camps in Philippines
• Conducted covert surveillance of maritime assets
  in Singapore, including oil refinery facilities
  on Jurong Island and a US vessel at the Changi
  Naval Base
• Increasing coordination between JI, ASG, MILF
  and RSM

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New Configurations- New Threats

• SEA terror groups ASG/MILF/JI currently
  enhancing their underwater capabilities
• 2 JI members reportedly training 23 ASG and MILF
  elements in scuba diving underwater demolition
  skills
• Upon completion of the training, the graduates
  will be divided into groups - each tasked to
  conduct underwater bombings against seaports and
  vessels in Mindanao
• Capability can be replicated elsewhere

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Conclusion

• Must focus on degrading the land capabilities of
  the groups
• To change focus from the land to the sea instead
  of just At Sea - "securing the littoral"
• Interdiction and constant disruption of the LIMO
  capabilities  thereby degrading of
  "capabilities" and minimising the "opportunities"
  of the asymmetric maritime threats

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• The risk of terrorist attack can perhaps never
  be eliminated, but sensible steps can be taken to
  reduce the risk. The issue here is how seriously
  do the governments take the threat of maritime
  terrorismPost-Limburg, we cannot continue to
  hope for the best and ignore the lessons.
• (International Maritime Bureau (IMB)of
  International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)